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ABSTRACT
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degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
The focus of the study is on petty industrial establishments, i.e.,
artisan shops and workshops, observed in two Turkish cities. Petty
industrial firms, that are also referred to as the "small-scale," "informal,"
"traditional," and "marginal" industries in the literature, are seen as
"non-factories" constituting the "lower" forms of capitalist industrial
production. The following questions are considered:
" How can we distinguish between the "higher" and "lower" forms
of capitalist industrial production?
" How did the "factory" and "non-factory" split of Turkish
industries emerge and evolve?
" What is the nature of artisan shops and workshops observed in
Eskigehir and Gaziantep in 1975?
" How does the "non-factory" sector of industries, i.e., the
domain of petty production activities, function in underdeveloped
countries?
.What are the functions performed by the "non-factory" sector
of industries in underdevelopment?
" What are the important problems and questions concerning the
"non-factory" sector of industries in underdeveloped countries
such as Turkey?
The basic theme of the study is that in underdeveloped countries
such as rurkey, the continuity of the process of progressive capitalist
industrial transformation has been interrupted. The "lower" and "higher"
forms of capitalist industrial production exist side by side as if they
are separated by a "glass-wall." "INon-factories," i.e., artisan shops and
workshops, do not transform into "factories," and the latter tend neither
to replace, nor to subordinate the former. The presence of such an industrial
landscape is due to the dependent nature of the "factory" sector in under-
developed countries.
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PREFACE
In the cities of underdeveloped countries "petty production"
emerges as an important component of the urban economy. There seems
to be a consensus on this point. But when it comes to assessing the
nature of "petty production," its history, and its present and future
roles within the economy at large, views begin to diverge. For the most
part, however, differences in opinion do not stem from factual evidence
gathered through in depth studies of the modes of contemporary industrial
production in underdeveloped countries. The related literatureI abounds
with guesses, accounts of and generalizations upon almost casual
observations, re-tabulations of already existing and often unreliable
statistical information on the industrial performances of underdeveloped
countries, arguments built upon inferences drawn from the body of economic
growth and development theories that are modelled after the experiences
of developed countries, and some new efforts to tailor concepts so as to
be able to operate within this relatively recent area of concern. In short,
what we have can best be described as a set of phenomena of which little
is known, but a lot said.
As it stands, the mushrooming petty industrial establishments in
underdeveloped countries have been ignored, in contrast to the parallel
development of squatter settlements in the same countries. This is not
accidental. Industrialization is taken to mean an increase in the stock
of "factory" type capitalist industrial enterprises and an increase in the
share of such establishments in the GNP, while "non-factory" types of
capitalist industrial production are believed to eventually decline and
0
-xvi-
disappear.
But the processes of industrialization in underdeveloped countries
held a surprise for the proponents of this view. The rise of capitalism
under imperialism led to a different situation. As small pockets of
"factories" were established and grew, petty industrial firms, i.e., "non-
factories," proliferated by their side.
A consequence was the need to reassess paradigms of economic
growth and development in underdeveloped countries, and industrialization
policies. In relation to such developments a set of new research questions
emerged. What was the exact nature of contemporary "petty production"
activities in underdeveloped countries? How did it differ from "factory"
types of capitalist industrial production? Did these different categories
of industrial production signal the existence of what can be termed
a "dual economy," and to pursue the speculation further, a "dual society"?
And finally, how would the co-existence and co-development of different
forms of productive activity influence policies of industrialization and
urban and regional development in underdeveloped countries? Answers to
these and other similar questions were filed. Discussions and further
elaborations upon the answers soon followed. The result was not only a
confusion in concepts, theories and methods to be employed, but also a
pronounced need for new information and fresh starts.
This study falls within this rather unsettled domain of inquiry.
I intend to study the sphere of "petty production" activities in two
Turkish cities, Eski§ehir and Gaziantep, with an eye on the possible
implications for policy. But the nature of the area of concern is such
that, I can neither be directly concerned with how accurate facts can
-xvii-
be obtainedand how a particular theory or a hypothesis thereby be
more rigorously tested, nor be directly involved in evaluating and
designing policies, plans, programs and strategies. Therefore, I must
address myself to another equally important task: "the discovery of
theory from data systematically obtained from social research."2
There are numerous sets of categories used to characterize the
structure of industrial production activities. For example, industries
in an underdeveloped country such as Turkey can be studied by using
distinctions such as "State" and "private" industries, "capital-intensive"
and "labor-intensive" industries, "consumer goods," "intermediary goods"
and "capital goods" industries, "metal," "wood," "leather," "chemical,"
and the like industries, "heavy" and "light" industries, "small" and
"large" industries, "modern" and "traditional" industries, and "formal"
and "informal" industries. Indeed, one of the first problems is to find
the set of categories that will best suit the purpose of the intended
research. Although quite different from each other, all of the sets of
categories noted above have a very important common feature. They all
indirectly suggest that there exists only one mode of industrial production
by not specifying otherwise. In the Marxist literature on capitalist
development, however, the focus is on transformations from one mode of
industrial production to another. In other words, the simultaneous existence
of more than one mode of industrial production not only appears as a
clear hypoyhesis, but also becomes the subject matter for inquiries. Yet,
although the "feudal" and "capitalist" modes of industrial production are
operationally distinguished from each other, the "lower" and "higher"
forms of capitalist industrial production are not. Thus, an important
-xviii-
problem materializes from the outset. If in an underdeveloped country
such as Turkey we can observe the simultaneous existence of more than
one mode of industrial production, and if we do not have the conceptual
tools to operationally distinguish them from each other, then how can
we systrmatically collect data in search of a grounded theory?
Hence, in the first section of this study I will try-to define
the "higher" and "lower" forms of capitalist industrial production as
it is observed in underdeveloped countries with reference to the "factory"
and "non-factory" distinction of industries.
Factories and mills are the "higher" forms of capitalist industrial
production. Petty industrial firms that are referred to as the "small-
scale," "traditional," "informal" and "marginal" industries in the
literature are "non-factories," and they constitute the "lower" forms of
capitalist industrial production. Indeed, the "non-factory" sector of
industries is not homogeneous insofar as modes of production are concerned.
There are artisan shops and workshops, and the former display what I
prefer to call a "distorted-lower" form of capitalist industrial production.
In the sections to follow, I will demonstrate how these categories can
be used in collecting data on contemporary "petty production" activities
in Turkey, and in interpreting the avilable historical documentation on
Ottohian and Turkish industries.
The basic theme of this study is that in underdeveloped countries
such as Turkey the historically antagonistic modes of capitalist industrial
production exist side by side as if separated by a "glass-wall." In other
words, the continuity of the process of progressive capitalist industrial
transformation has been interrupted. Indeed, this does not mean that
I
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the "factory" and "non-factory" sectors are independent of each other.
On the contrary, there is a kind of symbiotic relationship between
them. "Higher" forms of capitalist industrial production, i.e., "factories,"
neither tend to replace artisan shops and workshops, nor establish
sub-contracting links with and subordinate them. I attribute the presence
of such a situation to the peculiar nature of the "factory" sector of
industries which is "dependent" in nature, "inadequate" in scope and
"distorted" in outlook.
The rest of the study consists of elaborations on how and why
such a situation emerges, how the "factory" and "non-factory" sectors
interact, and how and why the two-fold outlook of Turkish industries
is reproduced. Details of the field-surveys conducted in Eskiqehir and
Gaziantep, some observations on method, and certain considerations on
the problems of obtaining reliable data on "petty production" activities
in Turkey will be presented as appendices to the text.
SECTION
WHAT IS A FACTORY, AND WHAT IS NOT?
"It should be known.that among other things
that are harmful to the human quest for
knowledge and to the attainment of a
thorough scholarship are the great number
of works available, the large variety in
technical terminology, and the numerous
methods."
IBN KHALDUN, The Muqaddimah, Rosenthal F.(Tr.),
Dawood N.J. (ed.), Princeton University Press,
(Princeton: 1967, 3rd. prt.:1974), p.414
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION ONE
1. Some Aspects Of The Industrial Landscape In
Underdeveloped Countries
Even a casual observer would note the existence of a two-fold
phenomena in the sphere of industrial production in underdeveloped
countries like Turkey. On the one hand there are few factories and mills,
and on the other there are numerous artisan-shops and workshops of all
sizes, i.e., petty industrial firms, that do not look like small factories.
When studied closer the picture becomes rather intriguing.
As a rule, factories and mills use modern technologies, have large
capital outlays, employ more workers per firm than the larger petty
industrial establishments, operate with high capital/labor ratios and
profit margins, and mass-produce. But artisan-shops and workshops use
obsolete technologies, have small capital outlays, employ fewer workers,
operate with low capital/labor ratios and profit margins, and do not
necessarily mass-produce. Often, factories and petty industrial firms
partition the consumer markets rather than compete against each other.
While the former tends to produce better quality goods for the relatively
well-to-do and the export markets, the latter makes lower quality goods
for the poor. In outlook, the factory owner is a different type of
industrial entrepreneur than the owner-operator of petty firms, i.e., the
petty producers. Usually, petty producers work just like other laborers
-2-
in their -in establishments. Also, unlike factory owners, their capital
and profits are small, and their access to credits is restricted. Furthermore,
factory workers are unionized but workers in petty firms are not.
Thus, while the former enjoy better working conditions and benefits
from social security programs, the latter receive wages that are far
below the official minimum rates and are hired and fired at the whim of
the petty producers. Last but not least, the nature and organization of
work in factories is quite different than in petty firms.
Such offhand observations indicate clearly that there exist two
qualitatively distinct spheres of industrial production in underdeveloped
countries like Turkey. It is as if two different worlds of industrial
production exist side by side. This is the starting point of the present
study.
2. A Question Of Approach: How To Define The Two-Fold Nature
Of Industrial Production In Underdeveloped Countries Like
Turkey?
The literature on social and economic development contains numerous
attempts to define and explain underdeveloped societies in terms of
dichotomies. But the two-fold nature of the domain of industrial production
activities has only recently started to attract attention? As the number
of studies focusing on the dual structure of industry in underdeveloped
countries increased, the question of how to distinguish the two qualitatively
distinct sectors of industry from each other assumed significant importance.
The answers to this question are of two types. In one group of studies
the emphasis is put upon the quantifiable aspects of the differences
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among industrial establishments. In the other, the emphasis is shifted
to qualitative differences.
Quantitative distinctions stress criteria such as the "size of
the labor force," the "size of the capital outlay," and the "level of utilization
of inorganic energy (measured in terms of horse-power)." Writers who use
these criteria end up dividing the sphere of industrial production into
two sectors: "medium and large" and "small" industries. The paradox underlying
this type of approach, however, is as obvious as the operational
convinience of the criteria used. Two qualitatively different things can
not be distinguished quantitatively. That is,we can not tell an apple
from an orange by measurements alone. Thus, in short, the "medium and large"
and "small" industries division falls short of capturing the
gist of the dichotomy that is observed readily in the sphere of industrial
production in underdeveloped countries like Turkey.
When the emphasis is shifted to qualitative dimensions, however,
a series of unoperational and controversial criteria come to play. Dichotomies
defined with reference to them take dubious forms like "modern" and
"traditional," "capitalist" and "pre-capitalist or non-capitalist,"
"organized" and "unorganized," "formal" and "informal," and "central or
essential" and "marginal." Such divisions are not only difficult to define
operafionally, but irrelevant if the real life situations in underdeveloped
countries are studied a bit further. Indeed, there exist qualitative
differences between a factory (for example a textile mill) and a workshop
(for example a 'kilim' or towel maker's shop). The textile mill may be
labelled as a "modern," "capitalist," "organized," and even "formal" industrial
firm. The 'kilim' maker's shop, however, may not be called "traditional,"
I
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"pre-capitalist or non-capitalist," "unorganized," or "informal". At least
in Turkey, to be more specific, in Gaziantep, 'kilim' makers use obsolete
but not traditional technology. They produce for markets, and exist within
the web of capitalist institutions that are peculiar to underdeveloped
countries. The traditional corporate body (the Weavers' Guild) that regulated
weaving industries disappeared along with other guilds as early as in the
second half of the nineteenth century, and was replaced by the voluntary
Weavers's Association. Their work is "organized" in the sense that there
exists a definite division of labor and hierarchy of jobs within the
production unit, the petty firm. Furthermore, to my knowledge, they are
extremely "formal" both at their place of work and at home.
They pay taxes, are eligible to receive credits, register at the Petty
Traders and Producers's Associations (Esnaf ve Sanatkar Dernekleri), vote,
and are subject to all effective laws of the Republic.
In summary, there are two methods used to define the two-fold
nature of the domain of industrial production activities in underdeveloped
countries. One emphasizes quantitative criteria and distorts the qualitative
differences between the two sectors of industry. The other emphasizes
qualitative criteria but ends up as unoperational, vague and often irrelevant.
Thus the question remains. How are we to define the two-fold nature of
industrial production in underdeveloped countries without either distorting
the qualitative differences between the two worlds of production , or
ending up as unoperational, vague, and irrelevant?
I begin with the proposition that there exist two qualitatively
distinct spheres of industrial production activities in underdeveloped
economies. I intend to study the nature, role, and future of the domain of
___ 0
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production activities that is often referred to as the "traditional,"
"pre-capitalist or non-capitalist," "unorganized," "informal," "marginal,"
or "small-industries" sector. But the existing literature does not suggest
a relevant operational definition of the chosen domain of inquiry upon
which to base research. In other words, there are the naked observations
and a "dualist" proposition to start from, and a grounded theory yet to
be formed.
The "dualist" proposition that there exist two qualitatively distinct
spheres of industrial production in underdeveloped countries is based upon
the observation that not all firms are organized and operate on the same
basis. A few may be called factories, but the rest, a large panoply of
artisan shops and workshops, are of a different nature. This crude
characterization of the industrial landscape in underdeveloped countries
rests upon a vague distinction of how industrial production occurs. It is
precisely this distinction that I intend to sharpen, qualify, and use as
a conceptual tool in defining the two qualitatively distinct worlds of
industrial production: the "factory" and "non-factory" sectors of industry.
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CHAPTER II
DISTINGUISHING THE LOWER FORPS
OF CAPITALIST INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION
1. Towards A New Framework:"Factory" and "Non-factory" modes
of capitalist industrial production
In every labor process there are three elements: the labor, the
means of production, and the raw materials. In the model "capitalist form"
of industrial production, the entrepreneur (the capitalist) purchases these
three elements through the markets, and puts them together into a productive
mechanism under his control. In other words, the capitalist owns the means
of production, the raw materials, and the final products. lie organizes the
work,and controls the laborers. But the productive work is performed by
unskilled laborers who sell their labor power to the capitalist for a wage.
Thus, an essential feature of the model "capitalist form" of industrial production
is the presence of a capitalist on the one hand, and unskilled wage laborers
on the other. The former is not involved in the productive work, but ccontrols
both the process of production and the product. The latter is alienated
3from the productive work but performs it, and controls neither the process
of production nor the product.
This model "capitalist form," however, characterizes mostly how
production occurs in factories, but not in the artisan shops and workshops
that we observe in underdeveloped countries like Turkey. In artisan shops
and workshops we find workers who have not yet lost autonomy over their
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own productive work, capitalists who are involved in the productive work,
and capitalists who have lost their control over the product. In other
words, in non-factories workers are not yet fully "proleterinized," and
capitalists are not yet clearly the "model capitalists."
Logically, therefore, if the labor processes in factories are
called the model "capitalist forms," then the labor processes observed
in artisan-shops and workshops, i.e., the petty industrial firms or the
non-factories, are "transitory capitalist forms."4 Furthermore, since
artisan-shops and workshops appeared on the scene earlier than factories,
and since the latter are regarded as a more developed form of industrial
enterprise, then it is possible to call the labor processes observed
in artisan-shops and workshops the "lower," "less developed," or
"incomplete" capitalist forms. Thus, the concepts "non-factory modes of
capitalist industrial production," "petty industrial production," 6 and
"lower-transitory-incomplete-less developed capitalist forms of industrial
production" are synonymous.
2. Differences Between "Factory" And "Non-Factory" Modes
Of Industrial Production
The crux of the difference between "factory" and "non-factory" types
of industrial production is the respective nature and organization of the
productive work. But to grasp the differences between "factory" and
"non-factory" work, the technical base for production in factories and
petty industrial establishments, i.e., the artisan shops and workshops,
ought to be set apart from each other.
In general, the body of a factory can be characterized as "machinery
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organized into a system,"'7 where production is carried out either by a
"single machine which performs all the various operations previously done
by one handicraftsman with his tools,"8 or by a "conglomeration of similar
and simultaneously acting machines," 9or by a "chain of machines of various
kinds, the one supplementing the other."10 hus, as a rule, factories display
a technical oneness either because "all machines (are) receiving their
impulse simultaneously, and in an equal degree, from the pulsations of the
common prime mover, by the intermediary of the transmitting mechanism,"
or because various machines operate together where, in a way, one employs
the other.
As the system of machinery becomes more and more perfect, "the
process (of production) as a whole becomes a continuous one, i.e., the
less the raw material is interrupted in its passage from its first phase
to its last." 13In other words, the more developed the technical base of
factory type production is, the less significant becomes the role played
by the "hand of man."
So far as the technical base of production is considered, the
most developed forms of factories are those which use no manual operations.
A large number of modern industries -- food, textiles, paper, leather,
construction materials, primary metal, fabricated metal, machinery --
are of this sort. Commodities are standardized and mass produced. In a
sense, it is the "machinery organized into a system" that carries out
the production. Workers simply attend machinery; machines are the
backbone of factory type production. In industrial-chemical plants
such as petroleum refineries, and alkali and chlorine factories
the processes are entirely automated and continuous; the job of the
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relatively few workers is to monitor instruments indirectly on panel boards.
What Marx saw as the emerging automaton, the technical monster of
14
nineteenth century England, has become almost the rule in modern industries.
But in certain industrial branches the nature of the product can limit the
use of complex machine processes, and thus make certain manual operations
15
necessary. In modern industries such as motor transportation equipment
(automobiles, motorcycles), electrical and electronic machinery, equipment
and supplies (televisions, hand computers, household appliances), where the
products are standardized but made up of a number of separate parts, some
sort of an assembly production becomes necessary. It is true that such
industries do not have completely mechanized production processes as in
the model developed factory, the automaton. We come across manual labor and
"detail-work.", But it is also true that, for the most part, these modern
industries display neither the "craft-work" nor the "detail-work" that we
observe in "non-factories." What then, is the nature of the "detail-work" in
factories? In industries using conveyor-belt assembly lines, for instance,
the tasks are divided in such a way that it requires from the laborers neither
an understanding of the total productive process as in artisan shops, nor
meaningful skills as in workshops. The manual work on the assembly line,
therefore, is different from the "detail-work" that typifies workshops, and
the "'craft-work" of artisan shops. It is "unskilled detail-work" where the
laborer loses control over his own productive work. Indeed, in such instances,
the factory workers are not merely machine attendants, nor do they monitor
machinery indirectly on panel boards, but they themselves function as human
"detail-machines" integrated to each other as well as to the backbone of
machinery by the conveyor-belt, itself a machine.
I
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If the body of a factory is "machinery organized into a system,"
then the body of a "non-factory" can be summarized best as a "productive
mechanism whose parts are human beings."16 In the case of artisan shops
and workshops the instruments of production are either exclusively simple
hand tools, or some kind of a combination of simple hand tools with machine
powered tools like electrical drills, saws, presses, and independently
standing detail-machines like lathes. What counts in the "non-factory" type
of industrial production is the skill and control of individual "craft" or
"detail" laborers in manipulating the technical base, and their cooperation
through division of labor. In other words, unlike the factories, in
"non-factories" the technical base does not display a technical unity.
The simple hand tools, power tools, independently standing detail-machines
and even the extremely sophisticated paraphernalia are not the basis of
the productive system. They are integrated indirectly in the labor
process, via the division of labor in the firm. In short, while in
factories technical cooperation among machines is the basis of the labor
process, in "non-factories" social cooperation among laborers is the
foundation of production. Thus, as a rule, in factories workers are
subordinated to the technical base, i.e., the machinery organized into a
system. But in "non-factories," the technical base is subservient to the
workers.
The technical unity of factory type production creates an
entirely different pace of work and division of labor, and it also excludes
factory workers from any control whatsoever over their own productive
work and the process of production. The worker is reduced to a machine
attendant, an organic detail-machine at the assembly line. Thus, the
·
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capit.list gains control and enhanced power to discipline workers. On the
one hand, the "alienation" of the worker from his own productive work and
the process of production facilitates the establishment and maintanence of
a job and wage hierarchy within the firm. On the other hand, as the "unskilled
detail-work" in factories does neither require nor build meaningful skills,
the capitalist finds himself in a better position to hire and fire workers
without disrupting the labor process. This, of course, is subject to the
conditions that the workers are not organized well, and that there is a
reserve army of the unemployed.
The absence of a comparable technical unity of the capital goods
at the base of "ron-factory" types of production makes it possible for
workers to retain some control over their own productive work. This makes
the control and disciplining of "craft" and "detail" laborers in artisan
shops and workshops by the capitalist much more difficult.
3. Differences Among "non-Factory" Types Of Industrial
Production
In principle, the stocks of capital goods in "non-factories" do not
exhibit a technical unity. It is only in this respect that the technical
base of "non-factories" can be called similar, for when examined more
closely the different "non-factories" display variations in the degree and
mix of technology embedded in the capital goods. Also, the sizes of the
labor force and the capital outlay in "non-factories" are varied. But these
characteristics will not identify the different types of "non-factories.' 17
The nature and organization of work in "non-factories" must be considered.
Indeed, in principle, the social cooperation among laborers is the foundation
of production in "non-factories." But there are further peculiarities among
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"non-factory" types of work that distinguish the different modes of petty
industrial production from one other. In brief, I distinguish two types of
"non-factory work": "craft" and "detail" work, and thus, two model "non-
factories": artisan shops with "craft work" and workshops with "detail work."
In the artisan shop, as a rule, the technical hardware consists
primarily of simple hand and power tools. The typical medieval European,
or Ottoman, master handicraftsmen worked with such tools as hammers, chisels,
18hand looms, knives, i.e., the simple handicraft tools. Today in underdeveloped
countries like Turkey some iron-smiths, copper-smiths, carpenters, and shoe
makers still use only simple hand tools. But in many artisan shops not only
power tools (machine powered but hand applied tools) like electric drills
and saws, oxygen torches, spray guns, and presses, but also detail-machines
(machine powered and machine operated tools) like lathes, sewing machines
and machine-looms are used.0 But what makes an artisan shop is the presence
of "craft-work," and "craft-work" is often associated with hand and power
tools rather than detail-machines. This is an important point to consider,
for it bears upon the issue of whether or not the technical base for production
determines the organization of work. Do "non-factories" with detail-machines
necessarily display "detail-work"? Conversely, do "non-factories" without
detail-machines necessarily display "craft-work"?
Some examples from Turkey will clarify this point. In Eskisehir
and Gaziantep I have observed many lathe shops where detail-machines
constitute the bulk of the capital equipment, yet the nature of work
is best described as "craft" rather than "detail." In such lathe shops
two to three workers (apprentices) are usually employed, and there is not
much work besides occasional repairs and machine parts duplications.
Either the owner of the shop or one of the workers performs in succession
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all the necessary operations to complete a job. It is only when the number of
a particular machine part duplication o der increases that dividing the job
into its detail components and assigning each to a worker becomes necessary.
Thus, there are shops with detail-machines that do not display "detail-work."
The horse wagon makers ('At Arabasi Imalcileri,)in Eskisehir, on the
other hand, do not use a single power tool or a detail-machine. They work
with simple hand tools. But the work is divided into its detail components,
and each is assigned to a worker. Iron-smiths produce the metal parts of
the wagon, there is a wheel-maker, a wheel-fitter, and various carpenters
who produce different wooden parts of the wagon. All this takes place in one
shop. Now, is this shop an artisan shop? No, it is a workshop or an atelier,
or to recall a term that was much in use in the beginnings of industrialization
in England, it is a "manufactory."21 Thus, shops without detail-machines
will not necessarily display "craft work."
What makes a workshop is the presence of "detail work." In artisan
shops workers perform in succession all the necessary operations to
produce a commodity, and acquire "composite-skills." But in workshops,
each worker is assigned to a particular component of the productive work
necessary to make a commodity. In other words, in workshops workers are
specialized in "detail work." Each worker repeats a particular operation
day after day. It is in this connection that the presence of "detail work"
in workshops breeds a distinct type of worker: the "detail-worker" with
"specialized-skills.",, Indeed, both the "craft-worker" in artisan shops and
the "detail-worker" in workshops have control over their own productive
work. But the latter has less control over the productive work performed
in the firm. The "detail-worker" controls the productive work as much as
_ _
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his "detail-work" and "specialized-skills" permit. This is important, for
here lies the reason why the "detail-worker" may not transcend his status
as a worker. Unless employed in a workshop, or unless his labor is first
purchased and then integrated with those of other detail-laborers into
a productive mechanism by the capitalist, the specialized skills of a
detail-worker do not carry significance in and of themselves at the market
place. Thus, unlike the "craft-worker" who may establish his own business,
the "detail-worker" is destined to look for employment by a capitalist.
As the detail-workers lose control over the unity of the productive
work, a discrete function emerges: the coordination of "detail-work." But
who is going to assume this new function: the person who forwards the
capital to put together the means of production, the laborers, and the
raw materials with the purpose of making profits, i.e., the capitalist,
or his workers? This is an important question, for whoever coordinates the
productive work gains a certain power in the firm. We know that the detail-
work does not appear out of the blue. It is the capitalist who divides
the productive work in order to increase his profits. But without
disciplined detail-workers it is difficult to increase profits, and by
letting the detail-workers gain control over the unity of the productive works
i.e., gain power in the firm, it is difficult to discipline them. Thus, the
capitalist does not only divide the productive work but also assumes the
new function of coordinating detail-work.
Both the artisan and the workshop operator (the boss) are capitalists.
They control the production process and the product. But in principle, the
artisan is directly involved in the productive work. He performs in
succession all the necessary operations to produce a commodity in front
~
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of ard with the aid of his workers. In a sense he teaches the productive
work, i.e., the craft, to his workers. As such, the craft work in artisan
shops is not divided (detail-work does not exist), and craft-workers retain
control over the unity of the productive work. But in workshops the picture
is quite different. The workshop operator is not directly involved in the
productive work. He does not dirty his hands, but divides the productive
work and assigns a task to each detail-worker. Unlike the artisan, therefore,
he alienates his workers from the unity of the productive work. This
increases his powers in the firm, and together with his powers his profits
increase. In short, the workshop operator is a capitalist specialized in
managing the process of production, in controlling the product, and in
supervising the productive work.
The division of labor in workshops is associated with the emergence
of detail-workers as wage earners on the one hand, and petty producers
as capitalist entrepreneurs on the other. In this connection, if the
workshop operator stands as an "industrial capitalist," then the artisan
is an "almost industrial capitalist." Similarly, if the detail-worker
is taken as an "induatrial wage earner," then the craft-worker is an "almost
industrial wage earner," for he learns a "trade" over and above receiving
wages. Consequently, if the workshop is considered as a "capitalist
indu'strial firm," then the artisan shop is an "almost capitalist industrial
firm." in other words, the labor process in workshops marks the beginning
of capitalist industrial production in the true sense of the word. As
Marx puts it,
"Capitalist production...really begins,..., when
each individual capital employs simultaneously a
comparatively large number of laborers; when
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consequently the labor process is carried on an
extensive scale and yields, relatively, large
quantities of products. A greater number-of
laborers working together, at the same time, in
one place (or, if you will, in the same field
of labor), in order to produce the same sort of
commodity under the mastership of one capitalist,
constitutes, both historically and logically, the
starting point of capitalist production." 24
Before elaborating upon the model classic and contemporary artisan
shops and workshops a point needs to be dealt with. If workshops are
taken to mark the first step of capitalist production in the true sense
of the word, then how are we to view the contemporary artisan shops in
underdeveloped countries like Turkey? Are they, "pre-capitalist"
or "non-capitalist" forms of industrial firms? If we use logic alone,
and do not refer to the reality itself, the the answer to this question
ought to be 'yes'. But we have on our hands a rather unique situation.
The artisan is not a typical capitalist. He is an "almost capitalist."
He is involved with manual labor in his own establishment, and shares the
control and responsibility over the productive work with his workers.
Furthermore, his workers are not the typical simple wage earners. Thus,
the artisan shop with craft-work may not be called a clearly capitalist
firm in and of itself. Yet it exists within the web of capitalist institutions.
in other words, although the organization of work within the contemporary
artiban shops is not clearly capitalist, the institutional web within which
the artisan shop exists is clearly capitalist. There are no Guild regulations
to tie the craft-worker to the artisan shop, to constrict competition, to
limit the number of new entries into the business, to regulate the relations
between artisans and merchants, or to control the quality and price of the
commodities. All such matters are determined at the market place. Furthermore,
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the Gui.ld credit mechanism ('sandik' as it was called in the Ottoman Guilds) 25
is replaced by banks, and the social security functions performed by the
26 27Guilds are either assumed by the State (like BAG-KUR in the Turkish case),
or simply allowed to deteriorate. The contemporary craft production
as it takes place in artisan shops, therefore, is neither "capitalist"
nor "non-capitalist." It is something in between. Here, at'this point, we
have to remember that the labor processes observed in artisan shops and
workshops, i.e., the "non-factories,," are the "lower capitalist" forms
when compared to the model "capitalist" form observed in factories. Thus,
it become clear that, while the workshops mark the first complete but
lower form of capitalist industrial production, the artisan shops signal
the presence of a distorted lower form.
j
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CHAPTER III
ARTISAN SHOPS
1. The Model Classic Artisan Shop: The "Pre-Capitalist"
Form Of Industrial Production
The model classic (the typical medieval European, or Ottoman) artisan
shop existed within a "pre-capitalist" economy. Thus, it marks a clearly
"pre-capitalist" mode of industrial production. In principle, the artisan
and his workers, i.e., the journeymen and apprentices (called in Turkish
'kalfa' and 'lirak' respectively), used simple hand tools, and the size
of the artisanal production was limited. Doubtless, the production was
oriented towards consumer markets. But the markets, the relations of production
within the artisan shop, and the relations among the artisans were regulated
3
by the citizen craft corporations, i.e., the guilds (called in Turkish
'asnif', 'esnaf' 4 ).
The organization of work in the model classic artisan shop is clear.
A master handicraftsman (called in Turkish 'usta') makes the entire product
using simple hand tools. He performs,in succession,all the operations
necessary for the production of the commodity, i.e., the craft (called in
Turkish 'zenaat', 'sanat'), together with, and assisted by his workers.
Indeed, the artisan has full control over both the process of production
and the product itself. But he shares some control and responsibility over
the productive work with his workers, allowing them not only to learn but
also to perform the "craft" under his supervision. This aspect of "craft iwork"
stands in sharp contrast with "detail work" in workshops on the one hand,
-1-
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and "factory work" in factories on the other. Subject to the approval
of the guild, workers progress from apprenticeship to journeyman status,
finally becoming masters capable of opening their own shops5 That is,
upon acquiring the necessary skills to perform the "craft", the workers
can become employers instead of being employed all their lives. Work
experience for the craft worker is an investment, much like that of a
student's internship labor. It is true that he is not paid the value
of his labor power, but it is equally true that he gains experience
over and above his wages. Since in the process of selling his labor power
to a master he acquires those qualities which will later on, enable him
to buy labor power (he learns-not only how to produce a commodity but also
to run a business), he is not a simple wage earner.
2. The Model Contemporary Artisan Shop in Underdeveloped
Countries: The "Distorted-Lower Capitalist" Form Of
Industrial Production
The organization of work in the contemporary artisan shop in
underdeveloped countries is much like the classic model, but there are
a few significant differences. In underdeveloped countries like Turkey
with a long history of non-factory types of production, the institutional
net surrounding the artisan shop has changed radically. Formerly, guilds
regulated and reinforced not only the relations among artisans and between
artisans and merchants, but also the organization of "craft work" within
the firm and the relations between the master handicraftsmen and their
workers. Today, market relations modified by labor laws provide the
institutional framework. Unlike the guild framework, the new institutional
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set-up around the artisan shop neither regulates nor reinforces any
particular form of organization of work within the firm. It may, therefore,
appear that upon the erosion of the guild regulations, the organization
of work within artisan shops became voluntary. In other words, if an
artisan is willing and able to reorganize the cooperation of labor in his
shop, he may do it in any way he sees fit. There would be no institutional
barriers in his way. Yet, it is common knowledge that not only in the
comparatively older artisan shops,but in those that are newly established,
in increasing numbers, "craft work" remains the principal framework for
cooperation of labor. This is neither due to the absence of motivation on
the part of the artisan to remodel the division of labor in his establishment,
nor to the lack of alternative organizational models. It is either due to
the shrinking markets for traditional commodities, or, more important, to
the lack of capital. Assuming that the demand for a particular commodity
does not decline, an artisan producing that commodity would at first need
to increase the number of his workers, provide detail machines, and probably
move into a larger space to accomodate these changes. He would then organize
a division of labor different from cooperation of labor in "craft.work",
and start worrying about acquiring raw materials, standardizing and diversifying
production, and increasing sales. All this, we know, requires capital and
risk taking. But how is an artisan going to collect the necessary
capital, even if he were willing to take risks, to finance all the necessary
changes involved in shifting into a qualitatively distinct organization of
work? In other words, how is he going to finance the transformation of
his artisan shop into a workshop, let alone into a factory? To start with,
artisanal production is limited in scale, and artisanal capital accumulates
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slowly. Furthermore there are the competition from other artisan shops,
and the rapid increase in the number of artisan shops. All the artisans
I came to know are fully aware of this situation. It is for the benefit
of those optimists who insist that there exist some avenues of success
which artisans are somehow unable to travel upon, that I outline the
impasse in contemporary Turkey.
Take the example of the artisan, an anachronistic master handicraftsman,
who makes the entire product using power tools, and even one or two detail
machines, besides simple hand tools. Working with his one or two employees
in a small shop, he usually makes enough money, and that is by
underpaying his workers, just to keep the business going. As a rule, it
is impossible for him to accumulate capital: within the artisanal sector
the merchants seem to be most capable of amassing capital. It is true that such an
artisan would be held eligible for credits distributed by the People's Bank
(TUrkiye Halk Bankasi), if he is registered at a Petty Producers's Association
(Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Dernegi) and the Petty Producers's Credit Cooperative
(Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatifi). But it is also true that the credit he could
receive, after much paper work, would not exceed $400-500 (5000 TL.).,
To receive more he would have to show an equity either in the form of capital
goods, or land. In other words, he can not receive credit to radically
transform his business because he does not have much capital to start with.
Faced with this paradox of the credit distribution policy of the People's
Bank, which was established with the purpose of helping artisans like
himself,what can he do? Sell his land? Sell his wife's jewellery? Sell
his labor?
In Turkey, as a rule, when a new artisan shop is opened it is built
am - -
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upon the previous savings of the family plus all their valuables, like
jewellery, land, &c., transformed into cash. Thus, a typical artisan
would start his career as a "poor artisan", and struggle to remain in
business as a "poor artisan". If he had the opportunity to sell his labor, or
if he could find a stable job, he would perhaps choose to try that
avenue. But such opportunities are rare. Therefore, when he wants to
transform the organization of work in his shop, he finds himself facing
the dilemma of transforming his artisan shop into a workshop altogether.
This requires far more initial capital outlay than he can forward. Unable
to finance any radical transformation in his business, he stands bitter
yet thankful, in his eastern frame of mind, that he is able to reproduce the
vicious cycle that he entered as a "poor artisan." Similar accounts of the
impasse that artisans find themselves in, may be provided from other
underdeveloped countries as well. But the picture is rather clear: the
organization of work in contemporary artisan shops along "craft" lines is
a predicament, not a choice.
In the model contemporary artisan shop in underdeveloped countries
the cooperation of labor along "craft work' guidelines, therefore, is not
imposed upon by the external institutional set-up, as is the case in the
classic model, but simply becomes the only possible solution given the
conditions under which the artisan shop exists and operates. This is,
however, not the only difference between the classic and contemporary
models of artisan shops. There is another twist to the picture: the
contemporary artisan may be best described as an anachronistic master
handicraftsman. In outlook, he is almost like an industrial entrepreneur.
He operates within an environment that may be characterized as a poorly
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regulat(ed market set-up. He puts together under one
from their respective markets, the raw materials,
equipment, and machinery, and the labor. He manage:
entire production with the purpose of making profil
thing too much. He, himself is involved in manual
he not only forwards capital, but also his labor.
handicraftsman in the classic model, he performs ir
operations necessary for the production of a certai
with the help of his few workers. Thus, the coope
his shop is necessarily such that his workers gradi
skills and knowledge not only to produce commoditiE
On the one hand, he uses this as an excuse to under
put into production by his "craft workers." But on i
about it. In the absence of guild regulations, his
develop confidence in themselves, that is--when the
out of them--, may open up similar artisan shops ar
without being subjected to any regulation whatsoeve
This situation causes a rapid turnover of la
the large number of new artisan shops which continu
the contemporary artisan, in the process of product
unique by-product: "craft workers" who are in fact
It is this aspect of the organization of work withi
that compels the contemporary artisan to consider d
Like all producers who forward capital with an eye
would very much like to enhance his control over hi
may squeeze more out of their accumulated skill. T
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has to do either of two things: change the cooperation of labor and
divide the work such that his workers become "detail laborers* and can
not learn the "craft", i.e., develop 'specialized skills' instead of
"composite skills," or stop his journeymen and apprentices from
leaving the shop by employing other methods. In certain cases, developing
a strong friendship and respect may prove operational. But in-the absence
of strong institutional ties, such personal loyalties are volatile.
Furthermore, the rapid social transformations that underdeveloped
countries display make personal loyalities appear more and more archaic.
Impersonal relations and abstract corporate loyalties are in the rise.
Scholars find this necessary to prove; but it is part and parcel of the
everyday life consciousness of the common people in underdeveloped countries.
The artisan, therefore, wants to try to change the organization of work
in his shop. Yet since he is unable to radically alter the situation, the
artisan either eventually falls back into eastern "fatalism", or he becomes
an ardent reactionary , wanting to turn back the wheels of history into
the past when "an artisan was really a masterhandicraftsman."
3. The Model Contemporary Artisan Shop in Developed Countries:
The Continuing "Lower Capitalist" Form Of Industrial
Production
In developed countries we also find artisan shops, artisans, "craft
work,,' and "craft workers," similar to the contemporary artisan shops
in underdeveloped countries. But they are of a different stock. First,
while the artisan shops in underdeveloped countries address themselves
predominantly to the "poor", in the case of developed countries it is
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either the "rich," or the "more conscientious" who constitute the markets
for "craft work." For instance, in Cambridge , USA, it costs more to
wear a hand-made belt or shoe than the domestic or imported, but
factory-made ones. In underdeveloped countries, however, the case is
just the reverse. And, while for the artisans and "craft workers" of
the developed countries, making a living from crafts stands more as an
"interesting alternative life-style," or a choice, for their counterparts
in the underdeveloped countries it is a trap they are born into. In other
words, in developed economies "craft work" appears as an escape, a relief,
or a holiday away from factory type work, whereas in underdeveloped countries
factory work stands as a relief from "craft work" both for the artisans
and craft workers, that is if they can ever get a job at the factory.
Finally, the relative importance of artisan shops, and "craft work" in the
industrial landscape of underdeveloped economies is similar to that of
factories and factory type work in developed economies. Thus,while any
attempt to equate artisan shops in developed countries with those in
underdeveloped economies is simply wrong, their critical comparisons may
open up new research avenues.
ON
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CHAPTER IV
WORKSHOPS
1, The Model Classic Workshop: The First "Complete
Capitalist" Form Of Industrial Production
The model classic workshop is the earliest "complete capitalist"
industrial firm, where not only the cooperation of labor through
division of work, i.e., "detail work," and "detail laborers" as simple
wage earners, but also the capitalist entrepreneur, increased output
and large scale profits appear on the scene. Indeed, it is difficult
to distinguish the early workshops from artisan-shops. The former
appear as simply enlarged versions of the latter. Except for the increased
outputs and the higher numbers of the simultaneously employed workers not
much seems to have been changed. Yet upon closer studies of the organization
of work within the workshops, it becomes evident that a major transformation
has already set in. Instead of"craft work," now there is "detail work"
with a clear and pronounced division of labor. All the operations necessary
for the production of a commodity are no longer performed in succession
by the same worker. The productive work is divided into its components,
and dach is assigned to a detail worker. The detail worker is, therefore,
specialized in performing a discrete task in and of itself. He works
next to other detail workers who perform different operations but labor
simultaneously. The literature is full of descriptions and analyses of
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this form of cooperation of labor, i.e., the division of labor that first
emerges in workshops, and how it results in increased output. Adam
Smith's description of the division of labor in a pin manufactory in
the Eighteenth Century is the best known example:
A workman not educated to his business (which the
division of labor has rendered a distinct trade),
nor acquainted with the use of the machinery employed
in it (to the invention of which the same division
of labor has probably given occasion), should scarce,
perhaps, with his utmost industry, make one pin a day,
and certainly could not make twenty. But in the way
in which this business is now carried on, not only the
whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into
a number of branches, of which the greater part are
likewise peculiar trades. One man draws out the wire;
another straights it; a third cuts it; a fourth points
it; a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head;
to make the head requires two or three distinct operations;
to put it on is a peculiar business; to whiten the pin
is another; it is even a trade by itself to put them
into the paper; and the important business of making a
pin is in this manner divided into about eighteen distinct
operations, which, in some manufactories, are all
performed by distinct hands, though in others the same
man will sometimes perform two or three of them. I have
seen a small manufactory of this kind, where ten men only
were employed, and where some of them, consequently,
performed two or three distinct operations. But though
they were poor, and, therefore, but indifferently
accommodated with the necessary machinery, they could,
when they exerted themselves, make among them about twelve
pounds of pins a day. There are in a pound upwards of four
thousand pins of a middling size. Ten persons, therefore
could make amqng them upwards of fourty-eight thousand
pins a day...
This type of division of labor, where one and the same thing
is gradually transformed through a succession of distinct operations performed
by different detail laborers, i.e., "serial manufacture,"2 however, is
merely one of the two forms in which cooperation of labor takes place
in workshops. The other is when each detail worker produces a complete
part of the commodity which then has to be fitted to other parts, i.e.,
9
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"heterogeneous manufacture."' In other words, in the first case the
"craft work" is merely redistributed among the detail workers, but
in the latter case different types of "craft work" are assembled in one
workshop to produce a commodity, reducing the previously independent
crafts into detail components of the workshop. Marx supplies us with an
example of the second form of division of labor:
A carriage, for example, was formerly the product of
the labor of a great number of independent artificers,
such as wheelwrights, harness-makers, tailors, locksmiths,
upholsterers, turners, fringe-makers, glaziers, painters,
polishers, gilders, &c. In the manufacture of carriages,
however, all these different artificers are assembled in
one building where they work into one another's hands.
It is true that a carriage cannot be gilt before it has
been made. But if a number of carriages are being made
simultaneously, some may be in the hands of the gilders
4i th a e4%t1 , o trouh a erlier rroce So. far
we are still in the domain of simple co-operation, which
finds its materials ready to hand in the shape of men and
things. But vqry soon an important change takes place.
The tailor, the locksmith and the other artificers, being
now exclusively occupied in carriage-making, each gradually
loses, through want of practice, the ability to carry on,
to its full extent, his old handicraft. But, on the other
hand, his activity now confined in one groove, assumes
the form best adapted to the narrowed sphere of action.
At first, carriage manufacture is a combination of various
handicrafts. By degrees, it becomes the splitting up of
carriage-making into its various detail processes, each of
which crystallises into the exclusive function of a
particular workman, the manufacture, as j whole, being
carried out by the men in conjunction...
Examples of this sort may be increased easily in number. Cloth5
and clock6 workshops, among many others, display a similar form of
division of labor where different and previously independent handicrafts
are combined together under one roof and under the control of a single
capitalist entrepreneur. Division of labor,as a whole, is such a well
studied field of inquiry that, as Mantoux puts it, "it is hardly necessary
to add anything more."7 A final note, however, is necessary. Division
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of labor and its obvious significance in the sphere of production as
displayed by the accuracy and quickness attained by detail workers and
the consequent rise in output have been acknowledged and noted much
earlier than the Classical Economists like Adam Smith and Karl Marx
themselves. Mantoux notes the following on this score:
Before Adam Smith, before even the author of Considerations
Upon East-India Trade, they had observed that "the
greater the Order and Regularity of every Work, the
same must needs be done in less time, the Labor must
be less, and consequently the prige of Labor less,
tho' Wages shou'd not be abated."
In earlier versions of the model classic workshops, the technical
base for production appears similar to that of the artisan shops., But
as the workshop type of non-factory production matures with its peculiar
cooperation of labor, there emerges a concomittant refinement in the
implements of labor. In other words, together with the rise of detail
work there appear developments in the stock of tools used in production.
This is not accidental. As the detail worker specializes in a particular
operation, simple craft tools at his hand, such as knives, drills, hammers,
&c., which were employed in craft work for various different operations,
and hence were, so to say, multi-purpose tools, are applied exclusively
to one and the same detail work, and therefore are reduced, in effect,
to single-purpose tools. In brief, as detail workers are tied to discrete
operations throughout the working day, it becomes obvious that craft tools
are not the most suitable form of implements for detail labour. Since
the fit between implements of labor and the kind of work bear directly
upon labor productivity and profits, the development of a technical base
that is more suitable for detail work becomes a necessity. If a detail
worker handles special tools fashioned exclusively for one operation,
!
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then the time and energy he puts into the required set of movements to
perform an operation decreases. And since by design, he has to repeat
one and the same operation over and over again throughout the work
day, his output may increase if he is properly supervised. This is
important. For, on the one hand, it shows that the organization of work
makes necessary the transformation of the technical base for production,
and not vice versa. And on the other hand, it suggests that neither the
organization of work and the transformation of the technical base alone,
nor both may automatically increase the output and profits: the supervision
of workers remains a crucial factor.
Nevertheless, the refinements of the implements of labor are part
and parcel of the capitalist's efforts to increase his profits. In
workshops, this, at first, occurs by adapting simple craft tools for
detail work. For instance, Marx notes the following:
In Birmingham alone (in the Nineteenth Century) 500
varieties of hammers are produced, and not only each
is adapted to one particular process, but several
varieties often serve exclusively for the different
operations in one and the same process... 9
But later, the new-hand tools, and finally, the detail-machines
follow. Thus, in a sense, the technological changes during the manufacturing
period in Europe were generated from within the domain of workshops, i.e.,
the r~on-factories. The implements of craft labor were refined and new
detail tools were added to the rapidly enlarging stock of technical
hardware. All this, on the one hand, generated "one of the material
10conditions for the existence of machinery" , which paved the way for
factory type industrial production, and on the other handdemonstrated
how technological innovations may yield increased labor productivity
· · Y
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and output, and larger profit margins if the workers are disciplined.
In summary, then, in the case of the model classic workshop, the
cooperation of labor through division of work is rationalized by
refinements of the technical base for production, and consequently (provided
that the workers are disciplined) the productivity of detail labor is
furthered and the capital accumulation process hastened.
As noted above, the perfection of the implements of labor is neither
the only, nor the most crucial factor in accounting for the increased
labor productivity in workshops. Basically, the division of work into
its detail components, and the close supervision and control of the workers
explain why the productivity of labor is far greater in workshops than
in artisan shops. Technological adjustments appear later, and stand as
complementary to the mainstream of the capitalist's efforts to increase
his profits. In other words, it is with the advent of detail work that
the labor productivity, i.e., workers's output per work day, increases.
When the worker is tied to one and the same detail work throughout
the work day, the flow of his labor tends to be interrupted less and less
than it would be if shifts of place, tools, and pace of work were
necessary. That is, since the detail worker does not perform different
operations in succession like the craft worker, he does not have to change
his location and tools, and interrupt the pace of his work as he stops
one operation and starts another. Thus, both the concentration of the
detail worker upon his work, and the flow of his labor exhibit fewer gaps.
In the meanwhile, the detail worker develops a particular skill into
perfection upon the sheer inertia of countless repetitions of an operation
throughout the work day.
-3;
Put in order to realize an increased output per work day, the
detail worker has to exert himself in his share of the productive work,
and more important, his detail work ought to be complemented by the
labor of others. The capitalist realizes these two conditions. On the
one hand, he increases the number of the simultaneously employed detail
workers while organizing the productive work such that the detail labor
of each worker complements the others'. And on the other hand, he forces
the workers, either by incentives or threats and controls, to exert
themselves in their respective detail work as much as possible. Thus,
the capitalist does not only create a new form of a "productive mechanism",
but also disciplines the workers.
Whether embedded in the forms of "serial" or "heterogeneous"
manufacture, detail work necessitates an increase in the number of the
simultaneously employed workers. This, together with the developments
i in the technical base for production account for a need to increase the
capital outlay. Increases in the number of workers and in the size of the
capital outlay, coupled with the increased productivity of detail labor
yield larger outputs. But when the outputs are marketed and turned into
money, the wages do not necessarily increase. Hence, the returns from
increased labor productivity remain in the capitalist's hand as profits.
This' is, in brief, how and why the accumulation of capital gains momentum
in the case of the model classic workshop.
The detail workers, specialized in one, or perhaps, two operations,
are not like craft workers who perform all the necessary operations in
succession. This accounts for the status of detail workers in the labor
market as simple wage earners. But, not every detail worker is the same
Y
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and ha6 the same status in the labor market. Indeed in the case of
"serial" manufacture, where a certain craft work is redistributed among
the detail workers, the individual worker becomes a simple wage earner
unable to perform the "craft" in its entirety. But in the case of
theterogeneous" manufacture, where different crafts are assembled under
one roof and under the control of a capitalist, the picture gets complicated.
The example of a previously independent iron-smith who is employed at a
rarriaae-maker's workshoD hammerina the metal ioints and the wheel frames
*1--~
will clarify this point. The previously independent iron-smith, the
handicraftsman,is only a detail worker in the workshop, for his work
is a detail component of carriage making. Eventually, upon the inertia of
fashioning a limited set of metal parts for carriages full time, he may
become a specialized iron smith. In the meanwhile, however, his detail
work retains its craft character, and so long as this condition holds,
the handicraftsman turned detail worker will retain a craft worker identity.
In the case of "serial" manufacture the detail workers' control over
the productive work is limited, if not extinct as in the case of factory
workers. It covers only one or two discrete operations. In the case of
"heterogeneous" manufacture, on the other hand, most detail work retains
an explicit craft nature. Thus, the craftsmen turned detail workers' control
over the productive work assumes greater importance, and increases the
detail workers' influence within the firm. This bears upon the bargaining power
of detail workers, and hence to their disciplining by the capitalist. As
a rule, the more control a worker enjoys over the productive work, the
more important is his detail labor,and the greater is his bargaining power.
This makes it more difficult for the capitalist not only to discipline but
9
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also to replace him With the increased bargaining power of the workers
come demands for wage increases, and hence a concomittant pressure upon
profits. Thus, in the model classic workshop we confront two types of
detail workers: those who retain their craft worker identity and enjoy
a stronger bargaining power, and those who do not, and a motivation for
the capitalist to subdivide the productive work such that no detail work
has a craft outlook.
The above noted distinction among detail workers is not the only
one that deserves attention. Through the workshop type non-factory
production yet another category of workers comes into being: the "unskilled
detail workers." It is true that when a craft work is divided into its
components and redistributed among various detail workers, the application
and building up of specialized skills become necessary. But it is also
true that this yields a stock of detail work that neither requires nor
builds specialized skills. Similarly, when various craft work are assembled
under one roof as detail components of a particular workshop production,
there appeams a group of detail work that does not require specialized
skills. For instance, in both the pin manufactory described by Adam Smith,
and the carriage-maker's workshop described by Marx, a set of-detail work
ranging from carrying tools, raw materials, and outputs to and from the
detail workers, and cleaning the workshop to performing extremely simple
operations like sorting out the raw materials, cutting, polishing, &c.,
stand in sharp contrast to other skill-demanding and skill-building detail
work like wire-drawing, pin head -making., wheel-making, and harness-making.
Such differences among the types of detail work in the workshop aid the
capitalist in building up a job hierarchy ~nd a parallel wage structure.
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The division of work, therefore, makes possible the establishment of a
job and wage hierarchy in the workshop, which in turn becomes a
13
tool for the capitalist to discipline his workers. At the bottom of
the job and wage pyramid within the firm, we confront a set of detail
work that neither requires nor builds skills, and pays the least. Such
detail work breeds a group of unskilled detail workers who may be easily
replaced by the capitalist. These workers enjoy no bargaining power
unless they join together. Often, they are "hired last but fired first."
As such, they stand in contrast to the detail workers who are relatively
skilled and the detail workers whose work retains a craft outlook. The
last two groups of detail workers are placed higher up in the job and
wage hierarchy of the firm, and enjoy a certain, though minimal, job
security. Thus in brief, in the model classic workshop we confront a job
and wage hierarchy determined by the capitalist, and a new category of
detail workers: the "unskilled detail workers," or to be precise the first
true members of the industrial proletariat.
In artisan shops, the apprentices and journeymen are younger people,
almost like students looking for a school, willing to stay in one job
and with one master in order to learn a "craft" in its entirety and
develop the "composite skills" necessary to start an independent
business. They envisage that low wages now will be compensated for by profits
tomorrow. To carry the analogy a bit further, their wages are like what
a scholarship is to a student. In short, for them, craft work is a way of
life rather than a means for life. But the same can not be said for the
workers in workshops. As a rule, the detail workers are out in the labor
market to sell their labor power in view of satisfying their immediate needs
rather than in view of their future benefits. It is in this connection
that when the artisan shops and workshops are taken together, we may
consider a sort of partitioning in the labor market. Indeed, this
is a labor market segmentation within the domain of non-factory types
of industrial production. In nineteenth century Europe, this division
was superseded by a more pronounced labor market segmentation with the
development of factory systems: the factory and non-factory connected
labor markets. In contemporary underdeveloped countries like Turkey,
however, the split of the non-factory connected labor markets into their
craft and detail work components, is as important as the labor market
segmentation along the factory and non-factory type of industrial production
division.
The typical workshop owner is quite different from the master
handicraftsman. He is a prototype capitalist industrial entrepreneur. We
know that not only the increased number of workers in the workshop, but
also the necessarily larger stocks of raw materials and the increased
number of capital goods force him to provide larger amounts of fixed and
variable capital than the artisan. The division of labor, on the other
hand, enables him to control the productive work and discipline his workers.
The workshop owner buys the necessary raw materials, provides the implements
of labor, divides and coordinates the productive work, establishes a job
and wage hierarchy within the firm, supervises the workers, worries about
the nature and the quality of the final product, and finally, upon marketing
the output incurs the costs of production for the round to follow so to
increase his personal wealth through larger profits and increased investments.
If he is an artisan turned capitalist, at first, he himself would be involved
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in det.dil work, i.e., a component of the productive work. But eventually,
upon assuming the entrepreneurial role in the full, he resigns from
manual work altogether and specializes in capitalist's work, i.e.,
coordinating the productive work, and controlling both the process of
production and the product. If, on the other hand, he is a merchant turned
workshop operator, he would be divorced from the productive'work at the outset.
Usually, workshop production occurs under one roof. But there is
yet another form of workshop production along the vein of "heteregenous
manufacture" which happens not under one but several roofs: the "putting-
out system." Briefly, in this case what we have at hand is a merchant who
supplies the necessary raw materials to various independent standing
artisan shops, and therefore, controls their respective products. In this
system the artisan loses his control over the product to the merchant.
That is to say, he is no longer independent. He can not market his product.
He works for the merchant. Thus, the merchant takes advantage of the existing
social cooperation among different crafts. He reduces each artisan shop
into a cell where a detail work of his "wide-spread workshop" is done.4
In seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Europe various putting-out
systems flourished in silk and wool spinning and weaving, but they were
superseded both by the workshops and the factories15 The major reason for
the disappearance , or rather the transformation, of the putting-out
16system was the difficulty of controlling and disciplining workers 6 In
contemporary underdeveloped countries, to be more specific in Gaziantep,
Turkey, however, variations of putting-out systems in shoe-making, silk,
'kilim' and carpet weaving, &c., where free standing spinners,dyers, pattern
makers,&c., are simultaneously employed by one and the same merchant, still exist.
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2. The Model Classic Workshop: Some Differences Between
The Europeaq And Ottoman Versions
As a rule, the classic model of workshops is derived from the
"manufacturing period" in England, which roughly extends from the middle
of the Sixteenth to the last third of the Eighteenth Century, in
particular, and the post-medieval period in Europe, in general. The
scarcity of historical documentation on workshops in Japan, India, China
and the Middle East (the Ottoman Empire) does not reflect the absence of
workshop type industrial production in the East. Indeed, the emergence
of workshops in the East may have predated the "manufacturing period" in
Europe. This remains to be shown. A more interesting question, however,
concerns the nature of the differences between the Eastern, Ottoman in
particular, and the Western versions of workshops.
Almost all the critical features of the Ottoman and European
workshops are similar. In both cases we confront an organization of
work through division of labor, and consequently, "detail labor" and
"detail workers". For instance, Evliya qelebi, a Turkish traveller in
the Seventeenth Century, notes the following in reference to the great
mint hear the mosque of Sultan Beyazit-II in istanbul,
The men employed at the mint are joiners, wire-makers,
coiners, weighers, melters, changers, guards; in short
from the Imams and Moezzins, down to the porters, more
than seventy different sorts of people;... It is a great
and wonderful fabric, and those who have not seen it have
seen nothing in the world. The mint is the glory and honour
of the Ottoman family. 1 7
Until the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, the technical base of the
---- 
--- -
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Ottoman workshop production was hardly distinguishable from that of its
European counterparts. 8 Furthermore, both in Europe and the Ottoman Empire,
19
not only the number of workers simultaneously employed under one roof,
and the size of the necessary capital to secure larger stocks of capital
equipment and raw materials in workshops, but also the volume of workshop
production increases. In short, it is not until the workshop operator himself
is considered that a division between the European and Ottoman workshops may
be suggested. In the case of the European workshops, the owner is clearly
a capitalist. He forwards the necessary capital, and controls the process
of production with the purpose of making profits. In other words, be him
an ex-artisan or an ex-merchant, the capitalist, having somehow accumulated
enough wealth in his hands, incurs the costs and takes the risks of running
a workshop provided that he gets richer. Yet, whatever is the rule in Europe
on this score, tends to be an exception in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed,
20
workshops run by capitalists do come into being. But they seem to carry
less weight in the sphere of industrial production than their European
counterparts. In the Ottoman Empire, the "imperial manufactories" and
the "state subsidized but privately run workshops" assume far greater
21importance than in Europe. This observation bears upon the nature of
the Ottoman state and society , in general, and the obstacles for the
development of industrial capitalism in the Empire, in particular. Thus,
a brief digression into the Ottoman social order becomes indispensable.
The social order of the Ottoman Empire was derived from a traditional
view of state and society that prevailed in the empires of the Middle-East,
22
Iran and Central-Asia. In brief, all institutions and all members of
the society, hence all sources of wealth, were not only held obliged to
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reproduce, but also were made subservient to the power of the ruler: the
Sultan, who, by the Sixteenth Century came to represent both the spiritual
23
and political functions of the state in his person. It is in this sense
that, roughly speaking, the Ottoman society was divided into two broad
groups: those who represented the authority of the Sultan or those who
24partook in the ruling establishment, and those who-were ruled24 The
power of the ruling establishment, the state, was (as is the case with all
political power) directly proportional to the size of the "surplus wealth"2 5
that it could control. The reproduction of the central authority
as the ruling caste, therefore, meant to operate, maintain, and refine (reform)
_· I
institutional mechanisms like the tax system, customs, and the collection
of other dues through which the surplus generated in agriculture, commerce,
and industry were being appropriated on the one hand, and to crush the
independent political power that flourished upon the control of the poosense
of surplus wealth which were somehow retained away from appropriation by
the Sultan and his mrepresen the other. Thus, in this connection, the 700
year long history of the Ottoman Empire, likand thoshewho.wer empires in the
East, may be seen as a continuing struggle on the part of the ruling caste to
maintain and enlarge its control over the surplus wealth, against the
resistances of, and tendencies to carve independent power bases. In summary,
then,the Ottoman situation differed radically from that of medieval and
post-medieval Europe. In the absence of a comparable dominance of a despotic
central state in Europe, not only the cities, church, and landed gentry
carved for themselves independent domains of power, but also prevented the
early emergence of a centralized and absolute rule by the state. Therefore,
unlike the Ottoman Empire, European merchants, artisans, and landlords
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could accumulate and easily hold on to their respective pools of surplus.
This paved the way for the early emergence and building up of a group of
potential industrial capitalists in Europe. Thus, in general, it may be
asserted that in the political and institutional organization of the Ottoman Empire,
with a despotic and all mighty central authority (or, a state best described
as a highly centralized surplus expropriating mechanism), wealth tended
to accumulate in, the hands of the state, the ruling caste, rather than staying with
the members of the "ruled groups", like the peasants, artisans, and merchants.
This may account for the relative insignificance of private initiative in
craft and workshop types of industrial prodiction. When the cases for
private initiatives in agricultural and commercial pursuits are considered,
however, the above noted generalizations need to be qualified. For one thing,
as the authority of the state declined in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth
Centuries, not only some foreign affiliated merchants, but also some large
land-holders who took to cash-cropping managed to prevent their surpluses
from being appropriated by the state, and hence, accumulated wealth while
necessarily reducing the already declining state revenues. With prospects
of enlargening its territories gone, and a gradual erosion of imperial
territory on its way, not only the revenues, but also the authority of the
Ottoman state started to weaken. With the decline of the central authority
came' the rise in tendencies to prevent some of the surplus from being appropriated.
This hastened the erosion of state revenues, which in turn fed the impotency
of the state. Thus, by the beginning of the twentieth century,, the mighty
Ottoman state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was transformed
into the "sick man of Europe." The artisans organized into guilds; peasants
and small traders, however, could not manage what the large land holders
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and the foreign affiliated merchants did. They remained subservient to
the state even when its powers declined. The rise of the foreign affiliated
merchants meant the flooding of the domestic markets with European workshop
and factory products, and hence a decline in the well being of small traders,
artisans and peasants. As if the decline of Ottoman industries was
not enough, the state,with few other sources to squeeze surplus from, came
to ask for more and more from the artisans in terms of taxes. The peasants
under tax-farming and the small traders facing increased internal customs
duties experienced a similar problem. In brief, all this on the one hand
accounts for the flimsy existence, and later, the deterioration of
the group of potential industrial capitalists in the Empire, and on the
other hand, sheds light upon the unwillingness of the foreign affiliated merchant
and large land holder to transform their wealth into industrial capital.
Given the nature of the state, the scope and importance of the
imperial workshops in the Ottoman economy become clear. For instance,
in the Seventeenth Century, in Istanbul, the seat of the Ottoman ruling caste,
there existed numerous imperial establishments, many in the form of workshops.
There was an imperial wax house where 1000 men were employed to make candles
for the Sultan, the 'vezirs' and the great men of istanbul26 Furthermore,
there were two imperial establishments for tailors, with 500 men in each 2
an irfperial gold-wire manufactory with 400 men28 five gun-powder houses,29
30 3a coffee grinding establishment with 300 men, a paper manufactory at Battal31
besides imperial butter and cloth magazines, fisheries, a slave market,
confectioners, &c.. Among the workshops run by the state, the imperial
mint ('arbhand) was the largest32 Also, we have to consider the vast imperial
projects ranging from the construction and repair of fortifications, water
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works, cisterns, mosques, medreses, fountains, caravan sarays, bridges,
hans, and baths to the construction of roads and gardens. In brief,
there were a large number of state employed detail-workers in construction
works which were carried out on a workshop basis. For instance, in the
33
Seventeenth Century, in Istanbul alone, there were 4000 carpenters, 3000
34 35builders, 1005 wood cutlers with 99 shops, 1000 'lokumcu' (makers of the
glue called 'lokum' for the water works , 1000 makers of the unburnt straw-
37 38 39bricks, 800 pavers ('kaldlrimcl'), 1000 stone cutlers, 1000 stone draggers
and others with lesser numbers.0
It may be concluded that the Ottoman state had been actively involved
with workshop type industrial production. Bonne makes a similar observation:
In addition to the artisan, the State, through its own
factories played from time to time an important role
as industrial producer, particularly in silk weaving,:
sugar and arms industries, The continuing military
enterprises undertaken by the Turkish rulers secured
for the Army Factories in Turkey in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries a leading position in the industrial
sector of the country. Cannon foundries, canvas looms,
dockyards as well as factories making goods for indirect
war needs (paper, leather, textiles) were run by the
Government, and from their surpluses the civil population
also was supplied.41
Some of what Bonne mentions, however, needs critical scrutiny. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, not only in the Ottoman Empire but
also in Europe there were no factories . He must be referring to workshops.
Also, every war related production, be it craft or workshop type, was not
necessarily organized into an Imperial Establishment. Historical evidence
signals the existence of craft guilds involved in the war industry of the
times, which were not directly run by the State. There were the sword
cutlers, musket makers, pistol makers, and many more who made lances,
daggers, scabbords, bows, arrows, cross-bows, slings, bow-rings, &c., but
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in seventeenth century Istanbul, the most zimportant were the saddlers
42('sarraglar') with 5000 men and 1084 shops, and the tanners ('dabballar')
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with 3000 men and 700 tanneries. The State had a difficult time keeping
these men in line let alone organizing them into Imperial Establishments.
On this, Evliya qelebi notes the following:
These tanners were a wild and savage set of men, and
were the cause of the late Melek Ahmed Pasha, losing
the place of Grand Vizier; they are so riotous and
unruly that if assembled togethe 4they would be
capable of deposing the Emperor.
Later in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries., while in Europe
the privately run workshops paved the way for the privately run factories,
in the Ottoman Empire, the State-run workshops simply declined and were
replaced by a new generation of State-run factories. Concerning this
peculiar transformation in the Ottoman Empire, Bonne notes the following:
These concerns (State-run enterprises), after their
decline in the eighteenth century, experienced a
revival under Selim III in Turkey and Mohammed Ali
in Egypt. It was then a case of larger establishments
run under the supervision of government-paid experts
and involving considerable capital investment 4
Some of these new State-enterprises were set up to run the gas, electricity,
railway, telegraph, and port facilities of the Empire. The rest, however,
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were unsuccessful factory transplants into the economy. The Sultan
financed these projects,which were modelled after the European examples,
designed and built by foreign companies, equipped with imported machinery,
managed by the Armenian or Greek minorities of the Empire, and operated
the technical assistance of foreign experts. Even the workers were
recruited from among the minorities.
An essential feature of the Ottoman State-run workshops in the
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seventeenth century was the absence from the picture of the capitalist
entrepreneur motivated by personal gain. The State, the Sultan, provided
the capital. But this was not enough to make the State assume the role
of a capitalist. The profit motive was not there. In other words, the
State was involved in workshop type production not because it wanted or
needed profits, but because it required large amounts of goods and services
to keep its authority going. It needed canvas for the ships, and dock-yards
to build a strong fleet in order to control the seas and assert authority over
far away lands. It needed cannons, gun-powder, leather goods, and textiles
to supply the standing armies with which it secured the flow of taxes and
other revenues into the royal purse, and acquired control over new
territories. In brief, the Ottoman State had its eyes set upon the surplus
generated by others on land, in industry, and through commerce, rather
than the wealth generated in its own industrial establishments. The latter
was necessary to acquire and preserve control over the former. Those who
controlled the process of production in the Ottoman State-run workshops,
on the other hand, were government employees. They were salaried and had
no control whatsoever over the product itself. Thus, in the case of the
State-run workshops there was the cart and the donkeybut the carrot, i.e.,
the profit motive, was missing. It was the whip of the driver that made
the donkey pull the cart, and the whip of the Sultan that made the driver
keep the cart on the road. This is important. For, it bears upon the
inertia that kept the Ottoman State-run workshops from yielding transformations
similar to those that occurred in Europe in the "manufacturing period"
and eventually culminated in the rise of a grass-roots factory type
development, i.e., the industrial revolution.
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Another form of workshop in the Ottoman Empire was the State-subsidized
but privately run firm . These workshops were not directly organized
into Imperial Manufactories, but were exclusively appropriated to the
needs of the State. For instance, in seventeenth century Istanbul,
47 48the standing army amounted to 80,000 men with 166 barracks, and there
were more than 1000 cuirass makers who worked exclusively for the army
in the camp, while in the city there were about 40 men with 4 shops involved
49 50in this craft. Also, the powder manufactory at At Meydani, and the
51
musket manufactory were essentially appropriated to the Janissaries: the
standing army. There were the bakers, amounting to 300 men, and the cooks
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of the Janissaries who cooked and baked only for the army, while the candlers
of At Meydani, 75 in number, were also appropriated to the corps of
Janissaries. The candlers were subsidized by the State54 _Furthermore,
about 1000 men worked in the sHeep-walks ('mandras') of the army55 In the
case of such workshops we find entrepreneurs who are in charge of the
process of production but are obliged to sell their produce to the State
at a fixed rate.
Thus, in both the State-run and State-subsidized or State-appropriated
but privately run workshops, we confront qualitatively distinct forms of
industrial production. In other words, the workshop type production emerges
with detail work and detail labor. But unlike Europe, it does not
assume a complete capitalist character. The capitalist who is in charge
of both the entire process of production and the product itself, and who
is motivated by eventual personal gains, is either replaced by a person
who forwards the necessary capital, controls the entire process of production
but is obliged to sell his produce to the State, or by a State-employee
N
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who runs the show in order to provide the goods and services for the
State. The presence of these types of workshops, however, does not imply
the absence of privately run workshops. It merely accounts for the
diminished role of capitalist workshop production in the Ottoman
economy, and the much acclaimed lack of an industrial capitalist group
in the Empire.
3. The Model Contemporary Workshop In Underdeveloped
Countries: The "Lower-Capitalist" Form of Industrial
Production
In essence, the model contemporary workshop in underdeveloped
countries like Turkey is similar to the classic model. The cooperation
of labor through division of work, the detail workers, increased productivity,
larger outputs, as well as the prototype capitalist, greater capital
outlays, and wider profit margins together with the need for, and the
problems of, controlling and disciplining workers, are all present. Even
the various versions of the putting out system may be observed. Yet, no
matter how overwhelming the number of parallels between the classic and
contemporary models of workshops are, the two may not be equated. The
social and institutional webs within which these two models* evolve and
oper&te are radically different. Indeed, we may draw many parallels
between eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe and contemporary
underdeveloped countries, but it is impossible to maintain that the
former was what the latter is now.
For one thing, the industrialization process in Europe started tiith
developments in the domain of non-factory types of industrial production,
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and resulted in the replacement of non-factories in the mainstream of
industrial activities by factories. The industrialization processes in
underdeveloped countries, however, started with developments outside the
domain of non-factory types of industrial production, and factories did
not eclipse the importance of non-factories in the economy. Thus, it is
only in the light of the differences between these two industrialization
processes, which have been shaped under historically unique sets of
factors, that the differences between the classic and contemporary models
of workshops become meaningful.
In the model contemporary workshop in underdeveloped countries,
the technical base for production is more "modern" and "sophisticated"
in outlook than in "the classic model. This hardly needs explanation. It
is a matter of simple observation to note that in nearly every workshop in
underdeveloped countries there are modern power-tools and detail-machines
besides the modern and traditional hand-tools. Yet, unlike the classic
model, the technical base for workshop production, and embedded in it
the technology, are neither generated nor developed from within the domain
of domestic non-factory types of industrial production activities. It
is borrowed. This is where the two models begin to diverge. In other words,
in underdeveloped countries, the origins and the process of developing
the instruments of labor to suit detail work, in and of themselves, are
external to workshops in particular, and to non-factories in general. None,
if not a negligible portion, of the collection of modern power-tools,
detail-machines, and modern hand tools in non-factories, are fashioned
in the domestic workshops and artisan shops. As a rule, lathes, electric
motors, power drills, power saws, mechanical presses, &c., are produced.
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in facLories, and to a large extent, are imported. This much may account
for the relatively sophisticated and modern outlook of the technical base
of contemporary workshops in underdeveloped countries. Also, it
sheds light upon a more important issue: the dependency of workshops on
domestic and foreign factories.
In the "manufacturing period" in Europe, the developments rooted
in the needs of, and generated from within the domain of non-factory types
of industrial production, prepared the material conditions for the emergence
of factories. Put in other words, in the classic model, technological
adjustments have followed the division of work in workshops, and helped
the capitalist to increase his profits by rationalizing detail work and
the job and wage hierarchy within the firm. With larger profit margins
workshops not only increased in size, but also multiplied in
number eventually yielding four important conditions which made factories
a reality: increased rates of industrial capital accumulation, growing
stocks of entrepreneurial experience, widening markets, and machinery that
could be organized into a system. In Europe it was the workshop type
production that nursed the factory system into maturity, and in turn, was
superseded by it. In the case of contemporary underdeveloped countries,
however, the picture is rather different. The factory system was neither
originated within the sphere of domestic workshop production, nor was it
nursed by it. The factory system was imported, in its maturity, from the
industrialized societies. It is in this sense, therefore, that the factory
system stands as a transplant to,rather than a product of the underdeveloped
economies.
With its roots abroad, the factory system in underdeveloped
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countries did not supersede domestic workshop production. In turn,
the workshops came to depend upon the factories (be them domestic or
foreign), for both raw materials and technology. Thus, in the model
contemporary workshops in underdeveloped countries, what we have at hand
is a market for the factory produced implements of labor and intermediate
goods, rather than a challange to, or a competitor for, factories.
But why did not the factories in underdeveloped countries supersede
the domestic workshop production? The second major difference between
the classic and contemporary models of workshops revolves around this
question. The workshops that we confront in underdeveloped countries,
like their classic counterparts, at one time or the other, confront
factories in their lines of production. Yet unlike the model
classic workshop, they do not necessarily disappear from the picture
all that easily. On the contrary, they proliferate. This is neither due to
the "efficiency" of workshop production, which is supposed to occur
because of its scale, nor due to the "inefficiency" of factories.
When studied more closely, it becomes clear that in underdeveloped
economies the confrontation of factories and workshops in a particular
line of production does not necessarily take the form of actual competition.
It is here that many fail to grasp the unique nature of the underdeveloped
industrial landscape. Indeed, in some lines of production,truly competetive
situations arise between factories and workshops to the extent that the
latter disappear. But such instances are rare. In other words, in contemporary
underdeveloped economies, competition between factories and workshops
stands as an exception rather than as a rule. Thus, what we have is a
unique case. -As a rule, in underdeveloped countries, factories
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and workshops confront each other in the same line of industrial production,
but not in the same markets, because the consumer markets themselves are
partitioned. Thus, instead of competition between workshops and factories,
a sort of an "unnegotiated peace," a de facto detente, is established.
This observation marks another aspect of the process of "underdeveloped
industrialization," and needs closer scrutiny.
Indeed, in nineteenth century Europe, factories and workshops often
operated in the same lines of production, and the former turned out
Q1gpper products that were similar in nature and quality to those produced
4 the latter. This competitive set-up, we know, was the rule, and worked
o0 the detriment of workshops. Eventually, factories wrested away the
control of many consumer markets. But, we also know that factories did
not replace all workshops in all lines of industrial production. Whenever
it was not possible to introduce factories into a certain line of production
workshops remained in business and even flourished. Sometimes the nature
of the product prevented the introduction of factories (as in the cases
of construction works, garment and furniture industries, and cheese,
beer, wine, and pipe-making), and sometimes the nature of the demand and the
unusually high costs of factory type production dimmed the prospects for
above -average profit rates. In either case, factories and workshops
did not confront each other in the same line of production, and for that reason
the latter persisted unchecked. Nevertheless, there emerged another
pattern of a non-competitive situation between factories and workshops in
industrialized countries which is quite different from the "unnegotiated
peace" in underdeveloped countries: the "negotiated peace" between factories
and workshops, or better the "sub-contracts." In this case, factories breed
and feed workshop production through sub-contracting mechanisms, where
the latter is subordinated by the former. The automotive industries
are good examples along this vein.
The "negotiated peace" between factories and workshops is a
new phenomenon in underdeveloped countries like Turkey, and remains as a
series of rare and isolated events in metropolitan areas and in few branches
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of industry. Certainly, it offers an important and fruitful avenue for
future research. What appears as a rule in the process of "underdeveloped
industrialization," however, is the "unnegotiated peace" between
workshops and factories. As I have noted, in underdeveloped countries
factories and workshops operating in the same lines of industry do not
confront each other, simply because they do not produce the same products.
To make this important point clear, let us consider the case of towel
production in Turkey.
Both in istanbul and Bursa, cities in the relatively more developed
Western Anatolia, there are factories which produce towels. But, on the
other hand, in Gaziantep which is located in the less developed Eastern
Anatolia, we observe wide-spread towel production carried out in
numerous workshops of all sizes. Both the factories and 6%orkshops
do good business. Tiile the towels produced in istanbul and Bursa are
sold in Gaziantep , Gaziantep towels find markets in Istanbul and Bursa.
The reason for this -unusual situation is simple: the factory produced towels
are not the same as the ones produced in workshops. They are of higher
quality. As a rule, the towels produced in factories are made of better
quality cotton, and therefore, are more absorbant. They are dyed with
better quality dyes, so the colors do not fade out when washed. Furthermore,
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they not only have more sophisticated patterns, but are also thicker,
heavier, and better woven than the ones produced in workshops. Consequently,
although the factory and workshop towels have similar use-values, their
exchange-values differ. In other words, the workshop towels are much
cheaper than the ones produced in factories, both in market value and
quality. The towel factories with their integrated systems of machinery,
have far greater capital outlays, operate with low labor/capital ratios,
and mass produce high quality towels. The towel workshops, on the other
hand, with their independent standing and relatively old but well maintained
power-looms, have small capital outlays, operate with high labor/capital
ratios, and produce "cheap" quality towels. The labor intensive and
technologically outdated workshops would not, can not, and do not compete
with towel factories. In other words, workshops simply can not produce
cheaper, better quality towels than factories. If the opposite were
true, then we would have to rewrite the entire history of capitalist
industrial development.
But, then, why do not factories mass produce cheaper, lower
quality towels? Indeed, if they did, an actual competition with workshops
would occur, and consequently, as in nineteenth century Europe,
the workshops, one after the other, would go out of business.
But 'factories do not tend to produce the kind of towels workshops
turn out. The reason for this is obvious. There is neither much profit,if
any, in the production of low quality towels, and the prospect of expanding
markets for them is very limited. It is only the "poor", who
buy low quality towels. The "poor" buy low quality towels not because they
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prefer them, but because they can not afford anything better given their
income levels. In other words, if and when their incomes increase,
---tbay. shift to better quality towels.. Furthermore, there is hardly
any demand for low quality towels in the international markets. All
this makes two points clear. First, to address the "poor", factories have
to produce low quality towels at extremely low prices, and therefore, end
up operating at minimal profit margins, if not at a loss, despite their
large capital outlays. 'Second, since the markets for low quality towels
are bound to be domestic, and they expand only when the number of the "poor",
i.e., "poverty", increases, for the factories to make profits it would
become necessary to deepen capital, if not :to lower wages, or to use the
worst and cheapest raw materials available, and at the same time hope that
"poverty" will spread and enlarge the markets. But, neither has there been
such a regressive capitalist development, nor can it be seriously
considered. To explain better why towel factories would not and can not
mass produce low quality towels at very low prices , and therefore, can
not address themselves to the needs of the "poor", let us analyze how
the workshops manage to meet.the low levels of effective demand for "cheap"
towels.
Towel workshops operate with high labor/capital ratios. In other
words, it takes more labor to produce a towel in a workshop than in a
factory, where the productivity of labor is higher. But, in workshops
labor is paid far below the official minimum wage rate. Also, extended
work-days (over and-above ten hours), and right out of the nineteenth
century working conditions are usual. The low wage rates in towel
workshops may be explained as a necessary outcome of the prevailing low
mm
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levels of labor productivity, which stem from the nature of the technical
base for production. In a typical towel workshop a few technologically
outdated power-looms constitute the bulk of the fixed capital investments.
When compared to the integrated machine systems in towel factories , the
outdated and independently standing detail machines clarify the essential
differences between factory and workshop capital: the fixed capital
outlay in workshops is not only small in size, but also embedded in
obsolete technology. In conclusion, small capital outlay embedded in
obsolete technology, low labor productivity, and low wages mark the production
of towels in workshops. Furthermore, as a rule, the capital returns of
contemporary workshops in underdeveloped countries precipitate at lower levels
than the average returns of factory capital.
Indeed, workers in workshops are overworked and poorly payed. But
this is not enough to generate average or above-average workshop profit
rates. It becomes necessary not only to use low quality, and hence cheaper,
raw materials, 58but also to skimp on them. In brief, therefore, it takes
a "distorted" process of capitalist production with low profit margins,
low wages, obsolete technology, and low quality raw materials,to turn out
"cheap" outputs for the inelastic demand of the urban and rural "poor."
Towel production is but an example. Other examples similar to the one
sketched above, where factories exist side by side with workshops (and
artisan shops for that matter), i.e., non-factories, in the same line of
production without direct competition, may be provided when the production
of tricots, socks, shoes, kitchen wares, &c., are studied.
The "cheap" outputs from the workshops which operate side by side with
factories in the same line of production are addressed exclusively to the "poor":
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those who need and want, but can not afford the factory produced (or
imported) better quality goods. Thus in a sense, the "unnegotiated peace"
between factories and workshops is rooted in the segmentation of the
consumer markets. This segmentation, however, ought to be seen in
conjunction with the segmentations of the labor and capital markets.
When non-factories (workshops and artisan shops) exist and even
proliferate next to factories in the same lines of production, neither
the workshop operators and their workers, nor the consumers are better off.
Workers are overworked and underpayed. The capitalist's profits are far
below the prevailing average returns of "factory" and " big merchant" capital.
The consumers, i.e., the "poor," on the other hand, end up satisfied but
with low quality goods. All this make clear that there is nothing romantic,
or indeed hopeful, about non-factories co-existing with factories
in certain lines of industrial production. Non-factories are neither alternatives
to factory production, nor may their persistance be attributed to a much
acclaimed "efficiency" tested through competition with factories. They
stand as part and parcel of the production of poverty, and the poverty of
production in the contemporary underdeveloped countries.
The third major difference between the classic and contemporary
models of workshops concerns the inability of the latter to transform into
factories. This is very important, 'for it marks the principle distinguishing
feature of the process of "underdeveloped industrialization". The path
for the progressive transformation of the capitalist forms of industrial
production is blocked. The lower forms do not evolve into higher forms on
their own. It is as if a glass wall separates the lower and the higher forms
of capitalist industrial production.
-57-
In the model contemporary workshop in underdeveloped countries,
the technical base for production is supplied by factories, but does not
display an up-towdate technology. In other words, unlike the classic
model, the bulk of contemporary workshop capital is embedded in
relatively modern but obsolete technology. It is true that in the capital
goods markets there are large collections of implements of labor which
may serve one and the same function at different levels of technological
sophistication. Also, as the technology embedded in a capital good gets
sophisticated, the more efficient becomes the implement of labor in the
sense that it increases the productivity of labor, and the higher is ;the
price of the capital good. Thus, conversely, the cheaper a capital good, the
less sophisticated is the technology embedded in it, and the lower is the
productivity of labor. As a rule, workshops are established by capitalists who
have limited initial capital, and since the chances of receiving large
credits at the outset are poor, the capitalist does not, have the
choice of purchasing an expensive, technologically sophisticated, and
hence more efficient set of capital goods. Instead, he is bound to make do
with the best he can afford: the cheaper. More specifically, in those lines
of industrial production where factories operate, the would-be entrepreneur,
by definition, can not afford the integrated systems of machinery. In other
words, the capitalist with small initial capital and limited chances to
receive credits is destined, at best, to become a workshop operator, and
not a factory owner. Thus, if and when workshops are established in lines
of production where factories operate,and. the demand of the "poor" remains
unanswered as in the case of towel production in Turkey, a vicious-cycle
of workshop capital begins. The workshop operator starts by purchasing cheaper
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implements of labor, and thus indirectly invests in labor with low
productivity. In his workshop it takes more labor with low productivity,
And less capital embedded in obsolete technology to produce a unit of
output, which in factories is produced with less labor with high
productivity, and more capital embedded in a system of machinery displaying
sophisticated technology. His establishment stands as "labor' intensive."
But since the productivity of labor in his firm is lower than in factories,
the workshop operator realizes that it is impossible to compete with factories
on their own terms. There remains only one alternative; to meet the demands of
the "poor." This, however, requires that he not only underpay and overwork
his employees, but also use low quality raw materials and lower his profit
margins. His tight profit margins, on the other hand, especially when coupled
with factory production paced inflation, make it impossible for him
to accumulate enough capital to radically change the technical base for
production. In other words, the accumulation of capital does not enable the
workshop operator to adopt a capital deepening path for expansion. If and
a when the workshop operator wants to expand his business, he can only do so
4 by widening his capital. He increases the number of detail-machines in his
workshop, and together with them grows the number of his workers. Yet, the
productivity of labor and the quality of the technical base for production
# remain unchanged. In short, then, the workshop operator can not accumulate
enough capital to transform his business into a factory. Thus, when we
2 consider those lines of industrial production where workshops and factories
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implemen~ts of labor, and thus indirectly invests in labor with low
productivity. In his workshop it takes more labor with low productivity,
•nd less- capital embedded •in obsolete technology to produce a unit of
output, which in factories is produced with less labor with high
productivity, and more capital embedded in a system of machinery displaying
sophisticated technology. His establishment stands as "labor· intensive."
But since the productivity of labor in his firm is lower than in factories,
the workshop operator realizes that it is impossible to compete with factories
on their own terms. There remains only one alternative; to meet the demands of
the ,'poor." This, however, requires that he not only underpay and overwork
his employees, but also use low quality raw materials and lower his profit
margins. His tight profit margins, on the other hand, especially when coupled
with factory production paced inflation, make it impossible for him
to accumulate enough capital to radically change the technical base for
production. In other words, the accumulation of capital does not enable the
workshop operator to adopt a capital deepening path for expansion. If and
when the workshop operator wants to expand his business, he can only do so
by widening his capital. He increases the number of detail-machines in his
workshop, and together with them grows the number of his workers. Yet, the
productivity of labor and the quality of the technical base for production
remaul unchanged. In short, then, the workshop operator can not accumulate
enough capital to transform his business into a factory. Thus, when we
consider those lines of industrial production where workshops and factories
co-exist, we observe two immtutable categories of capital: the workshop and
factory. Factory capital is embedded in more up-to-dat~e technology, operates with
higher labor productivity, generates higher profits, and accumulates faster
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than workshop capital.
This cycle of workshop capital which feeds the above noted segmentation
in capital markets, however, does not apply to all workshops in all lines
of industrial production. In certain lines of production like steel-safe
making, stove making, and agricultural equipments making, where factory
type production is possible, but does not exist, and in other lines of
production like meerschaum products making, where factory type production
may not be introduced due to the nature of the product (or the process of
production) itself, contemporary workshop capital in underdeveloped
countries tendSto yield returns that are comparable to the average returns
of factory capital. Yet, in the former case, the contemporary workshop
operator faces a dilemma which his classical counterparts did not and
could not: whether to continue the business as a workshop or to transform
it into a factory. High profit margins for workshop capital in lines of
industrial production where factories have not yet emerged is largely due
to the lower wages in the non-factory connected labor markets, and the
size of the domestic demand. Transforming the business into a factory
would certainly mean even higher profit rates, provided that the domestic
markets enlarge behind protective tariffs, and that later export markets
are secured. But, in the meanwhile, it would not be possible to bypass
the labor and tax regulations. Furthermore, in order to set up a factory
the capitalist would need larger capital, a change in location, a new
building, a new administration, sophisticated managerial, technical and
entrepreneurial skills. In brief, greater investments and qualitative
changes in almost every aspect of the process of production are required
to transform a workshop into a factory. For the contemporary workshop
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operator, therefore, to transform his business into a factory is not
the same step that his classic counterparts in nineteenth century
Europe took. Indeed, factory production is the logical but not quite
the natural extension of the lower forms of capitalist industrial
production in underdeveloped countries. Given all this, why should the
workshop operator transform his business on his own, when he may continue
to enjoy high enough profits without increasing his troubles? In the latter
case where the nature of the product, the process of production, or the
consumer demand make the introduction of factory type production impossible,
on the other hand, workshops proliferate like their classic counterparts
and workshops in developed economies. The workshops which function in
such lines of production as meerschaum products making, wine-making,
'baklava' making, &c., continue to enjoy high profit rates, and faster
capital accumulation due to the low wages that prevail in the non-factory
connected labor markets and the absence of competition from factories,
and ,therefore io not transform into factories.
4. The Model Contemporary Workshops in Developed Countries
In developed countries workshops seem to prevail in a limited set
of industries. For example, in wine, beer, ice-cream, and cheese-making, &c.,
in fish-smoking, auto repairing, dry cleaning, xeroxing and printing, and in
construction works, coffeehousesp restaurants, pizza and other quick food
businesses, in prototype equipment, and machinery making, &c., and in
fashion or garment making what We have are workshops which ,
stand as "productive mechanisms whose parts are human beings." In other
words, the non-factory portion of "small industries" or "small businesses"
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display a collection of workshops where independent standing detail
machines, power-tools, and hand-tools comprise the technical base for
production. As in the classic model of workshops, contemporary
workshops in developed countries exhibit detail-work and detail-workers.
Yet what makes the model contemporary workshop in developed countries
unique is the status of workshops within the economy rather than the
organization of work within them.
In developed countries such as the USA, workshops are more common in
services than in consumer goods industries, and they neither co-exist
nor compete with factories in the same lines of production. Indeed,
factories have replaced workshops in all lines of industrial production
where above -average or average factory profits could be realized.
Yet, this is not to say that there are no exceptions to the rule. In other
words, antagonisms between the workshop and factory forms of capitalist
industrial production have not ceased altogether. For instance, in the USA,
we still hear about the ongoing competition between workshop and factory
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types of production in beer making and fish-smoking. In such rare instances,
it is the particular quality of the product when produced in a non-factory
that makes workshop type production survive the tide of factory production.
As a rule, workshop type production continues to exist in certain
branches of industry not because it is more "efficient" than factory type
production, but because the introduction of factory type production into
those branches of industry is technically impossible. When we consider the
sub-contracting processes between workshops and factories in developed
economies, we face a certain ambiguity. It is clear from the literature
that "small industries" sub-contract from larger factories in certain branches
M I
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of indulstry. But we know that workshops are not "small factories", and
that not every "small industry" or "small business" is a workshop. Thus,
it is difficult to determine from the literature the importance of
sub-contracts between workshops and factories. This is an important point
which deserves closer attention and detailed research. Nevertheless, even
if we assume that in developed countries an important portion of workshops
do sub-contract from factories, the main argument holds: workshops neither
co-exist nor compete with factories in the same lines of production, they
are either replaced by or subordinated to factories.
Of necessity, the production of prototype equipments, machinery,
and consumer goods, and repairs of capital goods are carried out in workshops.
In underdeveloped countries examples of workshops nursing factories in
this manner are extremely rare, if they exist at all. In developed countries,
on the other hand, this is an important feature of the industrial landscape.
But there is a twist to the picture. This type of workshop production
is embedded within factories and corporations. In other words, as far as
the production of prototype goods,and the repair of capital goods are
concerned, workshops no longer stand as independent businesses in the way they
did in nineteenth century Europe. Large factories have their own research
laboratories and workshops to design, make , and test prototype goods
as well as their own machine shops for repairs.
As in underdeveloped countries, workshops proliferate in branches
of industry where the introduction of factory type production is impossible.
But the profits in workshops remain rooted in the lower wages that mark
the non-union, hired last but fired first, part time, minorities based,
and transient sections of the labor market, in the same way that the technical
0
Ibase for workshop production remains unchanged. The connection of workshop
type production with the "secondary labor markets" is not accidental.
Workshop capital is small to start with. Furthermore, it is linked to a
technical base that yields lower than average labor productivity
when compared to factory labor. Since, by way of definition, it is impossible
to transform workshops into factories in the branches of industry under
consideration, or in other words, since it is impossible to follow a far
reaching "capital deepening" path, the competition among workshops takes
a peculiar form. Unlike factories, no workshop operator can significantly
cut the price of his outputs by increasing the productivity of labor.
Nevertheless, workshop operators try to cut costs. But, both the cost of
capital and material inputs are factory determined, external, and hence
difficult to alter in the short term. This leaves one real alternative for
the capitalist to survive the competition offered by other workshops: to
either underpay or overwork his employees, or both. In brief, the competition
among workshops, especially in the short term, is made possible by, and
in turn, feeds the segmentation of labor markets into two distinct
compartments: workshop, or in general, "non-factory" and "factory" connected
labor pools.
Rationalization of the labor market segmentation, however, is
not'the only outcome of the competition among workshops. While some
workshops disappear, others manage to stay in business or even accumulate
capital and secure credits to finance a concomittant growth in size. Together
with larger capital outlays, the number of workers and the size of the output
increase. This facilitates larger material purchases at lower prices, aids
in the development of better credit ratings and, provided that wages
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do not increase and markets remain in control, yields larger profit rates.
Larger profit margins feed the accumulation of capital, and thus the
workshop completes a cycle in the "capital widening" path for growth:
the only option open for workshop type production in developed countries.
In certain lines of services production, the "capital widening" path for
the growth of workshop type of production, on the other hand, yields a
unique phenomenon which is very foreign to underdeveloped economies:
the national or international chains of workshops supported by diversified
basic materials factory production. Mc. Donald's Co., Kentucky Fried Chicken
Inc. Co., Brigham's Inc. Co., and Dunkin' Doughnuts Co., are examples of
the above mentioned phenomenon where the faster accumulation of workshop
capital leads to the widening of workshop production on the one hand, and
the spreading of capital into certain branches of industry in the form
of factory production on the other. These observations concerning the
peculiar aspects of workshop production in developed countries suggest
the need for detailed analyses and elaborations upon workshop production
in its own right.
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CHAPTER V
SOME OBSERVATIONS
ie Institutional, Web Around "Factories" and "Non-factories":
iderdeveloped Economies And The "Dualist" Proposition
In underdeveloped countries like Turkey, the sphere of industrial
production may be divided into two sectors: "factory" and "non-factory."
In essence, this is a distinction between the "lower" and "higher"
forms of capitalist industrial production. The crux of the difference
between "factory" and ,"non-factory" types of industrial production is
the nature and organization of the productive work.
Once the "lower", i.e., "non-factory," forms of capitalist industrial
production are isolated, their peculiarities can be studied. In brief, I argue
that there are two distinct categories of "non-factories": artisan shops
and workshops. While the former signals the presence of a "distorted lower"
form, the latter is the " complete but lower" form of capitalist industrial
production. The dividing criterion of the "non-factory" types is, again,
the nature and organization of work.
I have discussed at length how and why the artisan shops and
workshops observed in underdeveloped countries like Turkey differ from
their counterparts in contemporary industrialized societies on the
one hand, and in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe on the
other. Now let us reconsider the proposition that in underdeveloped
countries there are two qualitatively distinct spheres of industrial
production in view of the "factory" and "non-factory" division.
MThe social-institutional web which surrounds the "non-factories"
is a qualitatively distinct collection of phenomena from that which
engulfs the factories-..In other words. the two-fold division in the
sphere of industrial production extends to other realms of the economy
and even the social order. It is in this connection that the "dualist"
proposition assumes philosophical significance. Underdeveloped countries
like Turkey can be appropriately referred to as displaying a "dual social
and economic order." Over and above the division among the industrial
firms, i.e., "factories" and "non-factories," we note a series of
segmentations of capital and capital markets, labor and labor
markets, and finally, products and consumer markets in view of their
connections with either the "lower" or the "higher" forms of capitalist
industrial production.
There is a division between "non-factory" and "factory" types
of industrial production connected capital. Instead of a single governing
average industrial profit rate, there are two: one for "factory" capital,
and the other for "non-factory" capital. Indeed, the two-fold nature
of the returns of capital stems from the two-fold nature of the technology
employed in industrial production in underdeveloped countries. In other
words, there are two categories of industrial technology: the sophisticated
and' expensive but up-to-date imported technology, and the simple, cheaper,
and modern but obsolete technology. The former is employed in factories,
and the latter in "non-factories." Connected to this segmentation in the
nature of capital, there occur radical differences in the conditions for
and in the mechanisms and sources of the supply of industrial credits.
Furthermore, the average amount of "non-factoryH capital is far smaller thani
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"factory" capital. Thus eventually, there evolves a two-fold phenomenon
in the process of capital accumulation. In "non-factories,", capital
accumulates more slowly and reaches smaller amounts than in "factories."
As in the case for average returns of capital, there are two
averages of the rate of labor productivity. This is reflected in the
wage structure. There is the category of factory labor where minimum and
above-minimum wages are paid, next to the category of labor employed
in "non-factories" where, as a rule, below the minimum wages are paid.
Furthermore, "factory" labor is organized into unions. "Non-factory"
labor is not. Consequently, the latter is subject to longer working hours,
poorer working conditions, less job security, higher turnover, and lack of
social security over and above lower wages.
Whenever factories and "non-factories" are found operating in the same
lines of industrial production, as a rule, the "non-factory" produced commod-
ities are inferior in quality and are cheaper than those produced in
"factories." In this connection, "non-factories" address themselves to the
needs of the "poor," whereas "factories" supply the "rich" and export.
Finally, all laws and regulations concerning "factories" and
"non-factories," are separate. Indeed, in Turkey there is an exception.
The same "Labor Law" is enforced upon "factories" and "non-factories'"
without distinction. Yet, since 1967, attempts are being made to alter
the situation. As a rule, there are separate provisions for "non-factories"
in the "Commercial Law,,, the "Petty Producers' Law" which lays the
foundations for the "Petty Producers' Associations" and their "Confederation,"
the "People's Bank" and the "Petty Producers' Credit Cooperatives" Law,
and the "Petty Production Department" of the Ministry of Technology
1
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nd Industry.
In view of all this, therefore, it can be safely concluded that
n underdeveloped countries like Turkey, there is a "dual" capitalist
ndustrial (and even socio-economic) structure.
2. The "Higher" Forms Of Capitalist Industrial Production
i.e., "Factories," As Transplants To, And The "Lower,"
Forms, i.e,, "Non-Factories'," As The Grass-Root
Developments Of The Underdeveloped Economies
Contemporary underdeveloped countries are qualitatively distinct
rom eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe on the one hand, and
,ntemporary industrialized societies on the other. To clarify this
mneral observation, there is the need to compare the essential features
the capitalist industrial situation in underdeveloped countries with
ie well known classic path for capitalist development.
In industrialized societies the conditions for the emergence
"higher" forms of capitalist industrial production were ripened
Irough a period of proliferation of "non-factory" types of production.
4anufacture produced the machinery" says Marx, "by means of which Modern
Ldustry abolished the handicraft and manufacturing systems in those spheres
: ptoduction that it first seized upon." But this was not all. Manufacture
Lso produced the necessary capital, entrepreneurial skills, the wage-
iborers, and the markets necessary for "factory" type production, through
ie faster processes of capital accumulation, proleterinization of labor,
Id markets enlargement.
In the beginning, in all industrialized societies, the "factory system"
as
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was, in a way, nursed by "non-factory" types of production. For
one thing, factories depended upon the artisan shops and workshops for
-the production of their technical base, i.e., the integrated machine systems.
It was only after machines could be produced in factories that the factory
system stood by itself, and reproduced itself. Examples of this
from the industrialized societies could fill volumes. Yet, this
sort of industrial transformation did not occur in underdeveloped countries.
Factories were, and still are introduced from the outside. As a rule, in
underdeveloped countries the factory system does not stand by itself, and
reproduce itself. But is it then, as happened in almost all
developed countries at one point or the other, that the domestic "non-factory"
type production is nursing the factory proper? In other words, is it that the
classic capitalist industrial transformation will occur, but a bit late?
Unfortunately, the answers to such questions are negative.
In underdeveloped countries, the factory system is imported, and it
is dependent upon the foreign production of machinery. There are steel mills,
sugar, cement, Coca Cola, and textile factories, and automobile assembly
plants, but there are no capital goods industries. Most of the technical base
for factory type production, and in some cases as in steel mills, the
entire system of machinery has to be imported. Furthermore, the processes
of industrial capital accumulation, proleterinization of labor, and markets
enlargement are distorted. The capital accumulated ln the domain of "lower" forms
of capitalist industrial production does not flow into the factory proper.
The "non-factory" connected labor pools swell but do not impinge upon
the markets for factory labor. And finally, in some cases, even the consumer
markets are partitioned between the "lower" and "higher" forms of capitalist
as, ul  ay, Ir r jt~u uy · ·rrvrr~racr;ur-y·· Lyyes pr proaucclon, rl~or
one thing, factories~ depended upon the artisan shops and workshops for
.t~he~production of their technical base, ie,, the integrated machine systems,
It:was only Eifter inachines ctoul;d be produced in factories that the factory
systemstood by itself, and reproduced itself, Examples of this
from the industrialized societies could fill volumes, Yet, this
sort of industrial transformation did not occur in underdeveloped countries.
Factories ~Jere, and still are introduced from the outside. As a rule, in
underdeveloped countries the factory system does not stand by itself, and
reproduce itself, But is it then, as happened in almost all
developed countries at one point or the other, that the domestic Inon-factory''
type production is nursing the. factory~ proper? In other words, is jit that the
classic capitalist industrial transformation will occur, but a bit late2
Unfortunately, the answers to such questions are negative,
In underdeveloped countries, the factory system is imported, and it
is dependent upon the foreign production of machinery, There are steel mills,
sugar, cement, Coca cqla, and textile factories, and automobile assembly
plants, but there are no capitalgoods industries, ost of the technical base
for factory type production, and in some cases as in steel mills, the
entire system of machinery has to be imported, Furthermore, the processes
of industrial capital accumulation, proleterinization of labor, and markets
enlargement are distorted, he capital ;IccwnuPatedln the omain f "lower" forms
of capitalist industrial production does not flow into the factory proper.
The "non-factoryt, connected labor pools swell but:do not impinge upon
the markets for factory labor. And finally, in some cases, even the consumer
mar~cets are partitioned between the "lower" and "higher" forms of capitalist
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industrial production.
In contemporary underdeveloped countries, therefore, the
development of the factory system is not rooted in the domain of *lower'
forms of capitalist production. Thus, being imported (dependent) and
divorced from the grass-roots capitalist transformations, the factory
system could not acquire a prominent role in the sphere of industrial
production. It exists side by side with the "lower" forms, and does
not hinder the proliferation of the latter. These are, in outline form,
the basic features of the historically unique capitalist industrialization
process under imperialism. The underdeveloped economy, if not the society,
is partitioned into two spheres.
It may be pointed that during and after the respective industrialization
processes of developed countries, there existed (and still exists) a sort
of "dualism" similar to the one observed in contemporary underdeveloped
countries: the simultaneous existence of the "lower" and "higher" forms
Sof capitalist industrial production. But it is obvious that such a similarityipertains to the appearance rather than the essence of the process of
industrialization in underdeveloped countries. Unlike the factory system
that is rooted in the domain of "lower" forms of capitalist industrial
production, and later supersedes "non-factories," in underdeveloped countries
like 'Turkey, what we have is a factory system which is a foreign
extension and co-exists with the "lower" capitalist forms. Indeed, in
industrialized societies, the growth of the factory system meant the decline
of the "non-factories". But, in underdeveloped countries, the growth of
the factory system does not mean the decline in the overall importance of the
"lower" forms of capitalist industrial production in the economy. The two
M
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distinct and historically antagonistic modes of capitalist industrial
production seem to proliferate side by side in their respective niches
of the economy. It is as if there is some kind of an unnegotiated peace,
a "glass-wall", between them. In other words, in the case of the developed,
industrialized, countries there occurred a process of industrial
development which had a "dual" appearance, but a "dialectical" essence.
In the case of contemporary underdeveloped countries like Turkey, however,
we are witnessing a process of industrial growth which not only has a
"dual" appearance, but also a "dual" essence.
-E .--
SECTION
HOW DID THE "FACTORY" AND "NON-FACTORY"
SPLIT OF TURKISH INDUSTRIES EMERGE AND
EVOLVE?
"...Siz sanatkarlarin ufak dukkanlariniz
yerine muhtegem fabrikalar yapildgiani
gbrdiiUgu guin (memnuniyet ve saadetim) en
hakiki ve en yiiksek derecesini bulacaktir."
("...-artisans, petty producers- when I
witness the emergence of spectacular
factories in place of your small shops
my satisfaction and happiness will reach
its ultimate degree.)
M. KEMAL ATATURK, addressing the petty
producers in Adana, 16 March 1923.
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CHAPTER VI
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION TWO
1. What Is This Section About?
The number of studies on Ottoman and Turkish economic history
grows as debates on current economic policies intensify. This is not
accidental, for in order to grasp the special character of Turkish
Capitalism it is necessary to investigate the process of its formation
and development.
In this section an account of the history of Turkish industrial
capitalism will be provided in order to clarify the underlying character of
the contemporary industrial situation in Turkey. But an unorthodox method
will be followed, and an often ignored issue will be focused upon: the
nature of the transformations in the modes of capitalist industrial
production, or, in other words, the "factory" and "non-factory" sectors of
industrial production.
I will argue that the special characteristics of Turkish industrialization
have been two-fold: the inability of the "lower" forms of capitalist
industrial production, i.e., "non-factories," to transform themselves
into' "higher" forms, i.e., "factories"; and the inability of the "imported
and transplanted" "higher" forms to connect with and replace or dominate the
"lower" forms. I will demonstrate that these characteristics can be traced
from the moment the first Ottoman "factory" appeared up until the present. In
other words,the available historical documentation on Ottoman and Turkish
industries will be reorganized in view of a new paradigm: the nature of Turkish
MM
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industrial development is such that the historically antagonistic forms
of production, i.e., "factories" and "non-factories", exist side by side
as if they are separated by a "glass-wall." In outlook, therefore, the
survey of Turkish industrialization provided in this section will neither
be an attempt to test hypotheses, nor an effort to shed light upon hitherto
unknown sources. It will only be an attempt to articulate a "dual" industrial
structure paradigm, or an effort to prepare the groundwork for future
research. Thus follows the need to adapt an unorthodox method.
2. The Special Character Of Turkish Industrial Capitalism:
"Dualist" Growth Rather Than "Dialectical" Transformation
I define industrial "dualism" as the co-existence of "factory" and
"non-factory" types of capitalist industrial production while the growth
and development paths of one do not cross over the other's. This situation,
however, is not a recent phenomenon. If anything, the interest in
"dualism" is recent. The study of the Turkish industrialization process sheds
light upon this point. In Turkey, industrial "dualism",as a condition, began
with the establishment of the first Ottoman "factory" and has continued up
to the present. In brief, "dual" capitalist industrial growth
was, and still is, the striking feature of Turkish industries.
' Under the Ottomans industrial "dualism" had a "non-market," "non-
capitalist" outlook. It flourished within the "State" and "Populace", or the
"ruler" and "ruled" division of a deteriorating social system which is often
referred to as the "despotic" or "Asiatic" form that did not permit
"grass-roots" capitalist industrial development. There was a decaying stock
of "non-factories," i.e., artisan-shops and workshops, which tried to cater to
i
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the needs of the "ruled," next to a peculiar stock of "imported and
transplanted factories" which were designed to meet the demands of the
"ruling establishment."
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the industrial "dualism"
observed in Turkey assumed a capitalist outlook. In the model of Turkish
"dualism" there exists a recovering and growing stock of "non-factories"
next to a simultaneously expanding collection of "factories," and there
are connections between the two sectors of industry. Yet, the nature of
the "factory" sector and its connections with "non-factories" are such
that "factories" neither replace nor dominate the lower forms of capitalist
industrial production, and "non-factories" flourish without transforming
themselves into higher forms. Indeed, in a sense, "dualism" was a condition
inherited from the Empire. But from the 1920's on the setting for industrial
change attained a clear capitalistic nature. The young Turkish Republic was
in the process of developing a market society. In brief, Turkish "dualism"
was different from Ottoman, and it displayed three distinct phases of
development: (1)reconstruction, (2)entrenchment and (3)proliferation.
Under the "liberal" economic policies of the 1920's "dualism"
was reconstructed as a capitalistic condition. The State took over the project
of establishing the stage for capitalist industrial development. Yet, the
actdrs, i.e., the Turkish petty producers, merchants and large-land owners,
could not and did not play their parts as depicted in the classic script.
Private industrial initiative proved to be too weak on the "factory" type of
industrial production front. Even with government assistance it failed to
increase the number of "factories." Thus, the State had to assume the role
of industrial entrepreneurship as well. In the meanwhile, however, the
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number of "non-factories" increased.
In the 1930-50 period, "dualism" became entrenched in the industrial
landscape. The major factor was the "etatist" industrial policy. On the
one hand, the weak industrial initiative affiliated with "lower" forms of
production was encouraged, and on the other hand, the State-run "factory"
sector supported rather than replacing or subordinating "non-factories."
Thus in 1950, there were about 155 factories, most of which were State-run,
next to a collection of about 85,000 artisan-shops and workshops. While
"factories" employed about 90,000 workers, "non-factories" employed
almost three times as many. Indeed, the "etatist" industrial policy had
fertilized both the State-run "factory" and private "non-factory" sectors
of industry.
In the 1950's, Turkish "dualism" took a new turn with "liberal"
policies and weak capitalist industrial initiative on the one hand, and
the penetration of foreign industrial capital on the other. Foreign
industrialists carved a "neo-industrialist" group affiliated with "factory"
type production from among the "non-industrial" capitalist elite, and by-passed
the "non-factory" affiliated "grass-roots" industrial potential. In the
1960's the "neo-industrialist" group took over the lead in "factory"
building from the State, and the number of private "factories" increased.
But,' they too left the domain of lower forms of capitalist industrial
production alone . The result was the same: a side by side proliferation
of the historically antagonistic forms of capitalist industrial production.
"Non-factories" multiplied in numbers, but the "non-factory" sector
failed to generate "factories" from within itself; and, the "imported and
0
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transplanted factories" remained dependent upon foreign capital and know-how,
and neither replaced nor subordinated the "lower" forms.
The rule of Turkish industrialization is clear."Factories" are
"imported and transplanted" and they do not tend to replace or subordinate
"non-factories," and the "non-factory" sector fails to generate "factories"
from within. This split in the modes of industrial production is important
for another reason. It generates further repercussions in the social order.
The consumer, capital and labor markets split into two as well. In other
words, with its roots in the sphere of industrial production, "dualism"
spreads into the rest of the social system. As one portion of the Turkish
society grows richer and more "modern" with its "factory" affiliations, the
other appears relatively poorer and slower to "modernize" with its "non-factory"
affiliations. In brief, it seems that the "non-factory" sector of industries
performs an historic mission. It rationalizes the unevenness of dependent
1
capitalist development in an underdeveloped setting.
As such, the Turkish "dualist" path for capitalist industrial
development contrasts sharply with the classic English and the classic
,"late-comer" models. Instead of"factories" emerging from within the domain
of "non-factory" types of industrial production and superseding them as
in nineteenth century England, or factories, after being transplanted,
connecting with the domain of petty production and transforming it as in
Japan, Turkish "factories" remain as transplants and neither replace
nor dominate the "grass-roots" capitalist initiative. As a rule, "factory"
capital does not accumulate in the domain of petty production, "factories"
do not compete with petty firms, petty firms do not sub-contract from "factoriest
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and "'factories" sell to but do not purchase from petty firms. In short,
in Turkey we have a "glass-wall" between the two historically antagonistic
forms of capitalist industrial production. Today, in the 1970's,
the "dual" structure of the Turkish industrial landscape is undeniable.
Yet, this is not to say that the "glass-wall" is there to stay
forever. indeed, there are few examples where "factories" replace or
subordinate "non-factories," i.e., where the "glass-wall" thins and melts
through direct competition and sub-contracts. Such developments are important
and need closer scrutiny. I believe that the clue to the last phase in
Turkish "dualism", i.e., its dissolution, lies here. At any rate, however,
both the political and economic importance of the long unattended industrial
garden below the "glass-wall," i.e., the domain of lower forms of capitalist
industrial production, is hard to ignore.
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CHAPTER VII
THE EMERGENCE OF INDUSTRIAL DUALISM AS A "NON-MARKET,"
"NON-CAPITALIST" PHENOMENON UNDER THE OTTOMANS
1. Some Features Of The Ottoman Social Order
To understand the Ottoman industrial measures and the industrial
landscape of the Empire in the late eighteenth, nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries better, some distinct features of the Ottoman
society must be reviewed.
The Ottoman society was divided into two broad groups: those who
partook in the ruling establishment, and those who were ruled. The ruling
establishment, i.e., the State, was merely a surplus expropriating mechanism
which thrived on the wealth generated in the spheres of industrial and
3
agricultural production, and on the capital accumulated through commerce.
It was not the least interested in how the surplus was produced 4 The size
of the surplus appropriated by the Ottoman State was directly proportional
to its military and political authority. In this sense, the Ottoman State
was despotic. As its military establishment grew stronger, its domain
of surplus collection and its revenues became larger. As its administration
becaie more efficient, the appropriation of surplus, and the distribution
of surplus among the Sultan and his "slaves"7(the "men of the pen" and
the "men of the sword" who exercised power in his name) became faster and
easier.
In order to maintain and strengthen the authority of the ruling
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institution, it was necessary to provide a wide range of goods which
were not readily available in the markets oriented towards the material
needs of those who were "the ruled." The army needed swords, saddles,
uniforms, rifles, cannons, gunpowder, &c., while the Imperial bureaucracy
could not do without pen, paper and ink. In other words, the ruling
institution had a completely different demand function for industrial
goods than the common people. As a consequence of this, there emerged a
split in the sphere of Ottoman industrial production which is hard to
ignore. On the one hand, there were the State-run and State-appropriated
industrial establishments, and on the other hand, there were the privately
run but popular demand oriented industrial establishments organized into
Guilds. Another important aspect of the Ottoman industrial landscape
was that the Ottoman State was there to slow down the spread of "first
complete" forms of capitalist industrial production if not to block
the path for their emergence.
In view of these general observations, it is possible to formulate
a set of working .hypotheses to guide a critical inquiry into the nature
of the process of industrialization in the Ottoman Empire. First, as
long as the Ottomani State existed in the form of a surplus expropriating
mechanism, changes in the industrial landscape could not follow a blue-print
for the development of capitalism. In the case of the State-run and
State-appropriated industries, either the capitalist or the profit
motive was missing. In the case of the privately run artisan shops and
workshops, on the other hand, both the Guilds and the State and its foreign
trade policies were obstacles to the accumulation of domestic industrial
capital. Second, since the Ottoman State was concerned with satisfying its own
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material needs rather than those of the "ruled," most of the
direct industrial measures had to relate to the State-run and State-
appropriated industries sector rather than the popular sector. Third,
since the "factory" type of industrial production could not have been
a product of the "non-capitalist" Ottoman industrial organization, it must
have been imported by the State for itself. Fourth, thus the "factory" and
"non-factory" duality in the Ottoman industrial landscape was a reflection
of the two-fold nature of the Ottoman society, and had to begin and remain
as a "non-market," "non-capitalist" phenomenon.
2. Attempts To Upgrade Ottoman "Non-Factories" In The
Late Eighteenth Century
The Ottoman efforts to keep up with the industrial developments
registered in Europe may be traced back to the second half of the eighteenth
century. Most importantly, Sultan Selim III introduced contemporary
European processes and equipment for the production of rifles, cannons,
9
mines, and gunpowder in the 1790's, and had initiated a few State-run
industrial establishments by 1804.0 Such attempts to upgrade the State-run
"non-factories" of the Empire can be interpreted as the first phase in the
unfolding of the Ottoman industrial policies, for they clearly mark the
"beginning of the end" of the Ottoman "non-factories." 1 1 In other
words, they stand as one of the first reactions of the ruling institution
to the industrial backwardness of the Empire. Furthermore, they display,
in an embryo form, the "import and transplant" blue-print for the Ottoman
(and later, Turkish) approaches to "factory building."
Er---hr~~·-~-_-_1P_~~ -  ...~_
ln the beginning of the nineteenth century there were no factories
in the Empire. This may be imputed from the available literature on Ottoman
industries. For instance, the Tophaneistanbul cannon foundry, and the
Dolmabahge,istanbul musket works were converted from animal to steam-power
only in the late 1830's 12 Again in istanbul, in the 1800's, the State
constructed ornate buildings to house woolen works, which were mistaken
13by later travellers for converted palaces. Furthermore, in the late 1830's,
it was possible to transform a part of the paper works in H~inkar Iskelesi,
istanbul to cloth manufacturing. Thus, it is possible to assert that in
the late eighteenth century the Ottomans were trying to upgrade and vitalize
the existing stock of State-run and State-appropriated "non-factories",
rather than start a new generation of State-run factories.
The importing of European "non-factory" connected know-how with the
purpose of refining the Ottoman State industries, however, was not an
unknown thing. As early as the fifteenth century, Sultan Mehmet II
employed Hungarian experts to caft the largest cannons of the times
as a part of his preparations for the siege of Istanbul, then called
15Constantinople. But in the eighteenth century the importing of European
know-how had a different significance. Unlike Europe, the technical base for
Ottoman "non-factory" types of industrial production had remained practically
unchanged since the fifteenth century. The capitalist ferment lacking,
the Ottoman ruling institution in the 1790's, was still using rifle, cannons,
mines, swords, cloth, paper, &c., which were produced in large Imperial
workshops like those described by Evliya gelebi in the seventeenth century.6
In brief, in the late eighteenth century the introduction of contemporary
European processes and equipment for the production of military goods meant
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the irnmorting of "non-factory" connected know-how in order to catch-up
with Europe, not to overwhelm it.
Sultan Selim III is often credited with starting the "westernization"
movement in the sphere of Ottoman industrial production. This view is
distorted, for the industrial measures of the 1790's and early 1800's have
nothing to do with either a "factory" building period, or a' concerted push
for industrialization. They were part and parcel of a larger set of military
reforms conceived to strengthen the central authority, rather than a set
17
of coordinated efforts to "westernize" the Ottoman industrial landscape.
They can be attributed, in part, to Sultan Selim III's "intense personal
interest."18 But no matter how the late eighteenth century Ottoman industrial
measures are assessed, they do not stand as a clear body of industrial
policies in and of themselves. Furthermore, they were restricted in scope
to "non-factories," and also ineffective.
3. The General Framework Within Which The "Factory"
And "Non-Factory" Split Of The Ottoman Industries
Began
Sultan Selim III's military reforms, and included in them his
industrial measures, generated reactions among the Janissaries, i.e., the
corp's of the standing army in istanbul. The Sultan was deposed in 1807,
and until the overthrow of the Janissaries in 1826, little happened
on the industrial front. Following this reactionary pause, however,
there developed the second stage of Ottoman industrial policies. It was
marked by attempts to "import and transplant" European "factory" connected
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know-how into the Ottoman industrial landscape (into the Ottoman State-run
industries sector in particular) on the one hand, and by efforts to
vitaliehethe Ottoman "non-factories" on the other.
Some of the State-run "factories" established during this period
managed to survive with subsidies well into the twentieth century. But
in general, the attempts to "import and transplant" "factories" into the
Ottoman industrial landscape turned out to be spectacular economic fiascos.
Attempts to vitalize the Ottoman "non-factories," on the other hand,
followed the initial attempts to build "factories." But again, they were
unsuccessful and ended abruptly.
Given the nature of the Ottoman social order, the economic and
political superiority of the European powers over the Ottomans, the
continuously mounting "factory" competition from abroad, the disarray of
the domestic "non-factory" connected capital and technology, and the inert,
of the foreign affiliated Ottoman merchants20and large land-holders 21
22in transforming their wealth into industrial capital, the success of the
Ottoman industrial measures in the nineteenth century would have been a
miracle. In brief, keeping up with the capitalist industrial developments
in Europe was impossible because it would have required reorganizing the
decaying stock of "non-factories" which never assumed a wide-spread capital
character, and starting a grass-roots "factory" building process through
"importing" "factory" connected know-how and "planting" it in Ottoman soil
behind protective tariff barriers.3 Nevertheless, the industrial measures
taken during the nineteenth century bore some fruit. "Factories" appeared n
to the decaying stock of "non-factories." This was the beginning of a
) 1_ 1
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-factory" and "non-factory" split in the Ottoman industrial landscape.
Now let us study more closely the industrial measures taken in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when the Ottoman Empire was
engulfed in political turmoil.
4. Attempts To Revive Ottoman "Non-Factories"' In The
Nineteenth Century
In 1864 and 1868, two comissions for Industrial Reform were
established to revive the Ottoman "non-factories."24The first comission
Sfailed to accomplish anything except to pave the way for the second, which
became instrumental in the formation of seven "non-factory" based Producer
j Cooperatives in Istanbul. This was the first Ottoman effort ever to
directly interfere with privately run "non-factories" outside the domain
of State-appropriated artisan shops and workshops. The second such attempt
came only after the 1908 Young Turk's coup d'Etat, and consisted of
t the abolition of the last remnants of the decaying Ottoman Guild system,
and the organization of petty producers within voluntary Artisan Societies
('Esnaf Cemiyetleri') in 190926
The reasons for the divergence from the centuries old Ottoman
practice of dealing with the privately run artisan shops and workshops
through Guilds outside the domain of the State Industries sector, however,
can not be easily explained with reference to the far-sightedness of the
members of the government. We know that they were naive insofar as their
economic views were concerned. 7 Their organization of the industrial
reform comissions may be partially attributed to the success of isolated
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* however, it is difficult to assess the reasons for their closing.
4 Establishment of the Industrial Reform Comissions was not the only
step taken to deal with the privately run Ottoman "non-factories." In
341862, customs duties were increased from five to eight per cent. In 1863,
35 36
an Industrial Fair, and in 1867, a school for Industrial Reform were
* opened in istanbul. Unfortunately, however, these measures were not only
marginal, but also late. They did not alter the conditions which had been
paving the way for the collapse of the Ottoman industries since the 1838
£ Anglo-Turkish Trade Convention. This convention had removed the last Ottoman
Stariff barriers which obstructed the flow of European goods into the Empire.
UA
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contemporary industrial efforts elsewhere in the Empire. It may also be
seen as an imitation of the European cooperative movements. Furthermore,
the rapidly mounting complaints of the ruined petty producers, including
29
among them the ex-janissaries, can be considered as decisive. Indeed, the
move to establish cooperatives stands as an action designed to muffle a
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r conternorary industrial efforts elsewhere in the Empire It may also be
seen as an imitation of the uropean cooperative ovements, urthermore,
r the rapidly mounting complaints of the ruined petty producers, including
9
among them the ex-janissaries can be considered as decisive, Indeed, the
move to establish cooperatives stands as an action designed to muffle a
potential popular unrest in Istanbul. Yet, all in all, in the absence of
adequate research a plausible explanation for the policy to establish
Producer Cooperatives can not be forwarded.
Aside from the petty producers directly involved, the State and
some individual donors contributed capital towards the finance of these
30
cooperatives. Various measures for protection and encouragement were
31 32impending. Yet, one after another these cooperatives closed down.
Consequently, in 1874, the second comission for Industrial Reform was
dissolved, and its duties were transferred to the istanbul Municipal
Administration.33As with the reasons for the emergence of these cooperatives,
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Dishe-?rtened by the experiments confined to istanbul, therefore, the
'Tanzimat' Men shelved the plans and measures to reorganize the
"non-factories," and left them on their own.
5. Attempts To "Import And Transplant" Factories In The
Nineteenth Century
As efforts to revive the decaying stock of privately run Ottoman
"non-factories" took shape and failed, the "import and transplant"
strategy for "factory" building had already borne some fruit during
the 1830-50 period. Indeed, the Ottoman "factory" building attempts began37
soon after the overthrow of the Janissaries in 1826. By the end of
the nineteenth century, the Ottomans had built about 30 or more "factories."
The State, however, was not-directly involved in the construction of all
of them. There were some private "factory" building efforts as well. Yet,
let us first make clear the scope and nature of the State's "factory"
building projects.
In 1827, a spinning mill was built near Eyiip, istanbul.8 In 1826
an order of 50,000 fezes was secured from the 'Beylerbeyi' of Tunis, and in
1835 a fez factory was opened in Istanbul. In the 1830's the Tophane,
Istanbul cannon foundry, and the Dolmabahqe, Istanbul musket works were
40
converted from animal to steam power, while a tannery and boot works in Beykoz,
Istanbul were improved41 In the same period besides two military cloth
factories (one in Izmit and the other in islimiye) 42a new saw-mill and
a copper sheet rolling mill were established in Tophane, istanbul43 These are
listed among the early attempts to "import and transplant" European industrial
know-how into the Empire. Probably, like the tannery and boot works in Beykoz
Mi I I
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and the saw-mill in Tophane, among these industrial establishments there were
many "non-factories." Yet in the absence of adequate information, not
much may be argued on this score.
In the following decade, in the 1840's, the State factory building
efforts peaked. In the second half of the nineteenth century, however,
the pace for factory building slowed and eventually came to'a halt as the
factories built in the 1830's and 1840's faltered and became a burden on
the State.
The seemingly most ambitious among the 1840's generation of factory
projects was the istanbul Complex. In 1842 an agricultural and industrial
complex similar to contemporary "industrial parks" was started between
Yedikule,istanbul and Kiicik (ekmece! 4 It was spread over a nine-mile long
45
strip of land along the Istanbul-Edirne road. It had two manufacturing
centers. The more important core was near Zeytinburnu:
" (It contained) a foundry and machine works designed for
the production of iron pipe, steel rails, plows, bits,
stirrups, locks, lanceheads, cannon, swords, knives, razors
and other forgings and castings of any desired complexity
or quantity. One section was built to produce cloth and
cotton stockings. Workers were housed in a two-story barracks
650 feet long, and the entire impressive unit was enclosed
by walls approximately one-half mile in circumference." 46
The second core was in Bakirkiy:
"(It had) a factory to spin, weave and print calicoes,
another iron works with a furnace and two forges, a steam-
driven machine shop, and a boatyard equipped for the
construction of small steamships. The furnace was immediately
adjacent to a pre-existing gunpowder works, a fact which
prompted more cynical observers to predict an expansive,
even explosive future." 4 7(Indeed, in 1848, not this one
but a similar gunpowder works in Kucuk Cekmece, further
west, blew up.)
49
All in all, with a model-farm around Yegilk6y, the already existing
gunpowder works in KUcik Cekmece (the one that later blew up), and a salt
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50ing basin near Yedikulegstanbul, this istanbul Complex
"appeared destined to become a Turkish Manchester Leeds, a Turkish
Birmingham and Sheffield, all four in one."51But by the mid-nineteenth
century the project folded. Furthermore, most of the industrial establishments
in this complex were not real "factories." This can be imputed from the
descriptions. Nevertheless, during the 1840's there were other projects
besides the Istanbul Complex. Clark E.C. provides the following
account:
" Apparently part of the same governmental program of the
1840's were several more manufacturing facilities... Among
these were a tannery set up at Selvi Burnu (Silivri?) in
1841, a wool-weaving section added to the Istanbul Feshane
in 1843, a steam-driven stamping machine installed the
same year in the Imperial Mint, an iron foundry established
north of Istanbul at Besiktas in 1844, and a porcelain
factory to be constructed alongside the Bosporus at about
the same time.Farther from Istanbul a state factory reportedly
produced coarse wool cloth at Balikesir from 1842, a paper
factory was established in Izmir by 1844, and measures were
taken early in the 1840's to improve cannon-ball casting
foundries at Samako in Bulgaria. A new powder mill was built
in Baghdat in 1842-7, and toward the end of the decade
additional large sums were spent on blast-engines and furnaces
for copper smelting at Tokat... Almost certainly this list
is yet incomplete.,, 52
We may add three other factories to this list: a cloth factory in Izmit53
54and a cotton mill in Hereke established during the 1840's, and a steam
powered silk-reeling mill set up in Bursa in 1850.5
Both the realization and management of these projects were assigned to
a few Ottoman Christians who were on good terms with the State and had
foreign connections. For example, the entire istanbul Complex, the izmit
cloth factory, and the Hereke cotton mill were set up and managed by one
Armenian family: the Dadians.6 But as the projects which they were entrusted
with failed, they were removed from office and their property was seized57
m
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Furthprmore, not only all the machinery had to be imported, but also,
59the factories had to be put together by foreign craftsmen and detail-workers.
For example:
"...In Istanbul alone were to be found foreign draftsmen,
erectors, fitters* pattern makers, moulders, boilmakers,
engine-smiths, coal viewers, steam engineers, blast-furnace
keepers, puddlers, bar-iran rollers, smiths, turners,
millwrights, plate rollers and ship-builders.,60
The nature of the Ottoman markets in "non-factory" labor 6 1 generated problems
in recruiting workers, as well as in employing them, "efficiently" in the
factories.2 Another problem was the supply of raw materials, for the raw material
sources of the Empire were undeveloped. Thus, again the foreigners had to
63
come to the rescue. In brief, the Ottoman State factories were truly
64dependent. But of course, this does not mean that these factories were
economically feasible. For one thing, they were designed to meet the demand
of the ruling institution rather than the demand of the "ruled." The
"green-house conditions" to permit these "transplants" to stand on their
own feet were absent. In other words, without substantive tariff barriers,
a market in factory labor, domestic technology and skills to use in factory
building, developed industrial raw material sources, and large markets,
the Ottoman State factories were destined to fail. Thus, whenever heavy
State subsidies were not forthcoming they either remained idle or closed down.
It is the stock of such State factories, and some privately run
factories built before World War I that constituted the factory sector
of the Ottoman industries.
If State factories survived the lack of "green-house conditions,"
they did so because of State subsidies. The privately-run factories of the
Empire, however, were to be economically feasible within an environment
L.
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impossible for capitalist ventures to survive in; but, how?, If
private factories were established in the Empire, then what accounts for
their economic soundness? Were they miracles put forth by a non-existing
strata of Ottoman industrial entrepreneurs? The answer to this seemingly
paradoxical situation is simple. The privately-run Ottoman factories did
not survive despite the backwardness of the economy, but rather
because of it. In brief, they thrived upcn the industrial dependency of
the Empire. To make this important point clear, we have to put the facts
in order.
Almost all the privately-run factories in the Empire were established
by foreigners. In 1845, Falkeisen, a Swiss, established the first silk-
spinning factory in Bursa.5 By 1855 there were about ten privately-run
silk-spinning factories around it.6 Pasabahce,istanbul candle and stearin
67factory was a French concern. The Beykozistanbul paper factory was built
68
with English capital. The Kartal, istanbul canning factory was an Anglo-Swiss
69joint venture. Furthermore, the new glass factory established in Beykoz ,
70
Istanbul in 1890 was also a foreign enterprise.
Another important aspect of these factories was that they were
not designed to compete against foreign consumer goods in all markets
of the Empire. For instance, the Beykoz paper and glass factories, the
Kartal canning establishment, and the Payabahqe candle and stearin industry
addressed themselves primarily to the needs of the members of the
ruling establishment and of the State itself. It was a curious -situation.
The State was going to appropriate the surplus from the populace, and the
foreign entrepreneurs were going to profit from the demand created within
the ruling institution during and after this process.
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Indeed, there were some intermediary-goods-producing industries
appearing in raw materials rich regions like Bursa and Adana, and in
export ports like Izmir and Beirut. Yet, these privately run factories
were designed to undertake the initial processing of the Ottoman raw
materials before their export to Europe. For instance, the Bursa
silk-spinning factories were not complemented with Ottoman silk-weaving
71industries. Also, the cotton gins and presses in Adana and izmir processed
72
cotton for European textile-mills.
6. Attempts To Upgrade Ottoman Industries In The Early
Twentieth Century
From the 1850-60's until the 1908 coup d'Etat of the Young Turks ,
there existed hardly any industrial measures either to support the "factory"
building efforts at large, or to reorganize the stock of "non-factories."
But from 1908 on (until World War I ), some attempts were made to upgrade
Ottoman industries in general.
73In 1909, the Ottoman Guild System was officially abolished, and in
its place the voluntary Artisan Societies ('Esnaf Cemiyetleri') were
instituted. 4 The second important industrial measure taken in this period
was the issuing of the 1909 and 1913 Laws for the "Encouragement of Industry,"
which "stipulated facilities for investors as regards acquisition of land
and exemptions from taxes and customs duties on imported raw materials,
fuel and machinery."75 Finally, in 1913 and 1915 a census of the Ottoman
Industries was taken. Before these efforts could bear fruit , however,
the Empire collapsed upon its defeat in the World War.
|
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7. An Evaluation Of Ottoman Industrial Policies In
The Ninreteenth And Early Twentieth Centuries
The study of Ottoman industrial measures in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries makes it clear that Ottoman attempts to "import
and transplant" "factories" preceded efforts to reorganize the privately
run "non-factories" sector of industry. In other words, the .Ottomans
established "factories" before trying to solve the problems of the privately
run artisan shops and workshops which were not only without a sound economic
basis, but also without an effective organization. This, however, was
neither a question of strategy, nor a matter of choice. It bears directly on
the nature of the Ottoman State, and its stubborn struggle to retain
itself in whatever guise was available.
Industrial development was never seen, perhaps with the exception of
the Young Turks, as a goal in its own right. It remained as a means of
supplementing the authority of the ruling institution which thrived upon
surplus appropriation. Thus as a rule, the Ottoman State-run "factories"
were neither intended to cater to the material needs of the populace, nor
designed to break the spell of foreign "factory" competition in the domestic
markets of the Empire. In this connection, Clark E.C. observes the following,
perhaps with unnecessary cautions
"The bulk of the new Ottoman manufactures of the 1840's
was consumed by the military and the palace, and it can
be assumed that Ottoman industrial objectives in that
decade at least temporarily excluded the civilian market.
Nevertheless, some excess silks from Hereke did reach the
civilian market through a government store in Istanbul, and
fezes from the Feshane were retailed. Also, according to
an announcement made in 1845, the new foundries west of
Istanbul were so successful that the public was invited
to place orders for iron castings, forgings and other metal
workings. These civilian sales and services were exceptions,
L _ _
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for foreign importers reportedly neither anticipated
nor encountered much competition."7
Ottomans were bound to fail where Muhammed Ali of Egypt had
77
succeded a decade ago. Under the objective conditions of the Ottoman
economy at large, the ruling establishment could not have secured anything
close to industrial self-sufficiency for itself, let alone for the Empire
as a whole. Already in 1838 the Ottoman State had abandoned most of its
monopolies and levelled its tariff barriers. In brief, foreign help which the
Ottomans used to contain Muhammed Ali had borne the reasons why they could
not possibly repeat the Egyptian example of setting up a network of State-
monopolies behind protective tariffs 8. Consequently, as Clark E.C. sums up,
"Not even Ottoman military self-sufficiency was remotely
approached, however, and by 1848 half-completed or idle
Ottoman factories and rusting equipment were ominous
signs of impending disaster... With the Crimean War came
the first European loans and Ottoman indeptedness, and
the Porte was forced to abandon the greater part of its
industrial program." 79
How are we going to account for the Ottoman attempts to build factories
in the nineteenth century? Were they entertainments for the Sultan? Were
they a part of an all out attempt to "Westernize" the industrial landscape
of the Empire? Or, were they unwitting efforts of the ruling institution,
i.e., the State, to sustain an industrial and military self-sufficiency in order
to keep the status-quo, i.e., the age old practice of surplus appropriation
by force and decree? The pattern suggested by the Ottoman State-factory
80building practices, the example of Muhammed Ali in setting-up an economically
81
sound network of State-monopolies, the neglect of the domestic popular
82demand for consumer goods, attempts to build factories before considering
the problems of the decaying stock of privately-run artisan shops and
83
workshops, and finally, starting factories without calculating their economic
MM
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feasibilities in the absence of tariff protections, developed raw material
sources, technical know-how, and a tradition of industrial entrepreneurship,
all point to the following assessment of the Ottoman "factory" building
attempts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The Ottoman State did not care about the collapse of privately
run artisan shops and workshops, for it was ambivalent towards foreign
competition at home. It was a despotic State. Satisfying the material
needs of the populace was not a problem. The problem was to maintain the
status-quo, and since the reform of the State-run and State-appropriated
"non-factories" proved ineffective, there was only one industrial measure
left to supplement the State's authority. The stock of State-run and State-
subsidized "non-factories" had to be renewed by "importing and transplanting"
"factories." Thus in brief, the Ottoman State was not in "factory" building
for profits. The economic feasibility of the projects, plans and programs
was not an issue. State subsidies were always there when needed. Finally,
the economic impasse of the Empire at large did not weigh heavily as a
problem for the State, for its major problem was to arrest the erosion
of its authority. As long as the Sultanate survived, the house of Osman
remained intact and the State machinery operated, despite the fact that
the Empire had turned into an outright colony of Europe and was appropriately
called the "sick man of Europe," the Ottomans saw themselves as successful.
In a sense, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the Ottoman
Empire have all "imported and transplanted" "factory" connected know-how. They
were all "late comers." It was only in the Ottoman Empire, however, that "factory"
L
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building was not associated with an accelerated capitalist industrial
development process. This is not surprising, for it was only in the Ottoman
Empire that the "grass-roots capitalist industrial transformations"' were
absent. The Ottoman artisan shops and workshops were exposed to foreign
competition, and they were not merely declining, they were collapsing. In other
words, when in the nineteenth century, the European factory-connected know-how
was imported, the Ottoman "non-factories" were in shambles. Thus, in the
Ottoman experience of "importing and transplanting" factories, the issue
was not how the domestic "non-factory" types of industrial production were
going to connect with the imported type. The issue was whether the imports
were going to survive in the "non-capitalist" Ottoman industrial landscape
or not. Indeed, the necessary conditions for factory type industrial production
to take roots were absent. There was strong foreign competition at home
from European industries, and it was connected with the interests of an
entrenched strata of Ottoman and foreign merchants. 4 Protective tariff barriers
85
were absent, and it was difficult to raise new ones. The capital markets -.
were under foreign controls. 6 The group of potential industrial entrepreneurs
among the ranks of Ottoman petty producers and petty traders was as flimsy as
the accumulation of industrial capital through productive work could be in
an economy that was in absolute shambles. Furthermore, there was the inertia
of big merchants and large land-holders to transform their wealth into
industrial capital. Ottoman industrial know-how was archaic. 8 Organized
89labor markets did not exist. The industrial raw material sources of the
90Empire were either undeveloped, or under foreign control. The transportation
and communications networks were inadequate, and were shaped by foreign
concerns to facilitate direct exports of industrial raw materials such
M
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as cotton and silk rather than to connect the internal markets of the Empire
to each other. 2 Finally, the social peculiarities of the Ottoman society
as reflected in the formal and informal institutions were antithetical to
the kind of social environment which fertilized the "grass-roots capitalist
industrial development" processes elsewhere in Europe, and there survived
most stubbornly and for a very long time a typical Asiatic form of "despotic"
State.
These conditions,which made it improbable for imported factory
know-how to take roots, were also the conditions which rendered impossible
the beginning of "grass-roots" capitalist transformations from within
the privately run "non-factory" sector of Ottoman industries. In brief,
the "green-house"' condition needed to grow the foreign seeds on the
Ottoman soil were absent, and the native plants of the economy were
rotting. Nevertheless, we know that the Ottoman factories emerged next to
a deteriorating stock of "non-factories." The State-run factories turned
out to be economic fiascos, but with the aid of heavy subsidies some
managed to survive and fertilize the twentieth century generation of
Turkish State-run factories. The privately run Ottoman factories, on the
other hand, flourished as the Empire declined, but tended to disappear
from the industrial picture when the Empire gave birth to the Turkish Republic
in the 1920's.
Indeed, the "factories" and "non-factories" of the Empire
constituted a peculiar industrial landscape. They existed side by side
without connections. Now, let us try to estimate the scope of this split
within Ottoman industries.
Mm I
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8. An Estimate Of The Scope Of The "Factory" And "Non-Factory"
Split In The Ottoman Industrial Landscape In The Early
Twentieth Century -Circa 1915'i-
According to the 1913-1915 census of Ottoman :industries, there
were some 282 large industrial establishments 93employing 14,060 workers
94
in the Western Anatolian provinces of the Empire in 1915. Of this total,
95
however, 18 were auxiliary firms ('tali mUessese' in Turkish); and
of the remaining 264, some 249 employed machinery96while only 182 were
under operating conditions when surveyed.7 Comparing the 1913-1915 Census
with other sources, Eldem V. concludes that the total number of larger
industrial establishments in all the provinces of the Empire was about 835
in 19158 According to Eldem V., these establishments employed a total
work force of 38,8009 If the descriptions of Ottoman industries
in general, and the accounts of the factories in particular are considered,
however, the total number of factories (as defined in this study) may be
put somewhere between 30 and 40. 100In brief, therefore, not only the descriptions
and accounts of the Ottoman industrial situation since the beginning of the
101
nineteenth century, but also the findings of the 1913-1915 Census make it
clear that the 282 larger industries surveyed in 1915 comprised many
workshops. Consequently, neither the number of factories, nor the size
of the factory connected labor force may be documented once and for all.
.Yet, it may be estimated. All in all, the 30-40 factories combined could not
have employed more than 5,000 workers.0 2 The number of the "non-factories," i.e.,
the artisan shops and workshops, and the size of the "non-factory" connected
labor force, on the other hand, are neither accounted for in the 1913-1915
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Censur103 nor included in the other sources on Ottoman industries. This
makes it more difficult to forward an educated guess. On this score, Ravndal
iG.B., the American Consul General in istanbul, refers to official
statistics for the year 1921, and notes the following:
,,...(The 1913-1915 Cenaus) evidently takes no account of
the thousands of small shops, comparable to the village
blacksmith shops in the United States, which are scattered
throughout the country and which appear to have been includi_
in the following statistics for Asiatic Turkey (Anatolia)
only, prepared by the Ministry of National Economy for the
year 1921:
NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND THEIR WORKERS IN
ASIATIC TURKEY, 1921
Industry No. of Laborers
Establishments
Textiles 20,057 35,316
Curing of skins 5,347 17,964
Metallurgy 3,272 8,021
Lumber Industry 2,067 6,007
Food Products 1,274 4,493
Potteries and Cement 704 3,612
With the exception of certain abortive efforts at manufacturing,
made necessary by the World War and the ensuing Turko-Greek
War, nothing in the nature of industrial development transpired
between 1915 and 1921. On the contrary, military mobilization
restricted industry, and the restriction became more severe
after 1919 when the Greek occupation of the Smyrna region
temporarily severed from Turkey an area rich in developed
natural resources and relatively advanced industrially. It
is difficult, therefore, to concede that the figures for
1921 represent anything more than very liberal estimates,
even after making allowance for the inclusion in them of
household spinning, weaving, tanning, tinkering, etc."104
The official statistics to which Ravndal G.B. refers puts the total
number of industrial establishments in Turkey at 32,721, and the number
of the total active labor force at 75,413 in 1921. Certainly these figures
include factories over and above the ,Inon-factories."t Furthermore, as
cautioned by Ravndal, there are two other points to be considered. First,
this 1921 account reflects the impacts of World War I and the Independence
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Wars (1919-1923) upon industry. Second, it excludes the Turkish
territory occupied not only by the Greeks, but also by the English (the
istanbul-izmit area and the Dardanalles), the French (the Adana-Antep
area), the Italians (the Antalya area), and the Russians and Armenians
(the Kars-Ardahan area). Nevertheless, going through the descriptions of
106
Turkish industries in the 1920's 06 and keeping in perspective the various
indirect accounts referring to Ottoman "non-factories" in the nineteenth
century, it can be safe to assume that there must have been more than
40-45,000 artisan shops and workshops employing up to 100,000 workers in
the Anatolian provinces of the Empire circa 1915. In summary then, no matter
how slight it is, the "factory" and "non-factory" split of Ottoman industries
circa 1915 can be estimated.
With liberal allowances, the Ottoman industrial situation circa 1915
can be summarized as follows:
TABLE I
AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF "FACTORIES" AND "NON-FACTORIES"(ARTISAN SHOPS
AND WORKSHOPS) AND THEIR WORKERS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, CIRCA 1915
Type of Industrial Total Number Of Total Number Of
Production Establishments Workers
FACTORY* 40 (% 0.1) 5,000 (% 4.8)
NON-FACTORY** 40,000 (% 99.9) 100,000 (% 95.2)
(Artisan shop,
Workshop)
TOTAL 40,040 (% 100.0) 105,000 (% 100.0)
Sources (compared):(1) bkiin, Giinduz A.. Osmanli Sanayii: 1913, 1915 Ylllarl
Sanayi Istatistiki. Ankara: A.U.S.B,.F Yay. No. 299, 1970. (2) Eldem, Vedat.
Osmanl1 Imparatorluunun tktisadi ýartlarl Hakkinda Bir Tetkik. Ankara: it
Bankasi KtiltUr Yay., 1970. (3) Ravndal, G. Bie. Turkey: A Commercial and
Industrial Handbook. Washington, D.C.: Government Pr. Office, Trade Promotion
Series No. 28, 1926.
(9) The figures for Ottoman "factories" are the maximum of my estimates
(**) The figures for Ottoman "non-factories" are the minimum of my estimates.
Such a distortion is necessary in order to illustrate the "factory' and
"nonrfactory" split of the Ottoman industries better.
__ __111________~_~__ ~_~ ~_~_
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CHAPTER VIII
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL DUALISM AS A
CAPITALIST PHENOMENON: THE LIBERAL YEARS, 1923-30
1. Changes In The Nature Of The Turkish Ruling Institution
The collapse of Ottoman industries in the nineteenth century was
followed by the collapse of the Empire itself in the twentieth. The
Turkish nation-state emerged upon the ruins of the Empire in 1923. This
was a principal break from the centuries old Ottoman political legacy.
The new Turkish State, though still a continuation of the Ottoman ruling
institution in certain respects, was quite distinct in outlook. It
could no longer be a "despotic surplus expropriating mechanism" as the
Ottoman State was. The expansion of the young Republic's state revenues
through conquests and heavy taxation without regard to how surplus is produced
in agriculture, industry and commerce was impossible. In other words, the
Turkish State had to come to terms with the political economic reality
of the times: the State has to tend the production of surplus in order to
increase its revenues. But it was quite distinct from its European counterparts
as well. In Europe, the commercial and industrial interest groups had
already assumed the reigns of the government, and they were busy tailoring
policies to suit their particular interests by the nineteenth century. In Turkey,
however, the government of the 1920's was not formed upon a comparable internal
class and interest group struggle. The young Turkish State was a product
of the Turkish reaction to the outright colonization attempt of the Europeans.
It was an organization of self-assigned and self-selected Turkish nationals
_______~____1_11 ~______
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expel the foreign intruders. Thus, in the absence of a clear class base,
and with a national emergency at hand, the Turkish government under the
2
leadership of ex-Ottoman officials, functioned as the brain, heart and
muscle of the people rather than as the "executive" of a particular class
or interest groups.
Given this legacy, once the national sovereignty was secured the
initial bureaucrat and technocrat inspired "national front" had either to
commit itself to another national emergency, or to assume for itself a
clear class base. But in the 1920's the sphere of industrial production
did not produce a vociferous group of entrepreneurs. The Turkish industrial
-entrepreneurs were petty producers who controlled only small and
disjointed pools of capital. Similarly, the Turkish merchants were petty
traders. In short, there was no strong and organized group of capitalists
to either assume the reigns of government, or inspire a new course for
government policy. Indeed, the lack of a.group of capitalists as such meant
the absence of organized labor. Thus, workers' control over the
state machinery was out of the question. There was only one group
capable of overrunning the bureaucrat and technocrat controlled and inspired
government: the land-holders. Yet, they were interested more in keeping
theit property rights and local influence over the peasantry intact, than
gaining control of the State machinery. Since the outside threat upon
their land had disappeared, they expected to be left alone and did not want
to interfere'with others. In short,, there was hardly a group willing and
capable of taking over the reigns of government from the ex-Ottoman officials.
The pashas, bureaucrats and teqhnwcrats who had inspired the
L
M
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"national front", and came to hold the reigns of government were faced
with a dilemma. Either a new ruling establishment similar to the Ottoman
State could be formed and imposed upon the populace, or upon securing the
tacit approval of the different groups, a State modelled after the European
3
examples could be established. The former appeared possible, but it was
4 5
unrealistic. The latter, however, was difficult to realize, .and there was
the need for another national emergency.
With national reconstruction an undeniable problem ahead, and the
success of the Turkish independence struggle behind, the bureaucrats and
technocrats of the "national front" declared that the "industrialization
6
and Westernization" of Turkey was a national emergency. Thus both their leading
role in the Turkish government, and the "populist outlook" of the young
State were retained. Insofar as there seemed to be no group or class in the
way of another during this new emergency, it was deemed most appropriate
to forward a "populist" ideology , and later, to tailor it into "Etatism."
It is important to grasp this change in the character of the ruling
institution, for it marks clearly the emergence of a body of industrial
measures which were taken with the aim of developing the national economy
at large, rather than strengthening the hand of a "despotic surplus
expropriating machine." In other words, industrial measures which may be
referred to as a definite "industrial policy" emerged, for the first time
in Turkish history, as the new Turkish State emerged in the 1920's. Now
let us study the unfolding of the Turkish industrial policies, and trace
the changing nature of the "factory" and "non-factory" split in the Turkish
industrial landscape.
I
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And "Non-Factory" Split Of The Turkish Industries
Assumed a Capitalist Nature
During the 1920's, it was hoped that if the State provided some
factory building initiative8 besides encouraging and protecting industries
in general, then the "non-factories" would pick-up and the privately-run
factories would emerge on their own. But the necessary conditions to
make such a liberal policy successful were absent.
The stock of Turkish "non-factories" was in absolute shambles. The
Ottoman Guild system had been abolished in 1909, but the artisan shops
and workshops were literally thrown into an undeveloped capitalist industrial
situation without either protections or an effective organization. The raw
material, labor,and capital markets were small and unorganized. The consumer
a
markets, on the other hand, were flooded with fqreign goods. Furthermore,
tWorld War I, and the ensuing Turkish mobilization for national sovereignty,
together with the exodus of Greek, Jewish and Armenian merchants and petty
tproducers (the entrepreneurial elite of the Empire) had further eroded the
stock of Ottoman "non-factories."10The number of artisan shops and workshops
was at a record low. Also the indigenous technology for "non-factory" types
of industrial production had been practically unchanged since the eighteenth
century, perhaps with the exception of a limited set of detail-machines
imported in the second half of the nineteenth century. In brief, the Turkish
"non-factory" connected labor, capital, technical know-how, entrepreneurial
skills, raw material and even consumer pools were local in character and
almost dry in the early 1920's. Indeed, the Republic had inherited a stock
of "non-factories" in ruins. It consisted of artisan shops and workshops
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which naa managea u V bu.rvLve roreign competitlon, wars, scarcity or laoor,
flimsy demand, expensive raw materials, heavy tax burdens and exteremely
low profit rates. Such were the 32,721 industrial establishments reported
11by the Ministry of National Economy in 1921.
The stock of "factories", on the other hand, was not in a better
situation. The Turkish government took over six Ottoman State-factories
12besides the exclusively military works of the Empire. Some of the privately-
13
run Ottoman factories disappeared together with the Empire , but the twelve
14foreign controlled industrial establishments remained. Indeed, there was
a clear need for a new generation of factory building efforts. Yet, the
external factors needed to make factory type industrial production feasible
were missing, and the Turkish government could not afford
economically unsound factory projects. To establish the necessary "green-house
conditions" for factory type production to take roots there were many
things to accomplish: national industrial credit pools had to be established;
industrial legislation had to be prepared and, other institutions conducive
for "rapid Westernization" had to be cultivated via in depth social reforms;
markets had to be integrated; and, raw material sources had to be developed.
In order to realize the bulk of the technical infrastructure and to build
factories, however, not only foreign know-how but capital appeared indispensable.
This' was another problem, for foreign factory competition and foreign
interference in economic policy were not extinct altogether. For example,
foreigners controlled 82 companies besides the 12 industrial establishments
in 1924.15 Protective tariff barriers could not be raised immediately after
independence. Also, there was the issue of the Ottoman debts.
In short, a "laissez-faire" policy could not have generated privately
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run ,,factories" in the 1920's. On the one hand, there was hardly any
entrepreneur capable of undertaking large industrial risks under the
objectie cofditdio fthe times. On :the other hand, the conditions
needed to make privakt'• industrial initiative profitable were absent.
Indeed, the government could have started some factory building initiative,
which it did, 17but it was impossible to launch a large scale State factory
building program that could have had economic feasibility. There was one
obvious reason. The government was busy establishing the necessary
infrastructure for factory type industrial production. It could not have
built both the factories and the conditions for their success at the time.
Consequently, the liberal attitude towards industrialization in the 1920's
was destined to mean: "let the petty producers do what they can."
3. Industrial Measures Taken In The 1920's
The major industrial measures which mark the Turkish industrial
policy of the 1920's are as follows: organization of a forum to sort out
the economic problems of the Republic; some State initiative to build
factories in cooperation with industrial entrepreneurs; and, some
industrial legislation including a law designed to encourage private
industrial initiative.
The 1923 Economic Congress in izmir was the Forum where the overriding
problems of Turkish industrial production were voiced, and suggestions for
government action drafted. It laid down the following principles for
industrial policy:
".. :(a) promotion of legislation for the encouragement
of industry, and, in particular, changes in the customs
iM
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tariff according to the development needs of national
industry; (b) preference rates in land and sea transport
for local produce; (c) creation of better credit facilities
for industry; (d) technical instruction and education, and
training of engineers for industry."18
In 1924, a law "exempted raw materials for export industries from
duties."19 In 1925, "new regulations defined the legal status of professional
associations of craftsmen (the petty producers), which were'henceforth to
be under the control of Chambers of Commerce and the Ministry of National
Economy." 20 In the same year a government decree committed state agencies
and enterprises to purchase "local produce if its price did not exceed
that of foreign produce by more than 10 per cent." 21 inally in 1927, the
summary Law for the Encouragement of Industry was passed22 This was the
most important industrial measure of the decade along with some government
attempts to initiate factory building. It stipulated four types of privately-
23
run industrial enterprises: (1)firms with at least 10 HP motors, on the
average, and 1,500 work-days yearly; (2)firms with less than 10 HP motors,
but at least 1,500 work-days yearly, or firms with no motor power but with
more than 10 daily workers; (3)firms with less than 10 HP motors but more
than 750 work-days yearly; (4)firms employing several workers laboring
manually or with mechanical tools under one roof. The first type of firms
were to enjoy all the benefits of the law. The remaining three, however, were
24
to be granted only partial privilages. Hershlag Z.Y. provides a summary of
the facilities granted by this law:
,...: (1)Establishments approved by the Government and
recommended by the Ministry of Commerce will be granted
land free of charge up to 10 hectares. If need be, land
may be expropriated for this purpose by a special law, or
compulsorily purchased from another authority, eg. a
municipality; (2)Decrees may be issued to exempt enterprises
from telegraph or telephone charges on lines between various
____ 
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buildings of the.enterprise, or between them and the
outside world; (3)Installation of these lines as well
as of motor power throughout State areas will be free of
charge; (4)The enterprises, including buildings and land,
will be' exempt from the following taxes: immovable property
tax; land tax; profit tax; surtaxes on all previous taxes
due to provinces and municipalities; supplementary personal
tax; licence fees due to municipalities for construction,
steam engines, motors and stills; (5)Bonds and securities
of companies established for industrial entrepreneurship
will be free from stamp duties; (6)Materials'needed for the
construction of the enterprise, and accordingly specified,
will attract no customs duties so far as they are unobtainable
in the country, or can not be produced locally on an adequate
scale. Such machinery, equipment and building materials will
also be granted a reduction of 30 per cent on railway transport
and shipping. This reduction may also be applied to other
products and raw materials by special Government decree;
(7)By a special Government decision the industrial enterprise
may be granted a subsidy of up to 10 per cent of the value
of its annual output; (8)The Government may, upon the
recommendation of the Ministry of Commerce, issue permits for
reducing the prices of salt, alcohol, and explosive materials,
or may grant premiums; (9)Government institutions, municipalities,
companies and enterprises benefiting from the law are bound
to purchase the products of the encouraged enterprises, if the
local quality and quantity are adequate, rather than foreign
products, even if the price of the local product is up to
10 per cent higher." 25
The general condition of the Turkish industries in the 1920's and
the description of the firms held eligible for consideration by this law
suggest an important observation: Although private factory building may
have been anticipated, the government had indeed set up a framework
for the proliferation of "non-factories". For example by 1932, of the 1,473
enterprises which enjoyed the benefits of the 1927 Law, about 44.3 per cent
26(653) were established after 1927, and it is plausible that most, if not
all, were "non-factories". This may be demonstrated with the help of the
27
1932-1939 annual follow-up surveys carried out among the enterprises which were
registered under the 1927 Law.(An account of this will be provided in
the following ch4pter.)
|
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Indeed the 1927 Law was not the only government attempt to
encourage private initiative in factory building. In 1923 the Sanayi
ve Maadin Bankasi (Industry and Mining Bank) was established. It was going
to manage civilian State-factories, and also to help organize and channel
local private capital into factory building, The Bank established 16
joint-stock companies. Of these, about 11 were concerned with building
factories. A brief survey of these 11 companies will provide further
evidence of the weakness of industrial capitalism in Turkey in the 1920's.
In 1923 the Bank established the Upak Terakkii Ziraat TA§ (Ugak
Agricultural Development Co.) which became instrumental in the construction
28
of the Uqak Sugar Factory, completed in 1926. The Bank's share in this
company was initially 30 per cent. But it increased to 50 per cent in
1928, and to 100 per cent in 1931.
In 1924 the Bank established three companies: the Maraq 9eltik
Fabrikasi TAq (Maraq Rice-Mill Co.), the Aksaray Azmi Milli ýirketi (Aksaray
National Will Co.), and the Ankara Milli Mensucat A§ (Ankara National
Weaving Co.). Almost the entire capital for the Maraq company was provided
by the Bank 3. Eventually the company managed to put up a rice-mill in
Maras in 1924, and a flour-mill in 192831In the case of the Aksaray company,
the municipality and other government agencies like the Ziraat Bankasi
(Agricultural Bank) joined the Sanayi ve Maadin Bankasi in forwarding the
necessary capital. The Aksaray company established a flour-mill in Aksaray,
which was transferred to the Sumerbank in the 1930's.3 The Ankara company,
on the other hand, was a failure. The Bank and the Ministry of Commerce
provided some capital34The locals were going to raise the rest of the capital
necessary to build a textile plant, but they could not, and the company folded.5
~___~~ ~ _________
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In 1925 the Bank hastened its pace and established six companies.
Of these, the Kayseri-BVinyan Hall ipligi Fabrikasl TA§ (Kayseri-BUnyan
Carpet Fiber Spinning-Mill Co.) made possible the construction of a spinning-
mill in Kayseri in 1927. But, as the demand from the carpet weavers was far
below the factory capacity, marketing problems increased, and eventually the
36
Bank took over the company. The Isparta iplik Fabrikasl TA' (Isparta Fiber
Spinning-Mill Co.), on the other hand, failed to raise enough capital from
the locals. The spinning-mill which was intended to supply the carpet workshops
37
in Isparta, therefore, could not be realized. Indeed, the Tosya geltik
Fabrikasi TA§ (Tosya Rice-Mill Co.) built a factory in 1927. But, only six
per cent of the total capital was forwarded by the locals, and there was
a need to increase the capital stock. Thus, eventually the Bank took over
* this company as well38The Kiitahya 9ini igleri TAý (Kiitahya Pottery Porcelain
Works Co.) was realized upon a 50 per cent capital committment from the Bank.
The "non-factory" type production, however, proved to be economically
disheartening, and just as the Bank started a drive to build a "factory"
39instead, the company folded in 19303 The Bank supplied one-third of the
initial capital for both the Malatya Tegebbiisati Sinaiye TAS (Malatya
Industrial Ventures Co.), and the Trabzon Elektrik TAP (Trabzon Electric Co.).
Both of these companies managed to construct electric factories (generators),
while the former attempted to build a flour-mill as well.40
In 1926 the Bank's company building drive slackened. In this year only
the Yalvaý Ticaret ve Sanayi Aý (Yalva9 Commerce and Industry Co.) was
established. The locals supplied about two-thirds of the capital, but
just as the buildings for a leather factory were being erected the company
folded for lack of future funds.
fr
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The results of the Sanayi ve Maadin Bankasi experiments were not
spectacular: five food-industries (a sugar factory, two rice-mills, and
two flour-mills) and two electric generators. But they demonstrate an
important aspect of local Turkish private industrial initiative: its
weakness. A more interesting observation, however, is the attempt by the
locals in Kayseri and Isparta to set up "factories" (spinning-mills)
in order to supply the "non-factories" (carpet workshops). This tendency
to establish "factories" in order to "nurse" "non-factories" rather
than to "replace" them, will become a pattern in the 1930-50 period.
4. An Evaluation Of The "Factory" And "Non-Factory"
Split Of Turkish. Industries In The 1920's
Three important developments mark the Turkish industrial picture in
the 1920's. First, there was a weak, but undeniable recovery of
private industrial initiative in "non-factory" types of industrial production.
Second, private industrial initiative, even when supported by the
State, had been proven incapable of both establishing and running factories.
Third, a core of State-factory building experience was accumulating. These
three developments signal a shift in the nature of the "factory" and
"non-factory" split of industries as inherited from the Empire.
The petty producers were doing what they could, but not on their
own. The industrial measures taken in the 1920's as a whole, did not only
place them within a "capitalist frame," but also helped them to make a
comeback. The privately-run factories, however, were not forthcoming. Thus,
the State's involvement in factory building had to assume a new turn: to
help and guide weak local private industrial initiative. This picture of
I 1
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the Turkish industrial landscape in the 1920's was quite different.from
that of the Empire. On the one hand, a capitalist frame for industrial
production had emerged, and on the other, there-was a tendency (however
slight it may have been) towards an increased connection between the "factory"
and "non-factory" sectors of industry.
As a rule, the connection of the "factory" and "non-factory" sectorr
of industries in capitalist settings yields a two-fold consequence. First,
,"factories" replace "non-factories." Second, there emerges a non-competitive
(non-antagonistic) rapport between "factories" and "non-factories."'
Furthermore, as I have suggested earlier (in chapter V of the first section),
the non-competitive rapport between these two sectors of industry may be
of two kinds. Either "factories" subordinate "hon-factories" through
sub-contracts, or co-exist with them.
Probably,with the exception of the privately-run silk-spinning mills
in Bursa4 2 the Ottoman "factories" and "non-factories" were not connected to
each other. But in the Turkish industrial scene of the 1920's, there occurred
both competitive and non-competitive rapports between "factories" and
"non-factories." For instance, flour and rice mills replaced the
lower forms of industrial production, and carpet fiber-spinning mills
supplied carpet workshops without either replacing or subordinating them.
The entrenchment of non-competitive relations between "factories"
and "norrnfactories" took place in the 1930-50 period. The 1920's, therefore,
may be considered the period when a transition from the "non-capitalist"
industrial dualism of the Empire to the "capitalist" industrial dualism
'of the Republic occurred.
i
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5. Ah Estimate Of The Scope Of The "Fgcfdory" And "Non-Factory"
Split In The Turkish"TIdustrial Landscape In The 1920's
-Circa 1927-
According to the 1927 Census of industries, ,.there were 65,245
43
industrial establishments in Turkey. Approximately 2,060 firms, about 3.2 per
factories like flour-mills,which may have been overlooked in the accounts,
it is difficult to argue that there were more than 50-70 factories in 'Turkey
44
cent of the total, were employing more than 10 workers, and -of these only
155 had a labor force of 100 or morekish Furthermore, only 2822 firms, about
4 A3 per cent of the total, used motors. All in all, there were 4,850 motors
47
of different kinds in Turkey, and their combined power was not more than4449 50
163,548 HP.. Out of the total industrial work force of 256,855, some 165,886
were connected with the 13,683 industrial establishments employing more than
four workers5Tn other words, 51,562 firms, about 79 per cent of all industries,
were employing less than fo10ur workers. Of the 165,886 people connected with155 had athe firms mploying more thanof 100 r morek Furthermorever, 10only 2,822 firms, about6.6 per
cent, were listed as "bosses"( and term covering factower ners as well as
petty producers), and 22,684 , about 13.7 per cent, were 14 years old or
53
younger. In brief, the results of the 1927 Census clarify further that
we have at hand a rather weak collection of industries, but it does not
suggest clearly the number of factories. This, I have to estimate.
We know that besides the 12 industrial establishments (all of which
may rnot have been factories) controlled by foreigners, the six State-factories
and the exclusively military works inherited from the Empire, and the seven
factories built with the Sanayi ve Maadin Bankasl's initative, there were
but a few other factories. Thus, even after allowing for some privately-run
5;1
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TABLE 2
AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF "FACTORIES" AND "NON-FACTORIES"(ARTISAN SHOPS
AND WORKSHOPS) AND THEIR WORKERS IN TURKEY,
CIRCA 1927
Type Of Industrial Total Number Of Total Number Of
Production Establishments Workers
FACTORY 70 (% 0.1) 15,000 (% 5.7)
NON-FACTORY 66,000 (% 99.9) 250,000 (% 94.3)
(Artisan Shop,
Workshop)
TOTAL 66,070 (% 100.0) 265,000 (% 100.0)
|,- , i i ,
Office, Trade Promotion Series No. 28, 1926.
Sources (compared): (1) Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu. 1927 Sanayi Sayimi.
Ankara: Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu Yay. No. 584, 1969. (2) Ravndal, G. Bie.
Turkey: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook. Washington: Government Pr.
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circa 1927.
Indeed the 1927 Census suggests the existence of at least 155
firms employing more than 100 workers. But it is not clear that all of
these large firms were "factories." It is very probable that many among
them were mining concerns, or carpets putting-out companies employing
many "non-factories." Similarly, in the absence of further information,
it is impossible to separate the "factories" from among the 2,060 firms
which, according to the 1927 Census, employed more than ten workers.
In brief, therefore, when trying to assess the scope of the Turkish
"factory" and "non-factory" split of industries in the 1920's we seem to
have but one choice: to seek refuge in common sense if not ambiguity.
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CHAPTER IX
THE ENTRENCHMENT PERIOD OF INDUSTRIAL DUALISM: THE ETATIST YEARS,
1930-50
1. The General Framework Within Which The.
"Factory" And "Non-Factory" Split Of Turkish
Industries Was Entrenched
Neither the encouragement of private industrial initiative through
legislation, nor the cooperation between the local capitalists and
the State proved capable of producing a strong factory building drive in
the 1920's. Furthermore, there was an international economic crisis and
"industrial self-sufficiency" was fast becoming a necessity. Thus, with
the already proclaimed "Westernization and modernization" emergency at hand,
the Turkish government had no choice but to construct a "factory" sector
in the economy on its own. Such were the general conditions which paved
the way for what is known as the "etatist" period in Turkish history. It
1lasted roughly from the 1930's until 1950, and the development of a State
"factory" sector in the absence of a significant "grass-roots" capitalist
industrial ferment culminated in the entrenchment of the "factory" and "non-
factory" dualism.
Government attempts to "import and transplant" foreign "factory"
know-how marks the 1930-50 period. This time, however, the "transplants"
were accompanied by efforts to complete from the onset the necessary
externalities for factory type industrial production. Already by 1929,
tariff barriers were raised and domestic industries were under protection.
The rather lax nationalization program of the 1920's was tightened, and
Y
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the appropriation of foreign enterprises in Turkey was completed. The
national indubtrial capital and labor markets were put in order. The nation's
energy, transportation and communications networks were upgraded and
expanded. The education system among other social and cultural heritages
from the Empire was Westernized. Furthermore, two consecutive five year
ib
Industrial Development Plans were drafted in order to coordinate the
State's industrialization projectsi and the institutions to carry out these
plans were set up. In short, unlike the Ottoman factory building attempts, the
"green-house" conditions for factory type production were met. Consequently,
an economically sound State-run "factory" sector was created. But this "etatist"
drive for industrialization failed to spark private capitalist industrial
initiative in factory building. In other words, the contemporary foreign
factory know-how had been "imported" and successfully "transplanted"
inside a "green-house", but a private factory building process next to the
State-run factory sector was nowhere in sight, and instead privately run
"non-factories" were flourishing.
Earlier, in France, Italy, Russia and Japan, i.e., the "late-comers,"
the "transplantations" of factory know-how had somehow accelerated the pace
of private factory building. But why was not history repeating itself
in Turkey in the 1930's? A simple observation may help us to answer this
question. In Turkey, not the capitalists,but the bureaucrat and technocrat
controlled State felt the need to "transplant" foreign "factory" know-how.
In a sense, the State was trying to accomplish what the weak industrial
capitalists could not. Local Turkish industrial capital was connected
with "non-factories" and it was not only small,but also fragmented. Even
when organized by the government or on their own, the industrialists
re
lacked strength. This had become clear with the Sanayi ve Maadin Bankasi
experiments in the 1920's. Such turf could neither support "grass-
roots" private factory development, nor bear fruits with imported seeds.
In other words, given such a weak industrial capitalist potential, the
,"State-factory" and "private non-factory" split of Turkish industries
in the 1930-50 period was a predicament.
There is yet another question: Why did not the merchants and big
land-owners shift their interests to industrial production? Obviously, the
key to this question is the "populist" posture of the Turkish government
which claimed to be in alliance with every national interest group, and
gave concessions to each. As a consequence, the merchant and land-holder
capital not only expanded , but continued to yield high returns under
the "etatist" measures. Turkish merchants had acquired the trade posts
emptied by the Greek, Armenian and Jewish minorities of the Empire, and
they were enjoying official protection. The land-holders, on the other hand,
were benefiting from the policy of expanding agricultural production without
changing the Ottoman land-tenure system. Thus, given the sustained high
capital returns outside the domain of industrial production, the lack
of a tradition in entrepreneurial skill building and risk taking, and the
existential difficulties for the more common people of internalizing
"industrialization" as an altruistic goal as the "enlightened" bureaucrats and
technocrats had, it was only natural for the merchants and land-holders not
to shift their focus.
Strengthening merchant, land-holder and petty producer
i0Pterests functioned as obstacles to the emergence and development
oI a "factQry" cqnnected capitalist industrial interest group. In other
9 M
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words, with the petty producers, merchants and land-holders busy enjoying
their respective shares from the "populist" economic measures, there
remained nobody but the State to attend to the "factory" building emergency
which it had declared. Yet, there was a catch in this otherwise staker picture.
The "etatist" industrialization efforts were financed, of necessity,
by the domestic surplus wealth generated by the land, through petty industrial
3
production and via commerce. Foreign aid was negligible. In other words,
the bureaucrat and technocrat controlled State first let the
petty producers, merchants and land-holders accumulate capital, but
later appropriated it by means of retroactive taxes in order to finance its
industrialization projects. When the international economic crisis of 1929
made dents in government revenues, and later,when the Second World War
increased government expenditures (the army was put on alert), the above
noted contradiction at the root of the government's policy to finance
industrialization projects precipitated "popular discontent" in the 1940's.
The popular discontent of the 1940's was later used to gain Control of
the State apparatus by a splinter group of bureaucrats and technocrats
who were inspired by the post World War international political climate,
and were in alliance with the petty producers, merchants and land-holders.
The shift of power from one group of technocrats and bureaucrats
to another in 1950 resulted in a loosening of the "etatist" power of
the 1930's which had already eroded under the war-time economy of the
1940's. The 1950's,which is marked by the coming to power of the Democratic
Party with its liberal economic policies, therefore, stands as the beginning
of a new chapter in Turkish attempts to industrialize. The "factory"
and "non-factory" split of industries which was well entrenched in theh
__;_
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1930-50 period, proliferated from then on until it took the form that
can be observed now, in the 1970's.
In general two major factors have contributed to the entrenchment
of the "factory" and "non-factory" split of Turkish industries in the 1930's.
____l___s_______ ___
On the one hand, the industrial legislation in effect, especially the 1927
Law for the Encouragement of Industry which lasted until the early 1940's,
favored not only an expansion in the number of "non-factories", but also
a certain improvement in the technical base for "non-factory" types of industrial
production. The State-run "factories", on the other hand, were not designed
to compete against the "non-factories." They filled the vacuum of primary
and, to an extent, heavy manufacturing branches of industry, and consequently
became the industrial raw-material source for "non-factories."
2.The "Non-Factory" Types Of Industrial Production In The
1930-50 Period
According to the 1932-39 Teqvik-i Sanayi Surveys which covered only
4
the industrial establishments registered under the 1927 Law, in 1932 the
total fixed capital outlay (the capital invested in equipment alone) of
5
the 1,473 industrial firms was TL. 55,627,000. As the number of firms
registered under the 1927 Law decreased by 22.3 per cent to 1,144 in 1939,
6
their total fixed capital outlay doubled to TL. 103,677,000. This increase
in the total fixed capital outlay and the accompanying decrease in the
number of industrial establishments, however, was not due to an increase
in the number of privately-run factories registered under the Law. There
seems to have occurred a "non-factory" connected capital widening rather
than a capital deepening process, In other words, it is plausible that
t the industrial establishments registered under the ~927 Law,4 in ~932 the
total fixed capital outlay (the capital invested in equipment alone) of
the ~,473 industrial firms was TL. 55,627,0005 As the number of firms
registered wider the 1927~Law decreased by 22,3 per cent to 1,~44 in ~939,
their total fixed capital outlay doubled to TL, ~03,677,000 This increase
in the total fixed capital outlay and the accompanying decrease in the
number of industrial establishmentsl however, was not due to an increase
in the n~ber of privately-run factories registered ~tnder the Law, There
seems to have occ~red a "non-factory" connected capital widening rather
than a capital deepening Plr~c essIn other words, it is plausible that
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some factories appeared in food industries during the 1932-39
period. But in general, nothing like a factory building boom occurred. Indeed,
the Teqvik-i Sanayi Surveys suggest significant changes within the stock
of artisan shops and workshops short of transformations into "factory"
type industrial production.
In the seven years from 1932 to 1939 the industrial motor capacity
tripled, but so did the number of motors. The 1,473 industrial establishments
7
registered under the 1927 Law employed 5,889 motors with HP 102,670 in 1932.
By 1939 there were 1,144 firms, and they were utilizing 15,148 motors with
HP 353,2718 This indicates clearly that small and medium-size motors for
"detail machines" rather than the powerful motors used to run "integrated
machine systems" were on the increase. The total fixed capital outlay and
the total value of industrial output had increased hand in hand. The total
value of the output of the 1,473 firms was TL. 137,948,000 in 1932. By 1939
the total value of the output of the 1,144 firms, on the other hand, reached
10TL. 331,075,000. The increases in the total fixed capital outlay, machine
power and value of output, however, were accompanied by a concomittant
11increase in the total labor force, and the overall fixed capital outlay
per worker remained practically unchanged. 2 Indeed, the fixed capital outlay
per worker decreased slightly from TL. 1,066 in 1932,to TL. 1,058 in 193513
This suggests the presence of a capital widening rather than a capital
deepening process. Furthermore, the capital and labor connected with the
industrial establishments registered under the 1927 Law were spread rather
thinly over a wide range of industrial activity from mining to construction
and printing. Weaving industries were only third in importance after the
14
mining and food processing concerns. Wood, metal and chemical products
_ ________________ _ _
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industries combined, however, constituted a less important concentration
15
area for capital and labor than weaving. All of this points to one
conclusion: the 1927 Law resulted in the expansion of "non-factory" types
of industrial productionrather than in the growth of private "factory"
building experience. At any rate, given the 1920's level of the Turkish
industrial capitalist development, the encouragements for private industrial
initiative alone could not have started a "grass-roots" factory building
process in the 1930's, and they did not.
As the international economic crisis strained the foreign trade of
the Republic, and the army was put on alert in the 1940's, the private
"non-factory" connected industrial initiative slowed down. But as a rule,
a period of isolation from world markets contributes to local industrial
development by means of "import substitution," and in capitalist economies
war-time production yields extensive industrial profits. If so, then
why did not such developments occur in Turkey? Indeed, a key to the answer
to this question is the peculiar nature of Turkish capitalism. It was
undeveloped, and there were practically no privately run "factories" to
benefit from the situation. But more important, the State was involved in
16
works (some handed down from the Empire and some built later), but had also
built a State-run "factory" sector by the 1940's. As a consequence, the
military mobilization was supported by the State rather than private industries.
Yet, this alone does not account for the slowing dothwn of the "non-factory"
connected private industrial initiative. Other forces were at work. First,
military mobilization drained both the labor and demand pools of the
"non-factories." Second, it disrupted the importing of machinery. For example,
i · "non-factories." Second, it disrupted the importing of machinery. For example,
1
~
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the 1SZ7 Law was discontinued in 2942, Finally, government defense
expenses could only be financed with new taxes on the one hand, and
increased revenues from State Monopolies (retroactive taxation in
effect) on the other, Indeed, government monopolies constituted an importan~t;
part of the Turkish economy. The government not only supplied consumer
I· ----~
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he S27 aw as iscontinued n 1942. inally, ov rnment fense
xpenses ould nly e inanced ith ew axes n he ne and, nd
ncreased venues rom ate nopolies e roactive xation n
fect) n he ther. n eed, ov rnment nopolies onstituted n mportant
art f he urkish conomy. he ov rnment ot nly upplied onsumer
production and in consumer goods industries, The State-run "factories", on
the other hand, were built in order to support rather than stop the growth
of private industrial initiative. Indeed, the State-run "factorres" were
concentrated in primary and intermediary goods industries, and they required
large amounts of initial capital, advanced technical know-how and sophisticated
management, These conditions were beyond the capacity of weak private industrial
initiative. Furthermore, the protection and encouragement of private industrial
roduction nd i  onsumer ods ndustries. he tate-run factories", n
the other hand, ere uilt in rder to support rather than stop the rowth
f rivate ndustrial n tiative. n eed, he ate-run factories" re
concentrated in primary and intermediary goods industries, and they required
large ounts f nitial apital, dvanced technical no -how nd ophisticated
nagement. hese onditions re eyond he pacity f eak rivate ndustrial
initiative. Furthermore, the protection and ncouragement f rivate ndustrial
~
goods such as matches, salt, sugar and tobacco, but also provided
industrial raw materials such as coal, electricity, iron, steel, copper
and cotton fibers, and services such as rail and sea transport, radio,
mail, telephone and telegraph communications, Thus, the economic measures
of the 1940's were bound to hurt the "non-factory" connected industrial
initiative and generate "popular discon·t~en~o at the same time,
The war-time economy of the 29401s hurt the Turkish private
industrial initiative which was concentrated in "non-factory" types of
k
i
i
t
initiative was part and parcel of government policy in the 1930's, and the
1927 Law was in effect. Thus in brief, the "unnegotiated peace" between
"factory" and "non-factory" types of industrial production had to be, and
was, the he oth etatist industrial policies."
The 1924 and 1925 Sanayi ve Maadin Bankasi attempts to build spinning-
mills to aid the carpet workshops in Isparta and Kayseri were the early
mills to aid the carpet workshops in Isparta and Kayseri were the early
ods uch s atches, alt, ugar nd obacco, ut lso rovided
industrial raw aterials uch s oal, lectricity, ron, teel, opper
and tton fibers, nd ervices uch s ail nd ea ransport, adio,
ail, lephone nd legraph o munications. hus, the c nomic easures
f the 940's ere bound to urt the on-factory" onnected industrial
initiative nd nerate opular isco tent" t the ame ime.
he ar-time ec nomy f the 1940's urt the urkish rivate
industrial initiative ich as o centrated i  on-factory" types f
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examplcs of a trend, which later became the rule in Turkish industrialization.
"Factories" were designed to support rather than hurt "non-factories." The
17
expansion of the weaving industries registered under the 1927 Law was
a typical illustration of this observation.
According to the Teqvik-i Sanayi Surveys, during the seven years
between 1932 and 1939, the number of weaving establishments registered
under the 1927 Law (almost all of which were "non-factories") decreased
18 19 20from 351 to 249. Yet, the total capital outlay, the total number of motors,
21 22
the total labor force and the total value of output of these establishments
23
have tripled. This growth, however, occurred parallel to an increase in
the number of "factories" in weaving industries. The stock of twelve State-run
spinning and textile-mills had been completed by 194024
In brief, therefore, the pattern of industrial policy in the 1930-50
period was that, on the one hand, industrial legislation favored private
industrial initiative in "non-factory" types of production, and on the other
hand, the State-run "factories" such as spinning-mills, steel, iron and
copper works, &c., supplied "non-factories" such as weaving workshops,
iron-smiths, copper-smiths and lathe-shops. Consequently, as the State-run
"factory" sector developed,",non-factories" multiplied in numberjand the
technical base for "non-factory" types of industrial production became
modernized through imported machinery.
3. The State Factory Building Drive In The 1930-50 Period
Clearly, the entrenchment of "factory" and "non-factory" dualism
in the Turkish industrial landscape was, in part, a product of the government's
coordinated factory building efforts. Now, let us study the scope of the
____llX__·____~_~_~~_~ __~~_
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"etatish" factory building drive.
In 1932, the Sanayi ve Maadin Bankasi (Industry and Mining Bank)
was replaced by the Devlet Sanayi Ofisi (State Industry Office) and
the Sanayi Kredi Bankasi (Industrial Credit Bank).25 While the State Industry
Office became the SUmerbank in 1933, the Industrial Credit Bank folded soon
after its establishment 26 The Suimerbank carried many of the ."factory"
building projects which were spelled out in the 1933 and 1942 Five Year
Industrial Development Plans. It managed the seven non-military State-run
"factories", and established new partnerships with the private and public sectors
besides running the sixteen partnerships which were already there in 1933.7
As written in the Law, the Si~merbank was to establish new industries
28in the following decreasing order of importance (1) those that may be
built upon the available raw material sources of the nation, such as cotton,
silk and wool spinning-mills, textiles,cement and brick factories, and metal,
paper, leather and chemical industries; (2)those that relate to the
processing of major raw material exports, such as mining and food processing
industries; (3)those that are aimed at a large portion of the domestic market
but do not have an existing domestic raw material base, although such a base
can be developed, such as the sugar industry; (4)those that may have an
international competitive edge even without an existing raw material base,
or the possibility of establishing one in Turkey. Furthermore, it was to
29distribute industrial credits and organize joint-stock companies. In other
words, besides establishing "factories", the Simerbank was supposed not only
to aid,but also to cooperate with the private sector. Yet, the Stimerbank neith3r
turned into an important industrial credit mechanism, nor became a
second Sanayi ve Maadin Bankasm. Instead, while the Is Bankasi (Work Bank)
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assumcd the role of distributing industrial credits, the SUmerbank developed
30
full-control of most of its previous partnerships with the private sector,
31
and let the rest go. Indeed, especially after 1933, it was involved in new
partnerships. But this time the Si~merbank's partners were mostly other
government agencies rather than the private sector.2 In other words, with an
urgant "factory" building program and an impotent private industrial initiative,
the SUmerbank had realized that it could not produce "factories" and
"capitalists" at the same time.
Unsympathetic to cooperation with the private sector, the Stimerbank
realized the bulk of the projects it was assigned, and by 1950 there were
seven industry groups with a steel-complex and 22 factories under its
33jurisdiction.
Besides the Siimerbank and the iq Bankasi, three other institutions were
involved in the "etatist" "factory" building programs. In 1935 the sugar
industry was put under government management organized in the form of
a partnership between government agencies, cooperatives and previous joint-
34
stock sugar companies. Also in the same year, the Etibank and the Maden
Tetkik ve Arama Kurumu were established to coordinate and carry out the
State's mining ventures.5 By 1950, the Turkiye ýeker Fabrikalarl A.O.(the Turkish
Sugar Factories Co.) had five factories under its jurisdiction, and the
36
Etibank was managing eight mining-industry groups.
In summary, there were about 100 State-run "factories" in operation
by the end of the 1940's.
4. An Estimate Of The Scope Of The "Factory" And "Non-Factory"
Split In The Turkish Industrial Landscape -Circa 1950-
M -- ~~~---`~~-- ^
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According to the 1950 Census of Industries, during the period
which followed the 1927 Census Turkish industries in general showed
a significant growth in all areas. When the results from these two censuses
are compared ,the following becomes clear. First, the number of industrial
establishments increased from 65,245 to 82,331 3Fabout 26.2 per cent).
Second, the size of the industrial labor force grew by 66,045 from 256,855
in 1927 to 322,900 in 1950 38 ` (about 25.7 per cent). Third, the estimated
value of the total fixed industrial capital (equipment) outlay reached
TL. 873,127,000. Finally, the total value of industrial production
expanded from TL. 432,740,855 to TL. 2,543,815,000 40(about 8.3 per cent).
Yet, we know that this period was marked by the 1930's "etatist" and the
1940's war-time industrial policies on the one hand, and by the absence of a
private "factory" building boom,on the other. Furthermore, it is clear that
the number of State-run "factories" did not exceed 110 by the end of the
1940's. Consequently, the 1950 Census of Industries must be seen as a
record of the Turkish "non-factory" connected industrial growth, rather
than as an account of the performance of Turkish "factories." This point,
however, needs further elaboration .
In the 1950 Census of Industries, only 3.1 per cent of all establishments,
(2,818 out of 82,331),were classified as "large-scale."41 In other words,
there were 2,618 firms which employed more than ten workers. Yet, we know
that about 103 of these "large-scale" firms were State-run4 With some
liberal provisions, all the State-run industries may be considered "factories."
The remaining 2,515 privately-run establishments employing more than ten
people,however, may not be treated as such. As I have argued in some detail,
not even the privately-run firms registered under the 1927 Law, i.e., the
i
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"cream of the crop" of Turkish industries,many of which were employing
about ten people, could have been "factories." Thus, if not all, most
of the 2,515 "large-scale" firms noted in the 1950 Census must have been
large workshops rather than small "factories." Indeed, it is difficult
to estimate the exact number of privately-run "factories" in 1950. An
educated guess, however, may be easily provided. In view of-the 1950 Census
data and my evaluations concerning the level of Turkish capitalist industrial
initiative in the 1930-50 period, it is possible to assert that there were
no privately-run "factories" besides some flour and rice-mills and a few
other food industries. With liberal provisions, I prefer to put the number
of privately-run "factories" around 20-50, and the total of their labor
force somewhere between 5-10,000. Thus, the Turkish industrial scene circa
1950, after the "entrenchment" of the "factory" and "non-factory" split
of Turkish industries, can be summarized as follows:
TABLE: 3
AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF "FACTORIES" AND "NON-FACTORIES"(ARTISAN SHOPS
AND WORKSHOPS) AND THEIR WORKERS IN TURKEY, CIRCA 1950
Type Of Industrial Total Number Of Total Number Of
Production Establishments Workers
FACTORY
.State-run 105 (% 0.12) 80,000 (% 24.2)
.Private 50 (% 0.06) 10,000 (% 3.0)
NON-FACTORY 85,000 (% 99.82) 240,000 (% 72.8)
(Artisan shop,I Workshop)
TOTAL 85?155 (% 100.0) 330,000 (% 100.0)
Sources (compared): (1) 1950 Census of Industries in: Devlet istatistik
EnstitUsii. Tirkiye Istatistik Yi11~4- 1971. Ankara: Devlet istatistik
EnstitisU Yayin No. 670, 1973. (2) 1932-1939 Teqvik-i Sanayi Surveys in:
Devlet istatistik EnstitiisU. TUrkiyetde Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Geliqmenin
50 Yili. Ankara: Devlet istatistik EnstitUst Yayin No. 683, 1973.
(3) Devlet Istatistik EnstitUis. 1927 Sanayi Saylm. Ankara: Devlet
.statistik EnstitUsU Yayin No. 584, ý)69.
(*) According to the 1950 Census of Industries, there were 2,618 "large-
scale" firms and 79,713 "small-scale" firms. The former employed 165,454
workers, and the latter 157446,.[
I I
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According to the 1950 Census of Industries,there were 2,618 firms
which employed more than ten workers. They accounted for 78.8 per cent
(TL. 2,004,025,000) of the total industrial production. 3 Furthermore,
while the total estimated value of fixed capital (equipment) outlay for
all the industrial establishments was TL. 873,127,000 44during 1950,
the "large-scale" firms have expanded their capital (equipment) stock
by TL. 79,019,000. 5 Yet, as I suggested, in 1950 there were only
103 State-run and about 20-50 private "factories," a rounded total of 155,
among the 2,618 "large -scale" firms. Indeed, it is impossible to tell
the exact volumes of fixed capital outlay and output in "factories."
Nevertheless, however ambigious it may. be, a sense of the "factory" and
"non-factory" split on these counts may be derived. The following is an
*exercise in this respect:
TABLE: 4
AN ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF PRODUCTION IN "FACTORIES" AND "NON-FACTORIES"
(ARTISAN SHOPS AND WORKSHOPS) IN TURKEY, CIRCA 1950
Type Of Industrial Total Number Of Total Value Of Production
Production Estelishients (in TL. millions)
FACTORY
.State-run 105 950 (% 34.7)
.Private 50 250 (% 9.3)
NON-FACTORY 85,000 1,500 (% 56.0)
(Artisan shop,
Workshop)
TOTAL 85,155 2,700 (% 100.0)
Source(reviewed): 1950 Census of Industries in: Devlet istatistik EnstitusU.
TUrkiye'de Toplumsal ve Ekonomik Geligmenin 50 Yili. Ankara: Devlet
Istatist:ik EnstitUsU Yayin No. 683, 1973.
(*) According to the 1950 Census of Industries, the 2,618 "large-scale" firms
produced TL. 2,004,025,000 worth of goods. The 103 State-run "large-scale"
firms accounted for TL. 929,812,000 of this total. The rest was produced in
private "large-scale" firms. But indeed, the stock of private "large-scale"
firms includes private "factories",which,I assume, were about 50 in number.
The 79,713 "small-scale" firms, on the other hand, produced TL. 1,074,213,000
worth of goods and services.
('')With liberal provisions, I assume that, in 1950 each private"factory"
produced TL. 4,500,000 worth of goods on the average: about half the average
for the Stte-run "factories" as imputed from the 1950 Census of Industries.
i
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CHAPTER X
THE BLOSSOMING PERIOD OF INDUSTRIAL DUALISM: 1950-70
1. The General Framework Within Which The "Factoryt"
And "Non-Factory" Split Of Turkish Industries
Continued: The 1950's Turn
The year 1950 is often considered an important turning point in
modern Turkish history. Indeed, it is so. But there is an observation that
deserves in-depth analyses. Neither the nature of the State, nor the
outlook of Turkish society changed overnight in the manner that the
government economic policies did.
We know that, as a rule, until 1950 private Turkish industrial
initiative was not only connected with "non-factory" types of production,
but also remained unable to realize a large scale "factory" building drive.
The weak private sector of the 1920's strengthened in the 1930's, and
the stock of "non-factories" expanded. Yet, the war-time economic
measures of the 1940's impeded the recovery of private Turkish industrial
initiative. The shift in the government's industrial policy from an "etatist"
to a "liberal" program in 1950, therefore, can not be attributed to major
"grass-roots" pressures from industrialists in order to free themselves
for large scale "factory" building projects. This point is important to the
understanding of the 1950's turn in Turkish industrial "dualism." Furthermore,
as before, the Turkish State did not assume a clear class base under the
administration of the Democratic Party. The controls of the State machinery
remained in the hands of a group of bureaucrats and technocrats who were in
L
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alliaice, as displayed in the 1946 and 1950 elections, with not only the
peasants and large land-holders, but also the merchants, the petty producers
and the workers. In other words, the 1950 government was "populist," and
the Democratic Party was a sort of national front formed against another
,"populist" government run by a different group of bureaucrats and technocrats
in the 1930-50 period. The pre-1950 governments addressed themselves to
an altruistic goal: "rapid industrialization and Westernization." One of
the concrete results of the "etatist" policies designed to reach this goal,
however, turned out to be "popular discontent." In 1950, therefore, this
immediate and concrete issue, rather than a "national emergency of an
altruistic nature" was on the agenda. Thus, in a sense, the "national emergency"
for the new "populist" government was fabricated by the old, and it was
"liberalization" or "loosening of the belt."
2. The New "Populist" Government And Private Industrial
Initiative
On the industrial front "liberalization" meant a leading role for the
private sector. Yet, domestic private industrial initiative was weak.
It lacked the capital and spirit necessary to carry the weight of a large-
scale "factory" building drive similar to that realized by the State during
the "etatist" years. It needed not only time and capital, but also much
support and guidance. The 1950 government,on the other hand, could not repeat
the "etatist" model. It was there to undo it. Thus by default, the State's
role in "factory" building was to be that of a supporter rather than a leader.
Yet, even with government assistance, private Turkish industrial initiative
was too weak to draw plans for industrial development and realize a "big push"
M
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out of its "non-factory" affiliations. Indeed, the course of Turkish
industrialization had reached a major decision point: the State intended to
step down from its former role of leading industrial development, but
the private sector was unable to assume it. Events unfolded in a rather
well-known pattern from this juncture on, and produced an answer to the
apparent dilemma of "industrial liberalization" in the absence of strong
",grass-roots" capitalist industrial initiative.
The post World War II era was the expansion period of American
capitalism. If Americans wanted to enter into the Turkish industrial picture,
they could. There was nobody to stop them. On the contrary, many were ready
to receive them with open arms.
3. Foreign Capital And The "Factory" And "Non-Factory"
Split Of Turkish Industries
Foreign capital was affiliated with advanced "factory" type industrial
production. Furthermore, it was preoccupied with international "factory"
competition rather than the development of "grass-roots" capitalist industrial
initiative in Turkey. Indeed, if the Turkish State could not induce the
domestic private industrial potential to assume "factory" affiliation, then
why 'should the foreigners? From the point of view of foreign capital,
as long as there were Turkish partners and "green-house" conditions
for "factory" type production that could be internationally competitive,
the prospects of profits from Turkey were good. From the point of view
of the Turkish government, on the other hand, as long as foreign capital
assumed the lead in "factory" building, the future of the government's
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liberalization promises seemed to be saved on the industrial front.
Yet, there remained an important question to answer. With whom was
foreign capital going to cooperate: the "non-factory" affiliated and weak
"grass-roots" capitalist industrialists, i.e., the petty producers,
or the non-industrial capitalists such as merchants? The petty producers
were unable to respond to the foreign industrial capitalists' partnership
offers. The foreigners were speaking the languages of "factory production"
and "internationalism," and the Turkish petty producers could follow
neither. Some merchants, on the other hand, not only knew what "internationalism"
meant as far as "international trade" is concerned, but also had contacts
with foreign industrial capitalists. In other words, there were Turkish
non-industrial capitalists who could speak the language of "internationalism",
and follow, if not speak, the language of "factory" type industrial
production.
The response of the foreign capitalists to this question preserved
the Turkish "factory" and "non-factory" dualism, and furthered the conditions
necessary for its proliferation later in the 1960's and 1970's. The foreign
capitalists not only sided with the bureaucrat and technocrat controlled
State, but also joined forces with the non-industrial capitalists and
gradually tailored a core of "factory" affiliated "neo-industrialists" from
among them. In other words, the "grass-roots" Turkish industrial capitalists
were by-passed, and a new core of private industrialists was created.
Until 1950 the Turkish State, and during the 1950's the foreign
capitalists by-passed the "grass-roots" industrial potential for almost the
same reasons. The petty producers were provincial and unable to assume a
significant entrepreneurial role in an extensive industrialization plan, and
1I
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their capitals were not only small but also disjointed. Thus, confined to
,'non-factory" types of industrial production and unaided, the "grass-roots"
industrialists could not shift their focus to "factory" type production, and
the Turkish industrial "dualism" entrenched during the 1930-50 period continued
well into the 1970's. As the unholy trio, the Turkish government, the foreign
capitalists and the "neo-industrialists," established a group of private
"factories" next to the increasing stock of State-run "factories" which
were concentrated in heavy industries, the stock of "non-factories" grew
on its own.
4. A Brief Evaluation Of The "Factory" And "Non-Factory"
Split Of Turkish Industries In The 1950's
Before 1950, there were two important conditions which made possible
the entrenchment of the "factory" and "non-factory" split in Turkish industries.
On the one hand, the State-run "factories" were not products of "grass-roots"
industrial initiative, and on the other hand, the non-competitive market
connections between "factories" and "non-factories" were a rule rather
than an exception. These conditions remained unchanged even with the presence
of foreign "factory" affiliated capital. The private "factories" which
emerged after 1950 continued to be divorced from the "grass-roots"
industrial potential just as the State-run "factories" were. Indeed, artisan
shops and workshops were neither a match for , nor a threat to the "factories"
established in Turkey by foreign capitalists and their apprentices. Furthermore,
foreign capitalists were in Turkey neither to compete against Turkish "non-
factories" nor to transform them . The presence of foreign capitalists in.
Turkey was part and parcel of the strategy of multinational corporations forukytpr
r ----- r
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higher profits within the global economy, and as long as Turkish "non-
factories" remained markets for "factory" goods, they were an asset rather
than a liability to the industrial capitalists affiliated with advanced
technology and high labor productivity in "factories." What is more,
"factories" producing new goods in lines of industrial production other
than those already invaded by "non-factories" seemed capable of generating
large profits even without tariff protections. In other words, "neo-
industrialis" diremaned markfeel the need to replace "non-factories" in order
to make profits. Thus, in brief, the "etatist" "factory" building strategy
was repeate in tproducinge 1950new g'ods y te nes of -industrialist" section of the private
sector: "factories" were neither rooted in the domestic "grass-roots"
industrial potential, nor were thay intended to replace "non-factories."
5. An Estimate Of The Scope Of The "Factory" And "Non-Factory"
Split In The Turkish Industrial Landscape -Circa 1960-
According to the 1963 Census of Industries, Turkish industries
in general have shown a considerable growth since 1950. First, the number
of industrial establishments has increased by 78,440 (from 82,331 to 160,771),
about 95.2 per cent. Second, the size of the industrial labor force has
grown by 331,879 (from 322,900 in 1950 to 654,779 in 1963), about 102.8
per'cent. And third, the estimated value of total industrial production
has expanded by TL. 23,142,018,000 (from TL. 2,543,815,000 to TL. 25,658,833,000),
about 909.7 per cent. Yet, as in the pre-1950 period, all of this growth
can not be attributed to the "factory" sector alone. The share of the
"non-factories" in this growth, however, remains quite difficult to determine.
The 1963 Census of Industries makes a distinction between "small-
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scale" and ."large-scale'!,industrial firms. Indeed, all of the "small-scale"
4
firms, 157,751 in number, can be considered as "non-factories." Yet,
not all the "'large-scale" firms, i.e., those employing more than ten
workers, are "factories.o We know that in the 1950-60 period both the
number of private and State-run "factories" increased. Unfortunately,
however, in the absence of a detailed account, it is impossible to weed
out the "factories" from among the collection of "large-scale" industrial
establishments, which doubtlessly included many large workshops.
According to the available official data, in 1963 there were 3,012
5
firms with more than ten workers, (In 1950 there were 2,618 "large-scale"
firms). We know that of these, about 237 were State-run "factories," and
they employed a total of 144,573 workers and accounted for 33.7 per cent
(TL. 8,669,606,000) of the total value of industrial production in 1963.6
The remaining private "large-scale" firms, 2,775 in number, on the other
hand, employed a total of 179,369 workers, and accounted for 42 per cent
(TL. 10,966,058,000) of the total value of industrial production. But again,
it is very probable that there were many workshops among the private "large-
scale" firms. At this point, therefore, we are forced to forward an educated
guess. With liberal provisions,I prefer to assume that the number of
private "factories" did not exceed 300 in 1963, and that together they
employed not more than 60,000 people. Thus, the Turkish industrial picture
circa 1960 can be summarized as in TABLE 5.
Like the official 1950 Census of Industries, the 1963 data on Turkish
industries do not provide clues as to the exact size of "factory"
connected fixed capital outlay and the total value of "factory" production.
Nevertheless, with liberal assumptions, I have constructed TABLE 6 according to
the 1963 Census of industries in order to provide a further sense of the scope
M
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of the Turkish "factory" and "non-factory" dualism.
TABLE 5
AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF "FACTORIES" "ND "NON-FACTORIES" (ARTISAN SHOPS
AND WORKSHOPS) AND THEIR WORKERS IN TURKEY, CIRCA 1960
Type Of Industrial Total Number Of Total Number OF
Production Establishments Workers
FACTORY
.State-run 240 (% 0.15) 145,000 (% 20.9)
.Private 300 (% 0.18) 60,000 (% 8.6)
NON-FACTORY 165,000 (% 99.67) 490,000 (% 70.5)
(Artisan shop,
Workshop)
TOTAL 165,540 (% 100.0) 695,000 (% 100.0)
Source (reviewed):
TUrkiye Istatistik
1963 Census of Industries in: Devlet istatistik EnstitUist.
Yilli1.- 1971-. Ankara: Devlet istatistik Enstitiis Yayln
No. 670, 1973
(*) According to the 1963 Census of Industries,there were 3,012 "large-scale"
firms employing 323,942 workers and 157,759 "small-scale" firms employing
330,837 workers.
TABLE 6
AN ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF PRODUCTION IN "FACTORIES" AND "NON-FACTORIES"
(ARTISAN SHOPS AND WORKSHOPS) IN TURKEY, CIRCA 1960
Type Of Industrial Total Number Of Total Value Of Production
Production Establishments (in TL. Millions)
FACTORY
.State-run 240 9,000 (% 34.0)
.Private 300 5,500 (% 20.8)
NONrFACTORY 165,000 12,000 (% 45.2)
(Artisan shops,
Workshop)
TOTAL 165,540 26,500 (% 100.0)
Source (reviewed): 1963 Census of Industries in: Devlet Istatistik EnstitUsU.
TUrkiye istatistik Y111141- 1971. Ankara: Devlet istatistik EnstitiisU Yayln
No. 670, 1973.
(*)According to the 1963 Census of industries,the 2,775 private "large-scale"
firms produced TL. 10,966,058,000 worth of goods at current prices. With
liberal provisions ,I assumed that in 1963 each private "factory" produced
TL. 1,829,000 worth of goods: half the average for State-run "factories."
(continued)
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(**) According to the 1963 Census of industries, the 3,012 "large-scale"
firms produced TL. 19,635,664,000 worth of goods at current prices. The
237 State-run "large-scale" firms, included in the 3,012 "large-scale"
firmaq however, accounted for TL. 8,669,606,000 of this total. The 157,759
,"small-scale" firms, on the other hand, produced TL. 6,050,169,000 worth of
goods and services.
6. The General Framework Within Which The
"Factory" And "Non-Factory" Split Of Turkish Industries
Continued: The Rationalization Of The 1950's Turn
The 1960 'coup d'Etat' did not alter the liberal essence of the
economic policies which had been shaped in the 1950's. On the contrary, it
helped to rationalize them through a new generation of "Five Year Development
Plans" which started in 1963. 8 Thus, the 1950's turn in the nature of
Turkish industrial dualism crystallized in the 1960's and 1970's. The
"grass-roots" capitalist industrial initiative not only remained unable
to generate or nurse "factories" as in the classic model of capitalist
industrial development, but also stood apart from the "factory" sector.
The number of private and State-run "factories", on the other hand, increased.
Their non-competitive market connections with artisan-shops and workshops,
however, remained intact in principle, and the number of "non-factories"
increased as well.
Indeed, during the 1960's the "neo-industrialists" assumed a
leading role in "factory"building. Yet, this was a different phenomenon
from a "grass-roots" industrial initiative generating "factories." The
"neo-industrialists" did not establish ties with the "non-factory" sector
of Turkish industries, and they remained affiliated with foreign "factory"
know-how and international "factory" competition. In other words, not only
in the 1930-50 period, but also in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's, the Turkish
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11grass-Loots" industrial initative remained locked in its "non-factory"
affiliation, and the "imported and transplanted" private or State-run
"factories" operated outside and independent of the "non-factory" sector.
The official distinction of "small-scale" and "large-scale" industries
as early as the 1950's was a ratification of this situation.
We know that during the 1930-50 period the State, and during the
1950's the foreign industrialists and their apprentices had to by-pass
the "grass-roots" industrial potential. But, why did the "neo-industrialists"
with their "factory" affiliations, by-pass the petty production area once
again in the 1960's and 1970's2 They could have entered the already
proliferating domain of "non-factory" types of industrial production, and
tailored a ,,factory" building process either from within, bs in the classic
model for capitalist industrial development, replacing artisan shops and
workshops with factories, or from outside,as in Japan,by establishing
"sub-contracting" links-with "factories" and transforming workshops into
"small-scale factories."
The construction of a "factory" sector independent of the domain
of petty production activities was neither a conspiracy nor a mistake. It
was a predicament. How could it have been otherwise,given the capitalist
frame for industrial development where profits are central to every production
decision? Indeed, there seem to have existed two alternative paths for
the "neo-industrialists." But in practice, there was one for the small
capitalist and another for the big. To invest in high technology, high
labor productivity and high profit margins, or in other words, to invest
in "factory" type production,was not a real alternative for the small
capitalist, i.e., the petty producer, for he could not afford it. Similarly,to
!
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inves* in obsolete technology, low labor productivity and low profit
rates, or to get into "non-factory" types of industrial production when
the option to enter into more profitable avenues exists, would have been
the big capitalists' mistake, not alternative.
For bigger industrial capitalists the rational form of production
is "factory" production, and in underdeveloped countries placed in the
arena of international competition, "factory" production becomes feasible
either when it is possible to have a competitive edge in world markets,
or when it is possible to build special protective tariffs. Indeed, in
either case, cheap labor and raw materials enlarge "factory" profits.
But when protective tariffs are missing, or when wages and prices of raw
materials tend to rise, only an increase in labor productivity saves the
capitalist's profits. An important condition for sustained "factory"
profits, therefore, is the ability to improve upon "factory" technology.
Yet, we know tha get intosuch a potential itypes beyond the industrial capitalists
in underdeveloped countries like Turkey where "factory" know-how has to
be "imported and transplanted" to start with. Thusioin brief, the bigger
industrial capitalists in underdeveloped countries like Turkey seem to
have no choice but to: (1)coimport and transplant" "factory" type production
for it is the most profitable avenue; (2)try to secure a competitive edge
in whenorld markets, or seek protection behind tariff barriers; (3)try to keep
wages and prices of raw materials as low as possible; "fand most important,
try to augment labor productivity by isavporting or renting new technology.
This predicament sets into motion two mechanisms. First,ainthe domestic
"factory" sector of industries in underdeveloped countries not only
becomes increasingly dependent upon foreign technology, foreign originated
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producLs, foreign demand, and in part upon foreign capital and foreign
technical assistance, but also evolves as an integral part of the
international capitalist system rather than as a mechanism for upgrading
and transforming the "non-factory" sector. Second, affected indirectly by
the struggles of the larger industrial capitalists for higher profits, the
"grass-roots" industrial initiative that could not generate "factories"
from within, finds itself unable to join the large-scale, international,
sophisticated, "factory" connected capitalist game of risk-taking and profit
collecting. Due to its "non-factory" affiliation, obsolete technology,
markets restricted to the inelastic demands of the "poor," inexpensive but
low quality goods, child labor, underpaid and overworked "illegal" workers,
and low profit margins this "grass-roots" industrial initiative indulges
in a small-scale, less sophisticated, in short, "petty" capitalist
game.
In brief, today in the 1970's, the Turkish industrial landscape
displays a well-entrenched "dualism" with "factories" on the one hand
and "non-factories" on the other, each proliferating in its niche of the
economy. Furthermore, as I have suggested earlier in Section I of this
study, this split of industries can be observed in the labor, capital
and consumer markets as well. In the following sections, I will outline
the'nature of the domain of petty production activities, and the workings of
industrial "dualism" as observed in two Turkish cities. Before doing so,
however, an estimate of the scope of the "factory" and "non-factory" split
of Turkish industries in the early 1970's remains to be established.
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7, An Estimate Of The Scope Of The "Factory" And "Non-Factory"
Split In The Turkish Industrial Landscape -Circa 1970-
According to the 1970 Census of Industries, there occurred another
period of industrial growth after 1963. First, the number of industrial
establishments increased by 14,817 (from 160,771 to 175,588), about
942 per cent. Second, the size of the industrial labor force grew
10
by 247,068 (from 654,778 to 901,846), about 37.7 per cent. And third,
the estimated value of total industrial production expanded fromt
11
TL. 25,685,833,000 in 1963 to TL.116,709,995,000 in 1970, about 354.4 per
cent with inflation. Yet, as in previous decades,the growth in the "factory"
sector was accompanied by a growth in the "non-factory" sector of industries.
According to the 1970 Census of Industries, there were 5,465 firms
(about 3.1 per cent of all industrial establishments), which employed
12
more than ten workers. These "large-scale" firms employed 576,938 workers (about
64 per cent of the total industrial labor force), and accounted for about
89.9 per cent of the total Turkish industrial production (TL. 104,955,135,000
at current prices).3 But we know that 355 of these 5,465 "large-scale"
14
firms were State-run "factories," and that they employed 215,371 workers.
Now, are we to assume that the remaining private "large-scalen firms were
all "factories"? Indeed, the increase in the number of private "large-scale"
firis from 2,775 in 1963 to 5,110 in 1970, and the growth of the number
of workers employed from 179,369 in 1963 to 361,667 in 1970 suggest a rise
in the number of private "factories." Yet, doubtless, the stock of "large-
scale" firms includes many workshops, and we do not know the exact number
of private "factories" built up to 1970. In the absence of further information,
I will assume that the number of private "factories" did not exceed 800
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in 1970, and that these"factories," employed not more than 200,000 workers.
Thus, the scope of the "factory" and "non-factory" split of Turkish iTdustries.
circa 1970 can be summarized as follows:
TABLE: 7
AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF "FACTORIES" AND "NON-FACTORIES" (ARTISAN SHOPS
AND WORKSHOPS) AND THEIR WORKERS IN TURKEY, CIRCA 1970
Type Of Industrial Total Number Of Total Number Of
Production Establishments Workers
FACTORY
.State-run 360 (% 0.2) 220,000 (% 24.3)
.Private 800 (% 0.5) 200,000 (% 22.1)
NON-FACTORY 175,000 (% 99.3) 485,000 (% 53.6)
(Artisan shop,
Workshop)
TOTAL 176,160 (% 100.0) 905,000 (% 100.0)
Sources(reviewed): (1) Devlet istatistik Enstitsii. Sanayi ve IMyerleri
Saylmis Imalat Sanayii, II. KUdOk imalat Sanayii. Ankara: Devlet Istatistik
EnstitUsU Yaylnl No. 709, 1974. (2) Devlet Istatistik EnstitUsU. 1972 Yilllk
tmalat Sanayii Anket Sonuglari. Ankara: Devlet istatistik EnstitUsU Yayin
No. 713, 1974.
(*) According to the 1970 Census of Industries,there were 5,465 "large-scale"
firms employing 576,938 workers and 170,123 "small-scale" firms employing
324,908 workers.
A study of the 1970 Census of Industries data on the value of
industrial production can provide a further sense of the "factory" and
"non-factory" split of Turkish industries:
TABLE: 8
AN ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF PRODUCTION IN "FACTORIES" AND "NON-FACTORIES"
(ARTISAN SHOPS AND WORKSHOPS) IN TURKEY, CIRCA 1970
Type Of Industrial
Production
Total Number Of
Establishments
Total Value Of Production
( in TL. Millions)
FACTORY
.State-run 360 40,000 (% 42.1)
.Private 800 30,000 (% 31.6)
NON-FACTORY 175,000 25,000 (% 26.3)
(Artisan shop,
Workshop)
TOTAL 176,160 95,000 (% 100.0)
(continued)
L
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Sources (reviewed): (1)Devlet istatistik EnstitUsu. Sanayi ve I*yerleri
Sayimi: Imalat Sanayii, II. KUgUk imalat Sanayi. Ankaras Devlet Istatistik
EnstitUsU Yayln No. 709, 1974. (2)Devlet Istatistik EnstitisU. 1972 Yxllik
imalat Sanayii Anket Sonurlarl, Ankara: Devlet fastatistik Enstittsu Yayin
No. 713, 1974.
(*)According to the 1970 Census of Industries, the 355 State-run "factories"
produced TL. 39,279,460,184 worth of goods and services, and the 5,110
private "large-scale" firms produced TL. 43,625,165,495 worth of output.
Assuming that the 800 private "factories" produced two-thirds of this
total, I put their share at a maximum of TL. 30,000,000,000. Furthermore,
again according to the 1970 Census of Industries, the 170,123 "small-scale"
firms employing less than ten workers produced TL. 11,754,860,000 worth
of goods and services.
SECTION
DESCRIBING THE "NON-FACTORY" SECTOR OF INDUSTRIES
IN TWO TURKISH CITIES: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE
ARTISAN SHOPS AND WORKSHOPS OBSERVED IN ESKISEHIR
AND GAZiANTEP?
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CHAPTER XI
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION THREE
1. What Is This Section About?
The two-fold nature of the Turkish industrial landscape is a
commonplace observation. Indeed, for a casual observer,the pplit of
industries along "factory" and "non-factory" lines is at least visually
clear. There is almost no way to make a mistake. For one thing, in
larger Turkish cities " factories" and "non-factories" are segregated
spatially. Clusters of artisan shops and workshops are located either in the
center of cities, or in sites reserved for "small-scale" industries, i.e.,
'KUtik Sanayi Carsllarl' and 'Kiiciik Sanayi Siteleri'. "Factories," on the
other hand, are located outside cities along major transportation routes
and in industrial parks called 'Organize Sanayi B6lgeleri'. Nevertheless,
in the literature on industrial production in underdeveloped countries
like Turkey, not only the qualitative differences between the "factory" and
"non-factory" sectors of industr*es, but also the qualitative distinctions
among "non-factories" are not adequately scrutinized. Consequently,
important questions concerning the nature of the relations between the "factory"
and 'non-factory" sectors of industries are neither posed nor answered.
But as I have argued, the laws of Turkish industrialization have
been the inability of the lower forms of capitalist industrial production,
i.e., "non-factories," to transform into higher forms, i.e., "factories,"
on the one hand, and the impotency of the "imported and transplanted"
higher forms to connect with and replace or subordinate the lower forms,
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on the other. In brief, the nature of Turkish capitalist industrial
developnent is such that the historically antagonistic forms exist
side by side as if they are separated by a "glass-wall."
In this section, I will outline the structure of industries in
Eskisehir and Gaziantep in view of observations pertaining to the
nature of Turkish capitalist industrial development, and also provide a
description of the contemporary "non-factories," i.e., artisan shops and
workshops, examined in these cities. Thus, in a way, this section will
constitute a prelude to the analyses of the nature, role and future
of "non-factories" in industrial development in underdeveloped countries
like Turkey where we can talk about the presence of a "glass-wall" between
the lower and higher forms of capitalist industrial production.
in the first part of this section, in Chapter XII, I will provide
an account of the "factory" and "non-factory" split of industries in
Eskisehir and Gaziantep. The process by which the size and scope of
the "non-factory" sectors in these cities are determined, however, will
not be included in the text. I prefer to present the description of this
long and tedious process separately. (See: Appendix III of this study). In
brief, I will argue that both Eskiqehir and Gaziantep have dual urban
industrial structures, but that the nature of their industries differ
greatly. Eskisehir has a stronger "factory" sector than Gaziantep, and
Gaziantep has a larger and more colorful "non-factory" sector than
Eskigehir. In Eskisehir "factories"s and in Gaziantep "non-factories"
constitute the core of the urban industrial export base. Furthermore,
while 4non-factories" substitute for "factories" in Gaziantep, they
supplement or fill in the gaps of the "factory" sector in Eskigehir.
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Considering such differences, I will also argue that the nature
Idustries in Eskiqehir and Gaziantep reflects regional disparities in
strial development. Certainly, this observation will generate further
questions. For example, first, is it possible to duplicate the "Western"
experience in urban and regional development in Turkey where the
historically antagonistic forms of capitalist industrial production
exist side by side as if separated by a "glass-wall"? Second, is it possible
to aim for a single urban development strategy bag for growth centers
such as Eskisehir and Gaziantep with quite different industrial situations?
And third, if the answers to these questions are negative, and if there
is the need to design for urban growth in view of the dual structure of
industries in order to offset regional disparities, then where do we
start and how far can we go? Indeed, the number of such questions can be
increased. Yet, as of now, attempts to answer them ought to be postponed,
for we have to understand better the nature and workings of the "non-factory"
sector of industries and the role it plays in industrial development first.
In the second part of this section, in Chapters XIII and XIV,
I will describe the artisan shops and workshops observed in Eskigehir
and Gaziantep. Indeed, the "artisan shop"- "workshop" distinction between
"non-factories," which was examined earlier, will be used. (See: Section
One Chapter II, pp. 11-17 of this study). In general, the differences
between artisan shops and workshops stem from the nature of their
work organizations. Artisan shops are marked by "craft-work." The
artisan and his employees perform in succession all the necessary
operations to produce a particular commodity. Workshops, on the other
hand, display "detail-work." The workshop operator, or the "boss,"
__
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divides the productive work such that each worker is assigned to a few
discrete operations. Furthermore, as a rule, workshops have larger
capital outlays, better machinery and equipment, higher labor productivity,
larger labor forces,and higher profit and capital accumulation rates than
artisan shops.
"Non-factories" encompass more than one hundred kinds
of industrial occupation , and no two artisan shops or workshops within
a particular trade are identical. In other words, the stock of "non-factories"
is quite varied. As a rule, artisan shops are found in almost all lines
of petty production and repair work . But workshops appear only in lines
of production which proliferate. Thus, in a way, workshops are the "cream
of the crop" of "non-factories."
Both in Eskiqehir and Gaziantep, artisan shops constitute the bulk,
about 90-95 per cent, of "non-factories." Only 5-10 per cent of "non-factories"
are workshops. In 1974-75, I surveyed 95 artisan shops (47 in Eskigehir
and 48 in Gaziantep), and 43 workshops (16 in Eskisehir and 27 in Gaziantep).
These 138 petty firms represent about 60 different lines of industrial
activity, and about 10,000 "non-factories" (3,500 in Eskisehir and 6,500
in Gaziantep). The descriptions of the stratified random sample and
other surveys conducted among "non-factories" in Eskisehir and Gaziantep
will not be included in the text. They will be presented separately. (See:
Appendix IV, of this study.)
2.Why Eskigehir and Gaziantep?
Gaziantep is an active center in Eastern Anatolia. It has a strong
and colorful "non-factory" sector of industries with a long tradition.
m
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Eskiseljir, on the other hand, lies on the cross-roads of Western Anatolia,
but it does not have a strong and colorful "non-factory" sector. Both cities
have sifmilar population sizes,nearing 300,000, and both have undergone
an almost identical population growth pattern since 1923. Furthermore,
they are designated as growth centers in their respective regions by the
State Planning Organization.
In brief, Eskiqehir and Gaziantep are an ideal pair of laboratories for
uncovering the nature of the "non-factory" sector of industries. Indeed,
ranking as the sixth and seventh largest cities in Turkey in 1970, they do not
reflect some of the newly emerging industrial conditions such as subcontracting
between "factories" and "non-factories" seen in Istanbul, izmir and Bursa.
Yet, the size of Eskiqehir's and Gaziantep's economies makescomprehensive
studies managable, and the differences in the nature of Eskisehir's and
Gaziantep's industries provide opportunities for valuable comparis6ns. For
one thing, the "non-factory" sector of industries in Eskisehir and Gaziantep
have different positionings with respect to "factories" on the one hand,
and together they display quite a large panoply of patterns of decline and
proliferation on the other.
1
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CHAPTER XII
INDUSTRIAL DUALISM IN ESKIREHIR AND GAZIANTEP
1. Some Notes Concerning Urban Industrial Development
In Eskisehir And Gasidntep
Eskiqehir and Gaziantep have certain similarities. Both are designated
as regional growth centers by the State Planning Organization (SPO). Eskigehir,
however, lies on cross-roads in relatively developed Western Anatolia,
ind Gaziantep is in lagging Eastern Anatolia 2 Nevertheless, both cities
had similar population sizes first in ,1935 and then in 1970, Eskisehir
grew from a population of 47,045 in 1935 (ranking as the eighth largest among
80 Turkish cities) to 216,330 in 1970 (ranking as the seventh largest among
268 cities). Its population reached 120,000 in the early 1950's. 4
Gaziantep's population, on the other hand, increased from 50,965 in 1935
(Gaziantep was the seventh largest city then) to 225,881 in 1970 (ranking
5 6
as the sixth largest city in Turkey), and reached 120,000 in the late 1950's.
Furthermore, Eskigehir and Gaziantep began to display a dual urban industrial
structure at about the same period, the 1930's. Yet, not only the
industrial development patterns , but also the orientation and composition
of industries in these cities are quite different.
Gaziantep had a long history of a comparatively stronger petty
production activities sector. Being located on one of the major transport
routes connecting Anatolia with the Middle Eastern markets, it was
an important trade and crafts center in the fourteenth and fifteenth
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centuries. In the sixteenth century, following the pattern of specialization
among the Ottoman cities, which was determined by the "large-scale" and
"long-distance" trade, Gaziantep came to be known for its leather products
such as footwear. Furthermore, with a rich agricultural region that
yielded crops ranging from olives, grps and pistachio nuts to wheat, and
with its location in the relatively isolated Eastern Anatolia, Gaziantep's
economy not only flourished but also diversified. Yet in the eighteenth
century artisan..hops and workshops, in Gaziantep began to lose 'business.
Indeed, foreign factory-produced goods started tq appear in the Eastern
Anatolian markets, the "long-distance" trade with the Middle East started
to lose its importance, and the authority of the Ottoman ruling caste was
fast eroding. In the second half of the nineteenth century the situation
worsened. The major roads to and from Gaziantep lost their previous
importance, and they became far less secure. Small armed groups not only
harassed the countryside and the caravans, but also the city itself.9
Within the city proper itself, popular upheavals had become common.
Urban mobs often attacked official buildings, and the turnover of Governors
was high.0 Furthermore, the Muslim population in and around Gaziantep was taxed
more heavily and drafted into the Ottoman army more frequently than earlier
in order to maintain the Ottoman fronts against the Russian advances in Eastern
Anatolia. All these paved the way for a further decline in Gaziantep's economy.
Nevertheless, the "non-factory" affiliated private industrial initative
in Gaziantep managed to retain its posture.12
Eskiqehir, on the other hand, assumed importance only after the
collapse of the Empire. Under the Ottomans, Eskigehir remained a relatively
i
_. · __
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unimportant center until it was connected to Istanbul, Ankara and Afyon by
railroad in the second half of the nineteenth century13These railroad
14
connections brought in a Railroad Equipments Repair Works in 1894, and
15
also facilitated raw meerschaum and wheat exports from the region.
Both Eskisehir and Gaziantep were invaded during the Turkish
Independence Wars (1919-24). The former was occupied by the Greeks, and
the latter by the French and Armenian irregulars. Although Gaziantep put
forth a spontaneous local urban and rural resistance, Eskigehir was overrun
easily,only to be recovered by the Turkish armies as a burnt-down, half-empty
minor town on a strategic railroad connection. This indicates the presence
of a strong Turkish "bourgeoisie" in Gaziantep which derived its economic
power not only from agriculture,but also from commerce and petty production.
Indeed, in the late 1920's, Gaziantep had a more impressive collection
of urban industries than Eskisehir, and both lacked "factories."
According to the 1927 Census of Industries, there were twice as many
"non-factories" in Gaziantep as in Eskisehir. Gaziantep's 1,248 artisan-shops
16
and workshops employed a total of about 4,098 workers, while in Eskisehir
there were 598 industrial establishments, one being the Railroad Equipments
Repair Works, employing a total of 2,081 workers. All in all, there were
846 industrial firms in the Eskisehir province including the city of Eskisehir,
18
among which only thirty employed more than ten workers.8 In the Gaziantep
province, on the other hand, there were 2,016 firms among which 93 employed
19
more than ten workers. Weaving andefood industries were the two major
20
concentration areas for "norn-factories" in Gaziantep. But in Eskisehir metal
and wood works and food industries were the most important lines of "non-factory*
21
production.
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Under the Turkish Republic both cities not only grew in population
size, but also improved their industries. Yet, on many counts Gaziantep
received the short end of the stick. First, its manpower and capital losses
22
during the Independence Wars were not adequately replaced. Second, the State's
industrial investments were far less in Gaziantep than in Eskisehir.
Third, unlike Eski$ehir, Gaziantep was, and still is, not effectively
integrated into the national market. Fourth, Eskisehir's economy was weaker
than Gaziantep's in the 1920's, but,thanks to government initiative and its
favorable location, Eskigehir has a stronger "factory" sector than
Gaziantep in the 1970's. Fifth, isolated from the mainstream of Turkish
industrialization and government attention as it was from the mainstream
of Ottoman industrial regression, Gaziantep continued to channel its
private industrial initative into the avenues of "non-factory" rather than
"factory" production.
2. State-Run "Factories" In Eskigehir And Gaziantep
In Eskiqehir and Gaziantep the "factory" and "non-factory" split
of urban industries appeared in the 1930's, and widened in the 1950-70
period. Under the Ottomans neither city had "factories." During the 1920's,
on the other hand, neither Gaziantep with its relatively stronger "non-factory"
sector, nor Eskisehir could sustain a local "factory" building drive.
Indeed, during the 1920's local private industrial initiative all across
Turkey was weak enough to necessitate the State to take the lead in "factory"
building during the 1930's.
The first "factory" in Eskisehir appeared as a direct result of
government initiative. In 1932 the Is Bankasl (the Work Bank) established
~~~_
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23
the Anadolu ýeker Fabrikalarl TA$. (the Anatolian Sugar Factories Co.). By
the end of the following year,this company had managed to build the Eskigehir
Sugar Factory and,connected to it,the Eskigehir Sugar Industry Equipments
24
Factory. In Gaziantep, however, the first "factory" was a by-product of
the 1927 Law for the Encouragement of Industry. In 1932, a private spinning
and weaving plant (the Veliq iplik ve Dokuma Fabrikasl, still operating) was
25
founded. These factories not only mark the beginnings of industrial
dualism in Eskisehir and Gaziantep, but also the start of a comparatively
stronger government industrial commitment in Eskisehir.
Later, the Anatolian Sugar Factories Co. in Eskisehir was placed
26
under the TUrkiye *eker Fabrikalarl AO. (the Turkish Sugar Factories Co.),
a partnership among various government agencies, and in 1938, a distillery
(Eskisehir Ispirto Fabrikasl) was built next to the factories,constituting
27
the State-run Eskisehir Sugar Works. If the State-run Railroads Equipment
Repair Works and, later, the Production Works established in 1894 are counted
then by 1950 there were four State-run "factories" in Eskisehir. After 1950,
28
the State established a textile plant (the Simerbank Eskisehir Basma Fabrikasl),
and cooperated with the private sector in the building of two other factories:the
Eskisehir Cement Factory, and the Eskisehir Animal Feed Factory. In short, if the
Eskisehir Ucak Tamir Atelyeleri (the Military Aircraft Repair Works established
in the 1950's) are included in the account, then by the 1970's the State had
been directly involved in the realization of eight "factories" in Eskisehir.
Direct State involvement in "factory" building in Gaziantep, however,
began in the 1950's, and was not as far reaching. The State built a Raki and Wine
29
Factory employing about 400 workers, and cooperated with the private sector
30
to build a cement factory which employs around 550 workers. In short, as
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opposed to the eight industrial projects in Eskisehir, the government
sponsored merely two in Gaziantep.
3. Private Factories In Eski-ehir And Gaziantep
The private industrial initiative in Gaziantep proved capable of
realizing a limited "factory" building process. With the 1927 Law in
effect, four private flour mills followed the example of the Velig Textile
Plant. The first two flour mills, the PUrsefa Un Fabrikasi and the Arica Un
Fabrikasi were established in 193431In the following year the Metanet Un Fabrikasi
and six years later the Ornek Un Febrikasl began their operations32 uring
the 1940-50 period private "factory" building efforts stopped. The war time
economy of the 1940's, however, led to a peculiar development in Gaziantep.
Upon the SiUmerbank's suggestion, weavers all across Turkey were organized
into some 143 cooperatives in the late 1930's. 3 These cooperatives were
intended to regulate the distribution of the wool and cotton fibres spun
in the State-run Textile Plants to the weavers. In this connection, there
emerged three separate Weavers' Cooperatives in Gaziantep. Like the cooperatives
all across Turkey, one of the three cooperatives in Gaziantep closed down
when the rationing of yarn was stopped. Yet, the other two merged into one
and established a spinning-mill. Thus, indeed with government credits
forthcoming, 1945 saw the birth of the Dokumacilar Mensucat Fabrikasl, perhaps
the only "factory" ever to be established in Turkey through cooperation
34
among petty producers. This, on the one hand,demonstrates the relative
strength of the "non-factory" affiliated private industrial initiative in
Gaziantep, and on the other hand, indicates clearly that the "etatist" industrial
policy fertilized "dualism" by channeling "factory" building efforts into
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avenues where "non-factories" could be nursed rather than replaced or
subordinated.
After the 1940's pause, the private "factory" building process
accelerated. Yet again, food industries and textiles remained the major
lines of concentration for "factoriesit built in Gaziantep. During the
35 36post-1950 period twelve flour-mills, two macaroni factories, besides a
37 38 39biscuit , a wine and a soft-drinks factory were built. In brief, counting
the pre-1950 generation of flour-mills, today there are 21 private "factories"
40in food industries. Together they employ about 350-360 workers. The post-1950
increase in the number of private textile industries, on the other hand,
was confined to spinning rather than weaving. Apart from the Hydrophile
41 42Cotton Factory and the two new textile plants, about 40 cotton or wool
43fibres spinning-mills and three cotton-gihs were built. In brief, with the
Velic and Dokumacilar Textile Plants, there are now 48-50 "factories" in the
textile industry in Gaziantep. Together these "factories" employ about 2,800
44
workers. Yet, the recent flurry of private spinning-mills must be put in
proper perspective. Indeed, they are "small factories." Among themonly
45five employ more than 50 workers. Furthermore, they thrive upon the demand
from petty producers such as 'kilim' and towel weavers and tricot makers.
In other words, they nurse "non-factories" rather than threaten to replace
or subordinate them.
In Eskisehir, on the other hand, the 1927 Law for the Encouragement
46
of Industry spurred the construction of two private flour-mills, But
the private industrial initiative in Eskiqehir stopped right there until 1950.
In the pre-1950 period, therefore, Eskigehir not only lagged behind Gaziantep
in "non-factory" types of production, but also in private "factories."
i
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The favorable location of the city coupled with the change in industrial policy
of the 1950's, however, resulted in a more active private "factory" building
process in Eskisehir during the 1950-70 period than in Gaziantep. Being on
cross-roads in Western Anatolia, Eskisehir became a market for "factories"
in Istanbul, izmit, Adapazari and Bursa, i.e., the Eastern Marmara Region,
and to a limited extent for industries in Izmir and Ankara. Yet, at the
same time, new markets and avenues for industrial production were opened
for Eskisehir. Consequently, there emerged private "factories" in industries
such as tiles and brick production which are transport cost sensitive. Today in
Eskigehir there are ten brick and tile factories, and three other construction
materials producing plants including a prefabricated concrete posts factory,
besides nine flour-mills, seven flour-products factories, three sugar-
products factories, a wine factory and a vegetable oil factory.7
4. An Evaluation Of The "Factory" Sector Of Industries In
Eskigehir And Gaziantep
Gaziantep, with its population approaching 300,000, has a weak
"factory" sector. Its "factories" are principally confined to food and
textile industries. The only exception is the cement factory. There are
73-75 "factories" in Gaziantep, but most of them are "small and medium sized"
capitalist industrial ventures, and the larger ones are capital intensive.
Thus, all in all, the "factory" sector in Gaziantep employs about 4,250
workers. (See TABLE 9). With its population nearing 300,000, Eskisehir, on
the other hand, has a comparatively stronger "factory" sector with "medium
and large sized" industrial establishments. There are about 42-45 "factories"
in Eskisehir. Though more diversified than in Gaziantep, these "factories" are,
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nevertheless, concentrated in two major industrial activity branches: food
and construction materials, and they are capital-intensive in outlook
as well. Yet, all in all, the "factory" sector in Eskigehir employs almost
three times as many people as the "factory" sector in Gaziantep does:
about 11,000. (See TABLE 10).
TABLE 9
THE NUMBER OF FACTORIES AND FACTORY WORKERS IN GAZiANTEP IN 1974
Total Number Total NumberType Of Factories Of Factories Of Workers
STATE'-FUN
.Established, pre-1950
.Established, post-1950 2* 1,000
PRIVATE
.Established, pre-1950 6 1,250
.Established, post-1950 65 . 29000
TOTAL 73 4, 250
Sources (Compared): (1) Gaziantep Metropolitan Planlama i .rgiitu. "5 Kigiden
Fazla flfi i al•tiran Yerlerde gallqtirdl~i i i Adedine G6re Sanayi Sinif-
lamasi: Mayis 1974." List compiled from the records of the Gaziantep Labor
Office, Gaziantep, 1974. (Typewritten). (2) imar ve ±skan Bakanll4L, "Gaziantep
Sanayi Callmasl." A report, Ankara, 1964-5. (Typewritten). (3) Gaziantep
Sanayi ve Ticaret Odasl. 1973 Gaziantep Ekonomik Durumu. Gaziantep: Gaziantep
Sanayi ve Ticaret Odasi, 1973. (4) Iller Bankasi. Gaziantep Kent BitUnU.
Ankara: iller Bankasl, 1972. (5) Gaziantep Valiligi. Gaziantep Ii Y li4,
1968. Ankara: Gaziantep Valiligi, 1969. (6) Devlet Istatistik EnstitUsU.
Baqlaca $ehirlerde Igq•cU Anketi (Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Eskisehir, Gaziantep,
Istanbul, Izmir Kayseri). Ankara: Devlet Istatistik Enstitiis yay. no. 538,
19"68. (7) Devlet Istatistik Enstitis°l. "Gaziantep ve Eski§ehir'de 10 Kipiden
Fazla Ifgi Califtiran Sanayi Kuruluglari." List made available to the author
in an official letter, 15 January 1975, no. TI/YAY/ksl-92. (Typewritten).
(81 Field surveys and observations (see appendix III below).
(*) This figure includes the Gaziantep Cement Factory which is a state and
private joint venture. It employed 545 workers in 1974.
(**) I wanted to provide a sense of the size of the fixed capital outlay
of different types of factories as well, but the available data
differed from one source to the other such that I preferred to skip
them altogether.
- " ii_ , i|i | i
-157-
TABLE 10
THE NUMBER OF FACTORIES AND FACTORY WORKERS, AND THE SIZE
CAPITAL OUTLAY IN FACTORIES IN ESKI§EHiR
IN 1974
OF THE FIXED
Total Number TOtal Number Fixed Capital
Type Of ?actories Of Factories Of Workers in TL. Million
STATE-RUN
.Established, pre-1950 4 5,700 247
.Established, post-1950 4* 1,800** 20**
PRIVATE
.Established, pre-1950 2
.Established, post-1950 32
TOTAL 42 10,600 394.5
Sources (Compared): (1) Eski§ehir Sanayi Odasi. "1974 Kaylt Cetveli." List
of firms registered at the Chamber, Eskigehir, 1974. (Typewritten). (2)
Devlet Istatistik Enstitisi. Ba lica $ehirlerde Istici Anketi (Adana, Bursa.
Ankara, Eski ehir, Gaziantep, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri). Ankara: Devlet
Istatistik EnstitisU yay. no. 538, 1968. (3) Devlet Istatistik EnstitusU.
"Gaziantep ve Eski§ehir'de 10 Kisden Fazia I?9i gallstiran Sanayi Kuruluplarl.
List made available to the author in an official letter, 15 January 1975, no.
TI/YAY/ksl-92. (Typewritten). (4) Acaro'lu, irem. "Eskigehir Aragtlrmasi."
A report prepared to the Iller Bankasi, Ankara, 1974. (Mimeo.). (5) Field
Surveys and observations (see appendix III below).
(*) This figure includes the cement and animal feed factories which are
state and private joint ventures.
(*') Information on the number of workers employed and the size of the
capital outlay in the Military Aircraft Repair Works was not available.
(*'*) Four out of the 34 respondents did not provide information on the
number of workers employed in their firms.
The State-run "factories" in Gaziantep are fewer in number and employ
a smaller labor force than those in Eskigehir. This indicates clearly that
Gaziantep received the short-end of the stick in government sponsored
industrial projects when compared with Eskigehir. There are, on the other
hand, more private "factories" in Gaziantep than in Eskigehir. But the
number of workers employed in private "factories" in both cities are almost
the same. This, and the differences in the concentration areas for private
"factories" suggest a subtle divergence in the development of "industrial
___________ _~ ;i_~
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dualism" in Eskisehir and Gaziantep. The bulk of the "factories" in Eskisehir
are transport cost sensitive. In other words, Eskiqehir's "factory" sector,
which is concentrated in construction materials industries, is export
oriented. The same, however, can not be said for Gaziantep's "factory"
sector which is concentrated in fibres spinning industries. The bulk of the
"factories" in Gaziantep supply the "non-factories" in the Weaving industry
there, which in turn exports.
In Gaziantep we have a collection of "factories" which help "non-
factories" such as 'kilim', towel and tricot workshops to export. In
Eskigehir, on the other hand, "factories" neither compete with nor complement
"non-factories." The brick and tile factories, the prefabricated concrete
posts factory, and even the flour and sugar products factories in Eskisehir
address themselves to the transport-cost-sensitive demand from other centers
in the region and in Turkey, and compete with similar factories located
elsewhere. Thus, the ineffective section of the local demand for such
"factory" products (the demand of the urban and rural poor in Eskisehir)
is met by "non-factories" which produce lower quality and cheaper construction
materials and flour and sugar products. This is an example of market
segmentation among "factories" and "non-factories" which permit
presence of brick and tile casters, clay pit diggers, mud-brick makers and
various flour and sugar products makers in a city with a considerable
concentration of "factories" in construction materials and food industries.
Gaziantep is more isolated from the mainstream of the Turkish indus-
trialization process than Eskiqehir. It is not only a major center in the
industrially lagging and poorer East, but also is free from the immediate
impact of "factories" in the more developed Western Anatolian centers
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such as istanbul, Izmir, Bursa and i•mit. Both Gaziantep's "factories"
and "ran-factories" reflect this condition. Only a fraction of the "factory"
sector in Gaziantep, i.e., the flour-mills and textile plants, export, and
the rest butress the local "non-factory" types of industrial production.
The bulk of Gamiantep's "non-factory" sector, i.e., the 'kilim' and towel
weavers, copper smiths and kitchen wares, shoes, tricots and steel-safe makers,
however, export. Although Esk!iehir is an easily cccessb~le marcet for
"factories" in the Eastern Marmara Region, and to.. a limited extent,
for "factories" in izmir and Ankara, it does not have a large export-oriented
"non-factory" sector as Gaziantep does. "Factories" in Eskisehir
do not nurse the local "non-factories." Furthermore, Eskiqehir is open 1
for competition from "non-factories" in other cities. The Eskigehir
region, on the other hand, yields raw meerschaum, and generates a
considerable demand for agricultural equipments production and repairs.
Thus, although as a rule, "non-factories" in Eskisehir are local urban-
demand-oriented some exceptions to this do appear. Indeed, today in
Eskisehir, meerschaum carvers and pipe makers, furniture and stove makers,
and agricultural equipments makers and repairers constitute the "non-factory"
base of urban exports.
In brief, we have two cities with dual industrial structures. The
urban industrial export base is dominated by "non-factory" types of production
in one, and by "factory" types of production in the other. This observation
provides an insight into the handling of the "Urban Economic Base" concept.
in underdeveloped countries like Turkey. Since the split of urban industries
along "factory" and "non-factory" types of production is important, it is
necessary to distinguish between the export earnings of a city from its
I__
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,,factories," i.e., higher forms of capitalist industrial production, and
"non-factories," i.e., lower forms. This can help us to develop a better
understanding of the urban economy in underdeveloped countries, and hence
aid us in devising appropriate urban growth policies to offset regional
disparities. Indeed, such lines of investigation stand as agendas for
future research.
5. An Evaluation Of The "Non-Factory" Sector Of Industries
In Eskigehir And Gaziantep: A Prelude
Both Eskiqehir and Gaziantep have considerably large "non-factory"
sectors of industry. Yet, the former displays a less colorful and smaller
range of artisan shops and workshops than the latter. Furthermore, as a
rule, "non-factories" in Eskigehir complement and fill-in the gaps of
"factories." "Non-factories" in Gaziantep, on the other hand, substitute
for "factories." These differences, in a way, reflect regional disparities.
Gaziantep is a lively center in an industrially lagging region which has
a weak "factory" sector, if -any at all. But Eskisehir is on cross-roads
in a comparatively developed region which has a distorted and incomplete
but strong "factory" sector.
Gaziantep has a traditionally strong "non-factory" sector of
industries. This is not to say that Gaziantep's traditional industries
are strong and that they grow and multiply, but rather that in Gaziantep
"non-factory" types of industrial production appear, grow and adapt in
more ways than they decline, deteriorate and disappear.
As traditional demand structures change, or as "factory" produced,
inexpensive goods appear in local markets, many old lines of "non-factory"
___-~-a----.~·
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production tend to disappear. For example, 'semerciler' (makersa -packsaddles),
1yemeniciler' (makers of a kind of light shoe usually worn by peasants),
'kalayciiar' (~nsmiths) and tanners have all declined,and they are now
almost extinct. Such transformations, however, are not surprising. What <
is surprising is the unsuspected vitality of "non-factory" types of industrial
production in underdeveloped countries, and Gaziantep and Eskigehir are
good laboratories for uncovering the mechanisms which give life to artisan
shops and workshops.
As a rule, in Gaziantep "non-factories" proliferate as substitutes
for "factories." Indeed, there are several variations on this theme. First,
Eastern Anatolia lags behind the rest of Turkey in "factory" building, and
at the same time, it remains outside the economic reach of "factories" built
in other regions. Thus, by default, "non-factories" in Eastern Anatolian
cities assume the responsibility of satisfying the local and regional demands
unattended to by "factories." In this connection, many lines of "non-factory"
production such as copper and aluminum kitchenware , plastic and leather
shoes, construction materials, soap, &c., flourish in Gaziantep. Second,
sometimes "factories" in a particular industry do not compete against, but
rather nurse "non-factories." The spinning-mills in Gaziantep are good
examples of this. They supply 'kilim'.and towel weavers and tricots and
sock'makers, all of which multiply in number. Third, all across Turkey in
certain lines of production such as stoves, agricultural equipment , wooden
and metal furniture , steel-safe. making, &c., factories are slow to emerge.
Thus, in many cities like Gaziantep, "non-factories" proliferate in these
lines of production to the effect that the local and regional demand and
competition permit.
'il
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In Gaziantep, however, "non-factories" do not always proliferate
as substitutes for "factories." Certain lines of production such as
'baklava'(a sweet pastry for which Gaziantep is famous) and touristic
wrought-copper products making, and the servicing and repair of imported
equipment and machinery exclude "factory" types of production at the outset.
Thus, the "non-factory" ranks swell.
In Eskisehir, on the other hand, a slightly different stock of
transformation patterns can be observed in the "non-factory" sector of
industries. Indeed, as in Gaziantep, when traditional demand patterns change
and inexpensive "factory" goods appear in the markets, some lines of "non-factory"
production tend to decline and disappear. For example, cartwrights ('arabacilar'),
tinsmiths ('kalaycilar'), tanners, saddlers ('saraglar') and makers of
packsaddles ('semerciler') are now almost extinct, ironsmiths have lowered
their profiles, and the shoemakers are reduced to cobblers. Nevertheless,
certain sections of the "non-factory" sector of industries do proliferate
in Eskisehir. As in Gaziantep, there are instances when "non-factories"
substitute for "factories." For example, wooden and metal furniture , stoves
and agricultural equipment making have all grown in importance in the absence
of "factories', and now they constitute the "non-factory" base of the export
industries in Eskiqehir. Also, in lines of industry which exclude "factory"
types of production at the outset, such as meerschaum carving and pipe
making, and the servicing and repair of imported equipment and machinery,
"non-factories" have flourished. But in Eskigehir, instances where "non-factories"
complement or fill-in the gaps of "factories" are more important than in
Gaziantep. Especially in the building materials and food industries, "factories"
and "non-factories" partition the consumer markets. Clay-pit diggers, mud-brick
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and briquette makers, pastry makers and confectioners proliferate right
next to the brick and tile, and flour and sugar products factories.
6. An Estimate Of The Scope Of The "Non-Factory" Sector Of
Industries In Eski§ehir And Gaziantep
There are 42 "factories" in Eski§ehir which employ about 10,600
workers, and 73 "factories" in Gaziantep which employ about 4,250 workers.
But what is the number of artisan shops and workshops, i.e., "non-factories,"
and their workers in Eskigehir and Gaziantep? However unlikely it may
seem at the outset, it is impossible to give a decisive answer to this
question. The best that can be provided on this score is an educated guess.
There are several reasons for this. First, "factories' are fewer than
"non-factories." Thus, the former can be counted one by one in the field even
though they may be lumped together with large "non-factories" in various
sources. The same, however, can not be done easily for "non-factories." We can
not eliminate a certain margin of error in determining the size of the
"non-factory" sector of industries even after tracing and comparing each
and every source. A second problem is the unfortunate ambiguity which
prevails in distinguishing between industrial firms. (See: Appendix II of
this study). There seem to be as many definitions of petty production
firms and petty producers as there are studies and accounts of the "non-factory"
sector of industries. In other words, as a rule, the available sources and
documentation confuse the picture more than they clarify it."Non-factories"
are not only lumped together with "factories", but with petty trading and
personal services firms. In the absence of a clear demarcation line,
barber shops, shoe-shiners, restaurants, grocery stores ('bakkals'),&c.,i
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are often counted together with lathe shops, carpenter shops, auto repair
shops, bakeries , &c.. Also, while it is difficult to determine the number
of "non-factories",determining the number of their workers is impossible.
As a rule, petty producers work like other laborers . Their workers, on
the other hand, are not only underpayed,but unregistered. Furthermore, the
actual number of artisan shops and workshops and the actual employment
figures change frequently. The entry and exit conditions as well as the
hiring and firing of unregistered workers do not constitute serious problems
in the "non-factory" sector of industries.
Such peculiarities of the "non-factory" sector of industries couple
with the social and anthropological features of the people involved in
"non-factory" types of production, and then interact with the prejudices
and other personal qualities of the researcher. The result is often presented
as seemingly objective and clear-cut data. In other words, in the case
of social research on the "non-factory" sector of industries, the processý
of collecting information is more telling than the product. In this connection,
I strongly believe that the description of the process through which I have
arrived at my estimates of the total number of "non-factories" and their
workers in Eskisehir and Gaziantep will be more instructive than my estimates
themselves. The description provided in Appendix. III of this study will
demonstrate most clearly the real problems involved in a first hand study
of the "non-factory" sector of industries in two Turkish cities, and show
the difficulties of focusing sharply upon it. Furthermore, it will,"
serve the reader by providing a good introduction to the detailed analyses
of "non-factories" and by clarifying the type, nature and dependability of the
data collected and referred to in substantiating my arguments.
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STABLE 11
AN ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF "NON-FACTORIES" (ARTISAN SHOPS AND WORK-
SHOPS) AND THEIR WORKERS IN ESKI§EHIR AND
GAZIANTEP IN 1974
Total Number Of Total Number
Type Of Industrial Establishments Of Workers
Production ESKI EHiR GAZIANTEP ESKISEHiR GAZIANTEP
NON-FACTORY 3,500 6,500 12,000 20,000
(Artisan shop,
Workshop)
Sources (Compared): (1) Acaroglu,Irem. "Eskigehir Araqtirmasi." A report
prepared to the Iller Bankasi, Ankara, 1974. (Mimeo.). (2) iller Bankasl.
Gaziantep Kent BiitUn. Ankara: iller Bankasi, 1972. (3) Devlet Istatistik
Enstitsi7 Basglca ýehirlerde Itg~qciU Anketi (Adana, Bursa, Eski$ehir, Gazi-
Antep, tstanbul, Izmir, Kayseri). Ankara:Devlet Tstatistik EnstitisU yay.
no. 538, 1968. (4) Devlet Istatistik Enstitisi. "Gaziantep ve Eski§ehir'de
10 Kiqiden Fazla iggi galiqtiran Sanayi Kuruluglari." List made available
to the author in an official letter, 15 January 1975, no. TI/YAY/ksl-92.
(Typewritten). (5) Devlet Planlama Teykilatl. TVtrkiye'de Esnaf ve Kligik
Sanatk*r Sayllari. Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teqkilati yay. no. 991, 1970.
(6) Halk Bankasl. "Gaziantep Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatiflerinin Faaliyet Sahasi
Dahilinde Esnaf ve Sanatkirlarin Kaydina Mahsus Cetvel." Interoffice memos.,
Gaziantep, 31 December 1968 and 31 December 1974. (7) Devlet Planlama
Tepkilati. Esnaf ve Sanatkgrlarin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Sorunlarl Araqtlrmasi.
3 vols. Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teskilati yay. no. 975, 1971. (8) Gaziantep
Sanayi MUdiirlIil. "Liste." List, Gaziantep, 1970. (9) Gaziantep Ticaret ve
Sanayi Odasi. 1973 Gaziantep Ekonomik Durumu. Gaziantep: Gaziantep Ticaret
ve Sanayi Odasi, 1973. (10) imar ve Iskan Bakanlli. "Gaziantep Sanayi
Callsmasi." A report, Ankara, 1964-5. (Typewritten). (11) Eskiqehir Sanayi
Odasi. "1974 Kayit Cetveli." List of firms registered at the Chamber, Eskigehir,
1974. (Typewritten). (12) Eskigehir Ticaret Odasi. "Odaya Kayitli Olanlar
Listesi." Registration record, Eskiqehir, February 1975. (13) Eskigehir
Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Dernekleri. "Toplantlya Katilanlar listeleri" and
1"1ye Kayit Defterleri." Eskigehir, February 1975. (14) Gaziantep Esnaf ve
Sanatkarlar Dernekleri. "Toplantiya Katilanlar Listeleri" and "Uye Kaylt
Defterleri.", Gaziantep, December 1974.
(*) For a critical scrutiny of all these sources see appendix III below.
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CHAPTER XIII
CONTEMPORARY ARTISAN SHOPS IN ESKISEHiR AND GAZiANTEP*
1. Contemporary Artisans
The contemporary artisan, the petty producer called 'usta' in
Turkish, is an industrial entrepreneur on the one hand, and a craft-
worker on the other. He owns the means of production; acquires the
necessary raw materials and makes stocks; accepts production orders and
decides how much to produce; organizes the cooperation of labor within
the firm and supervises the workers (if there are any); markets the
product; pays the rent, the wages, and other expenses plus the taxes;
makes the necessary investments and purchases for the nex round of
production (if short of cash, seeks credits); and at the same time works
like another laborer in his own firm.
With the exception of the 70-90 year-old tinsmith ('kalaycl') in
Eskisehir, who had given up manual labor, all artisans were either busy
working or taking a short break when called upon. Furthermore, none of
the 95 artisan shops surveyed had a clearly defined space for administrative
functions. The glass partitions, metal desks, steel safes, telephones
and shelves for business documents seem to appear in workshops as the
petty producer assumes a clear-cut entrepreneurial role. Usually, the
artisan will store his notes of purchases, orders, and taxes, and various
* All the data mentioned in this chapter are derived from the results
of the stratified random sample survey conducted among petty producers
in Eskigehir and Gaziantep. For the details of this survey, see: Appendix
IV. Furthermore, in Appendix V, the data are organized into tables for
easier reference.
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registration documents somewhere among the raw material stocks or the
merchandise. In other words, not only the roles played by the artisan
remain undifferentiated, but the artisan shop is also an office, an atelier,
.a storage space and a marketing outlet all in one.
It is often believed that the artisans are older, traditional
people who do not read newspapers, frequent 'kahvehane's (coffee-tea houses),
do not know much about the world outside their shops, and are devoted
Muslims with conservative voting behaviors. In short, artisans in Turkey
are taken as prototype reactionaries. My findings in Eskisehir and Gaziantep,
however, suggest a rather reversed picture. About 63 per cent of the
artisans interviewed were younger than 40. Also, their businesses were
not that old. About 74 per cent of the artisan shops were established
after 1960, and about 80 per cent of the artisans are "first generation
petty producers." Furthermore, almost half of the artisans interviewed
may be best described as "reluctant" mosque and 'kahvehane' goers; about
81 per cent follow daily newspapers; and in the most recent elections,
the bulk of artisan votes were cast in favor of the Republican Party, the
party most outstanding for its support of liberal causes.
Another wide-spread belief concerning artisans in Turkey is that
they are unable to transform their businesses because they do not know
how'to; and that they are against cooperation of any sort. Yet almost
none of the artisans whom I interviewed in Eskigehir and Gaziantep fit
into this model of the obstinate and naive petty producer. Artisans, though
they are hardly economists, complain about the increased competition in
their trades due to lagging product quality controls, price regulations,
and entry restrictions; the unequal enforcement of labor and tax regulations;
.MEMEMEMEMMENNO,
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the rapid labor turnover; the difficulties of disciplining their workers;
the ineffectiveness of existing credit mechanisms; the extremely high
production costs; the changes in demand patterns; their dependence upon
merchants; and finally, the shortcomings of the liberal trade and industrial
development policies in effect in Turkey. In short, even a casual discussion
(provided that the interviewer knows what to ask) with an artisan about
his business seems to be more instructive than the knid of seminars
plagued with lifeless charts, tables and assumptions that abound in
academia. That is, in regard to their businesses they know what the problems
are, what ought to be done, what can be done, and what is to be expected
from those who simply never seem to understand their realities. Furthermore,
in general artisans believe that industrial production has to be mechanized,
and that they are not the ones to do it.
When asked about the possibility of artisans establishing cooperatives
to start large workshops or small factories, they invariably mention
that they would be better-off as "factory" workers since it is impossible
for all artisans in one trade to pool their capital (that is after succeeding
in finding somebody to buy their businesses) and for the government to
extend unlimited protection and credits. Thus, unlike workshop operators,
artisans see cooperative action as a means of by-passing intermediaries
rather than as a real alternative which would transform and upgrade their
businesses into "higher" forms of capitalist industrial production. Indeed,
some artisans have connections with the construction, purchasing and
marketing cooperatives which number 10-15 in Eskiqehir and 20 in Gaziantep.
Also, artisans seem to form partnerships either to start or to expand if
not to stabilize their businesses. Yet, one of their problems is that they
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dissolve such partnerships as easily as they form them. If their lending
of money, raw materials, labor and equipment to each other is considered,
then it becomes impossible to maintain that artisans are hostile towards
cooperation of all sorts. In brief, artisans are well aware of the
situations that they are in. Approximately 63 per cent assess the future
of their businesses as "middling" to "bleak." Yet, they have to press on,
for, on the average, there are four people at home who depend on them.
This much may suffice to indicate why artisans should not be viewed as
,status-quo seekers, or as ready opponents of social change in the
domain of petty production activities.
Artisans are often accounted for as another "marginal urban group."
Yet, in reality, the artisans interviewed turned out to be very much in
the mainstream of modern Turkish society. As a rule, they register at
associations; go through primary schooling (about 90 per cent are literate);
serve in the army; marry according to the civil code; are linked with a
social security system (BAG-KUR); and the like. Consequently, it is impossible
to consider artisans as either an "informal" or a "marginal" group.
2. Capital In Artisanal Production
As a rule, both the fixed and variable capital outlays needed
to open and operate an artisan shop are small. This is not accidental.
Not only the technical base for artisanal production, but also the craft
labor have low pice tags., and often it is possible to run an artisan
shop without raw material stocks. Furthermore, a small room without
ventilation, heating, plumbing and even electricity would do as a place
of work. The total fixed and variable capital invested in the 95 artisan
v-p"~
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shops surveyed in Eskigehir and Gaziantep adds up to TL. 11 million
( $ 733,333); about TL. 115,789 ($ 7,719) per firm. But this is only
an average. In reality, around 66 per cent of artisan shops are operated
with a total capital outlay below TL. 100,000 ($ 6,666); and about 14
per cent of the artisans run their businesses with capital investments
of less than TL. 10,000 ($ 666).
Given the absence of higher paying "factory" and government jobs,
the low wages for craft and detail workers in the domain of petty production
activities, and the lack of regulations restricting the number of artisan
ahops, the underpayed and overworked craft workers tend to attempt
"self-employment" whenever they put together a small amount of capital.
This paves the way for increases in the number of small new artisan shops,
where the journeymen turned artisans work for themselves with their own
capital. Yet, as the number of such petty firms increases, competition
among them mounts as well, and eventually some are squeezed out of business.
Nevertheless, small new artisan shops continue to appear.
It may take two to three years for an average apprentice to learn
a trade. But it takes longer to build the confidence to start a business,
and more important, to save enough money to furnish the initial stock
of capital. As a rule, craft workers start their own businesses after
completing their military s66 per cen. It is theartisan the immediate family's
funds are put together. Such seed-capital is often butressed by interest-free
loans from other relatives and friends, and occasionally through forming
partnerships or buying the necessary equipment on credit. In this connection,
the role of formal credit channels is minimal. For instance, only seven
out of 95 artisans mentioned using credits forrom banks or via the
out of 95 artisans mentioned using credits directly from banks or via the
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Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatifleri (the Petty Producers' Credit Cooperatives).
Many artisans start with small amounts of initial capital. Only
a handful, however, manage to improve their businesses and then only
marginally. Again, this is not accidental for there exists a vicious-circle
for small industrial capital: " small capital remains small." The technical
base for artisanal production mainly consists of hand-tools-and power-tools.
Such a stock of capital equipment makes the artisan shop more labor-intensive
than workshops and "factories," and the craft labor less productive than
detail labor and "factory" labor. This leads to a two-fold problem: lower
wage brackets for the craft laborer, and exteremely low profit and capital
accumulation rates (if any) for the artisan. In short, artisans struggle,
i.e., compete with each other, for survival rather than for growth.
During an average month, the 47 artisan shops in Eskisehir generate
a total gross income of TL. 900,000 ($ 60,000). Of this income 61 artisans
retain about 43.3 per cent (TL. 390,000); about TL. 8,300 ($ 550) per month
per artisan shop, or about TL. 6,400 ($ 425) per artisan per month. In
Gaziantep, on the other hand, the 65 artisans in 48 shops generate a total
monthly gross income of TL. 980,000 ($ 65,300), and retain about 34 per
cent (TL. 332,000); about TL. 6,900 ($ 460) per month per artisan shop,
or about TL. 5,100 ($ 340) per month per artisan. The personal earnings
of an artisan, however, consists of returns on his capital and labor combined.
It also includes depreciation on his obsolete equipment, interest payments
due on credits and payment of taxes. Thus, it is difficult to isolate
an artisan's net profit, but it is evident that artisanal production is
marked by low profit rates if any at all.
A consequence of low profit rates is weak capital accumulation.
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For instance, about 46 per cent of the artisans interviewed in Gaziantep,
and 36 per cent in Eskisehir did not improve their businesses at all.
Those who did improve theirs, however, did so only marginally. When
expanding their capital outlay, it seems, artisans usually rely on their
savings. Nevertheless, the role played by formal credit channels increases
in this matter. About half (21 out of 56) of the artisans who improved
their capital stocks made use of the Petty Producers' Credit Cooperatives.
Yet, since 37 out of the 95 artisans interviewed are Petty Producers' Credit
Cooperative members and receive the People's Bank credits, and since only
21 artisans used credits to improve their businesses, then it becomes
obvious that not everybody who receives credits through formal channels
accumulates capital. This raises a question. What do they do with the credits?
The answer is simple. They use it just to stay in business or, as artisans
themselves put it, they "eat it., In brief, the People's Bank credits do
not play a large role in the process of capital formation and capital
accumulation among the artisan shops. Indeed, neither artisans,nor those
who distribute the short term (five years) People's Bank credits ranging
from TL. 5,000-10,000 ($ 350-700) make mistakes about the real function
of the help made available to the artisans. It is commonplace knowledge
that these credits are designed to keep the artisan shops going or, more
concisely, maintain the "status-quo."
In general, artisan shops are less capital-intensive than workshops,
and the artisan shops in Gaziantep are more craft-labor-intensive (or
less capital-intensive) than those in Eskiqehir. For example, if artisans
are considered as workers, thea on the average TL. 46,000 ($ 3,000) worth
of capital outlay is provided for each craft worker in Eskiiehir as opposed
I[;$
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to about TL. 20,000 ($ 1,300) in Gaziantep. This point becomes clearer
when the composition of capital outlay is scrutinized.more closely.
The total capital outlay of the 47 artisan shops surveyed in Eski7ehir
is about TL. 7 million ($ 467,000). Of this total., about TL. 5 million
($ 333,000) is invested in capital goods (hand-tools, power-tools,
detail-machines and other equipment, but neither the land nor the buildin"),
In other words, in Eskigehir there is TL 33,000 ($ 2,200) worth of fixed
capital outlay per craft worker. In Gaziantep, on the other hand, the
total capital outlay of the 48 artisan shops adds up to TL. 3.8 million
($ 253,000) of which merely TL. 2 million ($ 133,000) are fixed capital
i investments. Thus, on the average, a craft worker in Gaziantep works with
TL. 11,000 ($ 700) worth of capital equipment.
If the size of the fixed capital outlay put the productivity of
craft labor in perspective, then the size of the variable capital (the
capital needed to cover the costs of typical production cycles per month
including expenditures on raw materials, maintenance, payments on interest,
rent and utilities, and wages) suggests the nature of artisanal production.
The total variable capital outlay of the 47 artisan shops in
Eskisehir is around TL. 2 million ($ 133,000): about TL. 42,500 ($ 2,830)
per artisan shop, and TL. 13,000 ($ 800) per craft worker. In Gaziantep,
on the other hand, the 48 artisan shops account for a total of TL. 1.8 million
($ 122,000) in variable capital: about TL. 37,500 ($ 2,540) per shop, and
TL. 9,000 ($ 600) per worker. Unfortunately, these averages distort much
to about TL. 20,000 ($ 1,300) in Gaziantep. This point becomes clearer
when the composition of capital outlay is scrutinized more closely.
The total capital outlay of the 47 artisan shops surveyed in Eskir~ehir
is about TL. 7 million ($ 467,000). Of this total., about TL. 5 million
($ 333,000) is invested in capital goods (hand-tools, power-tools,
detail-machines and other equipment, but neither the land nor the building).
In other words, in Eskigehir there is TL 33,000 ($ 2,200) worth of fixed
capital outlay per craft worker. In Gaziantep, on the other hand, the
total capital outlay of the 48 artisan shops adds up to TL. 3.8 million
($ 253,000) of which merely TL. 2 million ($ 133,000) are fixed capital
investments. Thus, on the average, a craft worker in Gaziantep works with
TLo 11,000 ($ 700) worth of capital equipment.
If the size of the fixed capital outlay put the productivity of
craft labor in perspective, then the size of the variable capital (the
capital needed to cover the costs of typical production cycles per month
including expenditures on raw materials, maintenance, payments on interest,
rent and utilities, and wages) suggests the nature of artisanal production.
The total variable capital outlay of the 47 artisan shops in
Eski~sehir is around TL. 2 million ($ 133,000): about TL. 42,500 ($ 2,830)
per artisan shop, and TL. 13,000 ($ 800) per craft worker. In Gaziantep,
on bhe other hand, the 48 artisan shops account for a total of TL. 1.83 million
D ($ 122,000) in variable capital: about TL. 37,500 ($ 2,540) per shop, and
TXL. 9,000 ($ 600) per worker. Unfortunately, these averages distort much
of the picture of artisanal production. Indeed, there are ,,independent"
artisan shops where the artisan stocks raw materials and produces in response
to the prevailing market demand. Yet, almost all lathe shops, auto repair
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shops and tailors together with many weavers, dyers, carpenters, shoe-
makers, &c., operate with insignificant raw material stocks if any at all.
Thus, the variable capital per artisan shop among the "independent" artisans
tends to be higher than among the artisans who do not have raw material
stocks to start with. When an artisan does not have raw material stocks,
the customer either provides the raw materials or pays for them in advance.
In other words, not every artisan ends up controlling his product. The
customers may be individual consumers, merchants or other artisans. As
long as the artisan does not depend exclusively on one or two customers
he may be referred to as being involved in "custom-made production for
the market," or as "quasi-dependent." Yet, when an artisan who is unable
to maintain his own raw material stock, starts to work exclusively for
a merchant or another artisan (when, indeed, he is reduced to being an
employee of someone else while he himself employs others) we are in the
realm of "putting-out" practices as they exist in Turkey. At least half
of the artisans observed in Eskisehir and two-thirds of those in Gaziantep
lack significant raw material stocks and therefore are "quasi-dependent"
upon those who not only file orders but also provide the necessary raw
materials. Among the "quasi-dependent" artisans in Eskisehir and Gaziantep,
however, about 30 per cent work exclusively for a merchant or another petty
producer, and hence may be appropriately called "dependent." In brief,
there are small and large artisan shops, but more important there are
the "independent," "quasi-dependent" and "dependent" forms of artisanal
production.
3. The Technical Base In Artisanal Production
· _ I ~ I I_ ~1~1 _ ~
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In artisan shops hand-tools rather than power-tools and detail-
machines provide the technical base for production. 26 out of the 95
artisan shops did not have power-tools or detail-machines. Shoe makers,
quilt makers, ironsmiths, coppersmiths, and auto repairers use hand-tools
more exclusively than artisans in other lines of production. As a rule,
the larger the fixed capital outlay of an artisan shop is, the more common
is the use of power-tools and detail-machines with motors. Yet, the total
capacity of motors to be found in artisan shops rarely exceeds the 10
horsepower mark. For instance, of the 69 artisan shops where motors are
used, about 49 employ less than 5 horsepower. In Eskigehir, the 37 artisan
shops employing motors utilize 201 horsepower in all: an average of 5.4
horsepower per firm. In Gaziantep, on the other hand, 32 artisan shops
out of 48 employ power-tools and detail-machines with motors. The total
capacity of all the motors in these 32 shops is around 138 horsepower: an
average of 4.3 horsepower per artisan shop. Among the artisans who employ
detail-machines with motors are the 'kilim' weavers, towel makers, lathe
shop operators, aluminum kitchen-ware makers, 'sayaci's, 'fora-frezeci's,
and the like. The most important observation concerning the technical base
for production in artisan shops, however, is not the capacity of motors
employed. The age of the capital equipment, and the quality of the technology
embedded in the power-tools and detail-machines is more revealing. For
instance, all 'kilim' weavers and towel makers operate machine-looms, but
the power looms may best be described as "modern-obsolete." They stand
as modern when compared to hand-looms used by a few silk-weavers and
'9aput kilim' makers; and, appear obsolete when compared to the integrated
machine systems in textile mills. The weavers who have one or two machine-
·---·- lilc--;-----·-------·--*-- ---
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looms usually acquire them second-hand from other weavers in the city.
Weavers with larger capital outlays , on the other hand, use comparatively
new machine-looms, buying either the looms produced in Bursa, or the
comparatively new but used looms from the Istanbul-Bursa area. In other
words, there is a recycling of equipment among the artisans. The smaller
the artisan shop is,the more obsolete its technical base. Indeed, examples
of such recycling of equipment can be observed among tailors, carpenters,
furniture makers, auto repairers, lathe shop operators, ironsmiths and
coppersmiths.
4. The Organization Of Work In Contemporary Artisan Shops
The artisan performs in succession all the operations necessary
for the production of a particular commodity in front of and with the
help of his journeymen (called 'kalfa' in Turkish) and apprentices
(called ' 1rak'). Also, whenever they can, the journeymen and apprentices
are allowed to perform in succession all the operations, just like the
artisan does. In other words, the cooperation of labor in artisan shops
follows "craft" guidelines even though power-tools and detail-machines
may be used. It is true that in certain trades such as furniture, hat,
shirt and copper utensil making, when the pace of business picks up there
evolves a tendency to adapt a division of labor akin to "serial manufacture."
Yet, as production orders decline or the market becomes saturated with
new artisan shops, the practice of "serial manufacture" disappears. Thus,
in the long run, workers in artisan shops eventually develop composite
skills rather than a set of detail skills as in workshops. In short, therefore,
both the journeymen and apprentices are craft-workers. While the former
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practice their composite-skills, the latter gradually acquire them.
Furthermore, since the purchases, storage, production and
marketing all occur in the presence of workers there are,in effect,
no business secrets. Craft-workers observe how business is carried out
in its entirety, and are aware of its problems. An inescapable consequence
is that workers learn how to run the business and tend to open a similar
shop at their earliest opportunity. In brief, therefore, the artisan
may control both the process of production and the product itself, but
at the same time he teaches his workers how to do so. Also, the artisan
himself works like another craft-worker, and his employees may not be
considered simple wage earners. Thus, the industrial production that
takes place in artisan shops is in effect a quasi-developed version of
capitalism.
When asked to describe the division of labor in their firms, all
artisans either looked puzzled or laughed before answering to the effect
that:
" Here, in this shop, everybody does whatever work
comes their way."
Indeed, this is a vague answer. Whenposing the same question to craft-
workers, therefore, a certain subtlety becomes indispensable. In this
connection, I assumed that the following two questions would be successful.
First, are you allowed to do all the necessary operations to complete
whatever products come out of this shop? Second, if given the opportunity,
would you be able to run a similar business?
In general, both the answers received to these questions and the
observations made were in agreement with the vague answers given by the
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artisans at the outset. All journeymen both know how, and are allowed
to perform all the operations necessary to complete any of the products
or services offered in the shop. Also, the journeymen respond with
confidence and pride that they are "of course" capable of running a
similar and perhaps a larger business provided that the necessary capital
is available. The apprentices,on the other hand, are more like students.
They learn one "detail operation" of the trade after another. When asked
about their work, they either say that they are helping the journeymen
or the artisan, or imply that they are in the process of learning both
the trade and the business.
Invariably there exists an artisan-journeymen-apprentice hierarchy
inside the artisan shop. Yet, this hierarchy is distinct from the traditional
situation. It is both voluntary in nature and petrified. It is voluntary
because the internal hierarchy of the artisan shop is not imposed from
outside the firm, but rather develops from within. It is petrified because
an apprentice may not start at the bottom of the ladder and become a journeyman
in the same shop. The only way to climb up the ladder seems to be through
changing shops and hoping that one of the consecutive artisans will
consider the apprentice a journeyman upon arrival. The internal hierarchy
of the artisan shop seems to pave the way for two distinct phenomena. First,
the rapid turnover of craft-workers (mostly apprentices), and second, the
easy exploitation of labor. There are many instances where the 16-20
year old apprentices are clearly no longer students. They function as the
journeymen do, but are not paid as journeymen. Nevertheless, it is in
workshops rather than in artisan shops that this practice emerges as a
rule, and hence becomes one of the major forms of exploiting labor.
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The contract between artisans and their employees is in reality
a "personal" one. Often the journeymen are not registered with the Labor
Office. In other words, the bulk of journeymen are indeed "illegally"
employed. About 60 per cent of the journeymen employed in artisan shops
surveyed in Eskisehir, and about 90 per cent in Gaziantep fall into this
category. The apprentices, on the other hand, are supposed to have written
consent of their parents, stay out of production and receive only "pocket
money." Yet, about 54 per cent of the apprentices whom I encountered are
involved in manual labor, and receive more than what is legally set as the
"pocket money" rate, i.e., TL. 100-200 ($ 7-14) per month. If .such
apprentices are taken together with those who work like laborers but just
receive "pocket money", then about 90-95 per cent of the apprentices employed
in the 95 artisan shops that I have seen can be called "illegal." As may
be expected, the illegal journeymen and apprentices are not unionized
either. Consequently, in their relations with artisans they are alone.
Artisans may hire , fire and pay their employees as they see fit. Yet, on
the other hand, craft-workers may leave a shop whenever they want to do
so. In short, therefore, the institutional organization (the market mechanism)
outside the artisan shop is such that it neither regulates, nor reinforces
any particular form of work within the firm. On the contrary, by letting
the employer-employee relations go unchecked the artisan-journeyman-apprentice
hierarchy is fostered, and the failure of craft-workers to organize makes
their exploitation easier.
Although the majority of artisan shops in Turkey include journeymen
and apprentices, not every artisan employs workers. There are cases where
two or more artisans form a partnership and work without hiring labor. I
m
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surveyed two such artisan shops in Eskigehir and three in Gaziantep. Also
several petty producers, each with his own means of production, sometimes
may come together under one roof to share the rent and utilities, but
not their businesses. Such artisans usually do not employ labor. I interviewed
a anner in Eskiqehir and a weaver in Gaziantep who work with two other
fellow artisans under such an arrangement. Finally, there are those who
work in their own shops all by themselves. I interviewed six such artisans
in Eskisehir and nine in Gaziantep. In short, 24 per cent of the artisans
interviewed in Eskigehir and Gaziantep do not employ workers.
5. Craft-Workers And Their Wages
In the 39 artisan shops in Eski§ehir where artisans employ workers,
I counted 32 journeymen and 60 apprentices. In the 36 artisan shops in
Gaziantep, on the other hand, both the number of journeymen and apprentices
were higher: 58 journeymen and 72 apprentices. If the artisans in partnership
are counted, there exist 61 artisans for 47 artisan shops in Eskiqehir
and 65 for 48 in Gaziantep. All in all, therefore, in Eskiqehir there are
153 people employed in the 47 artisan shops surveyed. Whereas in Gaziantep
the total number of people employed in the 48 artisan shops adds up to 195.
Thus, it may be concluded that, as a rule, there are 3-4 people employed
per artisan shop.
If the artisans are young,their workers are even younger. For
example, about 77 per cent of the journeymen are under 25. Similarly,
about 61 per cent of the apprentices are younger than 15, and around 98
per cent are below the age of 20. What is more interesting is that more
than 80 per cent of the journeymen and apprentices are "first or second
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generation" city dwellers. In other words, either their parents migrated
to Eskisehir and Gaziantep in the 1950-60's, or remained in villages,
but sent their childeren to the city. Those young craft-workers whose
parents are not in the city, either stay with their relatives or share
with others the rent of a one or two-room 'gecekondu' (squatter building)
in the outskirts of the city. This not only means that they'have to walk
long distances to and from work, but also that they are exposed to all
sorts of potentially negative influences at very young ages. Such an
uprooted urban life seems to be the rule among those who work in the
artisan shops and workshops and are neither married nor have relatives.
The military service, however, functions as a turning point. Those employed
in petty production firms usually get married upon completing their service
and seek an opportunity to open a business of their own.
As a rule, all apprentices are paid weekly. The journeymen, howeer,
are paid in differing ways. Among the tailors, tricot makers, dyers, weavers,
&c., piece work prevails. Also, daily and monthly payments are common.
Yet, no matter how they are paid, craft-workers are underpaid. About 51
per cent of the journeymen earn less than TL. 1,000 ($ 67) per month, while
30 per cent are paid somewhere between TL. 1,000 and the official monthly
minimum TL. 1,200. Apprentices, however, are far less fortunate. About
81 per cent take home less tha TL.400 ($ 27) per month.
6. Output In Artisanal Production
Only few artisan shops operate at full-capacity. 33 out of 95
artisan shops, about 35 per cent, come close to operating at full-capacity.
Yet, around 54 per cent ( 51 shops in all) function at half or less than
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half of their respective capacities. In short, what we have is a serious
under-utilization of capital and labor. In this connection, however,
it must be noted that the underlying cause of the inefficient use of
small chunks of capital embedded in "modern-obsolete" technology and
the inactivity of labor with low levels of productivity is the nature of
demand. Thus, even when artisan shops operate at full-capacity, it is
difficult to suggest that this is efficient resource utilization. In any
case, the under-utilization of the capital and labor in artisan shops
stems both from marketing bottlenecks and erratic production orders.
Consequently, not only the capacity in use, but the gross income, profits
and wages fluctuate from one month to the next., and from one season to
the next, as demand fluctuates. Unfortunately, however, most of the increases
in the gross income of artisan shops are reflections of the increasing costs
of raw materials, rent, and utilities rather than results of changes in the
volume and quality of production, or improvements in the productivity of
craft labor. As a rule, tight profit margins lead to slow capital accumulation
in the hands of artisans. With inflation, however, not only the cost of
raw materials but also the cost s of improving the quality of production,
increasing the sizes of the capital outlay and labor force, and improving
the productivity of labor increase. Consequently, real significant growth
in artisan shops becomes a reality only among the larger, "independent"
ones which later join the ranks of workshops anyway. In this connection,
it is to be remembered that about 46 per cent of the artisan shops in
Gaziantep, and about 36 per cent in Eskigehir were not improved upon at all.
Nevertheless, during an average month, the 39 artisan shops surveyed
in Eskiqehir generate a gross income of TL. 900,000 ($ 60,000). Out of this
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total, the artisans pay TL. 45,000 in wages, TL. 440,000 in raw materials,
TL. 5,000 in utilities and TL. 20,000 in rent. In Gaziantep, on the other
hand, the 48 artisan shops surveyed account for a slightly larger monthly
gross income: TL. 980,000 ($ 65,300). The artisans in Gaziantep employ
less capital and more labor, and therefore contribute more to the urban
economy when compared with their counterparts in Eskigehir. They pay more
in wages (TL. 75,000), in raw materials (TL. 545,000), in utilities (TL. 7,000),
and in rents (TL. 21,000) every month only to end up with less net income
as a whole than the artisans in Eskigehir: TL. 332,000 as opposed to
TL. 390,000.
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CHAPTER XIV
CONTEMPORARY WORKSHOPS IN ESKiSEHiR AND GAZiANTEP*
1. Contemporary Workshop Operators
In workshops the petty producer is distinct from the master-
craftsmen or the artisans (called 'usta' in Turkish) who run the artisan
shops. The workshop operator clearly assumes the role of a capitalist
industrial entrepreneur. He is a "boss" ('patron' in Turkish usage), who
is nevertheless distinct from "factory" owners, i.e., Turkish "neo-
industrialists." His capital is embedded in a fully developed yet lower
form of capitalist production. While artisans refer to their petty firms
as shops ('diikkan'), workshop operators call their firms manufactories
('imalathane'), ateliers ('atSlye'), manufacturing ateliers ('imalat
at6lyesi'), and sometimes factories ('fabrika'). In other words, workshop
operators like artisans take pains to distinguish between artisan shops
and workshops which they recognize as qualitatively distinct. Somehow,
this otherwise trivial point escapes the attention of officials, census
takers and scholars who insist on classifying petty firms with reference
to quantitative criteria.
The "boss" owns the means of production, and specializes in managing
the purchases and sales, in taking production orders, in book-keeping,
and in organizing and supervising the productive process inside the firm.
Unlike the artisan, he is neither involved in manual labor, nor in the
* All the data mentioned in this chapter are derived from the results of
the stratified random sample survey conducted among petty producers in
Eskigehir and Gaziantep. For the details of this survey, see: Appendix IV.
Furthermore, in Appendix V, data are organized into tables for easier
reference.
-185-
immediate supervision of workers. If he ever gets his hands dirty, it is
either when he shows a detail-worker how to proceed, or replaces somebody
out of sheer necessity. As soon as the petty producer becomes more
occupied with managerial functions than manual labor, that is as the
petty firm gradually acquires the character of a workshop, a clearly defined
space for administrative functions inside the work place emerges. Although
the storage space is frequently transferred to other buildings, the
administrative unit is seldom moved. When the main body of the workshop
and the administrative unit are separated, however, the latter tends to
be located in the central business district. For instance, in the case
of towel makers in Gaziantep, the looms are located in the industrially
zoned areas, i.e., 'Kcii9k Sanayi Cargl's, of the city, yet the headquarters
are concentrated in one building complex, locally known as the Towel Makers's
Market, in the business center.
As a rule, workshop operators are senior petty producers. Whereas
the bulk of artisans surveyed (about 63 per cent) are younger than 40,
about 70 per cent of those who run workshops are over 40. Furthermore,
all workshop operators younger than 30 (about 12 per cent) have simply
taken over their fathers' businesses rather than starting their own. In
short, therefore, workshops are relatively older petty industrial establishments
than artisan shops. Indeed, about 54 per cent of workshops surveyed (23 out
of 43) as opposed to 74 per cent of artisan shops were established after
1960.
Not every workshop starts as a workshop. For instance, 18 out of
the 43 (about 42 per cent) workshops surveyed in Gaziantep and Eskisehir
were artisan shops at the outset. On the average, it takes about six to
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ten years for a petty producer to transform his artisan shop into a
workshop without significant credit helps. In Eskisehir, among the 16
workshops surveyed only four started as artisan shops, and it took eight
to 25 years (an average of 15 years) for them to grow out of their initial
forms. In Gaziantep, on the other hand, such transformations seem to occur
more frequently and quickly. 14 out of the 27 workshops surveyed there
were initially artisan shops; and, in less than 15 years (an average of six
years) they all grew out of artisanal production. In short, therefore,
there are exceptions to the rule regarding the vicious-circle of small
capital. Within a period of a decade or so a few lucky artisans in proliferating
trades do indeed manage to accumulate enough capital to transform their
businesses. Needless to say, there may be some successful artisans who
enlarge their businesses without adapting workshop-type of industrial
production as well. Yet, as a rule, the bulk of artisan shops do not grow,
but rather remain the same, deteriorate, or go out of business as fresh
entries flood the markets; and, the successful ones, the ones that grow,
do become workshops.
Thus, unlike the stock of artisan shops, fresh entries are not
necessarily the only cause of increases in the number of workshops. Consequently,
workshops display a longer petty production tradition than artisan shops
do. Indeed, if 80 per cent of the artisans are"first generation petty
producers,"about 56 per cent of the workshop operators are "second or third
generation petty producers." In this connection, petty production is more
of a tradition in Gaziantep than in Eskisehir. In the former, about 70
per cent (19 out of 27) of the workshop operators, and 40 per cent (20 out
of 48) of the artisans are "second or third generation petty producers."
__ ~·I ~
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In the latter, however, merely 31 per cent (5 out of 16) of the workshop
operators, and 34 per cent (16 out of 47) of the artisans are sons and
grandsons of petty producers. This is yet another demonstration that
petty production activities have deeper roots in Gaziantep than in
Eskiqehir.
When compared with artisans, it was found that workshop operators
do not frequent coffee-tea houses as much, but go to the mosque more often.
This difference,however, stems mainly from differences in age rather than
differences in political inclinations between artisans and workshop
operators. For one thing, workshop operators seem to follow daily newspapers
even closely than artisans do. Also, more than 90 per cent are literate,
and about 33.per cent (as opposed to 27 per cent among artisans) have
attempted and succeeded in going through secondary education. Yet more
important, in the most recent elections, like the artisans, the bulk of
the workshop operators voted for the Republican Party. In brief, therefore,
like artisans, workshop operators are neither traditional nor conservative
people.
Unfortunately, workshop operators have never been studied as a
group of industrial entrepreneurs in their own right. They are either
lumped together with the artisans or with the "neo-industrialists."
In reality, however, they tend to fall somewhere in between. Like the
artisans they are connected with the "lower', forms of capitalist industrial
production, i.e., petty production. Yet, unlike the artisans, they clearly
assume the role of capitalist industrial entrepreneur, and hence may
be compared to but not equated with the "neo-industrialists" who own and
operate "factories." In other words, workshop operators are the grass-roots
_ ~CC ___ _T
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entrepreneurs peculiar to underdeveloped countries like Turkey. They usually
come from the ranks of artisans, but remain in the petty production
activities domain just short of turning into "factory" owners. In this
connection, their attitudes towards business, their assessment of business
problems, and their future plans are all different from those of both
artisans and "factory" owners.
Unlike the artisans, the workshop operators are in a position to
expand their businesses; and, they do so. Their initial capital outlay is
larger in size and is embedded in better technology from the beginning.
As they employ larger pools of detail-workers, and the productivity of
labor increases via the organization of work, the output of workshops
multiplies. The increased efficiency in production, however, does not
necessarily mean higher wages for the detail-workers. Thus, the workshop
operators, who have higher credit ratings than the artisans, enjoy higher
profit rates and faster capital accumulation as well. Consequently,
growth becomes the rule within the stock of workshops. In this vein, about
81 per cent of the workshop operators interviewed (14 out of 16 in Eskiqehir,
and 21 out of 27 in Gaziantep) assess the future of their businesses as
,"good"t to "excellent." Furthermore, their complaints revolve more around
the uneven quality of raw materials, the inadequate infrastructure, the
high interest rates, &c., rather than the set of problems brought up by the
artisans.
Workshops increase in number, and many expand in size. Yet, as a
rule, workshop operators do not start "factories." Or in other words, the
capital accumulated in the sphere of petty production activities does
not spill into the "factory" sector of industries. But why do the successful
I_ _ a___
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workshop operators stop short of transforming their firms into -factories"?
The workshop operators are, indeed, the cream of the crop of
the grass-roots industrialists. That is, they have neither learned
capitalism from the books, nor accumulated their capital on land or
through commerce. If they are reluctant to enter the sphere of "factory"
type industrial production, it is because they have a realistic sense of
the gap between the "factory" and "non-factory" types of capitalist
industrial production as it is in Turkey. For the sake of argument, let
us imagine a workshop operator willing to start a "factory", say an
agricultural equipments, a plow "factory." Since there are no domestic
"factories" or workshops from whic e can order capital equipment such as
drills, presses, &c., organized into a system of machinery, the workshop
operator has to consider imports. But is it possible for our would-be
"factory" owner to purchase the machinery to fit into the system that he
has in mind from the world markets? Of course not. The foreign producers
make capital goods according to the specifications of their own economies.
Consequently, what suits a developed capitalist economy, i.e., labor-saving,
capital-intensive technology, rarely fits the underdeveloped economy where
labor is abundant and the need to become capital-intensive is not yet
very strong. Furthermore, the imported machinery, sophisticated as it is,
would not only be unnecessarily expensive, but also difficult to maintain
and impossible to improve upon. Yet, let us continue with the exercise.
Let us assume that this workshop operator who is very determined to start
a "factory," came up with a larger amount of capital than would otherwise-
have been necessary to open a small labor-intensive "factory" as a realistic
extension of his workshop. After he imports all the necessary machinery,
__
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and transplants a large, modern and capital-intensive unit, then what
will happen? Our workshop operator turned "factory" owner is likely to
--. discover that he has in fact jumped a century too much. First, he will
realize that the organization of work he used in the workshop is no longer
applicable. In other words, he will find out that together with the
machinery, he has imported "the organization of work within. the firm" as
well. Furthermore, now that he is .a "factory" owner he will discover that
he is no longer in the same business environment that he successfully
manipulated while operating a workshop. In other words, he will soon
learn that "factory" type capitalist industrial production is very different
from "non-factory" types of production. He will have to deal with labor
unions, do political footwork within a totally different group consisting
of high officials, politicians, "neo-industrialists," bankers, &C., in order
to secure business favors and contracts. He will also have to improve his
business constantly in order to optimize his long-term profits. In short,
our workshop operator will be like a "fish on land."
In summary, if we could take our workshop operator and his business
back to nineteenth century England, no doubt he would be one of the
many starting a "factory" at that time. Yet, today in Turkey, with the
ever-widening gap between "factory" and "non-factory" types of industrial
production, workshop operators do not and often may not dare risk what
they have already accomplished. This is not to say that workshop operators
lack "the entrepreneurial spirit," but that the "dependent" versions of
capitalist industrial development prevailing in underdeveloped countries
are not conducive to grass-roots "factory" building.
Nevertheless, "abortive", attempts from above seem to be on way.
Lon
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For instance, the Turkish Government, supported by international
organizations, is distributing credits, providing infrastructure, granting
tax exemptions, and assisting in every other way the few selected workshop
operators who are also encouraged to organize into joint stock companies,
to establish "factories." Indeed, one or two "factories" may be forged
from among the more profitable workshops in this way. Yet, if this happens
are we to consider the Turkish petty production activities domain capable
of generating grass-roots "factories"? On this matter, I maintain that
as long as the technical base for "factory" and "non-factory" types of
industrial production can not be produced at home, Turkish capitalist
industrial development will retain its "dualist" nature. The gap between
"non-factory" and "factory" types of industrial production will widen, and
the latter will remain unable to join with and engulf the former.
Workshop operators are skeptical of the prospects of establishing
"factories," but not of the benefits of "mechanization" or "collective
actions" like forming partnerships, joining cooperatives and registering
with Chambers and Associations. More than half of the workshops surveyed
(seven out of 16 in Eskisehir, and 16 out of 27 in Gaziantep) are run in
partnerships. I counted a total of 69 workshop operators in the 43 workshops
surveyed: 24 in Eskisehir and 45 in Gaziantep. Half of the partnerships
are formed among family members, and usually, at least one of the partners
continues to do manual labor (albeit part-time) in order to supervise the
detail-workers. About half of the workshop operators surveyed (six out of
16 in Eskisehir, and 16 out of 27 in Gaziantep) are registered with the
Chambers of Industry and Commerce. Yet, despite regulations to the contrary,
many are also registered with the Petty Producers' Associations. Furthermore,
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46 per cent ( seven in Eski§ehir and 13 in Gaziantep) of the workshop
operators are members of various cooperatives that are focused mostly
on purchasing and construction.
2. Capital In Workshop Type Production
Both the fixed and variable capital outlays necessary to open and
operate a workshop are larger than those needed for an average artisan
shop. The total fixed and variable capital invested in the 43 workshops
surveyed in Eski§ehir and Gaziantep add up to TL. 45 million ($ 3 million):
about TL. I million ($ 66,666) per workshop. On the average,it takes ten
times as much capital to establish a workshop as it does to establish an
artisan shop. But again, this is only an average. In reality only five
workshops out of the 27 in Gaziantep, and six out of the 16 in Eskisehir
have a total capital outlay of TL. I million or more.
As I noted earlier about half of the workshops are indeed successful
artisan shops which have been transformed; and the other half are fresh
entries. Among the latter group of workshops, I found only three that were
established by people without a background in petty production. The first
two workshop operators were previously merchants, and the third was a
retired "factory" worker. In other words, the stock of workshop operators,i.e.,
the grass-roots industrialists, evolves within the domain of petty production
activities. Almost all workshop operators learn their trades as craft-workers,
and accumulate their initial capitals either by opening an artisan shop
or working as a detail-worker in a workshop, if they are not to take over
their fathers' businesses. As a rule, as is the case with artisan shops,
workshops are started after military service is completed. Thus, as may be
1
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expected, when asked about the sources of their initial capital, those
workshop operators interviewed mentioned in decreasing order, savings from
previous petty production activities, direct inheritance of the business,
interest-free loans from relatives and friends, credits from formal
channels, and finally the establishment of partnership and the use of
credit to buy the necessary capital equipment. In summary, like the workshop
operators themselves, the initial workshop capital originates within the
domain of petty production activities.
The larger amounts of workshop capital are embedded in more
sophisticated technical base for production than artisan shops. What we
have are detail-machines rather than hand and power tools. Thus, workshop
types of industrial production are not only more capital-intensive than
artisanal production, but also marked by higher labor productivity at the
outset. What follows is, therefore, three-fold; increased production,
larger profit rates and faster capital accumulation, and higher wages in
workshops than in artisan shops.
Clearly, workshop capital is not trapped in the vicious-circle
that inhibits capital invested in artisan shops. Yet, it may not penetrate
into the domain of "factory" types of industrial production either. In other
words, workshop capital seems to remain in between, perhaps trapped in its
own'vicious-circle. It is certainly larger in size and commands higher
rates of return than the capital invested in artisan shops, but when compared
to "factory" capital as it is in Turkey, it remains distinctly small in
size with lower rates of return.
During an average month, the 15 workshops surveyed (one workshop
operator did not supply information) in Eskigehir generate a total revenue
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of TL. 2.7 million ($ 180,000). Of this, the workshop operators retain
about 64 per cent (TL. 1.7 million) as their gross income: around
TL. 115,000 per workshop, or TL. 78,000 per workshop operator per month.
In Gaziantep, on the other hand, the 27 workshops surveyed generate a
total monthly revenue of TL. 6 million, of which the workshop operators
retain about 36.5 per cent (TL. 2.2 million): a monthly gross earning of
TL. 84,000 per workshop, or TL. 50,000 per workshop operator.
In order to approximate the net monthly profits, however, we have
to consider the reduction of the gross income of workshop operators due
to the depreciation of their capital equipment, interests due on credits,
and also taxes. Although it may be difficult to assess exactly the net
profits of workshops, one thing becomes clear: the profit rates in workshop
types of industrial production are higher than in artisanal production.
Whereas an average artisan shop has a total capital outlay of TL. 115,800
and yields a monthly gross income of TL. 7,600, an average workshop yields
13 times as much (TL. 99,500) with a total capital outlay that is about
8.5 times as much (TL. I million).
A consequence of higher profit rates is faster accumulation of
capital in the hands of workshop operators. For instance, with the exception
of three newly opened workshops, all workshops have been improved upon.
When expanding their capital outlays, workshop operators rely on credits
as much as their earnings. This is possible because, the credit ratings
of workshop operators are higher than those of artisans, and they have
easier access to larger credits with more favorable terms.
As a rule, while workshops are more capital-intensive than artisan
shops, the workshops in Gaziantep are more labor-intensive than those in
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Eskigehir. On the average, for each worker employed employed in a workshop
there is TL. 113,000 worth of total capital outlay (TL. 226,000 in Eskipehir
and TL. 64,000 in Gaziantep) as opposed to TL. 32,000 per worker in
artisan shops (Ti. 46,000 in Eskisehir and TL. 20,000 in Gaziantep).
3. The Technical Base Of Workshop Production.
In general, detail-machines and power-tools rather than hand-tools
mark the technical base of workshop production. Nevertheless, there are
exceptions to the rule. For example, in Gaziantep the shoe makers use
only hand-tools in their workshops, and put out the work that requires
detail-machines to the 'fora-frezeci's and 'sayaci's.
Usually detail-machines are motor powered. Yet again, there are
exceptional cases. For instance, tailors and tricot makers use hand or
foot powered sewing and knitting machines.
In this connection, only four ( one in Eskisehir and three in
Gaziantep) out of the 43 workshops surveyed do not employ motors. In
Eskisehir the 15 workshops with motors employ a total of 439 horsepower:
about 29 horsepower per workshop. In Gaziantep, on the other hand, the
average is lower. The 24 workshops with motors account for a total of
385 horsepower: about 16 horsepower per workshop. These averages, however,
distort the picture. Indeed, the range of motor capacity per workshop is
rather wide. There are workshops employing less than five horsepower, but
then, there are others employing more than 90 horsepower.
As a rule, the level of technology displayed in workshops is more
advanced than in artisan shops. But in certain trades such as shoe making,
tailoring and tricot making the levels of technology in artisan shops
j
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and workshops remain the same. In other words, both in workshops and
artisan shops the same kinds of hand-tools and the hand and foot powered
sewing and knitting machines are used to make shoes, coats, shirts, hats
and tricots. This makes it clear that the increased productivity of labor
and hence the increased production in workshops originates primarily from
the cooperation of labor through the division of work, rather than the
level of technology embedded in the stock of capital equipment.
4. Organization Of Work In Contemporary Workshops
In workshops what we have is a fully developed albeit a $,lower"
form of capitalist industrial production. On the one hand, unlike the
artisan, the workshop operator clearly assumes the role of a true industrial
entrepreneur, a capitalist. He owns the means of production and controls
both the process of production and the product itself, but he does not
get involved in production as a manual laborer. In other words, he specializes
in putting together the factors of production, i.e., the raw materials,
the means of production and the labor; in organizing the work; in supervising
the workers; and in marketing the product, all with one purpose in mind:
to make profits. On the other hand, unlike craft-workers, detail-workers
in workshops appear as pure and simple wage earners. They are neither
required to know, nor allowed to perform in succession all the operations
necessary to produce a commodity. They simply perform over and over again
the detail-work that they are assigned to.
Social cooperation of labor through division of work is at the core
of workshop production. The workshop operator divides the productive work
into its component parts and assigns tasks to detail-workers such that the
_ _
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detail-work of each employee complements that of the other. In other
words, unlike artisanal production which is marked by the craft-work
and craft-workers who perform in succession all the operations necessary
to complete a product, in workshops we have the detail-work and detail-
workers who are specialized in performing particular operations that
constitute the component parts of the work necessary to produce a commodity.
When a worker is tied to one and the same task, then not only his
concentration, but also the flow of his labor tends to be smoother.
Furthermore, the detail-worker develops a particular skill into perfection
by the mere momentum of countless repetitions. All this leads to increased
output per worker in workshops, provided that the detail-work performed
by the one is complemented by the labor of others, and that the workers
exert themselves in their respective detail-work.
To realize the former condition, the workshop operator simply has
to increase the fixed and variable capital outlays of the workshop. In
other words, the division of labor makes it necessary for the capitalist
to increase the number of simultaneously employed detail-workers and expand
the stock of raw materials and capital equipment.
To realize the latter condition, however, the workers have to be
disciplined. In other words, either by incentives or threats the workers
have to be made to work harder. In this connection, the workshop operator
soon discovers that the division of labor gives him not only absolute
control over the productive work, but also over the detail-workers. Indeed,
unlike the craft-work in artisan shops, the detail-work in workshops
neither requires nor builds meaningful skills. Unless complemented by the
labor of others the detail-skills, detail-work,and hence detail-labor do
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not have value in and of themselves. Furthermore, detail-skills are
easier to acquire than composite-skills, and most of them are such that
almost any worker can perform them without difficulty. All this places the
detail-worker as a simple wage earner in the labor markets: a person
who sells his labor not his skills. In other words, considering the numbers
of the unemployed, unlike the craft-worker with composite-skills, the
detail-worker finds out that he may be easily replaced. Of course, this
particular situation then gives the capitalist the much needed stick
for disciplining workers.
The increased output per detail-worker together with increases
in the number of simultaneously employed detail-workers account for
larger outputs. Yet, when outputs are marketed and turned into money,
the wages do not necessarily increase in the next round of production.
In other words, as a rule, the returns of increased labor productivity
are appropriated by the capitalist as "profits." The stick used to force
the detail-workers to work harder, serves the purpose of muffling the workers'
complaints concerning the uneven distribution of earnings in the firm.
Thus, in short, the cooperation of labor through division of work as it
occurs in workshops not only starts the first complete form of capitalist
industrial production, but also furthers it.
As a rule, in the workshops surveyed in Eskigehir and Gaziantep,
the division of labor follows the blue-print for "serial-manufacture"
where craft-work is redistributed among detail-workers. It is only in the
case of the cartwrights in Eskiqehir that a division of labor akin to
"heterogenous manufacture," where different types of craft-work are assembled
·r
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in one workshop, can be observed. Yet, in all the workshops the detail-
work and hence the detail-workers are present. In other words, instead
of artisans and journeymen making agricultural equipment, stoves, metal
and wooden furniture, shoes, shirts, &c., what we have in workshops are
the detail-workers called "master" ('usta'), "journeymen" ('kalfa') and
"apprentice" ('9lrak') performing detail-operations such as sorting, carrying,
cutting, molding, drilling, welding, fitting, assembling, sanding, polishing,
painting, &c.. Thus, when asked to describe the division of labor in their
firms, unlike artisans, workshop operators readily provide elaborate
descriptions of what each of their detail-workers does. In brief, in the
workshops every worker has a clear job assignment. Sometimes, however, when
the pace of production slows and some workers are laid-off, the remaining
detail-workers assume additional work loads. This shows clearly that in
workshops the division of work is not rigid and technology-determined.
It changes as the number of workers changes, and remains negotiable. In
this connection, when asked whether they are allowed to perform all the
operations necessary to complete whatever is produced in the workshop, all
detail-workers respond in the negative. Nevertheless, as a few detail-workers
saw fit to add, detail-workers can exchange work among each other when
extremely bored.
Often detail-work requires a particular skill. Yet, there are types
of detail-work such as sorting raw materials, carrying intermediary
products from one detail-worker to another, cleaning tqols and machines,
sweeping floors, &c., which do not require particular skills. As a rule,
the children between the ages of 9-14, called '91rak's and 'ayakalti's,
are assigned to such detail-work. In other words, unlike the 'qirak's in
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artisan shops, those in workshops are unskilled detail-workers, and
in the long runt all they may learn is a set of detail-skills rather than
a trade in its entirety. Detail-work such as molding, cutting, drilling,
fitting, &c., which requires particular skills in handling tools and
machines, however, is assigned to older detail-workers usually referred
to as "masters" ('usta'), "journeymen" ('kalfa') and sometimes "workers"
('iqi').
In general, the 'usta's and 'kalfa's except those who have already
worked in or have operated artisan shops, voice many doubts concerning
their ability to run a workshop on their own if given the opportunity.
This attitude contrasts sharply with that of the craft-workers'. In other
words, unlike craft-workers, detail-workers tend to see themselves as
simple wage earners, and to have realistic doubts about becoming workshop
operators: their working class consciousness is growing if not yet clearly
articulated. The 'lirak's, on the other hand, often say that they intend
to learn the trade. Yet, as I have noted, what they hope for is not what
they necessarily get from workshops.
Hand in hand with the division of labor, there develops a clear job
hierarchy. In this connection, the use of traditional titles for detail-
workers makes sense: they help to rationalize the job hierarchy in workshops
by invoking the traditional artisan-journeyman-apprentice organization.
The workers assigned to more difficult detail operations are called "masters"
('usta'). 'Usta's are paid wages either at the official minimum or above
the official minimum montly rate, and are often registered at the Labor Office.
The laborers tied to lesser detail-operations are called "journeymen" ('kalfa').
'Kalfa's are usually not registered at the Labor Office, and receive wages
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below the official minimum rate: TL. 1,200 per month. Finally, at the
bottom of the hierarchy, we have the "apprentices" ('91rak'), who receive
even lower wages than 'kalfa's.
The division of labor in the firm is set by the capitalist. Also,
he decides who gets which detail-work, and how much each worker receives
in wages. Thus in effect, if the "hiring and firing" of workers is the
"stick7 then the clear job-hierarchy becomes the "carrot" in disciplining
the workers. A detail-worker may fear being laid-off, but then he also
has hope for promotion and marginal wage increases. In other words, it
is a combination of "fear"' and "hope" that keeps the detail-workers in
line. Since a detail-worker may progress only when the "boss" assigns him
to more difficult detail-operations, his hope like his fear prevails on him to
be content with "low wages" and also patient. Furthermore, since it is
impossible for every fkalfa' to become an 'usta', and every 'cirak' to
become a 'kalfa' in the same workshop, detail-workers have to compete
against each other to win favors from the "boss." Yet, when a detail-worker
manages to climb a step up in the hierarchy, others lose hope of so doing.
Consequently, the bulk of '9lrak's and younger 'kalfa's tend to try their
chances in several workshops (mostly newly opened ones) rather than only
in one. Unless hired on a different footing at the outset, however, 'kalfa's
and' '9irak's who change jobs often remain as such once in the new workshop.
Given all this, therefore, whereas 'usta's stand as the "tenured"
detail-workers and usually do not change jobs, the labor turnover among
the 'kalfa's and '9lrak's often reaches phenomenal levels.
The immediate supervision of the detail-workers is done by a "trustee'"
of the "boss" chosen from among the "tenured" detail-workers, and called
-..·--~rr
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"head master" ('usta bag1'). The 'usta baqi's not only continue to perform
their particular detail-assignements, but also make sure that the production
flows smoothly. If the workshop is run as a partnership, then one of the
"bosses" assumes the role of supervising the workers. Sometimes, he may
even work like another detail-worker, and indeed be, a partner ('ortak')
and an 'usta bagi' at the same time.
5. Detail-Workers And Their Wages
In Eskiqehir, in the 15 workshops surveyed, I counted a total of
120 detail-workers (90 'usta's and 'kalfa's, and 30 ' 9 irak's): about 8
workers per workshop. In the 27 workshops surveyed in Gaziantep, on the
other hand, there are 275 detail-workers (172 'usta's and 'kalfa's, and
103 '91rak's): about 10 workers per workshop. If the workshop operators
(22 in Eskigehir and 45 in Gaziantep --one workshop operator and his
partner in Eskipehir did not supply information on their workers and,
therefore, are not considered) are included, then it may be concluded that
on the average a workshop employs three times as many people as an artisan
shop does: 10-12 as opposed to 3-4.
As noted earlier, 'usta's and 'kalfa's are older than '9irak's.
While about 98 per cent of the 'cirak's (28 out of 30 in Eskisehir and
102 out of 103 in Gaziantep) are younger than 20, about 80 per cent of
the 'usta's and 'kalfa's (83 out of 90 in Eskisehir and 126 out of 172 in
Gaziantep) are either 20 or older.
Whereas almost all 'lirak's are paid weekly, most of the 'kalfa's
and 'usta's are paid per piece-work. In certain instances, as in the cases
of the shoe makers and shirt makers, however, there is also the practice
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of employing a team of workers for particular sets of detail-operations.
In other words, the workshop operator, say a shoe maker, hires several
'kalfa's, but often each of these 'kalfa's comes in with two, three and
even more 'Cirak's of his choice. The detail-work that is assigned to the
'kalfa', such as attaching the uppers to the sole, is then performed by
the team after further division of labor. Later, when the 'kalfa' is paid
by the shoe maker per piece-work, he in turn pays his 'Firak's.
Nevertheless, detail-workers as a group turn out to be better paid
than craft-workers. For instance, about 77 per cent of the 'usta's and
'kalfa's (74 out of 90 in Eskiyehir and 127 out of 172 in Gaziantep) receive
wages either at the official minimum or above the official minimum rate:
TL. 1,200 per month.(This is what I was told by both the workers themselves
and the workshop operators. Yet, I still think that the actual numbers of
detail-workers --mostly 'usta's-- who are paid minimum or above the minimum
wages are far less than what I have been led to report.) The rest of the
'usta's and 'kalfa's (indeed, mostly 'kalfa's), (about 16 in Eskiyehir and
45 in Gaziantep), receive wages that fluctuate around TL. 750-800 per month.
The '5irak's, on the other hand, are paid far below the minimum wage rate.
Their monthly wages hardly exceed TL. 600.
In principle, those detail-workers reported as receiving minimum
or above minimum wages ought to be registered at the Labor Office. There
is, however, no way to check either the actual wages or the registrations
at the Labor Office without antagonizing the petty producers and hence
losing their cooperation in other matters. In this connection, therefore,
it is safe to assume that half of the detail-workers employed in workshops
go unregistered at the Labor Office, and thus do not have a formal job
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contract., Furthermore, like craft-workers, detail-workers do not have
unions. Consequently, at least half of them are hired and fired at the
whim of the workshop operators. Indeed, 'usta's receive higher wages; get
registered at the Labor Office; and do not change jobs frequently. Yet,
the labor turnover among the rest, i.e., among the 'kalfa's and '15 rak's,
is high. In short, between the craft-workers and the detail-workers who
are not registered at the Labor Office, there materializes a large stock
of non-union, illegal, and therefore, cheap labor that feeds both the
artisan shops and the workshops. This stock of labor maintains itself
through high labor turnover, and increases in size by migrations from the
countryside and business failures among artisan shops.
In general, the craft and detail-workers are male. Yet, this does
not mean that women are excluded from the sphere of petty production
activities. In certain exceptional casesas in Eskiehir, there are women
tailors and knitters. What is more important, however, is the practice of
putting out work to households. For instance, in Gaziantep, the tricot
makers, sock makers and even 'kilim' weavers put out certain detail-work
to women who stay at home, and thus include them indirectly in the labor
force.
6. Output In Workshop Type Production
As noted earlier, the division of labor combined with the improved
technical base for production results in the markedly larger output of
workshops. The size of the labor force, the labor productivity, the size
of the capital outlay, and the profit and capital accumulation rates are
all higher in workshops than in artisan shops. Furthermore, unlike artisan
]I II ' •--- - " -* -- .'
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shops, workshops tend to operate close to their respective full-capacities.
For example, 38 per cent of the workshops (six out of 15 in Eskisehir,
and ten out of 27 in Gaziantep) operate at full-capacity, and 19 per cent
(two in Eskigehir and six in Gaziantep) come close to operating at full-
capacity. Only six workshops in Eskijehir and eight in Gaziantep function
at half or less than half of their respective capacities.
During an average month, the 15 workshops surveyed in Eskigehir
generate a total gross income of TL. 2.7 million: about TL. 180,000 per
workshop as opposed to TL. 23,000 per artisan shop. Out of this total,
the workshop operators pay 4.4 per cent (TL. 117,680) in wages; 30.4 per
cent (TL. 821,000) in raw materials; 0.8 per cent (TL. 18,235) in utilities;
and 0.5 per cent (TL. 14,100) in rent. In Gaziantep, on the other hand, the
27 workshops surveyed account for a larger monthly gross income: TL. 6.2 million
(about TL. 230,000 per workshop as opposed to 20,400 per artisan shop).
Like the artisans, however, the workshop operators in Gaziantep retain
less than half of this total as their personal gross incomes. They pay
4 per cent (TL. 249,880) in wages; 58.7 per cent (TL. 3,646,000) in raw
materials; 0.4 per cent (TL. 24,710) in utilities; and 0.3 per cent
(TL. 18,535) in rent.
SECTION
6Ž
HOW DOES THE "NON-FACTORY" SECTOR OF INDUSTRIES
FUNCTION?
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CHAPTER XV
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION FOUR
1. What Is This Section About?
With the abolition of Ottoman Guilds, significant changes
occurred in the sphere of petty production activities. Traditional
practices for controlling the quality and price of the commodities
produced in "non-factories," restricting the number of new entries into
each trade, supervising the relations between petty producers and their
workers, distributing credits, providing social security, controlling
the quality of the raw materials used, determining the allocation of
raw materials to petty producers, &c., were abandoned. They were replaced
by a set of labor regulations that are applicable only to ,"factory" types
of industrial production; an erratic credit mechanism; an experimental
social security system which is not designed for but covers petty producers;
voluntary associations; and most important the "dog eat dog" system
otherwise known as the "invisible hand" of the capitalist market mechanism.
It is within such a situation that artisan shops and workshops have
evolved, and continue to operate.
Studies of the nature of petty firms can only disclose a partial
view of how the "non-factory" sector of industries functions. To complete
the picture, therefore, the relations among petty producers and the
relations between petty producers on the one hand, and merchants and
"factories," on the other, have to be scrutinized.
In chapter XVI, competitive relations among petty producers will be
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considered. In brief, I will argue that in each line of petty production
activity there are two separate fields of competition: the "easy
contest for growth" among workshops, and the intense "struggle for
immediate survival" among small artisan shops. An important point is
that the lax competition among large "non-factories" yields growth and
development, both of which remain in the domain of "lower" forms of
capitalist industrial production. In other words, the easy contest for
growth does not induce workshops to transform into "factories." The intense
struggle for immediate survival, on the other hand, yields considerable
retrogressive consequences. For example, the poverty of craft-workers can
only help smaller artisan shops to subsist rather than to accumulate capital.
In chapter XVII, features of non-competitive relations such as
dependency, sub-contracting, spatial agglomeration, lending, partnership
and cooperation practices among petty producers will be outlined.
In chapter XVIII, interactions between petty producers and merchants
will be scrutinized. I will argue that merchants tend to exploit
independent petty producers with small chunks of variable capital, but
service those with better bargaining positions. Furthermore, I will
explain why the putting-out practices observed in Eskisehir and Gaziantep
are not pregnant to "higher" forms of capitalist industrial production.
In chapter XIX, various direct and indirect links between "factories"
and "non-factories" will be analyzed. The subjects in focus include
sub-contracts, purchases, the absence of "factories," competition and
consumer market segmentations. While demonstrating that both the decline
and proliferation of petty production activities can be traced back to
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the pczuliarities of the "factory" sector, I will explain why in
underdeveloped countries such as Turkey, "non-factories" flourish not
orily when "factories" are late to emerge, but also after they do
appear.
__II II [
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CHAPTER XVI
_ _ __. ____ _~_~___
INTERACTIONS AMONG PETTY PRODUCERS: COMPETITIVE
RELATIONS
1. The Nature Of Competitive Relations In The "Non-Factory"
Sector Of Industries
Since the abolition of the Ottoman Guilds, competition has become
a dominant form of interaction among the petty producers in Turkey. As
the number of artisan shops and workshops increases, the competition
among them intensifies. The nature of the competitive relations in the
"non-factory" sector of industries, however, does not always fit neatly
into the text-book models.
Each line of petty production can be portrayed as a trade pyramid
with a base constituted of small artisan shops and an apex of workshops.
Competition occurs among small artisan shops in the bases and among
workshops in the apexes of these trade pyramids, but not between them.
When the number of workshops increases or when workshops expand the
volume of their production in a particular line of petty production, the
market for the small artisan shops at the base of that trade pyramid
tends to diminish. This, however, does not result from direct competition.
As a rule, workshops are comparatively higher forms of capitalist industrial
production than artisan shops are, and the latter have no real competitive
edge over the former. Thus, if in a particular trade pyramid, artisan
shops are found next to workshops, it is due to the inability of workshops
to control all of the market and eliminate artisan shops, rather than the
ability of the latter to compete against the former. In other words, in
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each trade pyramid, workshops easily extend their control over the market
as much as they can and leave artisan shops alone struggling among
themselves for a share in whatever is left of the market. In brief,
therefore, in each line of petty production, there are two separate fields
of competition rather than one. Competition among small artisan shops
is a matter of "immediate survival." Competition among large "non-factories",
at the apexes of trade pyramids, on the other hand, takes the form of
an "easy contest for growth."
2. The Easy Contest For Growth: Competition At The Top Of
Trade Pyramids
In the lines of petty production activity which proliferate, markets
expand faster than both the number of large "non-factories" and the
volume of their output. Furthermore, small artisan shops do not have a
real competitive edge over large "non-factories." Thus, large artisan
shops and workshops almost have a monopoly situation in their respective
lines of production. The occasional competition among large artisan
shops and workshops yields increased production rates, higher quality
products, diversification of products, expanded capital outlay and labor
forces, technical improvements, and finally increased profits and labor
productivity. Perhaps the most important consequence of competition at
the apex of trade pyramids is the pressure put upon large artisan shops
to transform into workshops. Indeed, there are times when some large
"non-factories" fail in this type of competition. But they do not have to
go out of business. They can always take a share of the market away from
small artisan shops and make-up for their losses. Thus, as long as the
------ m-N.NNENEN .....
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market expands and there are artisan shops that can be replaced, when
a large "non-factory" loses some advantage in the competition among its
peers it can regain parity sooner or later.
Large "non-factories" enjoy higher profit rates, faster accumulation
of capital and better credit standings than small artisan shops. Yet,
their numbers and the volume of their output increase slowly. Furthermore,
although some large artisan shops transform into workshops, workshops
do not transform into factories. In other words, the lax competition among
large "non-factories" yields growth and development, both of which
remain within the domain of "lower" forms of capitalist industrial production.
The number of large "non-factories" increases slowly, because the
number of small artisan shops which can grow is limited, and new large
"non-factory" entries are rare. Usually, the chunks of capital available
in the sphere of "non-factory" types of industrial production are small,
such that the number of new small artisan shops rather than large "non-
factories" tends to increase rapidly and continuously. This intensifies
the tight struggle for "immediate survival" among small artisan shops,
which in turn limits possibilities for growth.
The volume of the output of large "non-factories" expands slowly
for two reasons. First, the number of large artisan shops and workshops
incrpases slowly. Second, sooner or later workshops reach their maximum
capacities. Thus. it becomes impossible to increase the volume of output
radically and replace small artisan shops when markets expand and workshops
do not transform into "factories."
There are some large workshops employing as many as 30 workers among
the agricultural equipment makers in Eskisehir and the steel safe makers in
N.
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Gaziantep. These workshops, however, reached their maximum capacities
about a decade ago and have not transformed into "factories" since then.
One of the reasons for this inertia is the difficulty of transforming
a workshop into a modern "factory." Indeed, a large initial capital
investment and various organizational steps are required. Another reason
for the failure of workshops to transform into "factories," however, is the
lack of pressure from below. As long as the number of large "non-factories"
increases slowly and markets expand, workshops continue to enjoy a near-
monopoly situation and collect high profits. Thus, although changing to
the "factory" type of industrial production is a logical step, it is not a
realistic one for large workshops in present day Turkey. In other words,
transforming his business into a "factory" is too big and unnecessary a step
for a Turkish workshop operator who is doing well without such a change.
If Turkish workshop operators are not willing to start "factories,"
it is not because they are "shy at the threshold," but rather because they
are aware of the discontinuity between the domestic "non-factory" and the
imported "factory" types of industrial production. Nevertheless, the
underlying assumption of the prevailing government industrial policy in
this matter is that successful workshop operators are merely waiting for a
little bit of guidance and some encouragement to transform their businesses.
Thus, it is hoped that a "grass-roots" "factory" building process will
start if an adequate infrastructure, favorable credit terms, tax exemptions
and training programs are provided.
Even if efforts to turn the best of the "non-factories" into ,"factories,"
and successful workshop operators into "factory" owners succeed, there is
little to convince us that these efforts are not and will not remain as
I _
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,"abortions." In other words, as long as factory technology can not be
produced at home, and as long as the pressure upon large "non-factories"
to transform into "factories" does not materialize from within the petty
production activities sector of industries, a genuine "grass-roots"
"factory" building process will not begin in Turkey. The examples of a
few factories forged from the largest and most promising workshops in
particular lines of industrial production where factories did not exist,
can not open the way for a structural change in Turkish industry and melt
its "dualist" mold.
3.The Struggle For Immediate Survival: Competition At The
Base Of Trade Pyramids
The number of small artisan shops increases continuously and at a
faster rate than the markets left for small "non-factories" by larger
ones can expand. Thus, small "non-factories" find themselves in a
continuous and intense competitive situation at the base of each trade
pyramid. Indeed, competition among them is a tight struggle for immediate
survival. This tends to generate a set of retrogressive rather than progressive
consequences. As a rule, the rate of production declines and the volume
of repair work increases; the quality of products deteriorates; workers
are laid-off; obsolete technologies are used; labor productivity stagnates;
and 'profit rates decline. Small artisan shops which fail in this struggle
go out of business. But this does not mean that the others which survive
are better off. In brief, the competition among small artisan shops causes
impoverishment rather than progress.
A consequence of the struggle for immediate survival at the base
of trade pyramids is a decline in the prices of the commodities and services
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offered by small artisan shops. But at the same time , the productivity of
"craft-labor" remains unchanged. Furthermore, rapid inflation leads to
increases in the costs of raw materials, the wages (as the cost of living
increases the level of wages tends to increase as well, but of course this
is an issue to be settled between the artisans and their employees), the
interests on capital, the prices of utilities and rents. In short, small
artisan shops can sustain a struggle for survival only by lowering the
already low wages and profits. When profits dwindle, the accumulation of
capital halts, the chances of finding credits disappear and growth becomes
an impossibility. And when wages are kept low, artisans can neither expect
to increase the work load, nor hope to attract new apprentices and journeymen.
Indeed, when wages are lowered, craft-workers resign. They either open
their own small artisan shops or seek employment elsewhere. In certain cases,
however, artisans form partnership with their workers in order to stop
them from leaving.
The initial consequence of competition among small artisan shops
is clear. Small "non-factories" tend to get smaller and disappear rather
than grow. But of course there are many artisans who will work alone or
with an apprentice despite the extremely low returns for their capital and
"craft-labor," rather than close their businesses. Such artisans enter the
sec6nd round of their struggle for survival. In the meanwhile, however,
the number of new small artisan shops increases and keeps the prices of
commodities and services offered by small "non-factories" depressed. Thus,
in order to gain a competitive edge over the new-comers, artisans cut
production costs in the second round of their struggle by using lower-
quality raw materials and offering poorer craftsmanship. Markets in low
j
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quality goods and services persist as poverty prevails. Furthermore,
there are many new artisans who lower the quality of their outputs
just to remain self-employed,. Consequently, competition does not necessarily
slow down when artisans operate with low quality raw materials and low
returns on capital and "craft-labor," and produce cheap low-quality
products tailored for the "poor." In this round of the intense competition
among small artisan shops consumers, artisans and craft workers reach
a threshold of apathy. Nobody likes what he does or what he gets, but
nobody complains aloud either. Sinking low, artisans have one last resort
to keep their shops open: repair work. Nevertheless, competition persists
and both the price and quality of repair work declines as well.
The retrogressive consequences of competition among small artisan
shops stem from the rapid inflow of new firms on the one hand, and the
vicious-circle of small capital on the other. The rapid inflow of new
firms is a result of four summary conditions: the lack of better employment
opportunities for the would-be artisans and craft-workers; the lack of
more profitable avenues for small capital; the relative ease of setting-up
a new small artisan shop; and finally, the absence of regulations restricting
new entries into this sphere of petty production. The vicious-circle of
small capital, however, is more like a capitalist predicament. Small chunks
of oapital connected with obsolete technology and low labor productivity
yield small profits, and generate low capital accumulation rates. Two
factors seem to strengthen this vicious-circle. First, small "non-factories"
have higher raw material costs than the larger ones do. Usually, artisans
with small amounts of capital purchase the necessary raw materials from
third or fourth -hand intermediaries on credit. For example, among the
ft
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artisans surveyed in Eskisehir and Gaziantep, only founders and ironsmiths
had an option to by-pass the intermediaries by purchasing iron and
2
coal directly from the State enterprises via their associations. But
as a rule, artisans fail to cooperate in buying directly from the
producers or importers of raw materials. Petty producers with larger
variable capital, on the other hand, buy directly from factories and
wholesalers, and thus cut raw material costs where artisans with small
chunks of capital can not. Second, petty producers with small amounts of
capital have lower credit ratings, and receive smaller amounts of credit
than those with more capital. Indeed, the short-term credits offered to
small artisans by the People's Bank (Halk Bankasi) are more symbolic than
economically significant. Petty producers with large capital outlays,
however, are eligible for larger amounts of credit which can be used to
expand businesses.
4. Competitive Relations And Wages In The "Non-Factory"
Sector Of Industries
In general, labor markets in the "non-factory" sector of industries
are different from those in the "factory" sector. They are "secondary
labor markets" marked by low wages, high turnover rates, an absence of
unions and a lack of job and social securities.
Craft-workers in small artisan shops receive lower wages than
both the craft-workers in large artisan shops (those which are about to
transform into workshops) and the detail-workers in workshops. Furthermore,
their wages tend to remain low, although the cost of living increases steadily.
In small artisan shops wages are low because the productivity of "craft-labor"
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is low. Low wages, on the other hand, tend to remain low, because as
the costs of production increase, competition among small artisan shops
intensifies and depresses both the prices of outputs and the size of
profits. Since artisans are involved in manual labor as well, both craft-
workers and artisans find their labor depreciating in value. In short,
within the framework of the intense struggle for survival among small
artisan shops,low wages do not automatically mean higher profits for artisans.
In workshops, however, the productivity of labor is higher. Both
the division of labor within the firm, the improved technical base of
production (which is reflected in larger amounts of fixed capital outlay
per worker) and the lack of organization among workers account for this.
Furthermore, workshop operators with larger amounts of variable capital,
can not only easily by-pass intermediaries and thus cut raw material costs,
but can also employ larger numbers of more productive labor. Yet, indeed,
the wages of detail-workers do not show an improvement parallel to the
increases in labor productivity. Consequently, in workshops profits are
higher than in artisan shops. In other words, as a rule, the low wages
paid for "detail-labor" directly contribute to the increases in workshop
profits.
Unlike artisans, workshop operators can afford to increase wages.
In many instances, indeed they do so. But, although detail-workers receive
higher wages than craft-workers, they nevertheless are often paid below
the official minimum rate. This enables workshop operators to not only
underpay their workers, but also to divert labor away from artisan shops,
end recruit and keep the best workers in the "non-factory" sector of
industries. A result,of course, is the increased burden on artisans to find
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new apprentices and to keep their experienced journeymen. Thus, almost
all artisans complain about the difficulties of finding apprentices and
of keeping qualified journeymen. This clarifies another mechanism which
contributes to the whirlpool of intense competition for survival among
small artisan shops at the base of trade pyramids.
Almost all of the craft-workers, and at least half of the detail-
workers do not carry official job contracts, and are not registered at
the Labor Office. In other words, the bulk of the workers employed in the
"non-factory" sector of industries in Turkey, is, indeed, illegally employed.
Furthermore, neither craft-workers nor detail-workers have unions. Thus,
in the absence of labor organizations, and with a large reserve of unemployed
and a fast labor turnover, job and social security for workers in the
"non-factory" sector of industries is as a dream. In the meanwhile, however,
labor markets in the "factory" sector of industries function under a
completely different set of conditions.
The conditions of work in artisan shops and workshops are such that
a "factory" worker could not even imagine them. All "non-factories" lack
heating, ventilation and even plumbing. For craft and detail workers the
work day extends over and above ten hours, and paid leaves are unheard of.
Work accidents are common, but workers carry all the risk. A point, however,
must be clarified. Detail-workers have to exert themselves at their work
throughout the work day, but not craft-workers. As a rule, the latter idle
until there emerges an occasion to exert themselves.
i
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CHAPTER XVII
INTERACTIONS AMONG PETTY PRODUCERS: NON-COMPETITIVE
RELATIONS
1. The Nature Of Non-Competitive Relations In The
"Non-Factory" Sector Of Industries
Competition is the dominant but not the only form of interaction
in the "non-factory" sector of industries. Non-competitive relations
emerge and take roots among petty producers as well. But, in general,
non-competitive relations do not necessarily contradict or offset
competition among petty producers. Often, competitive and non-competitive
relations go hand in hand.
In certain instances non-competitive relations breed and intensify
competition. For example, petty producers form cooperatives to by-pass
intermediaries in acquiring raw materials, to construct shops on new
sites ('Kiciik Sanayi Siteleri' and 'KUciik Sanayi qarsilarl'), and to
receive credits from the People's Bank (Halk Bankasl). But they do not
produce or market their outputs together.
There are, however, other instances when competition breeds
non-competitive relations. For example, petty producers tend to locate
next to their competitors, and share the externalities produced in the
.process. Furthermore, sometimes competition results in the subordination
of small artisan shops by larger "non-factories," and the proliferation
of sub-contracting mechanisms among petty producers.
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2. Dependency Among Petty Producers
If an artisan does not have the necessary capital to maintain a
stock of raw material, or if he can not find a market outlet, he can
choose either to work for a well-to-do petty producer or to close his
business. Thus, there emerges an opportunity for petty producers with
large "non-factories" to subordinate unsuccessful artisans .(with or
without shops). Indeed, among the tailors, meerschaum carvers and quilt
makers in Eskisehir, and the 'kilim', woof ('atkl') and towel weavers in
Gaziantep, many small artisans have lost their independence to successful
petty producers. Subordinated artisans retain their shops, own their means
of production, and employ one or two craft-workcers, but they function as
appendages, i.e., auxiliaries, of larger "non-factories." They receive
their raw materials from, and leave their output to only one customer:
another petty producer in the same trade. In other words, they lose their
control over the product itself. In such cases, therefore, what we have
are artisans reduced to wage-earners. In the process, however, the subordinated
artisan not only sells his "craft-labor," but also rents his business, i.e.,
his shop, workers and means of production. Indeed, dependency among petty
producers is a version of the "putting-out" mechanism. But it is neither
as widespread, nor as well organized as the version in which petty producers
work for merchants.
3. Sub-Contracting Among Petty Producers
Often, petty producers sub-contract from each other. Such forms of
interdependence among "non-factories" are explicit examples of "social
cooperation of labor" through division of work among petty producers.
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Sub-contracting mechanisms, however, can also be seen as intricate webs
of "forward and backward linkages" within the "non-factory" sector of
industries. For example, shoe makers sub-contract parts of their work
to shoe-millers ('fora-frezeciler') and 'sayacl's (those who cut and sew
the upper part of shoes). Similarly, there is an interdependence between
'kilim', woof ('atks') and towel weavers and spinners, 'leventyi's (those
who prepare a part of the loom called 'levent' for weaving) and dyers.
Auto repairers, on the other hand, require services from the lathe-operators
('tornacilar') who duplicate machine parts, and sub-contract parts of their
work to auto-electricians, auto-body repairers, radiator repairers, &c..
In general, sub-contracting is a form of interdependence among
"non-factories." Petty producers sub-contract parts of their work to, and
receive sub-contracts from the artisans or workshop operators of their
choice. Yet, for small petty firms sub-contracting mechanisms can turn into
clear dependency situations. For example, stove makers usually sub-contract
parts of their work to founders, nickel-platers ('nikelajcilar') and glazers
(emayeciler'). But among the stove makers in Eskisehir, some workshop
operators have hand-picked founders and each operator gives sub-contracts
only to "his chosen founder." The chosen founders, on the other hand, agree
not to take orders from anybody else. Furthermore, the largest workshop,
which is a joint-stock company (SIM-TAS), recently provided capital for the
expansion of the foundry to which it sub-contracts and helped two petty
producers to establish a large nickel-plating workshop which will sub-contract
only from the company.
Sub-contracting mechanisms which turn into dependency situations
indicate the presence of a rather well-known path for capitalist development
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in the "non-factory" sector of Turkish industries, where capitalists
(either petty producers or merchants) rationalize the existing social
cooperation among "non-factories" and turn the social cooperation into
a productive mechanism under their control.
4. Spatial Agglomeration Tendencies Among Petty Producers
Petty producers tend to locate next to each other. In the process
"non -factories" form various conglomerations called '"arW2' (market) in
Turkish. In '1ars.'s petty firms become more accessible and enjoy better
and cheaper services than they would if scattered. Indeed, such pockets
of artisan shops and workshops can be found in and around the central
business districts (CBD's) of every large city, along the major roads
leading to the CBD's and at the periphery of cities. As a rule, '9argi's
that are close to the city center tend to be older, cover a smaller area
of land, include smaller "non-factories," have a higher density and display
a wider range of mix between "non-factories", and other uses than those
farther away. Conversely, '1aril's well-removed from the city center tend
to be more recent, cover a larger area of land, have a lower density, include
larger "non-factories," and display a smaller range of mix between "non-
factories" and other uses.
Like the nature of '1arsl's, the reasons why petty producers choose
one kind or the other varies. When left alone, petty producers take part
in the competition for urban space. They bid for the locations which suit
their activities best. As a rule, they want to get as close to the city
center as possible and still have as large a space as they can. Yet, with
small profit margins they are unable to out-bid merchants, professionals,
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banks, institutions and rich families all of whom want to locate in
and enjoy the externalities offered by the central city. Larger petty
production firms in the centrally located '1argl's are finding it more
and more difficult to remain there and grow as urban land values increase
and rents sky-rocket. Consequently, as the number of "non-factories"
rapidly increases, the older and larger artisan shops and workshops leave
the CBD's and the relatively new ones can not afford to move in. Thus,
petty producers settle for the best they can afford rather than get exactly
what they want. In the meanwhile, clusters of petty firms crop-up around
the CBD's, along the major roads leading to the city center and in the
centrally located lower-income residential areas. In brief, artisan shops
and workshops tend to surround the city center just as squatter districts
('gecekondu's) encircle the city.
In rapidly growing urban centers like Eskisehir and Gaziantep,
however, if unchecked, the tendency of "non-factories" to surround the
city center carries negative effects such as noise pollution, fire hazards,
traffic congestion, but more important it depresses the value of the
centrally located urban property. This is probably the only widely recognized
urban problem in Turkey. Unfortunately, however, both the diagnosis of
the problem and the policy designed to relieve the situation are not
satisfactory. Since "non-factories" have negative effects, it is argued,
those located in city centers should be forced to relocate, and the new
ones should be herded into 'Ki*iik Sanayi Carsli's built at the outskirts
of cities. In other words, everybody, but the petty producers should be
allowed to compete for urban land.
!
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For petty producers, being forced to locate next to
each other in 'KiiGcdk Sanayi gars1's is different from locating in
clusters of "nbn-factories' as a consequence of competition for urban
land. Indeed, many petty producers either cling together in centrally
located 'Faril's and resist relocation, or scatter around to evade
being herded into 'Ki"ik Sanayi 9arsl's farther away from the city center.
Thus, especially in big cities, the final picture of the distribution
of "non-factories" is rather complex.
In Gaziantep, most of the copper-smiths, shoe-makers, tailors,
and tricot makers are located in the traditional center. The bulk of
auto-repairers, lathe-shops, founders, iron-smiths, carpenters and weavers,
on the other hand, are zoned into three different 'KilGik Sanayi qarf.'s
which are not far away from the city center. A fourth and a larger 'carsi',
(KUS-GEM), is under construction at the outskirts of the city, for the
existing ones are already surrounded by residential areas (mostly squatters)
and they have no space left for expansion. In the meanwhile, however, there
are many weavers, iron-smiths, carpenters and repairers of all sorts
clustered along major roads and scattered in residential areas.
In Eskigehir, however, most of the petty producers are pushed out
of the city center. Nevertheless, clusters of tailors, meerschaum carvers
and pipe-makers, repairers of various appliances and some iron-smiths and
stove-makers are still in the city center. There are two "KGiUk Sanayi
Carsi's, and a new one is under construction. The one closer to the city
center is crowded with metal and wooden furniture makers and carpenters. Most
of the iron-smiths, founders, stove-makers, lathe shops, agricultural
equipment ma:ers and auto repairers , on the other hand, are located in
_I ~
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the second 'KUcilk Sanayi 9arsl' which is larger than the first and is
located at the outskirts of the city.
Relocating artisan shops and workshops farther away from the city
center is easy on paper. But in reality, many petty producers, especially
artisans with small shops, can not afford to lose externalities offered
by the CBD, and some do not need the large shops and technical infrastruc•ure
provided in 'Kiuliik Sanayi Carli's. Consequently, small artisan shops
continue to crop-up outside 'K iiik Sanayi Carsi's, and petty producers
do whatever they can to remain in and around the city center. In Gaziantep,
for example, relocation threatens the tricot-makers' practice of putting-out
work to women in the centrally located low-income neighborhoods. Also,
shoe-pakers are afraid that their intricate sub-contracting and putting-out
networks will be disturbed if they locate away from the city center. A fear
common to all petty producers with small businesses, however, is that if
they relocate they will not only lose some of their customers, but also
lose the anonymity of the CBD which disguises tax evasion and illegal
employment.
5. Lending Among Petty Producers
Petty producers lend raw materials, equipment and even labor to
each'other without charge. Indeed, such practices are limited in scope
and reciprocal in nature. Reciprocal lending occurs among petty producers
with small shops, and is circumscribed by rules of friendship and
neighborliness.
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6. Partnership Among Petty Producers
A widespread form of restricted cooperation among petty producers
is the establishment of partnerships. But it is usually artisans who are short
of capital who take this road when they want to atart a new business or to
expand their capital outlay. In other words, artisans with small chunks
of capital join forces in order to remain in business. There are, however,
instances when artisans establish partnerships with their workers as
well. Artisans who neither can afford to increase wages, nor want to lose
their workers to workshops, are inclined to offer partnership to qualified
journeymen in order to keep their businesses running.
As a rule, partnerships among artisans with small chunks of capital
neither last long, nor attract government attention. Yet,the government pays
ample attention to and encourages partnerships among workshop operators
as an alternative to widespread cooperation among petty producers. Encouraging
growth among large "non-factories" is part and parcel of the government policy
to transform the "cream of the crop of the petty firms" into "factories."
Thus, workshop operators can receive large amounts of credit, tax reductions,
better infrastructure and technical assistance either when they form
partnerships and joint-stock companies, or when they show an intention to
transform their businesses into "factories." In the meanwhile,Industrial
Districts ('Organize Sanayi B81geleri') are being planned. Indeed, they
can be used as tools to speed-up transformations among workshops. For example,
both in Eskiqehir and Gaziantep, Industrial Districts are under construction.
Furthermore, in Gaziantep, KUS-GEM ('Kii~ik Sanayii Geliltirme Merkezi'),
a United Nations inspired and sponsored agency of the Ministry of Industry
and Technology ('Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlil,'), is trying to initiate
|L
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and coordinate attempts to help and guide the promising large "non-
factories." But it is too early to assess the results of such government
action.
7. Cooperation Among Petty Producers
As a rule, petty producers form cooperatives in order to by-pass
merchants when purchasing raw materials and to construct 'carsi's, but
not to produce collectively.
One way to by-pass intermediaries is, indeed, to buy and sell
through cooperatives. In Gaziantep, there are 11 such cooperatives. But
in Eskisehir, there are only two. These cooperatives, however, are very
small. For example, with the exception of two cooperatives in Gaziantep
('Motorlu Dokumacllar KUc3k Sanat Kooperatifi' with 400 members and TL. 108,000
in capital, and 'Madeni Igler qelik Dbkiim KUfiok Sanat Kooperatifi' with
100 members and TL. 3,000,000 in capital),'and one in Eskisehir (ESASKO-
'Eskiqehir Agay ±sleri ve Mobilya imalat 5 llarl KIiick Sanat Kooperatifi'
with 40 members and TL. 375,000 in capital), no cooperative in either city
has more than 50 members and TL. 55,000 in capital. Another aspect of
these cooperatives is that they disappear rather easily and quickly.
For example, I could trace four cooperatives in Gaziantep and one in
Eskiiehir. which closed either because of mismanagement, pressure from
merchants and excessive red-tape, or back-biting among the petty producers.,
In brief, petty producers face many difficulties in establishing cooperatives,
and often fail in running them. Aside from the pressure from merchantsperhaps
the most important factor which contributes to the failure of cooperative
action among petty producers is the "unofficial", government policy to ignore
__ ___
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if not to openly discourage efforts along this vein. For example, both
in Eskisehir and Gaziantep, no cooperative established by petty producers
to buy or sell collectively received government assistance in any form.
Another way to by-pass intermediaries is akin to "import substitution."
Petty producers can form cooperatives to establish "factories" producing
the raw materials which they use most. But again, there are few
examples of this kind. We know that as early as the 1940's, two Weavers'
Cooperatives in Gaziantep established a spinning-mill with government
assistance. Yet in the 1970's the government neither gives credits nor
encourages in other ways such possible cooperative action. Nevertheless,
in Eskisehir, ESASKO, the cooperative established by furniture makers
to buy and sell collectively, plans to build a hard fiberboard ('sunta')
factory.
On the one hand, the Turkish government ignores petty producers when
they join together in order to by-pass merchants. But on the other hand,
it encourages them to form cooperatives, gives credit and provides assistance
so that 'Kiilk Sanayi qariL's can be built at the outskirts of cities. In
other words, the government encourages cooperative action among petty
producers when it serves particular ends. Indeed, 'KUýUk Sanayi (ars•'s
make the control and supervision of petty firms easier; relieve one of
the 'urban problems; make the supply of infrastructure to petty firms easier
and cheaper; and at the same time, generate business opportunities for
building contractors. For example, in Eski9ehir three separate Petty Producers*
Construction Cooperatives merged in 1969 and formed the Eskijehir PPCC
(ESSKSYK- Eskisehir Sinirll Sorumlu K iciik Sanatlar Yapi Kooperatifi).
There is a similar cooperative in Gaziantep as well: the Gaziantep PPCC.
L
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Both the Eskirehir and Gaziantep PPCC's are constructing a "Kiiciik Sanatlar
5arjisi'. Furthermore, both cooperatives receive credits from the Ministry
of Industry and Technology which amount to 60-70 per cent of their
respective construction costs, and both have contracted their construction
works to companies which use the "latest", i.e., labor saving, methods.
In other words, the Eskisehir and Gaziantep 'Kiicilk Sanatlar Carsl's will
be assembled from pre-fabricated concrete, steel, aluminium and glass
components, and shelter lower forms of capitalist industrial production. It
will be a spectacle: the nineteenth century will be packaged in the twentieth.
Petty producers are induced by Law to join together in Credit Cooper-
atives ('Esnaf Kefalet Kooperatifleri' ) .These cooperatives, of which there is
one in Eskisehir and two in Gaziantep, however, stand as tools for the State
to distribute credits to petty producers. Indeed, Credit Cooperatives help
the People's Bank (Halk Bankasl) function more than they help petty
producers gain access to the credits they need. For example, both artisans
and workshop operators tend to by-pass these cooperatives. The former are
not satisfied, and the latter can find credits from other sources.
Petty Producers' Associations (tEsnaf ve Sanatkar Dernekleri'),
on the other hand, are primarily adinistrative bodies. Yet, in a few instances
such as in the cases of the FoundersO and Iron-Smiths' Associations, they
can become instrumental in buying raw materials directly from the State-run
mines and factories.
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CHAPTER XVIII
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PETTY PRODUCERS AND MERCHANTS
1. Independent Petty Producers And Merchants
By definition, an independent petty producer is an artisan or
a workshop operator who retains control over the product itself. He
enters buyer's markets with his own capital, purchases necessary raw
materials and intermediary goods, and enters seller's markets with
his own product. Yet, he will not always buy raw materials and intermediary
goods directly from producers, and sell his products directly to consumers.
Thus, another important group appears : the intermediaries, i.e., merchants.
In principle, relations between independent petty producers and
merchants are a form of social cooperation. The latter supply services
which the former need. Yet, in reality, relations with merchants can, and
do, become a burden for petty producers. Indeed, the smaller the variable
capital of a petty producer such as an artisan is, the more likely he is
to be exploited by merchants. Conversely, the larger the variable capital
of a petty producer such as a workshop operator is, the more likely he is
to avoid intermediaries when preferable.
a As a rule, artisans neither mass-produce, nor can they afford to
make large raw material stocks. They tend to purchase small quantities
of raw materials at a time. Furthermore, they often need to buy on credit.
Thus, independent artisans with small chunks of variable capital not
only to fail to by-pass merchants where other petty producers can, but
also tend to purchase raw materials from third, fourth and even fifth hand
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intermediaries. Neverthelesd, artisans can avoid intermediaries in
marketing their products. They either receive their production orders
directly from indisvidual customers, or retail their products themselves.
But, unfortunately, as competition among them intensifies and demand
for their products fluctuates, it becomes more and more difficult for
artisans to maintain a steady pace and volume of production. When an
artisan by-passes merchants in marketing his products, therefore, he has
to locate his shop such that customers, in turn, do not by-pass him.
Thus follows the tendency of small artisan shops to form centrally located
'carsi's. Indeed, externalities of 'carsi's alleviate , but do not
necessarily solve the problem. Eventually, as the number of artisan shops
increases, the market becomes saturated, and sales and production orders
decline. In the meanwhile, independent artisans with small chunks of
variable capital who are unable to secure significant credits from formal
channels, find themselves in a poor bargaining position when merchants
knock on their doors to buy their products cheaply. In brief, as artisans
lose their bargaining power, they tend to fall prey to merchants when
purchasing raw materials and marketing their products. Artisans succintly
formulate this situation: "Merchants exploit us twice."
Workshop operators, on the other hand, can purchase raw materials
and intermediary goods directly from producers, importers and wholesalers.
Furthermore, they can cooperate with merchants in marketing their products,
and this cooperation does not become a burden for them as it does for
artisans. In other words, interactions between petty producers and
merchants display a two-fold character. Small "non-factories" at the base
of trade pyramids are surrounded by third, fourth and fifth hand intermediaries2
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i.e., petty merchants. The struggle for immediate survival at the
base of trade pyramids provides an opportunity for petty merchants to
"explqit," rather than "service" petty producers. But towards the apex
of trade pyramids the picture changes. Workshop operators have business
contacts with importers and wholesalers, and can by-pass them when
necessary. In this sense, therefore, merchants tend to "service" rather
than "exploit" petty producers with large chunks of variable capital.
As a rule, the intense and continuous competition among artisans
does not permit them to accumulate significant amounts of capital, and
they can not find large chunks of credit through formal channels. Thus,
artisans remain with small amounts of variable capital. Furthermore,
their attempts to form cooperatives in order to purchase raw materials
directly from factories and importers, and to market their products without
intermediaries fail. Consequently, artisans can not break away from the
grip of parasitic petty merchants. The picture of relations between artisans
and a particular set of petty merchants such as street cryers and rural
trawelling salesmen ('sandlk 9 i'), however, is different. Such petty
merchants without shops can not "exploit" petty producers. Indeed, they
depend upon artisans.
2. Quasi-Dependent And Dependent Petty Producers And
Merchants: Putting-Out Mechanisms
Quasi-dependent petty producers receive raw materials together with
production orders from their customers. In other words, they have neither
raw material nor finished product stocks. Their customers can be
individual consumers, other petty producers, merchants or corporate
bodies. Indeed, they do not exercise control over their products. Yet,
they do not work exclusively for one customer either. This is the
criterion which separates a quasi-dependent petty producer from a
dependent one. Many tailors, carpenters, and repairers of all sorts,
and some small weavers and tanners work on this basis. In a way, the
business of a quasi-dependent petty producer is to rent his labor, means
of production and workers to those customers who place orders and at
the same time provide raw materials. As such, therefore, quasi-dependent
petty producers do not necessarily come into contact with merchants
in order to find raw materials or to market their outputs.
When a quasi-dependent petty producer, however, begins to receive
raw materials and production orders from only one customer all the time,
he turns into a dependent petty producer. As such he stands without control
over his products, and becomes an employee of a customer who "puts-out"
work. Indeed, there are petty producers who also put-out work at the same
time, but the tendency among merchants to do this is more wide-spread.
The classic model of the putting-out system, where merchants
manipulate the existing "social cooperation" among petty producers in
related trades and create a larger productive mechanism under their
control, can be observed among the silk weavers in Gaziantep. The merchant
who ,puts-out work purchases the raw material ('bobin-beyaz') from either
a factory or a wholesaler; hands it in succession to a '~6zgiicu' (who
prepares the silk for dyeing), a dyer ('boyacl'), a 'tarakqi-desenci'
(who mounts the dyed silk on wooden frames called 'levent'), silk weavers
(who use hand-looms) and finally to a 'silindirci-kolacl' (who puts
starch on the material and irons it); pays all the petty producers he has
L
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employed; and markets the final product. There are about eight silk
merchants of this kind in Gaziantep. Some of them employ weavers in nearby
villages, and some own their own machine-looms. Most of the artisans
involved in the putting-out system, however, own their own shops and
employ workers, but work exclusively for one such merchant or the other.
A more wide-spread form of the putting-out system observed in
Eskisehir and Gaziantep, however, is a kind of short-cutj where merchants
supply raw materials to petty producers and come back to collect the
finished products when they are ready to market. In this type of putting-
out system, merchants are not involved with the productive mechanism.
Such relations between dependent petty producers and merchants occur
among the furniture makers in Eskisehir, and the 'kilim', towel and
woof ('atkl') weavers, shoe makers and tricot makers in Gaziantep. For
example, 'kilim' merchants who put-out work in Gaziantep purchase the yarn
and hand it to 'kilim' weavers who assume the responsibility of seeing
that the yarn is dyed mounted on frames and woven. When the 'kilim's are
ready the weavers hand them to merchants, and the latter market them.
Similarly, shoe, tricot and furniture merchants ('ayakkabi taciri,, 'triko
tiiccarl' and 'mobilya magazacisl' as they are respectively called in Turkish)
hand either raw materials or money to petty producers; let them sub-
contract to other petty producers if necessary; and collect the finished
products.
Both the classic and short-cut versions of the putting-out mechanism
are called 'fason iji' in Turkish. The person who puts-out work, be
him a petty producer or a merchant, gives 'fason' ('fason vermek'), and
dependent petty producers take 'fason' ('fason almak') or work 'fason'
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('fason callymak'). In reality, dependent petty producers, i.e., those
who take 'fason', are often better off than independent or quasi-
dependent artisans. Indeed, they have work to do, and therefore, they
waste neither their capital nor labor. Yet, in essence, they do not
work for themselves, and the returns on their capital and labor are
lower than those of quasi-dependent and independent petty producers.
Thus, almost all independent and quasi-dependent artisans prefer to
maintain a small volume of business rather than to take 'fason'. they
often remark:
"The more we work 'fason', the more we work for merchants.
They give us 'fason' in order to make money from us, not
because they like our black eyes. It is better to be a
wage-earner than to be a petty producer an work for
merchants."
Nevertheless, it is not very easy to find work once unemployed, and
therefore, many artisans eventually take 'fason' rather than close
their shops.
An important common aspect of the putting-out systems observed
in Eskisehir and Gaziantep is that the 'fason il' given by merchants
is not significant for "higher" forms of capitalist industrial
production. The silk-merchants who-put out work in Gaziantep, on the
one hand, are there to take advantage of whatever is left of a once
thriving branch of weaving. The number of weavers and other artisans,
workers, looms and merchants who put-out work declines as the markets for
silk material dwindle. The wide-spread short-cut version of putting-out,
on the other hand, makes it clear that the merchants who put-out work in
.weaving, shoe making, furniture making and tricots making are not really
comitted to increasing their profits by rationalizing the productive process.
i
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Once they give 'fason' to a petty producer, they leave his sub-
contracting relations unchecked. In other words, they do not care how
the final product is achieved. As such, therefore, 'fasonr-ii' takes
the form of outright exploitation of petty producers by merchants. It
is not a step forward either. The "social cooperation" among petty
producers is left intact and not rationalized under the control of a
capitalist as is done by workshop operators when they subordinate artisans
through sub-contracts. Furthermore, merchants who put-out work retard
transformations in the "non-factory" sector of industries by keeping employed
artisan shops which would otherwise be closed.
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CHAPTER XIX
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PETTY PRODUCERS AND "FACTORIES", AND THE
ANATOMY OF GROWTH IN THE "NON-FACTORY" SECTOR
1. The Nature Of The Connections Between The "Lower" And
"Higher" Forms Of Capitalist Industrial Production
In Turkey
The special characteristics of Turkish industrialization have
been two-fold: the inability of "non-factories" to transform into
"factories;" and the inability of "factories" to connect with, and
replace or subordinate artisan shops and workshops. Thus, in general, we
can talk about the presence of a break in the continuity of capitalist
transformations in the Turkish industrial landscape.The "lower" and "higher"
forms of capitalist industrial production proliferate side by side as if
they are separated by a "glass-wall." This, however, does not mean that
the "non-factory" and "factory" sectors of industry are unconnected.
Contrarily, it suggests that there are many direct and indirect links
between "factories" and "non-factories", but they fail to melt the
"glass-wall."
"Factories" can give sub-contracts to,and subordinate "non-factories."
But usually, they do not. Similarly, "factories" can easily compete against,
and replace artisan shops and workshops in many lines of industrial production.
But usually, they do not. Furthermore, the "non-factory" sector of industries
constitutes an important market for "factories." The bulk of the hand and
machine tools, detail-machines and raw materials used in artisan shops
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and wcrkshops are produced in #"factories." Also, "non-factories, act
as a reserve labor pool for "factories," check unemployment and keep
the cost of reproduction of factory-labor, i.e., wages, low by supplying
cheap,low-quality products* In brief, the various links between
"non-factories" and "factories" generate benefits for both sides.
The former find the opportunity to exist and proliferate, and the
latter exploit the situation. Thus, the side by side proliferation of
the "lower" and "higher" forms of capitalist industrial production can
be seen more as a result of the reluctance of "factories" to melt
the "glass-wall" from above, than as the inability of "non-factories"
to break the "glass-wall" from below.
We know that "factories" have been transplanted into the Turkish
industrial landscape. They did not emerge from among "non-factories." Furthermore,
they do not tend to replace and subordinate the "lower" forms of capitalist
industrial production. These observations indicate a peculiar stock of
"factories." Indeed, in general, the "factory" sector of industries in
Turkey is dependent in nature, inadequate in size and distorted in scope.
Turkish "factories" are dependent in nature, because their technical
bases can not be produced domestically. They have to be imported. But such
imports pave the way for, or rather rationalize, the adaptation of capital-
intdnsive production methods, the changes in the nature of products and
consumption patterns, the imports of foreign capital and technical assistance,
and finally the dependence on foreign technological developments. In brief,
Turkish "factories" are in the country, but their roots lie abroad.
The Turkish "factory" sector of industries is inadequate in size,
because, on the one hand, it is divorced from the "grass-roots" industrial
l. Iii ,.• .. ..
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potential, and on the other hand, it fails to channel capital. As the
available chunks of large capital flow into non-industrial avenues,
small chunks of industrial capital are absorbed in the "non-factory"
sector. Consequently, the "factory" sector of industries expands,but
slowly.
Turkish "factories" are distorted in scope because they tend
to be more capital-intensive whereas the opportunity cost of labor suggests
the opposite. Furthermore, they concentrate on avenues where easy profits
and export opportunities exist, and often leave the inelastic demands
of the "poor" unattended.
As a rule, Turkish "factories" are reluctant to replace and
subordinate "non-factories." This determines the scope of proliferation
in the "non-factory" sector of industries. Some lines of petty production
activity, i.e., trades, rise and some fall. But indeed, the anatomy of
growth in the sphere of "non-factory" types of industrial production is
complex. It can not be explained by the nature of the interactions between
"factories" and "non-factories" alone.
Since 1927, the number of "non-factories" in Turkey has tripled.
In the same period, the number of artisan shops and workshops in large
urban centers such as Eskioehir and Gaziantep sextup!ed.The anatomy of this
growth in the sphere of "non-factory" types of industrial production,
however, differs from one city to the other. Local urban and regional
differences are factors. For example, increases in the number of "non-factories"
in Eskigehir and Gaziantep were neither spread evenly across all
branches of industry, nor concentrated in the same trades. Nevertheless,
changes in petty production trades over time reveal a pattern. New petty
i_
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production trades appear. As "factories" are transplanted, the older trades
gain momentum and proliferate, stagnate, lose importance and decline,
or disappear.
Some trades tend to disappear altogether,together with many
artisan shops and workshops. But the other trades which emerge, proliferate
and remain saturated can account for the considerpble growth in; the number
of artisan shops and workshops. Usually, when a particular trade loses
importance and declines, the number of "non-factories" which shift their
line of production or go out of business increases faster than the number
of newwentries, Furthermore, both competition and growth among artisan shops and
workshops in the particular trade pyramid begin to falter. When a trade
starts to proliferate, on the other hand, the number of new-entries
increases faster than the number of exits. Competition among artisan
shops at the base of the trade pyramid intensifies. Also, larger artisan
shops tend to transform into workshops, and the latter grow in size.
Yet, usually, a period of stagnation or saturation follows proliferation.
The number of new-entries, the intensity of competition among small artisan
shops for immediate survival, and the number of business failures increase.
In the meanwhile, only large "non-factories" at the apex of the trade
pyramid manage to sustain some growth.
In general, both the overall growth in petty production activities
and the fate of each trade are determined outside the "non-factory" sector
of industries. In other words, competition among "non-factories" or the
internal workings of a particular trade can explain why artisan shops
and workshops grow, stagnate and close down, but can not account for
why there are so many new-entries, and why certain trades proliferate while
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others decline. Indeed, as I have noted earlier, factors other
than the reluctance of "factories" to replace and subordinate "lower"
forms of capitalist industrial production, are needed to explain the
anatomy of growth in the "non-factory" sector of industries.
Why do markets for commodities produced in artisan shops and
workshops emerge and expand? Why are there so many entrepreneurs
who invest their capital in "lower" forms of capitalist industrial
production? Why are there so many workers willing to be employed
in "non-factories" and receive low wages? Deep analyses of the reasons
why petty production activities decline or proliferate ought to be
provided in order to answer these questions.
2. Why Do Certain Petty Production Activities Decline?: The
Erosion Of Markets
Often the demand for traditional commodities produced in artisan
shops and workshops erodes.Some petty producers, therefore, either go
out of business, or shift their line of production. Somel however, remain
in business. But for them, finding customers and workers becomes more
and more difficult. As the more persistent petty producers reduce the
sizes of their businesses, the number of new-entries into the trade dwindles
and eventually stops. In short, a general continuous decline sets in.
But why does the demand for some traditional commodities erode or shift
in the first place?
One reason is the decline in the use-value of traditional commodities.
For example, as cars, trucks, busses and tractors become available, the use
of animals for transportation and agriculture decreases. Consequently, the
V
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demand for traditional products such as horse wagons, animal--
driven agricultural equipment and saddles declines. Along with the demand,
...the number of cartwrights, saddlers (tsaraglar'), horse-driven plow-
makers and iron-smiths who specialize in producingtipegs and horseshoes
dwindles. For example, in the 1950's there were more than 300 cartwrights in
Eskicehir. Now there are about 15, and it would be more appropriate
to call them horse-wagon repairers rather than cartwrights. Similarly,
since 1950, saddlers in Eskirehir as well as in Gaziantep have
become almost non-existent. Occasional orders from rural areas and
urban horse-wagon drivers keep the handful of cartwrights and saddlers
in business.
Another reason for the decline in the demand for traditional products
is the emergence of modern substitutes with similar use-values. Usually,
this occurs when cheaper,but different materials such as aluminum and
plastics replace traditional raw materials such as copper and leather.
For example, most of the kitchen-ware makers in Gaziantep now use aluminum
instead of copper. Indeed, the introduction of aluminum did not cause a
decline among copper kitchen-ware makers, because it is very easy to shift
from one raw material to the other. But on the other hand, tinsmiths
('kalaycilar') were hurt. They are now almost extinct. Tinsmiths who remain in
business, however, repair old copper utensils more than they coat them.
A better example along this vein is the decline among 'yemenici's (those
who produce a kind of light shoe worn by peasants). Not more than a decade
ago, some petty producers started to produce cheap low quality plastic
toys, baskets, kitchen-ware, imitation lace and footwear. This paved the
way for a shift in demand from coarse, hand-made, truck-tire soled.leather
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'yemeni's to cheaper plastic shoes cast in all colors, and the associated
decline in the number of 'yemenici's.
3. why Do Certain Petty Production Activities Decline?: The
Competition From ,,Factories" And "Non-Factories" In Other
Cities
The erosion of markets for commodities produced in artisan shops
and workshops, however, does not always occur because there is no competition
from "factories." In a few instances we can observe the classic model of
",factories" tirectly replacing "nno-factories." Tanners are the best example.
There are two small tanneries in Gaziantep, and qute a large one in.
Esk9ihir. Indeed, there are one or two tanners who work alone and employ
themselves by hand-processing hides brought in by occasional customers.,
The rest of the tanners in these cities, however, have been put out of business
as a direct result of the growth of modern leather industries in Istanbul.
Most of the ex-tanners, aside from those who are employed in tanneries,
sit around and wait for hide-merchants to employ them in carrying and salting
hides for storage before shipments to leather factories in istanbul. It
is a sad picture.
Competition from "factories," however, can result in the partitioning
of miarkets, i.e., the herding of petty producers into secondary markets, rather
than an immediate decline in the petty production trade. In such instances,
it is the combination of competition from "factories" and "non-factories"
in other cities which prove deadly. For example, shoe-makers in Eskisehir
suffered a lot from this. Their markets were reduced not only by shoe-
factories in nearby istanbul, but also by shoe-makers in cities as. far away
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as Gaziantep. As a consequence, most of the shoe-makers in Eskitsehir
either closed down, or became cobblers and shoe-merchants.
4. What Do The Unsuccessful Petty Producers And Their Workers
Do When Out Of Epployment?
Whenever a petty firm goes out of business, what we have
are unemployed people: the unsuccessful petty producer and his employees.
Thus, when particular lines of petty production activities start to
decline or stagnate, the number of unemployed tends to increase together
with the number of business failures. In other words, the "non-factory"
sector of industries constantly generates unemployment from within. Yet,
although factory jobs remain in short supply,the unemployed do not necessarily
remain without a job for a long time because the "non-factory" sector
can act as a sponge. Whatever is squeezed out from one side is picked up
by the other. On the one hand, it is relatively easy to start a new
petty production firm in another trade and thus employ oneself. On the
other hand, to find a low paying job for a short period in an artisan
shop or a workshop is not difficult, Aftern all, the number of "non-factories"
increases, and there is a high labor turnover. Despite
this, some labor and capital tends to flow outside the "non-factory" sector
of industries. Indeed, there is always the possibility of starting a
petty trading and services business with or without a shop. Also, one can either
migrate back to smaller settlements and start a new petty firm there, or
move to larger industrial centers (including Europe) in search of work.
Furthermore, there are underground activities such as widespread
smuggling in Gaziantep. Thus, in brief, when petty firms close down, neither
7"-
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the number of factory workers increases, nor does the pool of "urban unemployed"
swell. Now, let us have a closer look at what the unsuctessful petty
producers and their workers in Eskisehir and Gaziantep actually do
when out of work.
The petty producers interviewed estimate that during 1973 and 1974
about 200-250 artisans in Eskigehir and 300-350 in Gaziantep went
out of business. One-third of these unsuccessful artisans (about 29 per
cent in Eskisehir and 30 per cent in Gaziantep) started a new business.
But only 20 per cent of the new businesses were petty production firms.
In other words, four out of every five unsuccessful petty producers who
started a new business, took a chance in petty trading and services rather
than in production. Two-thirds of all the unsuccessful petty producers,
on the other hand, either stopped working altogother (about 5 per cent
in Eskiaehir and 6 per cent in Gaziantep), or entered industrial labor
markets (about 66 per cent in Eakisehir and 64 per cent in Gaziantepg.
Of those unsuccessful petty producers who entered the labor markets about
40 per cent in Eskifehir and 67,per cent in Gaziantep found jobs in other
"non-factories,," about 23 per cent in Eskigehir and 7 per cent in Gaziantep
found factory jobs, about 34 per cent in Eskisehir and 24 per cent in
Gaziantep migrated elsewhere (including Europe) in pursuit of work, and
the rest remained unemployed.
In connection with the outflow of Turkish labor to Europe from
among the unsuccessful petty producers, however, several points need
clarification. As a rule, many petty producers quit the "non-factory"
sector of industries in order to find a job in Europe even before the
market forces them out of business. In other words, for those weary of the
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conditions prevailing in the "non-factory" sector of industries, finding
Nwork in a factory in Turkey or in Europe is more than an alternative
It is a dream. We do not know what the ex-petty producers who return
from Europe with some savings do. Indeed, they can invest in real
estate, join one of the cooperatives formed to establish small factories
by pooling the savings of Turkish workers abroad, reopen their petty firms,
or start a new "non-factory." I encountered a 'sayacl' in Gaziantep, who,
after working in French shoe-factories for three years has returned
only to reopen his petty firm.. I also interviewed two petty producers
in Gaziantep whose partners work in Europe and transfer their savings
to Turkey in order to expand the capital outlay of their petty firms.
In short, there are instances when the accumulation of capital in the
"non-factory" sector of industries can be traced to "factorieS" in
Europe.
Unlike petty producers, apprentices and journeymen do not lose
employment only when an artisan shop or a workshop is closed down. In
the "non-factory" sector of industries, rapid labor turnover and low
wages characterize the labor markets. For apprentices and journeymen,
therefore, loss of employment is not a problem in and of itself. It is
as easy to find a low paying job in a "non-factory" for a short period, as it
is to lose one, Thus, apprentices and journeymen tend to remain as hired
hands in the "non-factory" sector until they find jobs elsewhere, or save
enough capital to start businesses of their own. But factory jobs are in
short supply, and it is not easy to save money iwhen the cost of living
increases and the low wages in the "non-factory" sector tend to remain as
they are.
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5. Why Do Petty Production Activities Proliferate?:The
Continuous Supply Of Capital
A reason for the proliferation of petty production activities is the
continuous flow of capital into the "non-factory" sector of industries.
In other words, there are always many people with small amounts of
capital who want to open artisan shops or workshops.
Petty producers are peculiar capitalists. Their primary concern
is to employ themselves rather than to find the most profitable avenue
for their capital. Thus,the continuous flow of small chunks of capital
into the "non-factory" sector of industries is more a function of attempts
to seek stable employment than efforts to exploit entrepreneurial
opportunities. Furthermore, large chunks of capital are necessary to
establish "modern factories" which arc not only imported, but also
technologically sophisticated, difficult to maintain and operate, and
capital intensive. A "factory-owner", therefore, has to have large amounts
of seed-capital and entrepreneurial skills as well as large amounts of credit
and government backing. The would-be petty producers, however, can meet
none of these conditions. Of necessity, therefore, they invest in "lower"
forms of capitalist industrial production. In other words, small chunks
of capital are channeled into the "non-factory" sector of industries where
poor' labor productivity, low profit rates and flimsy capital accumulation
prevail, as a matter of compulsion rather than choice.
The small chunks of capital which flow into the "non-factory" sector
of industries do not tend to grow and then flow into the "factory"
sector. In other words, there is a discontinuity between the "lower"
and "higher" forms of production, insofar as the procesp of industrial
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capital accumulation is concerned. The capital accumulated among
successful "non-factories', either remains in the "non-factory" sector
of industries, or flows into real estate, commerce and conspicuous
consumption. Indeed, successful artisan shops tend to grow and transform
into workshops. But workshops do not transform into "factories," and
there are many workshop operators who have large pieces of real estate
and expensive cars. In brief, small chunks of industrial capital are
destined to enter the "non-factory" sector, and they either remain there
or flow into non-industrial avenues. Thus, in this connection, we can talk
about the presence of a segmentation in industrial capital markets.
There are two sets of industrial capital markets in Turkey. One
is for small, and the other is for large chunks of capital. The former
set of capital markets is connected with "lower" forms of capitalist
industrial production. The latter set, on the other hand, is linked
with "factory" types of production. Indeed, there is no reciprocity
between these two sets. As a rule, factory capital neither originates in,
nor connects with and subordinates or channels the smaller pools of
capital in the "non-factory" sector. And since "non-factory"
capital can not transform into "factory" capital, it tends either to
remain below the "glass-wall" or flow into non-industrial avenues.
Hence, the segmentation of industrial capital markets can be seen both
as a result of, and as a reason for the continuous flow of capital into the
domain of petty production activities.
6. Why Do Petty Production Activities Proliferate?; The
Cqoitnuous $upply Of Labor
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Another reason for the proliferation of petty production activities is
the continuous flow of labor into the "non-factory" sector of industries.
In other words, together with the number of "non-factories," the number
of people willing to work in artisan shops and workshops increases. But
employment in the "non-factory" sector is not very attractive in and
of itself. Low wages, over-work, rapid labor turnover and poor working
conditions are wide-spread. Indeed, only the lack of better employment
opportunities can account for the sustained flow of labor into the
"non-factory," sector of industries.
In underdeveloped countries such as Turkey, the number of "factories"
increases. But, as a rule, "factory" jobs remain in short supply. For one
thing, "factories" tend to be capital intensive. Urban job openings in
non-iidustrial avenues, on the other hand, disappear rather quickly, and
the number of people who can raise enough capital to start a petty business
is limited. Thus, together with rapid urbanization, the ranks of the urban
unemployed tend to swell, and the labor markets connected with the "lower"
forms of capitalist industrial production become attractive. In other words,
labor flows into the domain of petty production activities because there
is no better alternative.
The reason why labor flows into the "non-factory" sector of
industries is also the reason why it tends to stay there. Indeed, the
"lower" forms of capitalist industrial production act as a reserve pool
for "factories." Furthermore, craft and detail workers can either migrate to
other places or start small businesses of their own. But such better
employment opportunities for such workerr are quite rare. Consequently,
the number of workers who leave the "non-factory"
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sector does not exceed the number of those who want to enter. it. This,
on the one hand, aids the proliferation of "non-factories", and on the
other hand, results in the segmentation of industrial labor markets.
There are some links between the "non-factory" and "factory"
connected industrial labor markets. But they are restricted in scope and
uni-directional. Whenever craft and detail-workers can find. "factory"
jobs they quit the "non-factory" sector for better working conditions
and higher wages. This, however, is not a frequent occurrence, and does
not mean that the "non-factory" sector is a labor training ground for
"factories." "Factory" and "non-factory" types of work are qualitatively
different. Some "factory" workers, tend to enter the "non-factory"
sector as petty producers rather than as workers after
their retirement.
7. Why Do Petty Production Activities Proliferate?: The
Expansion Of Markets For Commodities Produced In "Non-
Factories" In The Absence Of "Factories"-- Artisan Shops
And Workshops As Substitutes
Like continuous supplies of capital and labor into the domain of
petty production activities, the expansion of markets for commodities
produced in artisan shops and workshops can be traced back to the general
characteristics of "factories." In this respect, I will consider three
conditions: the absence of "factories!'; the segmentation of consumer
markets; and the abundance of imported machinery and equipment.
Sometimes the absence of "factories" in consumer goods and
services industries does not imply a weakness on the part of "factories."
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For example, in meerschaum-carving and pipe, wooden furniture and 'baklava'
making, either the nature of the work, or the nature of-the product does
not permit an extensive mechanization of the processes of production.
Often, however, the absence of "factories" in consumer goods and services
industries marks the inadequacy of the "factory" sector in meeting the
prevailing demand. In other words, in many lines of industrial production
"factories" can, but do not appear.
The failure of the "higher" forms of capitalist industrial
production to enter and dominate the markets for certain consumer goods
is a reflection of the peculiar nature of Turkish industrial development.
The number of artisan shops and workshops increases below the "glass-wall,"
but "factories" do not emerge from among these "non-factories." Thus, not
only capital, but also the technology necessary to establish "factories"
has to originate above the "glass-wall" in the "factory" sector. The
Turkish "factory" sector, however, is weak. It is neither capable of
reproducing,let alone improving, its own technical base, nor able to
fertilize a rapid "factory" building process. Indeed, "factory" technology
can be imported. Yet, even with foreign capital, large chunks of industrial
capital remain in short supply. Thus, the "factory" sector grows slowly.
Furthermore, as a rule, the handful of "factories" tends to concentrate
on intermediary goods and consumer goods in order to import-substitute.
By default, therefore, many markets in domestic consumer goods remain
unattended by "factories."
The number of artisan shops and workshops multiply when domestic
markets in commodities such as stoves, box-springs, metal furniture,
steel safes, simple agricultural equipment, plastic bags, toys and plastic
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shoes grow ; the necessary raw materials are available; imports are
not very profitable; and most important, "factories" are late to emerge.
In the process, either new lines of petty production activities crop-up,
or older ones undergo transformations and branch-out. In other words,
when in a particular line of consumer goods production, "factories" can
but do not appear, the "lower" forms of capitalist industrial production
substitute for the "higher" forms, and proliferate.
Sometimes new lines of petty production activities appear.
For example, plastic bags and shoes-making, steel safes production
and auto and electrical equipment repairs have taken roots in the domain
of petty production activities especially since 1950. More frequently,
however, older lines of petty production such as weaving and copper and
iron works undergo changes. As a rule, advanced means of production and
new techniques, shifts in demand and availability of new and cheaper
raw materials spark transformations in the older petty production trades.
Now, let us have a closer look at such changes.
When, in a trade, the use of advanced means of production and new
techniques disperse, the number of petty producers using hand tools and
traditional techniques dwindles. At the same time, the number of petty
firms with power-tools and detail-machines multiplies. Thus, the trade
continues, but the technical base of "non-factories" transforms. For
example, in Gaziantep, all 'kilim' weavers, except those who make 'cul
kilim', use machine-looms. Similarly, both in Eskisehir and Gaziantep,
it is difficult to find carpenters and iron-smiths who do not have power-
tools. Sometimes, however, the number of petty firms with advanced means
of production increases, but the number of petty producers who use
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traditional means of production does not decline. For example, in
Gaziantep, the upsurge of tourism and the related increase in demand for
hand-made copper wares preserved traditional forms of working copper.
When there is demand for old products made with new materials,
or when demand for one of the several different goods which can be
produced with minor adjustments in equipment increases, some petty
firms in relatively old trades shift their lines of production. For
example, in Gaziantep, as the demand for aluminum kitchen wares increased,
some copper-smiths with detail-machines started producing aluminum
utensils. Indeed, in the meanwhile, new petty firms emerged by their side.
Similarly, when the demand for cheap, second-rate towels woven in Gaziantep
increased, some 'kilim' weavers became towel makers. This contributed to
the influx of new entries into the market. Developments of this sort
occurred among iron-smiths and lathe shop operators as well. Both in
Gaziantep and Eskisehir, some iron-smiths specialized in simple agricultural
equipment making, while many lathe shop operators shifted back and
forth between duplicating parts for auto-repairers and making parts for
sewing machines and machine-looms.
8. Why Do Petty Production Activities Proliferate?: The
Expansion of Markets For Commodities Produced In "Non-
Factories" In The Presence Of "Factories"(i-- Partitioning
Of Consumer Markets
Oftenlin underdeveloped countries, the growth path of the "factory"
sector does not disturb the "non-factory" sector of industries. "Factories"
are slow to emerge, and they tend to concentrate on the intermediary goods
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and consumer goods which are mainly import substitutes. This, I have already
sketched. But there are many instances when "factories" appear
next to "non-factories" in a particular line of productiont and
leave them alone. In other words, there are instances when consumer
markets are partitioned among the "lower" and "higher" forms of capitalist
industrial production. This happens in two distinct ways. Either two
different commodities with similar use-values, or two versions of a
single commodity appear in markets.
When there are two commodities which serve similar purposes,
"factories" invariably produce the more modern and expensive one. For
example, wood and coal stoves are made in artisan shops and workshops,
but radiators and kerosene and electric stoves are produced in "factories."
Similarly, 'kilim's, 'tel dolap's (flyproof food cupboards with wire
screening) and kerosene kitchen stoves are made in "non-factories," and
wall-to-wall carpets, refrigerators and ovens are produced in "factories."
Such examples of "non-factories" specializing in the production of the less
modern and cheaper of the two products with similar use-values can
be increased in number. The tendency of consumer markets to split along
the "modern-expensive" and "less modern-cheap" commodity differentiation,
however, is not surprising. In underdeveloped countries such as Turkey,
both the material needs and aspiration levels of the urban "poor" increase
faster than their ability to match them. Indeed, while the average urban real
income grows, the income gap between the ufban "rich" and urban "poor" does
not shrink. In the meanwhile, many "modern-expensive" products remain
outside the reach of the urban "poor " because different commodities with
similar use-values often have extremely different exchange-values. Usually,
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differences in the nature of commodities rather than differences in the
nature of production processes account for this. For example, refrigerators
and 'tel dolap's are such different commodities with comparable use-values
that even the cheapest refrigerator produced in a "factory" is far more
expensive than the most expensive 'tel dolapl produced in a "non-factory."
Consequently, "factories" can meet the demand of the urban ",poor" only
when they produce 'tel dolap's. But then, they can not meet the demand
for refrigerators. In other words, "factories" have to choose between
producing the "modern-expensive" and the "less modern-cheap" commodity.
Indeed, markets for the former tend to expand. Markets for the latter,
on the other hand, remain only so long as there are those who can not afford
the "modern-expensive" commodity. which '!factories" choose to produce.
Sometimes, two different versions of a single commodity appear
in markets. The cheaper and lower quality versions of products such as
tricots, socks, towels and bricks come from "non-factories." The better
quality and expensive versions, on the other hand, are produced in "factories."
Indeed, the reason why "non-factories" can continue to produce second rate
commodities is the frequent impossibility of simultaneously meeting the
demands of the "rich" and "poor." In other words, in underdeveloped
countries such as Turkey, "factories" can not produce many commodities
which have both the low price the "poor" can afford, and the high quality
the "rich" want. Thus, they are faced with a choice: to ignore the "rich"
and produce for the "poor," or vice versa.
In brief, ,the markets in "lower quality-cheap" and "less modern-
cheap" commodities produced in "non-factories" do not necessarily erode
when "factories" appear. The gap between the purchasing powers and likes
-256-
of the "rich" and the "poor" is such that it is frequently impossible
to satisfy the "rich" and tlhe "poor" by the same commodity. Thus, pairs
of commodities with similar or the same use-values appear in markets.
But what the "poor" can afford is neither what the "rich" want , nor
what "factories" tend to produce. This results in the partitioning of
the consumer markets among "factories" and "non-factories." In other
words, "factories" do not replace the "lower" forms of production in
certain lines of industry, but simply herd them into the less profitable
segment,: of consumer markets. Consequently, artisan shops and workshops
specialize in producing lower quality and less modern commodities by using
obsolete technology, cheap labor and low quality raw materials. This can
be seen as a sort of division of responsibility among "factories" and
"non-factories." By default, the latter satisfy the "poor" ignored by the
former.
Indeed, when "factories" meet the demands of the "poor," artisan
shops and workshops will disappear. In this connection, therefore, the
division of responsibility between "factories" and "non-factories" is a
potentially transitory phenomenon. Yet, conditions which make possible
this "unnegotiated peace" between the historically antagonistic forms
of capitalist industrial production seem to be there to stay.
9. Why Do Petty Production Activities Proliferate?: The
Abundance Of Imported Goods
Another consequence of a weak and distorted "factory" sector of
industries is a large stock of imported machinery and equipment. When
imported goods such as detail-machines, power-tools, automobiles,tractors,
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motorcycles, television sets and radios flood domestic markets, the
number of petty firms involved in repairs and parts duplication multiplies.
Indeed, as the volume of a particular imported commodity expands, the
number of different brands Increases. This permits many small independent
repairers and1 lathe shops to continue their operations without either
further specialization or standardization. Yet, when domestic "factories"
begin to replace for imports, a different picture emerges. Small independent
repair shops and parts duplicating lathe shops tend to be replaced by
networks of "factory" affiliated repair and service stations, parts
retailing agencies and sub-contractors. Nevertheless, both in Eskisehir
and Gazianltep !the nunmber of independent repairers and parts duplicating
shops have not yet been threatened by the automobile, television and radio
assembling plants in the larger urban centers such as Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir
and Adana.
10. The "Non-Factory" Sector Of Industries As A Market For
"Factories," And The Failure Of "Factories" To Subordinate
Artisan Shops And Workshopsa Purchases And Sub-Contracts
In certain lines of industrial production "factories" have replaced
artisan shops and workshops. But in many lines of industry they have
allowed "non-factories" to proliferate either by being absent, or by
partitioning markets. Aside from these, the "factory" and "non-factory"
sectors of industry have other links.
"Factories" in capital goods and intermediary goods industries
nurse artisan shops and workshops by supplying them with the means of
production and raw materials. For example, stove makers, founders, iron-smiths,
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copper-smiths, aluminum kitchen-ware makers, weavers, &c., constitute
considerable markets for either domestic or foreign "factories" which
produce iron, steel, copper, aluminum, plastics, yarn, machine looms, &c..
In other words, the "non-factory" sector of industries depends upon
"factories." Often, however, the smaller petty producers can not buy
direct from "factories," and eventually fall prey to merchants. "Factories,"
on the other hand, do not purchase anything from petty producers except
repair services.
In developed countries, "factories" interact with "non-factories"
either through sub-contracts or by purchasing intermediary goods from
them. But, in the cases that I have observed in Eskiqehir and Gaziantep
the sub-contracting process assumes the nature of exploitation rather
than domination , and "factories" do not purchase intermediary goods
from "non-factories." Usually, it is only for repair jobs that
petty firms sub-contract from "factories." Furthermore, the lathe shops in
Eskipehir , under sub-contracts duplicate some machine parts for the
State-run sugar factory, or trim the steel frames of the private brick
and tile factories. Since such contracts are acquired through bidding,
and since the number of idle lathe shops is large, it is not difficult to
see why repair contracts become a form of exploitation of the petty producers.
I have witnessed a lathe shop operator who got a contract to
repair the frames of a brick factory by bidding merely for the scrap metal.
Indeed, in Eski ehir and Gaziantep "factories" do not have healthy
sub-contracting links with artisan shops and workshops. But this does
not mean that the same is true for all Turkish "factories." In larger
centers such as istanbul, izmir and Bursa there are 'non-factories" tied 12'
i'
i
i
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to the "factory" sector of industries through sub-contracts, and their
numbers are on the rise. Such relations between "factories" and "non-
factories"' are rare. Nevertheless, they deserve much attention, for they
indicate a turn in the process of Turkish industrial development: the
"glass-wall" between the "lower" and "higher" forms of capitalist production
begins to melt.
SECTION
CONCLUDIG BSEVATIONS
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
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CHAPTER XX
-FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE "NON-FACTORY" SECTOR OF INDUSTRIES
IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
1. "Non-Factories" And Employment
In underdeveloped countries such as Turkey,"lower" forms of
capitalist industrial production assume a slowly increasing share in
industrial employment, but not in industrial production. Indeed, the
"non-factory" sector of industries is one of the few alternative
fields of employment left for many who can not find jobs in the primary
urban labor markets, i.e., in "factories," large businesses, institutions
and government. As the number of artisan shops and workshops multiplies
the share of "non-factories" in industrial employment increases. Nevertheless,
"non-factories" are not really alternatives for "factories" in productively
employing labor and capital. Thus, as the number of capital-intensive
"factories" grows, the share of the "factory" sector in industrial production
rapidly expands. Such a picture can only emerge when there is an "unnegotiated-
peace", or a sort of symbiosis, between the historically antagonistic forms
of capitalist industrial production.
As a rule, "non-factories" are labor-intensive. Thus, as they
multiply in number, the unemployment problem is significantly modified.
This diverts the pressure put upon "factories" to adapt a labor-intensive
path for growth- Capital-intensive "factories", on the other hand, indirectly
sustain the continuous flow of labor into the "non-factory" sector of
industries, and hence aid in the proliferation of artisin ;hops and workshops.
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If we consider the petty trading and services businesses which
thrive upon "non-factories," the importance of employment in
secondary industrial labor markets become even clearer. Yet, neither
craft and detail workers, nor self-employed petty producers are satisfied
with their respective work situations in the sphere of petty production
activities. They remain there because better alternatives are not
available. This observation marks anwther function of the "non-factory"
sector of industries.
"Non-factories" are potential reserve labor pools for "factories.,'
In other words, artisan shops and workshops act as a sponge. They can not only
absorb the labor that spills over from the primary labor markets, but can also
provide labor for "factories" when necessary. This, however, does not
mean that the "non-factory" sector is a training ground for "factory"
labor. There are such qualitative differences between artisan shops, workshops
and "factories" on the one hand, and craft, detail and "factory" work on
the other,that a "non-factory" worker can become a "factory" worker
only in a "factory."
"Non-factory" workers are in a peculiar situation. They enter secondary
industrial labor markets despite of low wages and bad working conditions.
However, the official minimum wages and work conditions set by the Labor Office
are such that many petty producers can not afford to meet them. Of necessity,
therefore, both workers and petty producers agree to by-pass the labor
regulations aimed at controlling the "lower" forms of capitalist production.
Consequently, employment in many artisan shops and workshops assumes an
illegal status from the outset. This acts as an obstacle to organizing labor
in the domain of petty production activities. Unorganized labor
ci
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smoot-Ifs the way for the low wages, bad working conditions andA
high labor turnovers which mark the secondary industrial labor markets.
Yet, it is not only the fear of the Labor Office that keeps "non-factory"
workers isolated and in line. There is also hope. Since it is relatively
easy to start a small artisan shop, workers tend to entertain the hope
of raising enough capital to open their own petty businesses.
In other words, the hope of becoming petty producer or a petty trader,
on the one hand, and the fear of losing employment on the other,
keeps "non-factory" workers from uniting. Indeed, this is yet another
important function performed by the "non-factory" sector of industries.
It acts as a brake on the processes of proletarianization and the development
of working class consciousness.
2. "Non-Factories" And Regional Disparities
Gaziantep and Eskigehir rank as the sixth and seventh largest
cities in Turkey. The former is in the lagging East, and the latter lays
in the more developed Western Anatolia. I estimate that in Eskisehir about
15,500 , and in Gaziantep about 32,000 people are directly employed in
2the "non-factory" sector of industries. Roughly speaking, this is to
say that artisan shops and workshops provide an income for half of all
3fami Lies in Gaziantep, and for one-third in Eskijehir. This observation
suggests that the proportion of "non-factory" to "factory" employment tends
to increase the further one goes in Eastern Anatolia, and vice "ersa.Indeed,
this is the case. For example, in large Eastern Anatolian cities such as
Erzurum, Van, Kars, Erzincan, Gaziantep, Diyarbakir and Urfa the "factory"
sector of industries is almost non-existent. Yet, on the other hand,
smooth~ 2. "Non-Fatoritelwbaes" .And Regional oDisaitiens n
h gh aziauntves andEsicehi mrak the s ixth ay nd seventh la argetst
citiest i no Turky. The forer is i the laggrOfing Ehast, an tep l-actter lys
ins the more devealoe Wetsten Anaolia I restimten th ntratin Eskie hiaout
1550 , asnd inog Gazitan te aouent 32,000 pepett are iretlyempoedi
I ther "nnfcory", sectore of beoindustres2 Roghy spduer rakingthi toaer
say that onartisan shop fand workshopsi providean income fohr hl o l
faikees inn Gaziatep," ande fror one-thding Eskeehir This i e nte
suggststhat fnthen proportion oft "non-factory" to"fctory employmenttrens
to incresase thrae furthe rone goes in Eatrn An atoiania•o and vice ,.,•sa.Indeed
thi wristh clase. For examples,inlreEsrnAtoancissuha
Erzurum, Van, Kn as Ezianepanu Gazantpeople Darbae ad Urfatl thoe "fctry
~te"o-atr"sector of industries? isul alotnnexset et, ong the othe hand
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in large Western Anatolian centers such as Istanbul, izmit, Adapazarl,
Zonguldak, izmir, Eskisehir, Adana and Mersin the relative importance
of "non-factory" employmeht declines. Certainly this observation calls
for further research. Nevertheless, it sheds light upon another form
of symbiosis between "lower" and "higher" forms of capitalist industrial
production in underdeveloped countries such as Turkey.
"Non-factories" are widely spread throughout the country.It is possible
to find artisan shops and workshops in all cities. But "factories" are
different. They tend to be concentrated in large urban centers and more
developed regions. Thus, in a sense, "lower" forms of capitalist
production lessen the regional disparities in industry which stem from the
general tendency of "factories" to maximize their external economies.
3. "Non-Factories" And Low-Income Groups
In general, artisan shops and workshops can provide luxury items
for high-income groups. Yet, in underdeveloped countries, they specialize
in producing the low quality and cheap goods which the "rich" do not prefer,
but the "poor" can afford, In other words, "non-factories" appear
when "factories" choose not to primarily serve low-income groups. Thus,
the "non-factory" sector assumes another crucial function. It covers up
the distorted nature of the "factory" sector and neutralizes potential
popular unrest by supplying cheap commodities that the "poor" can afford.
The availability of cheap commodities produced in artisan shops and workshops,
on the other hand, indirectly smoothes the way for increases in "factory"
profits. When the cost of reproduction of "factory" labor is kept low,
the pace of demands for wage raises in the "factory" sector slows down.
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In brief, in underdeveloped countries, the "lower" forms of
capitalist industrial production not only employ, but also supply
low-income groups. Artisan shops and workshops are set up by the "poor"
in order to serve the "poor."
4. "Non-Factories" And Underdevelopment
The outstanding aspect of Turkish industrialization has been the
inability of the "lower" forms of capitalist production to transform
into "higher" forms, on the one hand, and the reluctance of the latter
to connect with and replace or subordinate the former, on the other.
In underdeveloped countries, this break in the process of progressive
capitalist industrial transformation emerges as a condition of dependency.
Indeed, the "higher" forms of capitalist industrial production observed
in underdeveloped countries have their roots abroad. They are imports
which primarily facilitate the in-flow of capital and technology from,
and the out-flow of quasi-rents on technology and profits to developed
countries. This accounts for the peculiar nature of the "factory" sector
of industries in underdeveloped countries, and its reluctance to transform
the domain of petty production activities.
The "lower" forms of capitalist industrial production, on the
other hand, can not generate "factories" from within. But they proliferate,
and in the process, render various direct and indirect services to "factories."
For example, the "non-factory" sector of industries serves "factories" as
a market, a reserve pool of labor, a source of cheap repair services, a
check on unemployment and regional disparities in industry, and finally,a
means to keep the cost of reproduction for "factory" labor low.
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In underdeveloped countries the continuity of the process of
progressive capitalist industrial transformation, is broken, and tends
to remain as such. This observation sheds new light upon the functions
performed by artisan shops and workshops. The "non-factory" sector
of industries rationalizes the status-quo and serves to minimize its
contradictions. In other words, the "lower" forms of capitalist industrial
production function as buffer mechanisms in the development of
underdevelopment.
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CHAPTER XXI
IMPORTANT PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE "NON-FACTORY"
SECTOR OF INDUSTRIES IN TURKEY, AND SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS
1. Can "Non-Factories" Transform Into "Factories" On
Their Own?
For a petty producer to establish a "factory" does not mean
slight adjustments in the organization of work, or a minimal expansion
in capital outlay. It means shifting from one level of technology to
another that is several levels above. It means changing the entire
organization of work. It means huge amounts of capital outlay. It means
new and sophisticated equipment imported from developed countries, a new
location, serious labor regulations, organized labor, sophisticated
management, new credit sources and channels, and new ways of purchasing
and marketing. In short, for a petty producer to become a "factory"
owner is akin to entering into a new game. Indeed, there are other factors
that prevent petty producers from making the qualitative changes necessary
to transform "non-factory" into "factory" enterprises. But among them,
the nature of competition and the features of capital accumulation in
the "non-factory" sector are the most important. In brief, a significant
capital accumulation occurs only in large artisan shops and workshops. Yet,
the capital accumulated is either reinvested in the "non-factory" sector
and remains there, or flows into non-industrial avenues.
It is true that some innovations occur in the domain of petty
production activities. But they stand more as minor product improvements
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and insignificant artisanal skill perfection efforts, than as major
technological break-throughs. Also, the process of accumulation of
capital is rooted in the exploitation of labor rather than in the use of
capital embedded in advanced technology. Indeed, "non-factories" employ
obsolete and labor-intensive technologies. They can not even reproduce
the bulk of their own technical base. Furthermore, the capital accumulated
in the "non-factory" sector is not large enough to fertilize a grass-roots
"factory" building process. In short, artisan shops and workshops generate
enough energy to reproduce rather than to transform themselves. They
can not yield "higher" forms of capitalist production without outside
help.
There may exist a few examples of petty producers who turned
into "factory" owners by their own means. I must admit that I have not
interviewed "factory" owners in this regardand I do not know of studies
that can shed light upon this issue. Among the workshop operators whom
I have interviewed, on the other hand, all those working towards
establishing a "factory" were aided by the government. Indeed, examples
of petty producers establishing "factories" through a selected help
from outside the "non-factory" sector are not difficult to find. Yet,
there are almost no examples of Turkish petty producers becoming "factory"
owners on their own.
2. Can "Non-Factories" Transform Into "Factories" With
Outside Help ?
As the number of "non-factories" increases, the number of business
failures among small artisan shops multiplies. In the meanwhile, the real
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*ages of "non-factory" workers, and the profit rates of petty producers
tend to decline. Thus, both petty producers and their employees come
to believe that something must be done. Yet, petty producers can not
join together in cooperatives, and craft and detail workers shy away
from unions.
Indeed, the "non-factory" sector of industries has many problems
such as inadequate credits, arbitrary tax assessment procedures, imposition
of labor regulations designed for "factories," exploitation by merchants,
high raw material costs, bottlenecks in marketing, low labor productivity,
unused capacity, and low wages and bad working conditions in the secondary
industrial labor markets. These problems aid in the development of an easy
consensus among those who are involved with "lower" forms of capitalist
industrial production that the government has to act. But how? Since
the contention that some "non-factories" would disappear, and others
would either automatically transform into "factories," or establish
sub-contracting links with "factories" as has happened in Japan, has
not held true, then new policies must be drawn. But upon which
understanding and theory?
I have argued that the "non-factory" and "factory" sectors of Turkish
industry exist side by side as if separated by a "glass-wall." This is
to say that in underdeveloped countries such as Turkey the continuity
of the process of progressive capitalist transformation has been interrupted.
Thus, an important question appears: How to establish links
between the "factory" and "non-factory" sectors of industry so that the
"glass-wall" in between them melts? Obviously, answers to this question
not only involve the "non-factory" sector. The nature of "factories"
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is also at issue.
The existing government policy is to pick up the best
of the "non-factories" and assist their transformations into "factories."
Indeed, such a policy can yield token "factory" owners turned petty
producers. But the "non-factory" sector and the "glass-wall" would be
left intact. This is not surprising. Turkish industrialization policies
were, and they still are, exclusively aimed at the establishment and
growth of the "factory" sector of industries. "Non-factory" types of
industrial production were neither expected to increase, nor was an increase
desired. But alongside "factories," petty firms proliferated and formed a
separate sphere of iriustrial activity. Furthermore, being spread all over the
country and throughout many industrial activity branches, they came to
involve large groups of people. Consequently, parallel to its economic
significance, the political importance of the domain of petty production
activities began to mount. In brief, though officially excluded from
the mainstream of industrialization plans and programs, and remaining as
an anamoly to the theories of capitalist development tailored in the West,
the "non-factory" sector of industries was a reality and it had to be
dealt with. There are various government agencies, institutions, laws and
regulations, and international organizations that relate to the petty
production activities domain. Yet, as examplified in the existing government
policy, these institutions help "lower" forms of capitalist industrial
production to survive rather than smooth the way for their transformation.
Another policy alternative is to establish "factories" and
produce cheap commodities that the "poor" can afford, regardless of whether
the "rich, prefer them or not. Indeed, such "factories" can replace
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artisan shops and workshops, and do away with the "glass-wall." But
there are many serious problems involved in taking such a line. For
e2ample, what will the unemployed petty producers and craft and detail
workers do if the "factory" sector continues on its present capital-intensive
path for growth? Furthermore, assuming that the "factory"' sector
adapts a labor-intensive path for growth; how and from where will the
technical base for such "factories" be provided? Assuming that unemployment
will not be a serious problem; will capital-intensive private "factories"
tend to produce cheap commodities for the "poqr" and leave the demand
of the "rich" unattended? Assuming that not private but State-run
"factories" replace "lower" forms of capitalist industrial production, and
they adapt labor-intensive methods; why should the State do what the
private "factories" decline to do because it is not profitable?
A third policy alternative is to reorganize the "non-factory"
sector. Indeed, this can be done by establishing cooperatives, and by
rationalizing the existing forms of social cooperation among petty producers
in selected lines of petty production activities. But this alternative
is not altogether different from the existing government policy. Instead
of one or two petty producers at a time, groups of petty producers could
be transferred into the "factory" sector, leaving the "glass-wall" intact.
In brief, I can see no feasible policy alternative to melt the
"glass-wall" from below, or to radically replace "non-factories" with
"factories."
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3. Can "Factories" Connect With And Transform The "Non-Factory"
Sector Of Industries?
When in a particular line of industry "factories" begin to
produce cheap commodities that the "poor" can afford and the "rich"
prefer, artisan shops and workshops tend to disappear. But even cheap
factory products such as pepsi cola, ball-point pens, paper', glass
and electric bulbs are not necessarily within the reach of the "poor."
Thus, in underdeveloped countries where the gap between the lower and
higher income groups is wide, examples of "factories" dilrectly transforming
the "non-factory" sector by replacing artisan shops and workshops are
rare.
Another way in which "factories" can connect with and transform
the "non-factory" sector of industries is through sub-contracts. Indeed,
in Turkey such connections between the "lower" and "higher" forms of
capitalist industrial production are in their infancy, and not much is
known about them. Nevertheless, I believe that sub-contracting links
between "factories" and "non-factories" constitute an important element
in melting the "glass-wall." They should be maximized in a planned manner.
This calls for a careful selection of "factories" which can give
sub-contracts to "non-factories," and artisan shops and workshops which
can teceive sub-contracts from "factories." Yet, even after all the
sub-contracting links between the "lower" and "higher" forms of capitalist
industrial production are exhausted, the "glass-wall" will not disappear.
In order to melt the "glass-wall" altogether, three conditions
must be met simultaneously. First, "factories" have to replace as many
"non-factories" as possible by eliminating the segmentation of consumer
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markets. Second, "factories" have to be more labor-intensive, and
"factory" technology must be produced and improved upon at home. Third,
"factories" have to subordinate the "lower" forms of capitalist industrial
production through sub-contracts and aid their transformations into
small "factories."
The first two conditions call for an income distribution and
a "factory" sector that are impossible to realize in a dependent underdeveloped
country. The third condition, however, can be met. Indeed, planned
sub-contracting links between "factories" and "non-factories" con be
refined as a tool for regional policy. For example, in underdeveloped
countries such as Turkey the maximization of potential sub-contracting
links between future "factory" investments and existing "non-factories"
can be used as a criteron in selecting industries for urban growth
centers in lagging regions.
FOOTNOTES
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was also specialized in the manufacture of caravan tools--;
the Konya-Afyon area in mat weaving; and Ugak-G6'rdes area
in carpet weaving... Manisa-Akhisar-Alaqehir regions(were
noted) for tanning and leather products; Marad for its
wrought iron; Damascus for its iron works, sword manufacturing
and enamel; and Gaziantep for its footwear,"
( Tekeli, "Evolution of Spatial Organization," p. 248)
3. In the cities the control and supervision of the ordinary citizens was
secured through corporate bodies organized along professional lines,
called 'sinif's. Every person pursuing an occupation, and his family
belonged to a 'sinif'. The number of these corporations was an indicator
of the diversity in urban living. For instance, in 1638, in Istanbul
there were around 1,000 guilds distributed into 57 sections. ( Evliya
9elebi, Narrative of Travels in Europe, Asia, and Africa in the
Seventeenth Century, trans. J. von Hammer (London: William H. Allen &
Co., 1834), p. 103). Trade and Craft Guilds ranked high among corporations,
while those of the 'boza'--an alcoholic beverage-- makers and tavern
keepers were the lowest. (Ibid., pp. 104-250). Corporations offered the
means by which the ordinary city dweller assumed his place in the social
order. Within these self-governing units individuals were screened off
the direct supervision of the governors. The social function of the
corporations were enhanced --not in all, but in most, especially of
the craft corporations-- by their religious affiliation, usually to
one of the great religious orders. ( Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society
and the West, p. 277; Esnaf ve Sanatk$rlar Konfederasyonu, Cumhurivetin
50. Yillnda Esnaf ve Sanatkar, (Ankara: E.S.K. Yay., 1973), pp. 3-48;
IslAm Ansiklopedisi, vol. 4, s.v. "FiitUvvet," by C. van Arendonk and
Bichlr Faris). From the members' point of view, the corporations maintained
the standard of craftsmanship, prevented underhand competition, served
the purposes of an insurance, promoted self-esteem, carved a niche in
the society for the individual, provided an immediate friendly group
outside the family, and served as a protection from petty oppressions
,of the officers. ( Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, p. 278).
From the rulers' vantage point, the 'sainf's helped maintain order
and discipline, and provided a convenient means of administration and
of extracting surplus. Within the limits imposed by religion., tradition,
and 'usage' these corporations were relatively free and autonomous.(Ibid.).
The head of each corporation was administrator and arbitrator in its
internal affairs, deciding disputes between the members, and maintaining
order and punishing misdemeanours. ( Ibid.; Sanatkirlar Konfederasyonu,
Esnaf ve Sanatkir, pp. 54-70). Furthermore, they represented the
corporation in all of its relations with the state, and distributed the
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tax-quotas. Over the corporations, was the city administration,
involved in regulating, controlling and coordinating 'sinif's while
organizing municipal common action. Authorized by, and representing
the authority of the Sultan, the municipal administrations were
comprised of the offices of 'kadl', 'muhtesib', and 'subagi' until
the nineteenth century reforms. ( Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and
the IWest, p. 278; Alfred Bonne', State and Economics in the Middle East,
(London: K. Paul, Trench & Trubner Co., 1948), pp. 39-61; Ira M. Lapidus,
Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Pr., 1967); lber Ortayll, Tanzimattan Sonra Mahalli Idareler: 1840-
1878, (Ankara: T.O.D.A.I.E. Yay. No. 142, 1974), pp.163-96.)
4. The Arabic name was 'sinf' or 'hifa', in contemporary sources generally
'taifa' or 'kar'. The term 'guild' is not quite satisfactory as a
translation of these terms, since the powers of the medieval guilds
in Europe in controlling the industry were much wider than those of
the Islamic corporations. The study of these craft corporations has
not progressed beyond the initial stages. (Gibb and Bowen, Islamic
Society and the West, p. 281). Also see fsl'm Ansiklopedisi, vol. 10,
s.v. "Sinif"; Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 10, s.v. "1edd," by Abdiibaki
Gb!pinarll.
5. The privilage of owning a shop was called 'gedik'. For accounts of the
'gedik' system see Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, p. 282;
Sanatkarlar Konfederasyonu, Esnaf ve Sanatla&r , pp. 48-54.
6. Islrm Ansiklopedisi, vol. 10, s.v. "ýedd," by Abdiilbaki GOlplnarli.
7. But, the labor laws are designed with "factories" in mind.
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collaborated with the invaders, had to move southwards to Syria (then
an ex-Ottoman province under the French protectorate). It is true that
a similar phenomenon occurred in Eskiqehir when the Greek and Armenian
minorities there fled with the Greek army. Yet, it is also true that
the Armenian community in Gaziantep was larger, and had a comparatively
more important role in the urban economy. The loss of Armenian capital
and skill stood as the price paid by Gaziantep for the national independence.
This loss, however, was not offset later as in Eskigehir. All that
Gaziantep received was the addition of 'gazi', meaning 'war hero', as
a prefix to its name, which was then simply Antep.
23. Apak et al., Sanayi ve Maadin, p. 237.
24. Ibid., p. 241.
25. iller Bankast, Gaziantep Kent BtldtnU, p. 45.
26. Apak et al., Sanayi ve Mlaadin, p. 238.
27. Ibid., p. 146.
28. Acaroglu,"Eskiqehir Araqtirmasl' p. 146. It was established in 1965.
29. Gaziantep Metropolitan Planlama OrgUtil, "5 Kigiden Fazla Isgi qallitiran
Yerlerde Callgtirdlil If9i Adedine Gire Sanayi Siniflamasl:
Mayls 1974," List compiled from the records of the Gaziantep
Labor Office, Gaziantep, 1974. (Typewritten).
30. Ibid.
31. iller Bankasl, Gaziantep Kent Bilti'dn, p. 45.
32. Ibid.
33. Imar ve Iskan Bakanlil, "Gaziantep Sanayi Callmasl," A report, Ankara,
1964-5. (Typewritten), p. 97.
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34. Unfortunately, I could not personally contact the head of the
Dokurnacilar Mensucat Fabrikasl (Mr. M. 6yiicW), who actually took
part in the transformation of the cooperative into a factory. His
accounts of this important process must be recorded.
35. Gaziantep Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasl, 1973 Gaziantep Ekonomik Durumu,
(Gaziantep: GaziantepTicaret ve Sanayi Odasi yay., 1973),
table 1, p. 4. In 1973, the 16 flour-mills, including the
4 established before 1950, employed 230 workers. Yet, in
the same year, one of these factories was closed.(Ibid., p.
4). Furthermore, according to the Gaziantep Metropolitan
Planning Agency, there were only 14 flour mills employing
215 workers in 1974. (Gaziantep Metropolitan Planlama BrgUtU,
"5 Kiliden Fazla 19yi.,)
36. These factories were built in 1968 and 1972. Taken together they employed
50 workers in 1973 and 53 workers in 1974. Both factories use Italian
built machinery.(Gaziantep Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasi, 1973 Gaziantep,
p. 5; Gaziantep Metropolitan Planlama Orgiitt, "5 Kigiden Fazla gg9i.")
37. This factory employed 10 workers in 1974.(Gaziantep Metropolitan Planlama
brgUtU, "5 Kipiden Fazla It9i.")
38. The privately-run Wine Factory (Burg9 arap Fabrikasl) employed 28
workers in 1974, (Ibid.), and its annual wine capacity, 2.5 million
liters) is 2.5 times that of the state-run Wine and Raki Factory.
(Gaziantep Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasi, 1973 Gaziantep, p. 10.)
39. The Gazoz Fabrikas± employed 30 workers in 1974.(Gaziantep Metropolitan
Planlama 'drgUtU, "5 Kigiden Fazla iggi.")
40. The four flour-mills which were established before 1950, now employ
about 90 workers.
41. This factory employed 164 workers in 1974.
42. One of the new textile factories (Soymazer Fabrikasl) was established
in 1971, and employed 65 workers in 1973. It produces laces, curtains
and cloths using synthetic fibres. Consequently it is iot in direct
competition with either the kilim and towel makers, or the tricot makers.
The other textile factory (Soymur Iplik ve Dokuma Fabrikasi) was
established in the 1960's, and it employed 146 workers.( Imar ve iskan
Bakanll'l, "Gaziantep Sanayi galilmasl," p. 82.) According to the
Gaziantep Metropolitan Planlama OrgtitU, it employed 200 workers in 1974.
43. According to the Gaziantep Metropolitan Planlama (OrgitU there were only
two cotton gins in 1974, one employing 11 and the other 10 workers. Yet
according to the list of industrial establishments obtained from the
Gaziantep Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasi, there are three cotton gins.
44. The post-1950 generation of spinning mills employ 1,311 workers. But
on the other hand, the Dokumacilar factory, the three cotton gins, the
two new textile plants and the Veliq Factory employ 530, 29, 265, and
627 workers respectively.
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45. Gaziantep Metropolitan Planlama brgitU, "5 Ki§iden Fazla Iggi."
46. Acaroglu, "Eskigehir Araqtlrmasi," table 33, p. 144. According to this
source, there were 4 firms which employed more than 10 workers
in food industries in the Eskigehir province before 1950.
Indeed, the Eskigehir Sugar Factory and the Distilliary are
included in the count, but the nature of the remaining two
food industries is not clear. In the absence of further
information , I assumed that they were privately-run flour-
mills in Eskiqehir.
47. For a detailed account of these industries on a firm by firm basis
see Eskigehir Sanayi Odasi, "1974 Kayit Cetveli," List of firms
registered at the Chamber, Eskigehir, 1974. (Typewritten).
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER XV
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1. See pp. 247-57 below.
2. Yet, even then, an ironsmith or a founder who needs more iron or coal
than he is assigned to, has to depend on small merchants.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER XVII
1. For the definition of the concepts "backward" and "forward" linkages
see. Hirschman, Strategy of Economic Development, pp. 98-119.
2. Large Turkish cities seem to display two CBD's; a traditional, and a
modern one. See Tuirul Akjura, Ankara: Tirkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Bagkenti
Hakkinda Monografik Bir Araqtirma, (Ankara: Orta Dogu Teknik tniversitesi
•Mim. Fak. yay. no. 16, 1971), 111-27.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER XX
1. SUhendan Ekni, 1968 Sekt3rei KGfigk imalat Sanayii Tahmini, (Ankara:
Devlet Istatistik EnstittsU yay. no. 686, 1973), table 1,
p. 18.
2. See table 11 above.
3. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that each person directly employed
in the "non-factory" sector of industries has a family of five people,
and that Eski§ehir and Gaziantep have a population of 300,000.
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1. Erdo3an Soral, 6zel Kesimde TrIrk MNtesebb¶sleri, (Ankara: Ankara Iktisadi
Ticari Ilimler Akademisi yay. no. 72, 1974), pp. 29-47.
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APPENDIX I
SOME NOTES ON METHOD
1. Concerning Definition Of Terms
In this study "petty production" is defined to encompass the whole
gamut of "non-factory" types of industrial production activities. In other
words, if the qualitative distinctions of "factory" type production are
absent in a work place, then the establishment under consideration is
defined as being a part of the "non-factory" or "petty production" domain
of industrial production activities, regardless of the size of its labor
force and capital outlay, and the total power of its machinery. In general,
therefore, the term "petty production" refers to a particular mode of
production, and the term "petty production firm" or"petty firm" includes
all "non-factories" ranging from the smallest artisan shop to the largest
workshop.
The concept "petty production firm " (or "non-factory") does not
refer to the same set of industrial establishments that are included in
by the term "small-scale industries." Although the concepts "petty
production firm" and "small-scale industries" appear interchangable, they
are'not. The latter refers only to a sub-set of "non-factories" as defined
in this study. Often, larger workshops do not qualify as "small-scale
industries." For instance, in the Turkish industrial censuses,implemented
since 1950, workshops employing more than 10 workers are defined as "large-
scale" rather than "small-scale" manufacturing establishments. Hence,
although all "small-scale" Turkish industrial firms can be viewed as
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"non-factories," the collection of "large-scale industries" includes
larger "non-factories," i.e., workshops, as well as "factories."
The concept "small business" not only encompasses a sub-set of
"non-factories," but also includes all forms of business whether they
are production oriented or not. By definition, all "small-scale industries"
are"small businesses." Yet, since larger workshops are often labelled as
"large-scale industries," they may not be referred to as "small businesses."
Thus,not every "petty production" may qualify as a "small business."
Furthermore, non-industrial establishments like grocery stores and barber
shops are considered to be "small businesses." In brief, net every "small
business" may be called a "petty production firm," and conversely, not
every "petty production firm " qualifies as a "small business."
The term "handicrafts" applies to the craft-work that is observed
in artisan shops, and not to the detail-work that is connected with workshops.
Consequently, the concept "handicraft industry" includes only the artisan
shops, a sub-set of "petty production firms."
The term "cottage industry" is a hybrid of the two common concepts:
"handicraft" and "small-scale" industries, and has a "rural" connotation.
Thus, whatever its definitional virtues may be, it refers to yet another
sub-set of "non-factories" rather than to the entire range of "petty
production firms" observed in urban areas.
The term "petty producer" refers to both artisans and workshop
operators. It is true that all "petty producers" are industrial entrepreneurs.
Yet, it is not true that all "industrial entrepreneurs" are petty producers.
"non-factories," the collection of "large-scale industries" includes
larger ,,non-factories," i~e.• workshops, as well as "factories."
The concept "small business" not only encompasses a sub-set of
"non-factories," but also includes all forms of business whether they
are production oriented or not. By definition, all "small-scale industries"
are"small businesses." Yet, since lar~j~r worksh~4ps are often labelled as
"large-scale industries," they may not be referred to as "small :businesses."
Thus,not every "petty production" may qualify as a "small business."
Furthermore, non-industrial establishments like grocery stores and barber
shops are considered to be ,,small businesses." In brief, net every "small
business" may be called a "petty production firm," and conversely, not
every "petty production firm " qualifies as a "small business."
The term "handicrafts" applies to the craft-work that is observed
in artisan shops, and not to the detail-work that is connected with workshops.
Consequently, the concept "handicraft industry,, includes only the artisan
shops, a sub-set of "'petty production firms."
The ter  "cottage industry" is a hybrid of the two common concepts:
"handicraft" and "small-scale" industries, and has a "rural" connotation.
Thus, whatever its definitional virtues may be, it refers to yet another
sub-set of "non-factories" rather than to the entire range of "petty
production firms" observed in urban areas.
i T~he ter  "petty producer" refers to both artisans and workshop
operators. It is true that all "petty producers" are industrial entrepreneurs.
Yet, it is not true that all "industrial entrepreneurs,, are petty producers.
In particular, factory o•ner-operators are labelled as industrial entrepreneurs
as well. Yet, by definition, they are not petty producers, i.e., ,,non-factory"
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owner-operators. Furthermore, in a wider sense, the term "entrepreneur"
may be considered as synonymous with the term "businessman." As such, an
insurance company owner, a banker, a building contractor, an import-export
merchant, a grocery shop operator, a barber, and even a peddlar may qualify
as "businessmen" just as "industrial entrepreneurs" do. Thus, although the
term "small businessman" does not cover the larger workshop owner-operators
because their establishments do not qualify as "small-businesses," it does
include "petty merchants".
Finally, the concepts "industrial worker" and "industrial employee"
encompass "non-factory workers and employees" in particular. Yet, while
the former lumps non-factory workers with factory workers, the latter t
tends to be even more confusing because it refers to all who receive wages
and salaries regardless of the kind of employment in factories or non-
factories. Thus, on the one hand the craft and detail workers of non-factories
are equated with factory workers, and on the other, the underpaid, un-
registered and seasonal labor force connected with non-factories is lumped
together with the staff and workers of factories.
In this study, not only the above-mentioned categories, but also
others such as: (1) factory and non-factory connected capital, profit rates,
capital accumulation, and capital markets; (2) factory and non-factory
connected labor, labor productivity, work organization, work contracts,
wages, working conditions, and labor markets; (3) factory and non-factory
connected technology, product lines, and consumer markets,were included
and used to build a theory to account for the "two-fold" nature of the
industrial landscape in underdeveloped countries like Turkey. In short,
the analytical categories used in this study were neither chosen at random
_ _
in the absence of a theoretical frame, nor accidentally included
without a methodological perspective and discipline. They are the products
of painstaking critical scrutiny of the available wisdom on the "petty
industrial production activities domain" in underdeveloped countries.
2. Concerning The Methodological Underpinnings of This
Study
The contemporary versians of artisan shops and workshops are
easily discernible from factories. Artisan shops and workshops. are
"non-factories,," where ownership and the management and supervision of
work are not differentiated. Furthermore, "non-factories" can be seen
as productive mechanisms whose parts are human beings., In other words,
the non-factory types of work are centered around the social cooperation
of labor rather than the technical and mechanical cooperation among machines.
Once the "petty production firms" are identified appropriately in view
of the qualitative criteria woven around these two points9 then the
quantifiable aspects of production follow, illuminating the scope and
dimensions of ",petty production activities" in particular. This is the
crux of the methodological orientation of this study. It is believed that
quantitative criteria become useful only after the domain of inquiry is
defined in the light of qualitative distinctions, and not before. In the
literature relating to the non-factory types of industrial production
activities in underdeveloped countries, however, there is a diametrically
opposing logic in scientific inquiry; first various quantitative critera
are invoked to define petty production firms, then their qualitative
peculiarities are studied. As a frequent consequence, a peculiar
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sequence of apologies follows: (1)it is extremely easy and convenient to
forward quantitative definitions for petty production firms and also for
the domain of petty production activities at the beginning, mainly
because the available qualitative criteria are not yet operational and
they do not have an umbrella of theory; (2) yet, as a rule, given the
qualitative aspects of petty production firms, the initial choice of
quantitative definitions are inappropriate and arbitrary; (3) therefore,
it is extremely difficult if not impossible to forward a clear-cut and
universally applicable operational definition for petty production firms
and consequently for the domain of petty production activities;(4) hence,
the ambiguities and overlappings surrounding the core concepts of "petty
production firms" and "petty production" are unavoidable; (5) but, the
"imperfections" of such analytical categories may be corrected ex-facto
in footnotes. More directly, the problems concerning the core concepts
of the field of inquiry can be "swept under the carpet."
Indeed, such an apologetic stand signifies the presence of an
epistemological paradox, or a methodological dead-end. This paradox, however,
is not only important to note, but also avoidable. It is important to
note because if analytical categories and, therefore, the domain of inquiry
are not defined clearly at the outset then not only the analyses, but the
generalizations that are reached and the theories that are built have to
be discarded as unscientific. After all, if we can not clearly define
what we are studying, then how can we expect to arrive at a clear understanding
of the phenomena under investigation? It is avoidable, because petty
production firms, and hence, the domain of petty production activities
can be defined operationally with reference to qualitative criteria organized
___
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under the umbrella of a theory.
The above-noted epistemological problem that marks the bulk of
studies on petty production can be seen as a trivial point, but it is
not. It ties rather than frees the mind of the researcher and restricts
the scope of his inquiries from the outset. In other words, even though
the problems' of defining petty firms with reference to quantitative criteria
may be acknowledged and some qualifications are forwarded, their use in
the collection, organization and display of information remains. Once
petty firms are defined with exclusive reference to the size of their
labor force and capital outlay, then, of necessity, as collected data
increase it becomes more and more difficult to move away from the original
definitions. Thus, the available second-hand data on petty production not
only channel the modes of thinking about petty firms, but also restrict the
scope of alternative analyses to the realm of sterile statistical
reiterations. Furthermore, while the epistemological paradox at the roots
of such analytical categories makes the available data on petty production
a kind of an "intellectual trap," the far more concrete problems of ,industrial
census-taking in underdeveloped countries erode their dependability.
- 1-
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APPENDIX II
SOME NOTES ON THE CRITICAL HANDLING OF THE TURKISH
DATA ON INDUSTRIES IN GENERAL, AND ON PETTY FIRMS
IN PARTICULAR
In the available literature on petty production activities in
Turkey, there are some instances when qualitative criteria are used
to define petty firms. I Yet, as a rule, the non-quantifiable aspects
of petty production have not been developed into a theory. Therefore
they are presented either in footnotes, or as apologies to modify the
quantitative criteria chosen to operationally define the petty firms,
Thus, as in other underdeveloped countries, the bulk of the existing data
on the domain of Turkish petty production activities continues to be
collected and sorted out with reference to the size of the labor force,
the capital outlay, and the total machine pwer in industrial establishments ,
The exclusive adoption of such quantitative criteria, which is a serious
theoretical problem, however, stands as a blessing when the Turkish data
collection efforts on industries are studied a little closer.
In many scholarly works, as well as in current official Turkish
industrial accounts "the size of the labor force" criteron appears as
the,most frequently used reference to distinguish "petty firms" (small-scale
industries), and thereby, to define the domain of petty production
activities (the informal, traditional, or unorganized industrial sector).
But this is only a recent development. It took roots with the second
nation-wide census of industries in 1950. The first official Turkish census
of industries, taken on 19279 for instance, did not display a distinction
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between "large-scale" and "small-scale" industries. In this connection,
the last official Ottoman census of industries, in effect the first
unofficial Turkish industrial survey, presents yet another way to collect
and present data.
In the 1913-1915 survey of Ottoman industries, all artisan shops
and most of the workshops were excluded from the outset. Only the larger
industrial establishments of the times, in and around a handful of Western
Anatolian cities, were surveyed. The criteria used to distinguish the firms
to be surveyed, however, are not very clear. In brief, a sum total of 282
industrial establishments (155 in and around Istanbul, 62 in Izmir, and
the rest distributed in Bursa, Izmit, Karamursel, Bandirma and Usak) are
accounted in this census. Of this total, some 117 were included in the
survey because they were registered under the 1913 Law for the Encouragement
of Industry, which granted some tax exemptions to those industrial firms
which had an overall value above 1,000 Liras, employed over 750 work-days
4
equivalent of labor per annum, and utilized more than five horsepowers.
The remaining 165 establishments, however, were included in the census
5
on the basis of the census takers' opinions, which are hard to pinpoint.
Furthermore, in relation to the survey, an unfruitful attempt was made to
collect information from the distant provinces of the Empire. Written
infbrmation concerning industrial establishments employing more than 10
workers was requested. 6 All this points to the lack of definitional clarity
that plagued the 1913-15 industrial survey. Consequently, it becomes
impossible to tell, if not to estimate, how many of the 282 larger industrial
firms recorded were actually factories.
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Unlike the 1913-1915 survey, the 1927 census if Industries took
7all artisan shops and workshops into account. Yet, neither the "small-
scale" and "large-scale" industries distinction, nor a clear demarcation
for "factories" was forwarded. Consequently, it is impossible to
calculate the number of factories in the sum total of 65,245 industrial
establishments surveyed. Similarly it is difficult to determine how many
of the 256,855 industrial workers recorded were factory workers. The same
can be said of the 1932-39 iTesvik-i Sanayi surveys. They were carried out
annually to trace the impacts on industry of the 1927 Law for the Encouragement
of Industry, but were basically modelled after the 1927 census of Industry9
Later, however, the Turkish State Institute of Statistics (SIS)
began to differentiate between "small-scale" and "large-scale" industries
in the categorizing of data on industries;10
"...Manufacturing industries employing ten or more
employees, and those having less than ten employees,
but utilizing fifty or more horsepower (are) defined as
large scale; all others (are) defined as small scale."
This rather simplistic definition of "petty firms" which is based on the
size of the labor force enjoyed uncritical approval among scholars, and
was soon established as the principal frame of reference both in academic
circles and in SIS publications. Yet, this widely accepted and circulated
demarcation line aimed at making a distinction between two qualitatively
separate industrial phenomena, is insufficient. Let us examine it closer.
According to this definition, if 10 workers are employed in a workshop
then it is going to be called a "large-scale" manufacturing industry. But,
if the petty producer decides to lay-off a worker, then the very same
workshop will suddenly become a "small-scale" industry, since now there
1~
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are less than 10 workers employed. Similarly, if a lathe shop operator
employing less than 10 workers acquires a new and more powerful lathe,
and hence increases the total horsepower of his detail-machines and
power-tools over a certain mark, in this case over 50, his workshop will
turn into a "large-scale" industry. A parallel exercise can be forwarded
for instances when the "size of the capital outlay" criteron, or various
combinations of exclusively quantitative criteria are used to define petty
industrial firms. In short, quantitative criteria are not only operational
and clear, but also are destined to be absurd and arbitrary when used to
establish a demarcation line between qualitatively distinct industrial
phenomena such as "factories" and "non-factories." Furthermore, if by
simple association, one thinks of "large-scale manufacturing industries
as a collection of "factories" rather than a melange of "non-factories"
and "factories," then what follows is a serious distortion of the industrial
landscape from the outset. Indeed, it is impossible to calculate the exact
number of workshops which employ more than 10 workers and 50 horsepowers.
But we know that there are many such workshops. If the current definitions
for "petty industrial firm" are applied, then most of these workshops
will have to be grouped with "factories" rather than viewed as a part of
the domain of petty production activities. In summary, it is clear that
the ,exclusive use of quantitative criteria is problematic. First, such
criteria fall short of capturing the essence of the qualitative distinctions
between "factories" and "non-factories." Second, as a consequence, the data
on "small-scale" industries furnished by available sources such as the SIS
basically refer to nothing more than an arbitrarily defined sub-set of the
domain of "petty production activities" as defined in this study. Third,
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when such criteria are applied, no matter how clear and operational they
may be, they generate important practical problems relating to the
dependability of the information secured. For instance, due to the nature
of "non-factory" connected labor markets which have unregistered workers,
apprentices without work contracts, family employment, and high labor
turnovers, it becomes difficult not only to determine the actual size
of the labor force, but also to quantify it in terms of an undifferentiated
employment category: "workers." Similarly, the use of modern but obsolete
technology, and the prevailing levels of unused capacity in petty production
make both the "size of capital outlay" and the "total horsepower" criteron
generate data of dubious value.
As I have noted earlier the use of quantitative criteria is not the
only problem that distorts the available Turkish data on petty production
activities. There is a lack of consensus among various official sources
on which quantitative criteron to use in defining petty firms, as well as
a serious semantics problem in modern Turkish which afflicts both this and
other fields of social inquiry. Recently, upon recognizing the practical
impasse generated by the application of the "labor force" criteron, the
Ministry of Industry and Technology adopted another qualitative criteron
to define petty industrial firms: "the size of the capital outlay." The
foll6wing is the definition settled on by a special committee of the
Ministry:
"The unit utilizing power driven equipment which has a
maximum of TL. 2,500,000 = $ 180,000 investment in
machinery and equipment active in the manufacturjqg
industry is defined as a Small Industrial Unit."
Thus, along with the already existing problem of relying on quantitative
criteria alone to define petty industrial firms, another problem was added.
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The Ministry and the SIS now define petty firms on overlapping but different
bases. T'his, however, is not all. The People's Bank distribute credits
to petty producers, defining "small scale" industries with reference
to the "size of the capital outlay" criteron, but differently from the
Mlinistry. According to the Bank, those industrial establishments with
capital outlays (perhaps including the value of land and construction)
with less than TL. 5 million ($ 360,000) are "small-scale" industries,
and hence are eligible for credits if registered at the Petty Producers'
13Credit Cooperatives. The State Planning Organization (SPO), on the other
hand, drafts all of the official Five Year Development Plans and also
conducts research 4and collects data lon petty production activities, but
with a totally different orientation from the SIS, the People's Bank, the
academics, and the iMinistry. In the Second (1968-72) and Third (1973-/7)
live Year Development Plans, although the "size of the labor force" criteron
seems to be utilized extensively in the displays of industrial data that
16
was borrowed from the SIS, this criteron is not acknowledged. instead, a
vague distinction between "small scale industries" and "handicrafts" is
forwarded iwhich further confuses the picture. The Second Five Year Development
Plan deals with these two categories separately, whereas the Third Plan
17lumps them together. In the Second Five Year Development Plan where
"small scale industries" are treated separately from "handicrafts," the
former (implicitly those industrial firms employing less than 10 workers) are
described as follows:
" The technical division of labor in the small-scale
industrial enterprises is similar to that in the
large-scale industries, though not to the. same extent.
This is due to the fact that, even in the small-scale
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industry, mass production techniques constitute
the basic principle of production." 18
Whereas, "handicrafts" are defined as follows:
",...those goods (this must be a mista1ke in translation)
produced by an artisan working on any craft manually and
by using his skill, independently and under his own
responsibility or with a member of his family or
together with a craftsman or apprentice, at his home
and/or as a peddlar, for the purpose of marketing
his products." 19
The picture, however, gets more blurred when it is noted that:
"The term handicrafts also includes small-scale
industry an handicrafts created in homes and
villages.1,
In addition to the lack of consensus among various official sources
on how to define petty industrial firms, the definitions of petty firms,
petty producers, and petty production activities written in the Law21
form a separate category. In the current Petty Traders and Petty Producers
Law, petty industrial firms are defined indirectly through references to
petty producers, and the emphasis is put upon qualitative criteria. Yet,
since petty producers are grouped together with "petty traders" and
"petty servicemen," another pair of concepts are introduced& "small businessmen"
and "small businesses." Specifically Turkish Public Law No. 507 defines
small businessmen ('Esnaf' and 'Sanatkar') with reference to their lines
of occupation, the nature of their involvment in work, and the size of
22their earnings. These qualitative distinctions, however, are vague and
unoperational.3 Consequently, while the People's Bank focuses on
quantitative definitions of petty producers, the qualification for
membership in the Petty Producers' Associations established by the
provisions of Public Law No. 507 remain vague. This paves the way for
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another confusion. Many petty producers register at the Chambers of
Commerce and Industry if it suits them, since there is no clear definition
24
of "petty producers" preventing them from doing so. In other words, they
officially become "merchants" and "large-scale industrial entrepreneurs."
Yet, unable to secure credits like factory owners and big merchants, they
turn to the People's Bank. The Bank, however, is only entitled to
distribute credits to those registered at the Petty Producers' Associations
and to "medium and large scale industrial establishments." This problem,
rooted in the vague definition of petty producers in the current Law,
can be by-passed if the Bank forwards another definition for petty industrial
establishments, and that is exactly what the Bank does.
In brief, the Mlinistry, the SIS, the SPO, the Bank, the Associations,
the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, the Labor Office, the Tax Administration,
the Municipalities, and also the scholars, the foreign experts and the
petty producers themselves, seem to have overlapping but different definitions
for petty industrial firms and petty industrial production. To this the
finer semantical distortions generated by irresponsible handling of
Ottoman, "T.urkish, English, French and German concepts pertaining to
industrial production must be added.
The backstage for the bulk of Turkish industrial censuses, therefore,
is not complex, but confused. In the absence of competing theories, there
prevails an overabundance of definitions and descriptions of petty
industrial firms and petty industrial production activities. It is astounding
but true that, there exists no current theory to account for the domain
of "non-factory" types of industrial production activities in underdeveloped
countries. Consequently, the available past and current, official and
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unofficial Turkish data on petty production can not be accepted at its
face value. In general, they are distorted, narrow in scope, and
unreliable. In view of all this the main body of information on Turkish
industries in general, and petty production activities in particular,
must be handled cautiously if not discarded from the outset25
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APPENDIX III
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE AVAILABLE SOURCES ON INDUSTRIES
IN ESKISEHIR AND GAZIANTEP: TOWARDS ESTIMATING THE SIZE OF
THE "NON-FACTORY" CONNECTED INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES SECTOR
In a 1973 Survey of Businesses in Eskisehir, conducted in
conjunction with a report prepared for the Bank of the Provinces (Iller
Bankasi), the total number of industrial establishments in the city is
put at 2,477 , of which about 6 per cent (147) employ more than 10 workers.
The distribution of industrial establishments by the number of workers-
employed and activity branches is given in Table A-It From this information,
however, it is impossible to tell which firms are actually factories and
which are not. Yet, it is clear that although categorized separately from
"artisans," a large portion of the industrial establishments classified
according to the "Standard Industrial Classification" adopted by the State
2
Institute of Statistics (SIS), are indeed "non-factories". Since we know
3that there are 40-50 factories in Eskisehir, it could have been easy to
estimate the number of "non-factories" from this account. But, unfortunately,
our job is not that easy. Not every profession listed as artisanal
occupation in this account can be included in the domain of petty production
activities. For instance, there are no glass manufactories in Eskisehir.
Of the 72 listed, with the exception of those that make mirrors, about
20-30 and perhaps more must be considered as petty traders and servicemen
rather than producers. They buy glass produced at factories in Istanbul,
and sell it in Eskisehir after cutting and mounting it on window panes.
In this connection we have to remember the automobile-glass mounters who
are often recorded as auto-repairers. Furthermore, the employment figures
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TABLE A-1
DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN ESKISEHIR BY NUMBER OF WORKERS
AND ACTIVITY BRANCHES. 1973
Industrial Number Of
Activity Industrial Number Of Industrial Establishments Employing
Branches Establish. 0 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200+
01 175 66 61 12 25 5 4 1 1
04 1 - - - - 1 -
05 37 12 19 - 6 - - - -
06 186 85 93 4 3 1 - - -
07 271 72 156 36 7 -
08 7 - 6 - - 1 - - -
09 25 18 6 - 1 -
10 1 - - - 1 -
11 6 6 - - - - - - -
12 1 - - - - 1 - - -
14 45 19 12 1 1 2 1 5 4
15 15 - - 12 2 - - 1 -
16 257 66 138 25 20 8 - - -
17 104 21 31 20 16 14 1 - 1
19 8 1 - 6 - 1 - - -
20 12 12 - -
Artisans
Tailors, quilt
makers, weavers 384 336 42 6 - - - - -
Silver smiths,
Clock repairers 132 132 -
Electrical equip.
repairers 132 126 - - - 6 - - -
Ironsmiths, Copper-
smiths, Small stove
makers, Bicycle &c.,
repairers 246 204 36 6 -
Auto repairers 288 264 18 -
Tanners 36 18 18 -
Upholstry,
Carpenters 36 18 18 -
Glass F mirror 72 72
TOTAL 2477 1548 654 128 88 39 6 8 6
Source: Irem Acaroglu. "Eskisehir Arastirmasi." A report prepared to the
Iller Bankasi, Ankara, 1974, (Mimeographed).
The information presented in this table is compiled by hand from several
computer readings, submitted as appendices to the Bank of the Provinces copy.
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include tha apprentices, and possibly a good number of unregistered workers
who have been carefully hidden from the eyes of official or semi-official
researchers. Nevertheless, an estimate of the scope of petty production
activities in Eskisehir can be derived from this account. Some assumptions
become indespensable. First, discounting petty traders and servicemen,
the number of petty production firms can be put around 2,4004 Second,
assuming that, on the average, a petty firm employs one unaccounted worker,
i.e., an apprentice, a family worker or an unregistered -hence hidden-
worker, the total number of workers in the petty production activities
domain can be put between 7,500 and 7,6005 To this figure, however, the
petty producers who work like laborers in their own businesses must be
added. But how many petty producers can be considered as part entrepreneur
and part worker? Again, we have to forward an assumption. If we assume
that the owner operators of establishments employing more than 10 workers
do not work like laborers, then a conservative estimate of the total
number of workers in petty firms can reach 10,000; about as many workers
as there are employed at the factories in Eskisehir.
7
In a comparable 1971 study of businesses in Gaziantep, through
invoking the "size of the labor force"criteron and defining those
industrial establishments employing more than 10 workers as "organized"
and the rest as "unorganized" or "small-scale" industries, a distribution
of firms by activity branches is provided. (See Table A-2). According to
this source, of the 2,431 industrial enterprises in Gaziantep, only 2.5
per cent (61) employ more than 10 workers, which constitutes 27.6 per cent
(4,328) of the total industrial labor force. Upon closer scrutiny of this
data, however, there emerges the need to reassess the number of petty firms
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TABLE A-2
DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN GAZIANTEP BY NUMBER OF WORKERS
AND ACTIVITY BRANCHES9 1971
IndustrialActivity ORGANIZED INDUSTRIES SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIESActivity
Branches No. of No. of No. of No. of
(SIS codes) Establish. Workers Establish. Workers
01 17 514 107 955
02 3 472 11 100
04 22 2081 546 2415
05 - - 175 868
06 - - 270 1071
07 - - 36 244
08 - - 5 16
09 - - 16 97
10 - - 48 291
11 - - 9 49
12 1 104 27 174
14 3 557 48 350
15 - - 32 264
16 - - 244 1063
17 1 28 10 40
18 - - 9 50
19 - - 362 2334
20 14 626 415 937
TOTAL 61 4328 2370 11318
Source: Iller Bankasi (The Bank Of The Provinces). Gaziantep Kent Butunu.
Ankara: Iller Bankasi yay., 1972.
This table is compiled from tables "Organize Endustride Sektorlere Gore
Calisanlarin Yillik Geliri", and "Kucuk Endustride Calisanlar", pp. 50-51.
and the size of the labor force. First, according to my observations there are
70-75 factories in Gaziantep. Yet, again according to my observations,
6 spinning mills out of the total of these factories employ less than 10
workers. Furthermore, several workshops employing more than 10 workers
(including apprentices and unregistered workers) have been witnessed, and
indeed surveyed. In view of these observations, therefore, the collection
of 61 organized industries not only excludes smaller spinning-mills (because
they employ less than 10 workers), but also includes larger "non-factories"
(because they employ more than 10 workers). Nevertheless, the total number
suggested for "organized industries," is not very different from what I
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observed in 1975. Second, not all lines of petty production activities
fit smoothly into the ,Standard Industrial Classification System" that
has been adopted. Consequently, it is difficult to account for tailors,
hat makers, shirt makers, silver smiths, cobbler, and the like. Some
of the petty production occupations could have been lumped together in
group no. 20 (Miscellaneous Manufacturing Activities), or simply left out.
In short, it is almost impossible to know which petty production activities
and how many petty firms are not covered by this survey. It is very probable
that a good number of smaller petty firms in obscure lines of production
or repairs have been overlooked. Third, the labor figures are questionable.
TABLE A-3
COMPOSITION OF THE INDUSTRIAL LABOR FORCE IN GAZIANTEP,
1971
Industrial ORGANIZED INDUSTRIES SMALL-sCALE INDUSTRIES
Activity Tech. & Skilled &
Branches Administr. Unskilled Undefined Adult Child
(SIS codes) Personnel Workers Workers Workers
01 35 429 50 892 63
02 22 450 - 82 18
04 81 1919 81 1789 626
05 - - - 652 216
06 - - - 771 300
07 - - - 184 60
08 -- - 12 4
09 - - - 89 8
10 - - - 276 15
11 -- - 39 10
12 4 100 - 174 -
'14 60 494 3 338 12
15 - - - 190 74
16 - - - 770 293
17 3 22 3 29 11
18 - - - 42 8
19 - - - 1474 860
20 45 539 42 699 238
TOTAL 250 3953 179 8502 2816
Source: Iller Bankasi (The Bank Of The Provinces). Gaziantep Kent Butunu.
Ankara: Iller Bankasi yay., 1972,
This table is compiled from tables on pp. 50-51.
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It is true that a "Composition of the Labor Force in Small-Scale Industries"
is provided (see Table A-3), but the question remains: How dependable
are the data generated on employment in petty firms to start with? From
the break-down given in Table A-3 an idea of the size and composition of
the labor force in petty production activities can be derived. There are
almost as many childeren employed in petty firms as there are workers in
factories. Yet, there are two other questions to be answered before attempting
to arrive at an estimate based on these data. First, are there petty
producers working like other laborers in their firms and included among
"adult workers"? If not, how many workers and apprentices were hidden from
the eyes of the surveyors? At this point, one is inclined to put the number
of petty firms in Gaziantep between 2,500 and 3,000, and the connected
labor force around 14,500. Let us continue the scrutiny of available data
on these counts.
In a 1966 SIS survey of the urban labor force in selected cities,
some information concerning eight Turkish cities is provided! This makes
a comparison of the size and composition of the urban labor force in
Gaziantep and Eskisehir possible. (See Table A-4 and Table A-5). Yet,
particularly due to the "Economic Activity" and "Occupational," classification
systems used in categorizing information, it becomes difficult to develop
a clear idea of the urban industrial employment picture. We know that the
term "Manufacturing Industries" refers to factories as well as petty production
firms, i.e., "non-factories." But we are not sure whether it covers "all"
lines of petty production activities . For example, some employment connected
with petty production activities may have been inadvertantly included in
the "Residual" employment category which consists of 5,136 people in
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TABLE A-4
PERSONS EMPLOYED BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN ESKISEHIR AND GAZIANTEP: 12
YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1966
Economic
Activity TotalE
Groups Employ
.Agriculture,Forestry,
Hunting : Fishing 1656
.Mining & Quarrying 72
.Manufacturing industries 13008
.Construction 2664
.Electric,Gas,Water &
Sanitary services 312
.Commerce,Banking,Insurance
& Real estate 4632
.Transport,Storage & Comm. 4392
.Services 6984
.Activities not adequately
described,Persons without
occupation & Unknowns 5136
TOTAL 38856
SKISEHIR
ed % share
4.3
0.2
33.5
6.8
0.8
11.9
11.3
18.0
13.2
100.0
Tot•z I AN TEPTotyed % share
Employed % share
1326
219
12835
2465
153
5202
2482
6868
4726
36176
3.7
0.3
35.5
6.8
0.4
14.4
6.8
19.0
13.1
100.0
Source: Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu (SIS). Labor Force Survey in Selected
Main Cities (Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Eskisehir,Gaziantep,
Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri). Ankara: D.I.E. Yay. No. 538, 1968.
This table is complied from data presented on pp. 23 and 29.
TABLE A-5
PERSONS EMIPLOYED BY USUAL OCCUPATIONS IN ESKISEHIR AND GAZIANTEP: 12 YEARS
OLD AND OVER9 1966
ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Usual Occupations Total % share Total % share
.Technical,Clerical &
Professional workers
.Entrepreneurs,managerial,
Administrative &c., workers
.Salesmen & related workers
.FarmersLumbermen,Fishermen,
Hunters and related workers
.Miners,Quarrymen and workers
.Workers in Transport,Storage
& Communications
.Craftsmen,Production and
Process workers & Repairmen
.Manual Workers
.Service workers
.Workers in occupations other-
wise not classified or not
reported
2760
3696
4320
1200
216
2832
14400
3864
3936
7.1
9.5
11.1
3.1
0.6
7.3
37.1
9.9
10.1
1564
2363
5882
1326
119
2295
12971
6069
3485
4.3
6.5
16.3
3.7
0.3
6.3
35.9
16.8
9.6
TOTAL 38856 100.0 36176 100.0
Source: conttnued
-c-~~-- --- --- -- ~ -- -~--
- - --- - ~ - ~---- - --
-
1632 4.2 102 0.3
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Table A-5 continued
Source: Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu (SIS). Labor Force Survey In Selected
Main Cities (Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Eskisehir, Gaziantep,
Istanbul
, 
izmir, Kayseri). Ankara: D.I.E. Yay. No. 538,
1968.
This table is compiled from data presented on RP. 20 and 26.
in Eskisehir and 4,726 in Gaziantep. There are other problems involved.
First, are the self-employed petty producers included in the urban industrial
labor force? Second, is it possible that all of the unregistered workers
and apprentices that constitute the bulk of "non-factory" connected
employment were recorded by official-looking SIS surveyors? Nevertheless,
according to the information presented in Table A-4, both Eskisehir and
Gaziantep employment in "Manufacturing Industries" seems to constitute
roughly one-third of the urban labor force: 33.5 per cent (13,008) in
Eskisehir, and 35.5 per cent (12,835) in Gaziantep. If the information
presented in Table A-5 is considered, however, then the size of the industrial
labor force in Eskisehir and in Gaziantep must be even larger. For instance,
the number of craftsmen, "production and process workers," and repairmen
is put at 14,400 in Eskisehir and 12,971 in Gaziantep. Furthermore, if we
assume that some of the "Manual Workers" (3,864 in Eskisehir and 3,485 in
Gaziantep), and the "Entrepreneurs, Managerial, Adminstrative, &c., and
related workers" (3,696 in Eskisehir and 2,363 in Gaziantep) work either
in "factories" or petty production firms, then the SIS data presented in
Table A-4 appear to be at odds with those displayed in Table A-5. In short,
the quality of the SIS employment figures for Eskisehir and Gaziantep,
and their handling is questionable. Yet, what is more, it is even impossible
to approximate the number of workers employed in petty production firms.
Further information on the number of workers employed in "large-
-327-
scale" industries in Eskisehir and Gaziantep was furnished by the SIS,
upon request. Based on the data sent (in a letter dated January 15th, 1975
and numbered TI/YAY/ksl-92), and Table A-4, a division of the industrial
labor force in Eskisehir and Gaziantep is constructed in view of the
"large-scale," and "'small-scale" industries distinction. (See Table A-6).
TABLE A-6
DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL LABOR FORCE BY TYPE OF FIRMS IN ESKISEHIR AND
GAZIANTEP: 12 YEARS OLD AND OVER, 1966
Type Of ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Industrial No. Of Total No. No. Of Total No.
Firms Firms Employed Firms Employe d
LARGE-SCALE 54 9,225* 33 2,672**
(employing more than
10 people)
SMALL-SCALE 3,783 10,163
TOTAL 13,008 12,835
Sources compared: Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu (SIS). Labor Force Survey
in Selected Main Cities (Ankara, Adana, Bursa,
Eskisehir, Gaziantep, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri).
Ankara: D.I.E. Yay. No. 538, 1968.
Idem., "Letter dated january 15th, 1975 and numbered
TI/YAY/ksl-92."
* 4 out of the 54 large-scale firms did not furnish information.
** 2 out of the 33 large-scale firms did not furnish information.
The dependability of the SIS information so far presented in Tables A-4,
A-5, and A-6 is as questionable as is its use for this study. This has
been pointed out to demonstrate the scope and quality of data which,
quite often, starting points for many studies on the domain of petty
industrial production activities.
The sources so far reviewed have one thing in common. They handle
data on industrial production activities in view of the "size of the
labor force" criteron, used to distinguish types of industrial firms,
and the "Standard Industrial Classification System" , invoked to group
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lines of industrial production activities, both of which distort the
realities of the industrial landscapes in Eskisehir and Gaziantep.
Nevertheless, upon cautious comparisons of these sources we can arrive
at a vague idea of the scope of petty production activities.
I. Acaroglu puts the total number of industrial firms in Eskisehir
in 1973, at 2,477. According to her, out of the total of 2,477 firms,
only 174 (about 6 per cent) employ more than 10 workers. The SIS, on the
other hand, without referring to the total number of industrial firms in
Eskisehir, notes that there were 54 "large-scale" firms in 1966, and
51 in 1968. It is difficult to accept readily that, in Eskisehir, the
number of industrial firms employing more than 10 workers tripled between
1968 and 1973, after declining between 1966 and 1968. Either something
extraordinary happened after 1968, or these two sources are at odds.
Unfortunately, the latter is more plausible. Furthermore, according to
my observations there are 40-50 factories in Eskisehir over and above the
many workshops that employmore than 10 people. Consequently, one is inclined
to consider Acaroglu's figures as more exact. Yet, instead of trying to
determine which is a lesser mistake before actually going out into the
field, it may be wiser to take the liberty of seeking refuge in ambiguity
and common sense. Thus, it is preferred to assume that in 1975 the total
number of industrial firms in Eskisehir ranged between 2,500-2,600, of
which less than 50 were factories. Similarly, according to the Bank of
the Provinces, only 61 out of a total 2,431 industrial firms, about 2.5
per cent, employed more than 10 workers in 1971. The SIS, on the other
hand, puts the number of "large-scale" firms in Gaziantep at 33 in 1966,
and at 45 in 196810 Yet, according to my counts in Gaziantep, alongwith
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many workshops employing more than 10 people, there were 70-75 factories.
Without extending the scrutiny of these sources, one prefers to assume
that in 1975 the total number of industrial firms in Gaziantep was
somewhere between 2,600- 3,000, among which less than 75 were factories.
It is impossible to develop a sharper focus on the number of petty
industrial production firms in Eskisehir and Gaziantep prior to a first
hand survey. Given the scope and quality of the information handled so
far, this is hardly surprising. The picture, however, gets even fuzzier
if one attempts to scrutinize and compare data on the size of the labor
force. In summary, therefore, the study of this kind of sources yields,
at best, a vague sense of the subject matter to be focused upon. In other
words, all meddling with data categorized according to the "size of the
labor force" criteron, and the "Standard Industrial Classification" system,
will only result in rough estimates concerning petty production activities
proper. Yet, will other sources, which offer information on petty production
with a markedly different orientation than those that have been reviewed
above, help develop a clearer picture of the universe of petty production
firms? Unfortunately, the answer to this question has to be negative.
Nevertheless, let us see why.
In the cluster of sources which do not use the "size of the labor
forte" criteron, information on the petty production activities domain
is usually generated according to the records kept at the Petty Traders
and Petty Producers' Associations. This approach, however, is not free
of problems. First, the Associations are founded upon the provisions of
Turkish Public Law No. 507, where petty producers, petty traders, and
petty servicemen are taken together as a group. Yet, according to the
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defi;,itions written in the law, three criteria seem to have been invoked
to distinguish petty producers from petty traders and servicemen. In
brief, a petty producer is considered to be a person who performs any
of the trades listed under Article 115 of the Law; 12whose work requires
13
"bodily involvement"; and whose business is "small enough not to necessitate
registration in the Chambers of Commerce and Industry."14 The first two
criteria are problematic, and the third is even more so. It is not
clear what makes a business large enough to "necessitate registration
in the Chambers". The Law related to the Chambers of Commerce and Industry
does not clarify this issue either.!5 Consequently, in the absence of clear
definitions, some petty producers, especially those employing more than
5-6 workers, register at the Chambers. It is also possible to come across
artisans who are not registered at Associations, and those who are registered
both at the Associations and the Chambers. Furthermore, in accordance with
the provisions of the Law, workers can register at the Associations as
well. Therefore, it is difficult to assume that the number of registrations
at the Associations reflects the number of petty production firms.
A second problem is that there are Associations of petty producers,
of petty traders, and of petty servicemen. The only way to identify them
is by referring to the occupations of the members. In many secondary
sources different occupations, and hence, different Associations are
defined as those of petty producers. For instance, the list of trades
provided in Article 115 of Turkiah Public Law No. 507 is different from
the list of petty production trades prepared and used by the People's Bank
in distributing credits, both of which in turn are different from the lists
of Associations relating to production and repair occupations in Eskisehir
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or Gaziantep. Furthermore, in the 1971 State Planning Organization Survey,
17
the 1970 KUS-GEM Report, the 1965 Ministry of Reconstruction and
Settlement Survey,18 and other less important sources, still different
lists of petty production occupations are forwarded.
Finally, not every member of an Association belongs to the same
trade. Since it is necessary to have at least 50 members to establish
an Association, in many cases members of lesser trades register at
whichever Association appeals them the most. For instance, the printers
in Eskisehir do not have an Association, and therefore some are registered
in Ironsmiths' and Carpenters' Associations while the rest crop up in
the records of the Chambers. Furthermore, it is possible to come across
petty traders dealing in one commodity and registering together with producers
of it, as in the case of shoe merchants.
In summary the information on the number of petty firms in
Eskisehir and Gaziantep as offered by various secondary sources that make
use of Associations' registration records, invariably falls short of
accurately depicting the size of the petty production activities domain.
Yet, a closer scrutiny of these sources may yield a better sense of the
extent of petty production activities than does the first cluster of sources
where data are collected and categorized according to the "size of the
lab6r force" criteron.
In the 1970 State Planning Organization (SPO) Survey of the
Number of Petty Producers and Petty Traders in Turkey, which suffered from
20
poor response, 61 petty production and repairs occupations are listed,
and grouped in 11 activity branches". The results of this survey that have
a bearing upon the number of petty producers in Eskisehir and Gaziantep
.· ~ ~~__~~___~_~
are given in the following table:
TABLE A-7
THE NUMBER OF PETTY PRODUCERS IN ESKISEHIR AND GAZIANTEP
AND ACTIVITY BRANCHES, 1970
BY OCCUPATIONS
Activity Branches and
Occupations ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
1. FOOD MANUFACTURING (GIDA MADDELERI IMALI)
.Flour millers (un degirmencileri) - 72
.Bakers (Firincilar) 75 96
.Flour product makers (Unlu maddeler
imalcileri) 4 -
.Sugar product makers (Sekerli maddeler
imalcileri) 20m 57
.Dairy product makers (Mandiracilar) 31-
.Sausage makers (Sucuk, pastirma imalcileri) 8m
.Canners (konservecilik) - -
.Pea-roasters (Leblebiciler) -
.Soft drink makers (Alkolsuz icki imali) 11-
Total 192 225
2. MANUFACTURE OF TEXTILES & FINISHED TEXTILE
PRODUCTS (DOKUMA-ORM1E, GIYIM-KUSAM IMALI)
.Cotton weavers (pamuklu dokuma)
.Wool cleaners (Yapagi temizleme)
.Wool -weavers (Yunlu dokuma)
.Carpet, 'kilim',blanket weavers (Hali,
kilim,battaniyecilik)
.Misc. Cotton plaiters (Her turlu pamuk orgu)
.Rope makers (Halat,urgan imalcileri)
.Felt makers (Kece, kepenek)
.Ready-made clothes makers (Hazir giyim esya
esyasi)
.Tailors (terzilik)
.Shirt and underwear makers (Gomlek ve
ic camasiri yapimi)
.Hat makers (Sapka, kep imali)
.Mattress and quilt makers (Yati c,yorqancilar)
Total
3.1MANUFACTURE OF LEATHER AND LEATHER PRODUCTS
(DERI VE DERIDEN MAMUL ESYA IMALI)
.Leather wearing apparel makers (Deriden
giyim kusam imali)
.Shoe makers (Kundura imali)
.Cobblers (Kundura tamircileri)
.Tanners (Tabaklar)
.Saddler (Saraclar)
.Uppers makers (Sayacilar)
.Packsaddle makers (Semerciler)
1270
324
324
305
-
21
1596
310
89
43g
442
442Continuea
-332-
- ---
- -- ------ --
Total 86
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Table A-7 continued
4. MANUFACTURE OF WOOD PRODUCTS (AGAC ISLERI
SANATLARI)
.Sawmillers (Bigkihaneler, torna,planya)
.Carpenters (Marangozluk,dogramacilik)
.Crate makers (Tahta kutu ve diger
ambalaj)
.Furniture and fixture makers(mobilya
ve mefrusat)
.Barrel makers (Fici imalciligi)
To
374 225
225
225
tal 374tal 374
5.MANUFACTURE OF METAL PRODUCTS (MADENI
ESYA IIMALCILIGI)
.Ironsmiths (sicak-soguk demirciler)
.Coppersmiths, (Bakir-kalay)
.Tinsmiths, solderers (Teneke-lehim)
.Lathe operators (Tornacilik, freze ve
tesviyecilik)
.Founders (Dokumculuk)
.Blacksmiths (Nalbandlik)
.Cutting instrument makers (kesici alet
yapimi)
.Locksmiths (Cilingirlik)
.Silversmiths (Kuyumculuk)
149
149
143
231
231
.0
Total 160 523
6. MANUFACTURE OF NON-METALLIC MINERAL
PRODUCTS (METALDEN GAYRI MADDELER IMALI)
.Brick and tile makers (Tugla, kiremit imali) 4 4g
.Potters, ceramists (Fayans, canak,comlek
cini imali) - -
.Lime and gypsum handlers (kirec-alcicilar) -
.Briquette and wash basin makers(Briket,
lavabo imali)
.Marble and stone carvers (Mermer ve baska
tas islemeciligi) 72 -
Total 116
7. MANUFACTURE AND REPAIR OF TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT (ULASTIRMIA ARACLARI IMAL VE
TAMIRATI)
,Makers and repairers of transport equipment
without engines (Motorsuz kara tasitlari
imal ve tamiri)
.Vehicule repairers (Motorlu kara tasitlari
tamir ve bakimi)
.Trailer and auto-body makers and repairers
(Kasa, Karuser ve Romork imal ve tamiri)
. Boat makers and repairers (Deniz tasitlari
imal ve bakimi)
.Motorcycle and bicycle repairers
(Motorsiklet ve bisiklet tamiri)
116 169
continued
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Table A-7 continued
.Tire makers and repairers (Motorlu araclar
ic ve dis lastikleri imal ve tamiri)
.Auto-upholstery makers (Oto dosemecileri
ve tenteciler)
8.REPAIR OF MACHINERY (M4AKINA VE MOTOR
TAMIRCILERI)
.Machinists (Makina motor tamirciligi)
.Electrical equipment repairers (Her
turlu elektirikli arac tamirciligi)
Total 277 169
7 102
Total 7 102
9.CONSTRUCTION (YAPI S;ANATLARI)
.Masons, brick and tile layers and
concrete casters (Duvarci,sivaci, beton
dokucu, ve fayans doseyici) 110 520
.Painters (Boya Badanacilar) - -
.Electricians (Elektrik tesisatcilari) 6 2g
.Glass installers (camcilik) -
.Plumbers (Sihhi tesisatcilik) 15 -
Total 187 520
10.PRINTING AND PAPER PRODUCTS (KAGIT VE
BASINLA ILGILI SANIATLAR)
.Printers (Matbaacilik) - 24
.Book binders(Ciltcilik) 12 -
.Paper"bag makers (Kesekagidi ve kagittan
torba imali) - -
Total 12 24
11.HISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING AND REPAIRS
(DIGER IMALAT VE TAMIRAT)
.Musical instrument makers (Muzik aletleri
imali)
.Toys and sporting goods makers (Oyuncak
ve spor malzemeleri imali) 14
.Soap and detergent makers (Sabun ve
deterjan imali) 14
.Glass and Glass products makers(Cam ve
camdan mamul esya imali)
.Watch and eyeglass repairers (Saat ve gozluk
tamiri) 44 -
. Photographers (Fotografcilik) 5 2g 101
Total 110 115
TOTAL 1,845 4,166
Source: Devlet Planlama Teskilati (SPO). Turkiye'de Esnaf ve Kucuk Sanatkar
Sayilari. Ankara: D.P.T. Yay. No. 991, 1970.
This table is compiled from the data presented on page, 92 through 237.
All the information presented refers to the responses received from Associations
except those marked by "g" and "m". ",,g stands for responses received from
the Governor's Office, and "mi" stands for responses received from the
Mayor's Office.
__ _._. _I__.l
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There is one point that needs to be clarified before scanning
the dependability of the information presented in Table A-7. The detailed
break-down by occupations gives a better idea of the nature of petty
production activities. The standard activity groupings such as the
"Manufacture of Machinery," and the "Manufacture of Electrical Machinery,
apparatus, and Appliance" sectors, which are used indiscriminately for
all types of industrial production in traditional literature, have rather
different perspective. At the least, a reformulation is attempted. The
"Manufacture of Machinery" sector of industrial activities, for instance,
is christened as the "Repairs of Machinery" sector. Yet, though its
industrial activity categories may be closer to the realities of the petty
production activities sector in Turkey, this survey yields highly questionable
22data. First, as admitted, the information is incomplete. Second, the
occupational break-down of the petty production activities, if not the
broader activity groupings, is problematic. For instance, a shoe maker
may repair shoes when he does not have enough production orders. Also,
'sayaci's can not be considered as a separate body of petty producers.
They exist within the framework of a sub-contracting system wide-spread
in shoe making. A shoe maker cuts the leather, a 'sayaci' sews it and
gets paid by the shoe maker, who upon receiving the sewn leather mounts
it on the sole. Sometimes, from this point on, it is the shoe maker who
completes the shoe. Yet, often, as in Gaziantep, the shoe maker after
mounting the sewn leather on the sole sends the half completed product to
a 'fora-frezeci' who sews the sole to the leather and , after trimming the
sole and polishing the shoe, returns it for completion. Whenever production
orders decline, the shoe maker stops sub-contracting, and does all the work
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in his shop. If production orders decline even further, then the shoe
maker may take up--shoe repairs. It is in this connection that 'sayaci's
consider themselves not as shoe makers, but as an integral part of the
shoe making process,and, therefore, always register at the Shoe Makers'
Associations. Thus, the separate treatment of occupations that are part
and parcel of one production process blurs the picture. In other words,
shoe makers, cobblers, 'sayaci's, and 'fora-frezeci's emerge as independent
petty producers under an umbrella of production relations that are peculiar
to the process of shoe making. By themselves they do not mean much, but
taken together they give a better sense of a mode of production in effect.
Examples of such careless handling of petty production occupations can be
increased in number. Given the present unfortunate limits of knowledge
about the petty production activities, this is hardly surprising. Third,
data supplied by the Associations can not be accepted at face value.
As it has been noted earlier, not every member of the Association is a
petty producer, and the number of registrations does not correspond to
the number of petty firms. The data supplied by the Governor's and the
Mayor's Offices, are even more problematic. It is strongly suspected that
their unidentified source of information is the Associations, for they
do not carry out independent surveys concerning the local economy like
the,Chambers do. Fourth, in many instances, distinguishing petty producers
from petty traders and petty servicemen by reference to occupations generates
difficulties. For instance, are masons, brick layers, concrete casters
and painters (all associated with "Construction Works"), petty producers,
workers or petty servicemen? Quite often, they work with their own tools
and equipment, call themselves 'usta's (masters), and assemble a team ('takim')
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of workers ('isci',not 'cirak') whenever necessary. Their work is
seasonal, and while working at the construction site (they have no
independent shops), they are under the constant supervision of the
contractor and the engineers. Some sources label them as petty producers,
some do not. I prefer to include them in the petty services sector.
Also, gypsum and lime handlers are not petty producers. They purchase
lime and gypsum either directly from the mines, or from wholesale merchants,
and usually sell it without grinding or sieving. Thus, unlike salt handlers,
who always grind the chunks of salt, which are allocated to them by the
State Salt Monopoly before selling, the gypsum and lime handlers are more
of petty traders than petty producers.
When all the considerations outlined above are taken into account,
it becomes clear .why the data offered in the 1970 SPO Survey may simply
be claimed as having little value.
In the 1971 SPO Survey of petty producers and petty traders in
23Gaziantep, a set of information concerning the number of petty production
firms and the size of the labor force, complied from several different
sources, is presented. The elementary data was furnished to the SPO by the
People's Bank. (See Table A-8).
TABLE A-8
THE NUMBER OF PETTY PRODUCTION FIRMS BY OCCUPATIONS IN GAZIANTEP, 1968
Occupations No. Of
Petty Firms
1. Flour millers & 'zahireciler' 72
2. Bakers 96
3. Sugar product makers 57
4. Shoe makers 310
5. Saddlers and suitcase makers 43
6. Tanners & 'dericiler'(hide merchants) 89
7. Tailors & shirt makers 305
8. Socks & underwear makers 156
continued
_ _
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Table A-8 continued
i 9. Quilt makers
10. Weavers
11. Carpet & 'kiiim' makers-
12. Coppersmiths
13. Cutlers
14. Ironsmiths
15. Silversmiths
16. Auto repairers & cartwrights
17. Tinsmiths & Stove makers
18. Lathe operators
19. Carpenters & Furniture makers
20. Saw-millers
21. Construction 'usta's & workers
22. Masons & Brick layers
23. Potters & Ceramists
24. Electricians & Electrical equipment repairers
25. Soap makers
26. Rope makers('kenevirciler')
27. Printers
Total
21
475
12"70
143
15
149
65
169
129
231
225
211
520
270
42
102
14
57
24
5260*
Source: Turkiye Halk Bankasi (The People's Bank). "Gaziantep Esnaf Kefalet
Kooperatifinin Faaliyet Sahasi Dahilinde Esnaf ve Sanatkar-
larin Kaydina Mahsus Cetvel". (31 December 1968). in:
Esnaf ve Sanatkarlarin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Sorunlari Aras-
tirmasi. Devlet Planlama Teskilati (SPO). Ankara: D.P.T.
Yay. No. 975, 1971.(vol.II, p. 17, Table 18)
* This total is incorrectly noted as 5,340 in the above mentioned source
This information is based in part upon the registration records of
the Petty Producers' Credit Cooperatives, and in part upon the information
received from Associations. Nevertheless, it stands as the People's Bank's
estimate, designed to help keep records on credits distributed through the
Credit Cooperatives. In this connection, it is of value to remember that
the Bank defines "small-scale" industries not with reference to the "size
of the labor force" criteron, but with reference to the "size of the
capital outlay" criteron. Those industrial establishments with capital
outlays worth less than TL. 5 million ($ 350,000), are defined as eligible
24for the credits offered. According to this, "large-scale" firms have to
find other credit channels. Though more dependable than the data we have
25
seen so far, this information, nevertheless, is questionable. First, it
---
-- - -- ~ ~~---
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does not cover the entire petty production activities domain. Larger
workshops, defined as "large-scale" firms, are excluded from the list.
Second, sources of information are not specified. Thus, it is impossible
to know how much of the data is a product of guess-work. Yet, in brief,
if the construction 'usta's and workers, together with masons and brick
layers are overlooked, we may suggest that there were 4,400-4,500, or
more, petty firmns in Gaziantep around 1968: almost twice as much as the
figure given by the Bank of the Provinces for the year 1971. Hoping to
follow up with the 1968 estimates of the People's Bank, the 1974 estimates
were obtained. Yet, several changes had been made. First, the 1974 estimates
are categorized by industrial activity branches(15 in number) rather than
by occupations. Second, instead of the number of petty firms, the number
of petty producers is given. These changes make any attempt to compare the
1968 and 1974 estimates of the same source impossible. Nevertheless, the
information obtained is given below in Table A-9.
TABLE A-9
THE NUMBER OF PETTY PRODUCERS BY INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY BRANCHES IN GAZIANTEP,
1974
Industrial Activity No. Of Petty No. of Petty
Branches Adopted for Producers Producers Registered
Petty Production Estimated at the Credit Coops.
1. Manufacture and repairs of all
metal products and machinery 926 293
2. Ma1nufacture and repairs of
transport equipment 328 163
3. Electricians 264 33
4. Manufacture of non-metallic
mineral products 305 9
5. Manufacture of wood products 911 150
6. Manufacture of leather and leather
products 438 41
continued
_ _
Table A-9 continued
7. Construction
8. All kinds of weaving
9. Manufacture of wearing apparel
10. Paper products and printing
11. Manufacture of sporting & medical
goods
12. Food manufacturing
13. Manufacture of 'polyester' goods
14. Glass products
613
2920
2165
47
86
399
352
19
208 104
15. Miscellaneous occupations 921 14
TOTAL 10106 1667
Source: Turkiye Halk Bankasi (The People's Bank). "Gaziantep
Kooperatiflerinin Gorev Alani Icindeki Esnaf
Unpublished List. 31 December 1974.
Esnaf Kefalet
Ve Sanatkarlar".
A second source mentioned in the 1971 SPO Survey is an earlier
SPO Survey , which furnished information on the number of petty production
firms and the number of employed in Gaziantep in 1970 by 38 different
occupations:
TABLE A-10
THE NUMBER OF PETTY PRODUCTION FIRMS AND THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYED BY
OCCUPATIONS IN GAZIANTEP, 1970
Occupations No.of Petty No. of
Firms Employed
Flour-millers 25 55
Weavers 470 1798
Belt weavers ('kusakci') &
weavers with 'jakar' looms
'Kilim' makers
Tailors
Shirt-makers
Hat-makers
Shoe-makers
'Sayaci's
Tanners
Carpenters
Furniture makers
Wooden concrete casting-mold
makers ('kalipcilar')
112
450
250
30
100
160
60
90
205
66
173
19914. Other wood works
290
1500
970
100
265
365
116
430
42
495
-continued
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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
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Table A-10 continued
15. Stove makers 62 358
16. Ironsmiths ('sicak demirciler') 99 458
17. Tinsmiths 36 252
18. Steel-safe makers 24 265
19. Ironsmiths ('soguk demirciler') 62 360
20. Box-spring makers 7 58
21. Lathe operators 110 857
22. Auto repairers 115 911
23. Auto-body repairers 85 585
24. Auto painters 80 481
25. 'Karoserciler' 95 517
26. 'Oto sasicileri' 60 385
27. Auto electricians 63 418
28. Auto upholstery makers 20 185
29. Auto radiator repairers 31 216
30. Auto tire repairers 10 18
31. Auto glass mounters 3 -
32. Bicycle repairers 13 100
33. Founders 27 295
34. 'Kalaycilar' (tinsmiths) 57 30
35. Silversmiths 110 -
36. Clock repairers 25 -
37. Radio repairers 20 -
38. Printers 23 -
TOTAL 3627* 13175
Source: Devlet Planlama Teskilati (SPO). A 1970 SPO Survey Mentioned in:
Esnaf ve Sanatkarlarin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Sorunlari Aras-
tirmasi. Devlet Planlama Teskilati (SPO). Ankara: D.P.T.
Yay. No. 975, 1971. (vol.II, p.19, Table 19)
* This total is incorrectly noted as 3,604 in the above mentioned source
This information pertains to petty firms that fall within the scope of
Turkish Public Law No. 507. In other words, it is based upon the
Associations' records. An account of the issues that bear upon the
nature and quality of the data obtained from the Associations has already
been given. Pending further questions relating to the dependability of
the work-force figures, several observations about the 38 occupations
that are mentioned must be provided. This listing is just another of the
many classifications forwarded for the occupations related to petty
production activities. While, for instance, coppersmiths are left out of
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the listing, 'baklavaci's (makers of a special pastry, for which Gaziantep
is famous) with 100 shops and 56 workers are included within the "petty
services and trading" sector. Based on this data, but with the inclusion
of the coppersmiths and 'baklavaci's as well as those petty production
firms that are not in the Associations' records, it can be said that in
1970 the number of petty firms in Gaziantep was over 3,800 with a labor
force of 13,000-14,000.
This much may convince the reader that the problem is not the
scarcity of information on the petty production activities domain in Turkey,
but its quality. Nevertheless, less to demonstrate that the avilable
data do not yield a sharp focus upon the universe from which the samples
of a survey may be drawn, and more just for the record,further sources are
noted.
A third source used in the 1971 SPO Survey is the Office of Industry
in Gaziantep (Gaziantep Sanayi Mudurlugu), according to which the number
of petty firms in Gaziantep in 1970 is as follows in Table A-11.2 7
TABLE A-11
THE NUMBER OF PETTY PRODUCTION FIRMS BY OCCUPATIONS IN GAZIANTEP,1970
Occ
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
cupations No. of
Petty Firms
Flour-millers 56
Bakers 186
Pastry makers & chickpea-roasters ('leblebici') 75
,Shoe makers 145
Tanners 78
'Koskerler' (leather products makers) 113
'Sayaci's 50
Tailors 223
Tricot & sock makers 131
Weavers 282
'Kilim' makers 258
Coppersmiths & 'kalaycilar'(tinsmiths) 174
Auto and machine repairers 551
Ironsmiths 317
Electricians 95
continued
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~
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Table A-11 continued
16. Clock and radio repairers
17. Carpenters and furniture makers
18. Cinder-block makers
19. Masons. brick layers and plasterers
20. Painters
21. Motorcycle and bicycle repairers
22. Photographers
58
300
123
338
82
80
63
TOTAL 3778
Source: Gaziantep Sanayi Mudurlugu. Mentioned in: Esnaf ve Sanatkarlarip
Sosyal ve Ekonomik Sorunlari Arastirmasi. Devlet Planlama
Teskilati (SPO). Ankara: D.P.T. Yay. No. 975, 1971.
(vol.II, p. 21, Table 21)
This set of data has been prepared in cooperation with the Associations,
and presented with reference to another unique classification of occupations
related to petty production. As usual with similar sources, not only
the dependability of the information, but also the appropriateness of
the occupational classification system is at issue. Nevertheless, the
SPO, after somehow comparing the data offered by the People's Bank, the
previous SPo Survey, and the Gaziantep Office of Industry, arrives at a
series of estimates, which are categorized by 12 "industrial activity
branches" and taken to constitute the basis for the SPO Survey conducted
in Gaziantep in 1971. The method adopted in forwarding estimates is not
clear. The following is an account of the SPO estimates as compared to
data furnished by three different sources:
TABLE A-12
THE NU1IBER OF PETTY PRODUCTION FIRMS IN GAZIANTEP BY INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY
BRANCHES: COMPARISONS OF THREE OTHER SOURCES WITH SPO ESTIMATES
Industrial Activity The 1968 The earlier The Office 'The 1971
Estimates of SPO Survey of Industry SPO Survey
the People's in Gaziantep Estimates
Bank
(Table A-8) (Table A-10) (Table A-11)
1. FOOD MANUFACTURING
2. IMANUFACTURE OF TEXTILES
3. IMANUFACTURE OF WEARIING
APPAREL
225
1901
305
25
1032
380
428
671
223
317I
863
368
continued
-
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Table A-12 continued
4. IMANUFACTURE OF LEA1THER AND
LEATHER PRObUCTS
5. MiANUFACTURE OF WOOD PROD.
6. MANUFACTURE OF METAL PROD.
7. MANUFACTURE OF NON-METALLIC
MINERAL PRODUCTS
8. MANUFACTURE AND REPAIR OF
TRANSPORT EQUIP MENT
9. CONSTRUCTION
10. REPAIR OF ELECTRICAL EQUIP.
11. PRINTING AND PAPER PRODUCTS
12. MISC. LANUFACTURE & REPAIRS
442
436
732-
313
163
520
102
24
310
643
484
573
20
23
386
300
491
123
241
643
711
123
575
421
95
23
631
421
95
23
7 71 135 
9 * 150
TOTAL 5340** 3625*** 3801**** 4530
Source: Devlet Planlama Teskilati (SPO). Esnaf ve Sanatkarlarin Sosyal ve
Ekonomik Sorunlari Arastirmasi . Ankara: D.P.T. Yay. No. 975,
1971. (vol.II, p. 23, Table 22)
Upon a closer study of the detailed breakdown of the 1971 SPO estimates
(presented on pp. 26-27 in Table 24 of the above noted source) it
becomes clear that shoe makers are included in the industrial activity
branch category no. 3, whereas in accounting for the other sources
shoe makers are included in category no.4
** This total does not match the figure in Table A-8 of this study.
*** This total does not match the figure in Table A-10 of this study, and is
incorrectly noted as 3,627 in the above noted source.
**** This total does not match the figure in Table A-11 of this study, and
is incorrectly noted as 3,778 in the above mentioned source.
There is no way to tell how close to reality the 1971 SPO Survey
28
estimates (4,350 petty production firms with a labor force of 13,145)28are.
To get a better idea of the 1971 SPO estimates, I have studied the list
of petty firms(categorized by occupations) that were eventually surveyed.29
Of the total 248 petty firms surveyed, for example, about 14 per cent (34)
belong to occupations which were estimated not to exist in Gaziantep.
Also, in this connection, it should be noted that, although the 1971 SPO
Survey definition of petty production firms is larger in scope than is
provided for by Turkish Public Law No. 507, it does not cover the whole
gamut of petty production activities as defined in this study. Consequently,
pending consideration of the quality of the data and methods used in
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arriving at a set of estimates, the 1971 SPO Survey is nevertheless an
important step forward in studies on the domain of petty production
activities in Turkey.
It has already been mentioned twice that not every petty producer
is registered at the Associations. Some, making use of the fuzzy wording
of the related laws, register at the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.
Thus, a closer scrutiny of the registration records kept at the Chambers
may yield a sense of the extent to which petty producers are registered
there. This may in turn, prove helpful in correcting the data supplied
by the Associations. The following is an account in this vein.
In the 1965 Imar ve Iskan Bakanligi (Ministry of Construction and
Resettlement) Survey of industries in Gaziantep, the number of production
firms registered at the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1964
is documented as follows:
TABLE A-13
THE NUMBER OF MANUFACTURING FIRMIS REGISTERED AT THE GAZIANTEP CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRYq 1964
Occupations No. of Firms
.Flour-millers (un fabrikalari,mercimek
kirma ve nisastacilar) 40
.Cracked-wheat & 'pekmez' producers 35
.Confectioners (seker, sekerleme ve biskuvi) 30
.'Baklava' makers 14
. Soap makers 37
. 'Helva" and ice cream makers 12
. Wine and soft drink makers 11
. Wehvers 213
Tricot and sock makers 64
.Dyers 38
.Rope makers 26
.Tanners 88
.Shoe makers 56
.Tailors ('tuccar terzi') 39
.Bakers (ekmek firincilari') 29
.'Karoserciler' and auto painters 21
.Steel-safe and stove makers, and cutlers 26
.Lathe operators, founders and auto repairers 67
continued
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Table A-13 continued
.Coppersmiths
.Electricians, radio, clock and eyeglass
repairers
TOTAL 933
Source: Gaziantep Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasi (Chamber of Commerce and
Industry)."Oda Uye Durumu," (10 November 1964). List
mentioned in: "Gaziantep Sanayi Calismasi.'~mar ve Iskan
Bakanligi (Ministriy df Conitruction and Settlement).
Ankara , 1965. (Mimeographed). pp. 54-6
If we discount the possible merchant firms; exclude the production firms
not located in Gaziantep but registered at the Chamber; and, weed out the
factories, then we can find the number of petty firms registered at the
Chamber. Yet, all of this is impossible to accomplish. The following
detailed account for the same year appears to be of some help in this
matter. Nevertheless, when scrutinized, it proves to be the opposite.
(See Table A-14).
TABLE A-14
PRODUCTION FIRMIS REGISTERED AT THE GAZIANTEP CHAPiBER OF COMIMIERCE AND
INDUSTRY, 1964
Type of occupation No. of No. of Total Capital
Firms Workers Outlay in TL.
.Founders 7
.Auto tires repair ('lastik kaplama)1
.Lathe shops 62
.Beverages production 2
.Saw millers(agac dograma) 12
.Tobacco industry 1
.Leather works ('deri, kosele') 34
.Copper works ('levha bakir sanayii)4
.Hydrophile cotton industry I
.'Circir' industry 4
.'Yun ipi' industry 4
.Lentils industry 6
.Weaving industries 137
.Construction materials production 2
.Flour mills 15
.Confectioners 13
.Soap makers 12
.Ice making 3
10
4
187
167
10
100
57
56
41
102
217
15
1090
362
171
70
74
40
279 000
135 000
897 650
602 351
147 450
317 120
293 000
941 700
892 000
897 250
488 500
670 531
032 751
352 739
954 602
845 000
265 000
080 000
continued
__ 
___
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Table A-14 continued
.Food industries ('uzum,fistik,bulgur,
pekmez imali') 9 87 1 980 000
.Steel-safe making 6 20 131 500
*'Karoser' industry 11 75 425 000
.Tricot and sock making 60 100 1 070 000
.Coppersmiths 57 89 1 212 000
.'Kilim' makers* 450 1000 1 250 000
. Silk weaving 30 800 746 000
TOTAL 943** 4944 144,906,144
Source: Gaziantep Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasi (Chamber of Commerce and Industry).
Mentioned in:"Gaziantep Sanayi Calismasi' Imar ve Iskan Bakanllgi
(Ministry of Construction and Settlement). Ankara: Mimeo., 1965.
(pp. 57-v, 57-vi).
* In Imar ve Iskan Bakanligi."Gaziantep Sanayi Calismasl. pp. 57-vi., it
is noted that 'kilim' makers are not registered at the Chamber. If so,
then the total number of production firms registered at the Chamber
must be (943-450=493), which means that the same source quoted as
having supplied the data displayed in Tables A-13 and A-14 contradicts
itself. The number of firms reported as registered at the Chamber simply
do not match.
" This total is incorrectly noted as 941 in the above-mentioned source.
In another source, however, the number of production firms
registered at the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1966 is
put at 859. (See Table A-15).
TABLE A-15
THE NUMBER OF PRODUCTION FIRMS REGISTERED AT THE GAZIANTEP CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY BY OCCUPATIONS, 1966
Occupations No. of Production
Firms
.Flour mills, 'mercimek kirma', starch makers 39
.Cracked-wheat and 'pekmez' makers 19
.Confectioners 25
.'Baklava' makers 20
.'Helva' and ice-cream makers 15
.Makers and sellers of cheap shoes ('kavaf','kavafiye
imalatcilari') 14
.Soap makers 32
.Wine and soft drink makers 9
.Weavers ('iplik ve ipekli dokuma imalatcilari') 221
.Tricot and sock makers 19
.Dyers 41
.Rope makers('iplik, ip ve kendir imalatcilari') 23
continued
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*Tanners.('deri ve kosele ir*alatcilari') 84
.Tailors,( 'Tuccar · erziler') 40
*Printers and photographers 24
.Bakers h t 31
S'Karoserciler' and auto painters 22
.Steel-safe makers, cuttlers and stove makers 33
.Lathe operators, auto repairers and founders 66
.Coppersmiths 27
.Electricians; radioclock ande ye glass repairers 55
TOTAL 859
Source: Gaziantep Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasi (Chamber of Commerce and industry),
Mentioned in: Gaziantep Ii Yilligi. Gaziantep Valiligi. Ankara:
Gaziantep Valiligi, 1969. (p. 205).
More up-to-date information on the number of production firms
registered at the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce and Industry is as follows:
see Table A-16.
TABLE A-16
THE NUMBER OF PRODUCTION FIRMS REGISTERED AT THE GAZIANTEP CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY BY OCCUPATIONS, 1973
Occupations No. of -Registrations
.Tanners ('deri ve kosele imalatcilari') 42
.Shoe makers ('hazir kundura ve imalatcilari') 45
.Thermo plastic and rubber product makers 63
.Confectioners 39
. 'Helva' and ice-cream makers, and soft drink producers 17
.Cracked-wheat makers,'pekmezciler','kuru uzum isletmeleri'
and 'fistik hazirlama tesisleri' 77
.Other food manufacturing 14
.Flour mills, semolina, noodles and starch makers 52
.Bakers 22
.'Baklavacilar, tatlicilar ve pastahaneler' 24
.Soap and detergent producers 48
.Tai'lors ('Tuccar terziler') 44
*'Kilim ipi' makers 33
.'Kilim' makers 162
.Weavers and sellers of carpet 17
*'Mahrukatcilar'; wooden crate and paper bag makers 48
.Carpenters and furniture makers 34
.Construction material makers 47
.Electricians, and producers and sellers of electrical
equipment 91
.Lathe operators, founders 53
.Auto repairers, 'karoserciler', auto painters and auto-
body repairers
continued
-349-
Table A-16 continued
.Auto electricians ('Bilumum oto elektrikcileri, akuculer, 15
bobinaj ve oto tamircileri)
.Steel-safe makers, cuttiers, stove makers, coppersmiths
and copper works, 'darabacilar' 58
.Printers and photographers 29
.Weavers 149
.Dyers 35
.Rope makers 37
.Tricot and sock makers 152
TOTAL 1492
Source : Gaziantep Sanayi ve Ticaret Odasi (Chamber of Commerce and Industry).
1973 Gaziantep Ekonomik Durumu. Gaziantep: G.S.T.O. Yay.,1973. (pp. 47-49).
In short four different listings of production firms that are registered
at the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce and Industry come up with four
incompatible results. According to the first (Table A-13), the total
number of production firms registered in 1964 is 933, whereas the second
(Table A-14), notes 943 registrations for the same year. According to the
third source (Table A-15), the number of registrations declined to 859
in 1966, while the most up-to-date source puts it at 1492 in 1973. The
occupational categories, as well as their wording change from one source
to the other. Often the wording is so fuzzy that it becomes impossible
to differentiate the trading firms included in the counts. Furthermore,
the lack of detailed information on a firm by firm basis make even a crude
distinction between factories and petty production firms impossible. Yet,
we khow that the production firms located in Gaziantep and registered at
the Chamber only 60-75 are factories. Thus, it can be suggested that among
the 900-1,500 firms registered at the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, about 800-1,400 were petty production firms not accounted for
in the Associations' records.
In Eskisehir, the registration records of the Chambers present a
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different picture. Instead of a combined Chamber of Commerce and Industry
as in Gaziantep, Eskisehir has two Chambers. The records of the Eskisehir
Chamber of Commerce yield data comparable to those of the Gaziantep
Chamber of Commerce and Industry in quality. But the records of the Eskisehir
Chamber of Industry are much better. I have received access to the
records kept at both Chambers. Therefore, instead of referring to secondar,,
sources at length, I prefer to note my own compilations of the relevant
information that was made available.
The following is an account of the firms registered at the Eskisehir
Chamber of Industry in 1974. I have categorized the information, which is
available on a firm by firm basis, with reference to the larger industry
activity groupings as adopted by the Chamber. (See Table A-17).
TABLE A-17
FIRMS REGISTERED AT THE ESKISEHIR CHAMBER OF INDUSTRY BY INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY
GROUPS IN 1974
Industrial Activity Groups No. of Capital Total No.
Firms Outlay Employed
(TL.'000)
.Tile and Brick Manufacturing
.Flour mills, and flour products
manufacturing
.Machines, Equipment and Spare parts
parts production
Metal Products
.Stove makers, Founders and Other
Iron works
.Miscellaneous Food Industries
14* 58 293 1
210* 40 548
19 10 720
(1 firm did
not supply
data)
14 4 482
(1 firm did
not supply
data)
20 237 277
13 54 497
(2 firms did
not supply
data)
951 (2 firms did
not supply data)
534 (3 firms did not
supply data)
434 (1 firm did not
supply data)
125 (1 firm did not
supply data)
4253
2220 (4 firms did
not supply data)
continued
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,Mining and Miscellaneous Chemicals
Production -19*** 63 372 1402 (2 firms did
(I firm did not supply
not supply data)
data)
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 33 20 815 2036 (2 firms did
not supply
data)
TOTAL 153 490 004 12,955
(5 firms did (15 firms did
not supply not supply
data) data)
Source: Eskisehir Sanayi Odasi (Chamber of Industry). "Odaya Kayitli
Sanayiciler Listesi". Unpublished List.(as of February 1975)
* Two firms are located in Bozuyuk
* One firm is located in Cifteler
** Three firms are located elsewhere in the Province. One is located in
Bozuyuk, the other in Mihalliccik. The third is a mining-concern with
only an office in Eskisehir.
Thus, in reality, only 147 firms out of the 153 registered at the Chamber
are located in Eskisehir.
In brief, we know that of the 147 production firms located in Eskisehir
about 40-45 are in effect factories. Thus, we have at least 100 petty
production firms not accounted for in therecords of the Associations, since
none of the Chamber of Industry members can register at the Associations.
Furthermore, though in reality possibly higher, about 1,500-1,600 of the
people employed in these 100 "non-factories" must be considered as part and
parcel of the petty production activities connected labor pool.
The data available at the Eskisehir Chamber of Commerce, on the
other hand, do not yield a rigorous separation of petty production firms
from among the merchant firms. Furthermore, unlike the Chamber of Industry,
members of the Chamber of Commerce may and do register at Associations,and
it is impossible to tell how many in which occupations are registered at
which Association in the absence of records on this count. Nevertheless,
going through the membership records of the Eskisehir Chamber of Commerce
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and picking out the petty producers and repairers one by one with reference
to their listed occupations, the following information has been compiled.
(See Table A-18).
TABLE A-18
THE NUMBER OF PETTY PRODUCERS REGISTERED AT THE ESKISEHIR CHAMBER OF
COIMERCE BY OCCUPATIONS9 1974
Occupation Categories as Defined Total No. of Total No. of
By The Eskisehir Chamber Of Registrations Petty Producers
Commerce from Eskisehir and Repairers
1. BANKS, INSURANCE CO., REAL ESTATE
AND SIMILAR SERVICES, PRIVATE
SCHOOLS AND SIMILAR ESTABLISHMENTS 145
2. CONSTRUCTION SERVICES: CONTRACTORS
ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS 495
3. CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS: TRADERS IN
CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS, PLUMIBERS
AND THE LIKE, 'HIRDAVATCILAR',t"HURDA-
CILAR', 'CA1CILAR' 152
4. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT AND VALUABLE
GOODS: ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT REPAIRERS,
MAKERS AND TRADERS OF ELECTRICAL EQUIP.,
ELECTRICIANS, CLOCK REPAIRERS, SILVER-
SMITHS, 'SARRAFLAR ' 108 68
5. AUTO SPARE PARTS, AGRICULTURAL EQUIP.,
AND 1MACHINERY AND SPARE PARTS, FUELS,
GAS STATIONS, OFFICE FURNITURE AND
MACHIN'ERY, SEWIING MIACHINES, REFRIGERATORS
AND THE LIKE 179 12
6. 'TUHAFIYEI', 'ZUCCACIYE' : 'TUHAFIYE' AND
'IPLIKCILER', 'ZUCCACIYECILER', TOY
MERCHANTS 161
7. TEXTILE EI-RCANTS : 'MANIFATURACILAR',
TRADERS IN TOWELS, SHEETS AND THE LIKE,
QUILT IiAKERS 123 3
8. *-MERCHANTS OF OTHER MATERIALS, TAILORS,
READY-MADE APPAREL 'IMAKERS 153 72
9. SHOE MAKERS AND SELLERS, OTHER LEATHER
PRODUCTS MAKERS AND TRADERS, 'SARRAC',
AND TANNERS 111 19
10. AGRICULTURAL AND HUSBANDRY PRODUCTS:
'ZAHIRECILER' 'BAKLIYATCILAR' ,MERCHANTS
OF WOOL AND COTTON, COMMERCE IN 'KEPEK'
AND ANIMAL FEED, FELT PRODUCTION AND
Y' UN TARA
MA'
5 continued
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11. LIVE-STOCK MERCHANTS AND BUTCHERS 130
12.'BAKKALIYE' AND 'MUTABIYE': GROCERS,
'KANTARIYE' AND 'YAGCILAR', 'MUTABIYE',
SACKS AND ROPE IIERCHANTS, STATE MONOPOLY
RETAIL OUTLETS, EGG IERCHANTS AND 'KURU
KAHVECILER' 219 9
13. CONFECTIONS AND SOFT DRINKS :CONFECTIONERS,
MILK PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING AND COMMERCE,
PASTRY MAKERS, SOFT DRINK PRODUCERS, AND
' PEK1,EzCILER ' 95 59
14. HOTELS.AND ENTERTAINMENT 103 -
15. FRUITS AND VEGETABLE MERCHANTS 94
16. TRANSPORTATION SERVICES 146
17. PRINTING AND 'KIRTASIYECILER':PRINTERS,
PUBLISHERS, BOOK STORES, 'KIRTASIYECILER',
BOOK BINDERS, PHOTOGRAPHERS, AND PAPER
MERCHANTS 65 30
18. FURNITURE AND FIXTURES: FURNITURE
MERCHANTS, CARPET SELLERS AND CARPET
FIBRE MAKERS 106 11
19. WOOD PRODUCTS: SAW MILLERS, CARPENTERS,
FURNITURE MAKERS, 'MAHRUKAT', AND
PACKAGING 184 57
20. FLOUR PRODUCTS MANUFACTURERS: FLOUR MILLS
BAKERS, BISCUIT AND OTHER FLOUR PRODUCT
MANUFACTURERS 41 38
21. NON-IMETALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 41 -
22. MINING: MEERSCHAUM MERCHANTS AND CARVERS,
QUARRIES AND 'kUM OCAKLARI', LIME AND
GYPSUM HANDLERS 93 38
23. MANUFACTURE OF METAL PRODUCTS: FOUNDERS,
AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT AND SPARE PART
MAKERS, IRONSMITHS, LATHE OPERATORS, &C.. 185 168
24. DRUG STORES AND MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS 84 5
TOTAL 3302 594
Source: Eskisehir Ticaret Odasi (Chamber of Commerce). "Odaya Kayitli
Olanlar Listesi". Unpublished List. (as of February 1975)
In short, of the 3,302 registrations at the Eskisehir Chamber of Commerce,
about 18 per cent (594) can be classified within the domain of petty production
t ·
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activities.
The records kept at Associations are the most important source of
information on petty production firms. Established upon the provisions of
Turkish Public Law No. 507, there are 33 Associations in Eskisehir, and
55 in Gaziantep. Of the 33 Associations in Eskisehir, only 17 can be
called petty producers' Associations. In Gaziantep, on the other hand, there
are 25 petty producers' Associations. The rest of the Associations abound
in professions which can be aptly referred to as "petty services" and
"petty commerce." The problems involved in the handling of data provided
by the Associations has already been mentioned. Yet, there remains one more
issue to settle before giving a brief account of the information compiled
from records kept at tha Associations: the quality of book-keeping.
First, as new petty production and repair firms are established,
new petty producers come to register at the Associations. When petty firms
go out of business or petty producers die, however, the records usually
remain unchanged. Sometimes upon closing his shop, a petty producer will
either go away for two years to serve in the army, or move to other cities
in pursuit of his line of occupation. Again, he remains registered at his
initial Association. In short, the records not only include the practising
members, but also those who are away for some reason or the other, and those
who have changed their lines of occupation or died.
Second, each Association is supposed to call a general assembly
('genel kurul') every three years to elect a new steering committee ('yonetim
kurulu'), a court of honour ('haysiyet divani'), supervisors ('denetciler'),
and a chairman ('baskan') 3 1 In order to do so, a List of Members ('Toplantiya
Katilanlar Listesi') has to be prepared in advance3. Usually, it is the
1
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number of petty producers recorded in the list that Associations refer
as to the latest count of their members. Since these lists are prepared
on the basis of registration records ('Uye Kayit Beyannameleri' and
'Uye Kayit Defterleri') which are not updated, they are distorted. Nevertheless,
they are taken as the official references until the following general
assembly. In other words, the only official information available from
Associations, if a special effort of going through registration records
one by one is ignored, is the number of registrations at each Association
as noted on these lists of members.
Thus, not only the dependability of the official information
supplied by Associations, but also its handling by scholars and institutions
is questionable and problematic. In view of this, instead of noting the
various secondary sources reporting the data acquired from Associations
without critical scrutiny, or duplicating the data given to me, I prefer
to give my own accounts of the petty producers registered at Associations
in Eskisehir and Gaziantep.
I have gained direct access to registration records and the most
recent official membership lists of Associations. In the case of petty
producers' Associations, I went through the records with the assistance
from the chairman, secretery general, and some members of the steering
committee. This was helpful in sorting out the members by their occupations
and most recent standing. In brief, for each petty producers' Association
I tried to depict the actual number of currently practising petty producers
registered, after weeding out the partners, employees, petty merchants,
and those who have migrated, changed line of occupation, retired, or died.
Consequently, the number of petty producers that I have listed approximates
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the numiber of petty production and repair firms registered at the Associations.
In the case of petty servicemen's and petty merchants' Associations,
however, I did not go far. The following is the summary of my compilations
of the petty producers and repairers registered at Associations in Eskisehir
and Gaziantep. (See Tables A-19, and A-20).
TABLE A-19
THI- NUMBER OF REGISTRATIONS AT TIE PETTY PRODUCERS' AND REPAIRýERS'
ASSOCIATIONS IN ESKISEHIR, 1975
Name of The No. of Registrations Actual No. and Occupations
Association According tO The of Currently Practising
Records Kept at Petty Producers Registered
Associations At Associations
1. AYAKKABICILAR
(SHOE M•AKERS) 310 203
(75 shoe makers, 12 slipper
makers, 1 leather bag and
belt maker, 3 'fora-frezeci',
13 'sayaci', 99 cobblers
2. DOSEMECILER
(UPHOLSTERERS) 97 97
3. DOKUMiCULER
(FOUNfDERS) 62 62
(56 iron founders, 6 brass
founders)
4. DEMIRCILER
(IRONSI4ITHS) 431 334
(334 Ironsmiths making simple
agricultural equipment, knives,
&c, welders, metal furniture
makers, &c.,)
5. ELEKTRIKCILER
(ELECTRICIANS) 84 5
(1 electrical eauipment part
maker, 1 electric motor repairer,
3 Auto-electricians)
6. LULETASI PIPO IMALCILERI
(V1EERSCHAUI CARVERS) 114 100
(94 meerschaum carvers, 3
meerschaum sanders, 2 pipe
stem makers, 1 tile maker)
7.HiIARANGOZLAR
(CARPENTERS) 485 478
(478 carpenters and furniture
makers)
continued
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8. SARACLAR VE TABAKLAR
(TANNERS AND LEATHER
PRODUCT MAKERS) 80 56
(48 'sarac', 8 tannery
operators)
9. SOBACI, BISIKLETCI VE
EMSALI SA ATKARLAR
(STOVE MAKERS, BICYCLE
REPAIRERS ETC.) 399 336
(186 stove makers, 3 stove
repairers, 22 plumbers, 1 box-
spring maker, 66 bicycle and
motorcycle repairers, 2 locksmiths,
4 'gas ocagi' repairers, 1
'kalayci', 9 welders and metal
furniture makers, 1 sewing machine
repairer, 7 'nikelajci', 1
founder, 1 wooden crate maker,
3 auto electricians, 2 'bileyici',
1 telephone repairer, 1 motor
repairer, 6 'tesviyeci', 3
refrigerator repairers, 5 ironsmiths,
2 lathe operators, 5 printers,
3 weavers, I gun repairer.)
10. SAATCILER
(WATCH AND CLOCK
REPAIRERS) 62 61
(61 watch and clock repairers)
11. TERZILER
(TAILORS) 494 412
(364 men's tailors, 37 women's
tailors, 3 men's trousers
makers, 3 leather coat makers,
I 'telaci', 3 hat makers, 1
trousseau goods maker)
12. YORGANCILAR, DOKUMACILAR
ORUCULER (QUILT MAKERS,
WEAVERS, AND KNITTERS) 132 107
(38 quilt makers with shops,
25 knitters--18 woman 'orucu's--,
9 'hallacci', 5 'cozgucu'--
weaving--, 1 'tarakci'--weaving--,
29 'cul kilim' weavers)
13. TORNACILAR VE OTO TAMIRCILERI
(LATHE OPERATORS AND AUTO
REPAIRERS) 360 358
(81 lathe operators, 3 'torna-
tesviye', 3 'tesviye', 135 auto-
continued
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repairers, 10 'makasci', 6 'frenci',
3 'karoserci', 30 auto-body
repairers, 24 auto painters, 23
auto electricians, 10 auto
upholsterers, 6 radiator repairers,
4 auto tire repairers, 2 nut and
bolt maker, 1 motorcycle repairer,
7 welders)
14. BAKIRCILAR VE KALAYCILAR
(COPPERSMITHS AND TIN-
SI,'ITHS) 52 52
15. FIRINCILAR, PASTACILAR,
KURU YEMISCILER (BAK<ERS,
PASTRY MAKERS, &C.) 179 164
(72 pastry makers, 36 bakers,
3 pastry bakers, 10 'yufka' makers,
3 'borek' makers, 1 'boza' maker,
35 'baklava' makers, 4 ice-cream
makers)
16. RADYOCULAR
(RADIO REPAIRERS) 60 59
(59 radio and other electrical
equipment repairers)
17. KUYUNCULAR
(SILVERSMITHS) 50 38
(38 silversmiths)
TOTAL 3451 2922
Source: Eskisehir Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Dernekleri (Petty Traders' and Petty
Producers' Associations). "Toplantiya Katilanlar Listeleri",
" Uye Kayit Defterleri". Lists and Registration Records
kept at Associations. (as of February 1975).
TABLE A-20
THE NUMBER OF REGISTRATIONS AT THE PETTY PRODUCERS' AND REPAIRERS'
ASSOCIATIONS IN GAZIANTEP 1975
No. of Registrations Actual No. and occupations
Association According to The of Currently Practising
Records Kept at Petty Producers Registered
Associations at Associations
1. AHSAP ISLERI
(WOOD WORKS) 334 276
(18 chair makers, 42 'hizarci',
31 wooden crate makers, 30
'kulekci', 16 saddlepack makers,
continued
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54 carpenters, 66 'harat', 13
cigarette holder makers, 2
'korukcu', 3 'hasirci', 1 paper
bag maker)
2. AV MIALZEIECILERI VE
TAMIRCILERI (HUNTING EQUIP.
AND REPAIRS) 65* 65
3. BAKIRCILAR
(COPPERSMITHS) 164 96-
(26 aluminum kitchen ware maktrs,
70 coppersmiths, copper sheets
and other copper product makers)
4. BRIKETCILER
(BRIQUETTE MAKERS) 102 * 102
5. CORAP VE TRIKOTAJ
(TRICOT AND SOCK MAKERS) 334 244
(34 sock makers, 210 tricot
makers)
6. DOKUMACILAR
(WEAVERS) 524 513
(2 'iplikci', 10 'cozgucu', 1
'mezzekci', 13 'bukucu', 2
'dokuma silindircisi', 3 cotton
gin operators, 2 'iplik saricisi',
3 silk weavers, 330 towel makers,
147 misc. weavers)
7. ELEKTRIKCILER
(ELECTRICIANS) 215 175
(175 electric equipment repairers
and installers)
8. KALAYCI
(TINSMITHS) 66* 66
9. KILIMCILER
(Kil1 NAKERS) 477 450
(6 'mutaf', 8 'bukucu', 10 cotton
and wool gin operators, 6 'hasirci',
420 'kilim' makers--including
kilim fiber makers, dyers, and
3 loom part making lathe shop
operators besides 'kilim' weavers--)
10. KOSKERLER
(MISC. LEATHER PRODUCTS
MAKERS) 111 98
(41 'kosker', 20 'kavaf', 21
'sarac', 6 plastic bag and shoe
makers)
continued
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11. KUNDURACILAR
(SHOE MAKERS) 301 220
12. MATBAACILAR
(PRINTERS) 73* 73
13. KUSAK VE JAKARLI DOKUMACILAR
(WEAVERS WITH LOOMS CALLED
'JAKARLI' ANUD BELT WEAVERS) 164 152
(64 belt weavers, 60 dyers, 13
'cozgucu', 1 pattern designer
for 'jakar', 7 silk weavers,
7 'tarakci')
14. MADENI SANATLAR
(METAL WORKS) 621 562
(122 ironsmiths, 10 welders,
9 box-spring makers, 110 'demir
dogramaci's,33 steel-safe makers,
15 cutlers, 53 founders, 45 tin-
box makers, 92 stove makers, 14
'darabaci's, 20 sewing machine,
type-writer &c., repairers and
some bolt and nut makers, 39
silversmiths)
15. ,MARANGOZ VE MOBILYACILAR
(CARPENTERS AND FURNITURE
MAKERS) 650 650
(450 carpenters, 200 furniture
makers)
16. OTO, MAKINA SANATLARI
(AUTO AND MACHINE WORKS) 820 808
(194 auto repairers, 173 lathe
operators, 64 'karoserci', 53
Auto painters, 38 auto upholsterers,
103 auto electricians, 25 radiator
repairers, 16 founders, 141 auto-
body repairers, 1' sasici')
17. SAYACILAR
(I~AKERS OF THE UPPER PART
OF SHOES) 59 59
(8 leather bag makers, 10 'fora-
frezeci's, 41 'sayaci's)
18. TERZILER
(TAILORS) 612* 537
(43 shirt makers, 26 hat makers,
13 quilt makers, 1 'torbaci',
2 'korseci's, 5 misc. tailoring
continued
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like ironing shops and old suits
repairers, 7 ready-made apparel
producers, 440 tailors including
men and women's tailors)
19. TABAKLAR
(TANNERS) 139 14
(2 felt makers,12 tanners)
20. DEGIRIENCILER
(FLOUR MILLERS) 51* 51
21. FIRINCILAR
(BAKERS) 265* 265
22. HELVACI VE DONDUR1,ACILAR
('HELVA' AND ICE-CREAMI
MAKERS) 207* 207
(37 'helvaci's, 170 'mesrubatci's)
23. SAATCILER VE RADYOCULAR
(RADIO AND CLOCK REPAIRERS) 102* 102
24. KEBABCILAR LOKANTACILAR
('KEBAB' MAKERS AND RESTAURANT
OWNERS)** (360)** 100
(100 'baklava' makers)
TOTAL 6456 5885
Source: GAZIANTEP Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Dernekleri ( Petty Traders' and Petty
Producers' Associations). "Toplantiya Katilanlar Listeleri",
"Uye Kayit Defterleri". Lists and Registration Records
kept at Associations. (as of December 1974)
* Unfortunately in Gaziantep, I could not go through all the Uye Kayit
Defterleri. The information marked (*) were obtained from a list prepared
by the Esnaf Dernekleri Birligi (Union of Petty Producers' and Petty
Traders' Associations) upon the request of the Gaziantep Sanayi Mudurlugu
(Office of Industry) dated January Ist, 1975. Nevertheless, I have
cross-checked the data as much as possible.
** The 'Kebabcilar ve Lokantacilar' Association hardly belongs to the domain of
petty production activities. I consider it as a petty servicemen's
A'ssociation. Yet, it includes the 'baklava' makers, whom I consider as
petty producers. Thus, the total 6,456 does not include the 360 registered
at this Association, while the total 5,885 includes the 'baklava' makers.
Perhaps the information presented in Tables A-19 and A-20, is detailed
enough to convince the reader on several points. First, the occupations
which constitute the domain of petty production activities in Eskisehir
and Gaziantep can not be easily grouped according to conventional industrial
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classification systems. I have noted more than 90 different lines of
petty production activities, ranging from stove making and meerschaum
carving to auto repairing and lathe operating, in Eskisehir4 and even more
in Gaziantep. Often strong sub-contracting links connect the different,
and otherwise ,seemingly unrelated, occupations. For instance, in weaving,
shoe making, auto repairs, stove making, copper product making, &c.,
petty producers, petty repairers and even petty merchants from varied
occupations come to form closely knit clusters, with effective backward
and forward linkages, akin to those observed in the "factory" sector of
industries. Also,a modern version of the "putting-out" system, where
independently standing petty producers with different occupations are
employed by one and the same person (a petty producer or a merchant) in
the production of one good, prevails in 'kilim' and silk weaving in Gaziantep.
Given these, and the lack of an in-depth understanding of petty production
activities in underdeveloped countries in general, how are we to classify
hundreds of occupations without actually knowing what occurs in the firms:
what is produced and how? Second, it is easy to distinguish petty production
firms from "factories" on the one hand, and petty merchant firms on the
other. Yet, in the case of certain occupations such as plumbing, electric
systems installing, construction works, photography, and restaurant operating,
with or without shops, the distinction between petty production and petty
services remains fuzzy. Finally, in view of these two observations, the
data displayed in Tables A-19 and A-20 are valuable so long as they remain
disaggregated. In this connection, therefore, the painstaking survey of
the Associations records can be seen as not yielding very much. For the time
being, however, we can draw at least two meaningful summary points: First,
-363-
that in Eskisehir there are about 2,900 petty firms registered at the
Associations, while in Gaziantep there are twice as many4 and second, that
both in Eskisehir and Gaziantep about 15 to 17 per cent of the petty
firms registered are repairs rather than production oriented. There are
about 500 petty repair firms in Eskisehir, and 950 in Gaziantep.
In conclusion, the value of the available Turkish data on petty
production is rather dubious. Nevertheless, the tedious exercise of
critically evaluating such information is rewarding. It makes it possible
to forward what can be called an "educated guess" concerning the size of
petty production activities in Eskisehir and Gaziantep.
After studying the registration records kept at the Chambers, it
can be seen that in 1975, in Eskisehir there were about 100 petty production
firms registered at the Chamber of Industry, and 600 at the Chamber of
Commerce. In Gaziantep, on the other hand, there were somewhere between
800-1,400 petty production firms to be found in the Chamber of Commerce
and Industry's records, and not in the Associations'. When the detailed
compilation of the registrations at the petty producers' Associations is
included in the account, then a more accurate idea of the current number
of petty production firms can be developed. Yet, since the number of
registrations at the Associations does not necessarily correspond to the
numb'er of petty production firms, and since there are unaccountable cross-
registrations between the Chambers and Associations, the conclusions drawn
from the data can be nothing more than a set of approximations. Furthermore,
there are some petty producers who go without any kind of registration
anywhere. Consequently, it is impossible to know the exact number of petty
producers, and therefore, petty firms. Nevertheless, if the petty producers
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registered at the Chambers are taken together with those registered at
the Associations, the total number of petty producers (assuming that there
are as many petty firms as there are petty producers), and hence of petty
firms in Eskisehir and Gaziantep can be put around 3,500 and 6,500
respectively. Yet, how many people in all are employed in these petty
production firms? Unfortunately, on this point the reader has to be content
with a rather flat approximation. Assuming that on the average, petty
production (or repair) firms employ 3-4 people (this is the minimum of
my estimate), the size of the petty production connected labor force can
be put between 10,000-12,000 in Eskisehir, and 18,000-20,000 in Gaziantep.
Yet, since I am sticking my neck out in this respect, let me provide a
summary account of the various sources that have been scrutinized so far.
TABLE A-21
THE NUMBER OF PETTY PRODUCTION FIRMS AND THE CONNECTED LABOR FORCE IN
ESKISEHIRI: A SUMMARY OF VARIOUS SOURCES SCIRUTINIZED IN THIS STUDY
Year
Source
No. of Petty
Production
Firms
No. of Employed
in Petty
Production Firms
1. ACAROGLU
(See: Table A-i)
2. Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu
(SIS) (See Tables A-4, A-5,
and A-6)
3. Devlet Planlana Teskilati
(SPO) (See Table A-7)
4. Esnaf ve Sanatkar Dernekleri
(ASSOCIATIONS)(See Table A-19)
.Records
.Records sifted
1973
1966
1970
1975
1975
2,300-2,400 7,600-10,000
3,700-3,800
1,800-1,900
3,400-3,500
2,900-2,950
MY ESTIMATES 1975 Around 3,500 10,000-12,000
-
---- --- ~-~--" --- - -- -- ~~
-~-- --
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TABLE A-22
THE NU1MBER OF PETTY PRODUCTION FIRMS AND THE CONNECTED LABOR FORCE IN
GAZIANTEP: A SUMMARY OF VARIOUS SOURC2S SCRUTgNIZED IN THIS STUDY
Source Year No. of Petty No. of Employed
Production in Petty
Fi4 ms Production Firms
1. Iller Bankasi (BANK OF THE
PROVINCES) (Spe Tables A-2
and A-3)
2. Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu
(SIS)(See Tables A-4, A-5
and A-6 )
3. Devlet Planlama Teskilati
(SPO)(See Table A-7 .)
4. Halk Bankasi (PEOPLE'S BANK)
(See Tables A-8 and A-9 )
1971
1966
1970
. 1968
2,500-3,000 13,000-14,500
10,000-10,200
4,100-4,200
5,200-5,300
. 1974 10,100-10,200
5. Devlet Planlama Teskilati
(SPO)(See Table A-10)
6. Gaziantep Sanayi Mudurlugu
(OFFICE OF INDUSTRY)(See
Table A-11)
7. Devlet Planlama Teskilati
(SPO)(See Table A-12)
8. Esnaf ve Sanatkar Dernekleri
(ASSOCIATIONS)(See Table A-20)
.Records
1970
1970
1971
1975
-1 r% I
3,600-3,700
3,700-3,800
4,500-4,600
6,400-6,500
13,100-13,200
13,100-13,200
R. ecords sifted 1975
5, 800-
51
900 -
MY ESTIMATES 
1975 Around 6,500 18,000-20,000
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NOTES TO APPENDIX III
1. Irem Acaroglu, Eskisehir Arastirmasi, (Ankara: mimeo., 1974).
I was given full access to the data banks of this study. The information
displayed in Table A-1 was complied by hand from the computer readings
submitted as an appendix to the Bank of the Provinces copy.
2. In many secondary sources on industrial production in Turkey, data are
grouped with reference to a modified version of the Standard Industrial
Classification. In an underdeveloped society like Turkey where
qualitatively distinct modes of industrial production, i.e., "factories"
and "non-factories," exist side by side, this generates serious probler .
As far as production activities are considered, many of the artisanal
occupations, or in other words, many petty production activities simply
do not fit into the categories designed with developed industrial economies
in mind. Yet, many Turkish scholars are content to perpetuate the use
of the SIS version of the StandardIndustrial Classification System
although it destorts much of the realities of the Turkish industrial
landscape. Since I can not avoid dealing with the shortcomings of this
practice while going through the available information presented in
the secondary sources, it is necessary to note what kinds of production
activities the SIS categories of industry refer to.
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (Imalat Sanayii): This category corresponds to
(Division D.-MANUFACTURING) 'section of the U.S. Standard Industrial
Classification Manual prepared by the Executive Office of the President
in 1972. The following is a guide to the detailed break-down of this
category.
Industry groups as
defined by the SIS
Gida Maddeleri Sanayii
Icki Sanayii
Tutun Mamulleri
Dokuma Sanayii
Kundura, diger Giyecek
Esya ve Hazir Dokuma Esya
Sanayii
References to the
US. Standard Ind.
Classification
Manual, 1972.
IMajor Gr. No. 20:
FOOD & KINDRED PRoDUCTS
Gr. No. 208: BEVERAGES
Major Gr. No. 21:
TOBACCO MANUFACTURES
Major Gr. No. 22:
TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS
MIajor Gr. No. 3:
APPAREL AND OTHER
FINISHED PRODUCTS MADE
FROI FABRICS & SIMIILAR
MATERIALS
Gr. No. 313: BOOT &
SHOE CUT STOCK &
FINDINGS
Gr. No. 314: FOOTWEAR
EXCEPT RUBBER
continued
Code used
in this
study
01
SIS
Major
Group
No.
20
21
_ __
1
i
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06
07
08,
09.
10
11
12
13
14
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
3. See: Section III- Chapter XII of this study.
continued
Agac ve Mantar Mamulleri
Sanayii--Mobilya Haric
Mobilya ve Mefrusat
Sanayii
Kagit ve Kagittan MamiAl
Esya Sanayii
Matbaacilik, Yayin ve
BUnlarla Ilgili Sanayii
Kurk ve Deri Mamulleri
Sanayii--Ayakkabi ve
Diger Giyim Esyasi Haric
Kaucuk Mamulleri Sanayii
Kimya S1nayii
Petrol ve Komur Ilamulieri
Imali
Metalden Gayri Madenlerden
Ijamul Esya Sanayii--Petrol
ve Kornur Turemleri Haric
ietal Ana Sanayii
Madeni Esya Sanayii--Tasit
Araclari ve Makinalar Haric
Makina Sanayii--Elektrik
Makinalari Haric
Elektrik Makinalari,Cihaz-
lari, aletleri ve elektrik
Malzemesi Sanayii
Tasit Araclari ve Malzeme-
si Sanayii
Muhtelif Imalat Sanayii
Major Gr. No. 24:LUMNBER
AND WOOD PRODUCTS EXCEPT
FURNITURE
Major Gr. No. 25:
FURNITURE & FIXTURES
Major Gr. No. 26: PAPER
AND ALLIED PRODUCTS
Major Gr. No. 27: PRINTING
PUBLISHING AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES
Major Gr. No. 31:LEA-idER
& LEATHER PRODUCTS
Gr. No. 237: FUR GOODS
Major Gr. No. 30:RUBBER &
MISC. PLASTIC PRODUCTS
Major Gr. No. 28:CHIErMICALS
& ALLIED PRODUCTS
Major Gr. No. 29:PETROLEUI
REFINING & RELATED IND.
Major Gr. No. 32: STONE,
CLAY, AND CONCRETE
PRODUCTS
Major Gr. No. 33: PRIMARY
TETAL INDUSTRIES
Major Gr, No. 34:FABRICATED
METAL PRODUCTS, EXCEPT
MACHINERY AND TRANSPORT.
EQUIPTMENT
Major Gr. No. 35:1NACHINERY
EXCEPT ELECTRICAL
Major Gr. No. 36:ELECTRICAL
& ELECTRONIC MACHINERY,
EQUIP., AND SUPPLIES
Major Gr. No. 37:
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMEI'NTZ
Major Gr. No. 38:MIEASURING,
ANALYZING, & CONTROLLING
INSTRUMENTS, MEDICAL &
OPTICAL GOODS; WATCHES AND
CLOCKS
Major Gr. No. 39: MISC.
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
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4. If w:e assume that establishments which employ more than 50 workers are
most probably "factories," and that about 20 of the petty firms
in glass works are not manufacturing establishments, then the total
number of petty production firms in Eskisehir can be put at 2437.
(1548+654+128+88+39-20=2437)
5. (654)(2½)+(128)(7)+(88)(14½2)+(39)(35)+2437=7609, where 21, 7, 142, and 35
are the average number of workers per establishment in each labor size
category below the 50-99 group.
6. 7609+(1548-20+654+128)=9919
7. Iller Bankasi (The Bank of The Provinces), Gaziantep Kent Butunu, (Ankara:
I.B. Yay., 1972), pp. 49-54.
8. Deviet Istatistik Enstitusu (SIS), Labor Force Survey in Selected Main
Cities (Adana! Ankara, Bursa, Eskisehir, Gaziantep, Istanbul,
Iz•ir, Kayseri) , (Ankara: D.I.E. Yay. No. 538, 1968)
9. Idem., "Letter to the author" (Dated January 15th, 1975, and numbered
TI/YAY/ksl-92)
10. Ibid..
11. See: Article No. 2 of Turkish Public Law No. 507,.
N.F. Izmirlioglu and M. Uzunyayla, Izahli Esnaf ve Kucuk Sanatkarlar Kanunu,
(Ankara: Turkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Konfederasyonu Yay.,
1964), p. 8.
12. Ibid., pp. 158-159.
13. Ibid., p. 8 .
14. Ibid..
15. M. Unai, "Esnaf ve Sanatkarlarla Ilgili Mevzuat," in Esnaf ve Sanatkarlarin
Sosyal ve Ekonomik Sorunlari Arastirmasi, Devlet Planlama
Teskilati, 3 vols., (Ankara: D.P.T. Yay. No. 975, 1971), vol.I.,
Appendix: 1.
16. Devlet Planlama Teskilati (SPO), Esnaf ve Sanatkarlarin Sosyal ve Ekonomik
Sorunlari Arastirmasi, 3 vols., (Ankara: D.P.T. Yay. No. 975,
1971), vol. II.
17. S.V.S. Sharma, S. Altikardes, E. Erim, Gaziantep Kucuk Sanayii, (Gaziantep:
mimeo. KUS-GEM report, 1970).
18. Imar ve Iskan Bakanligi (Ministry of Construction and Settlement),
Gaziantep Sanayi Calismasi, (Ankara: mimeo., 1965).
19. See: Article No. 3 of Turkish Public Law No. 507.
20. Devlet Planlama Teskilati (SPO), Turkiye'de Esnaf ve Kucuk Sanatkar Sayilari,
(Ankara: D.P.T. Yay. No. 991, 1970).
21. Ibid., pp. 3-10
22. Ibid..
23. Idem., Esnaf ve Sanatkarlarin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Sorunlari Arastirmasi.,
3 vols., (Ankara: DpT. Yay. No. 975, 1971), vol. II
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24. Turkiye Halk Bankasi (The People's Bank), "Genelge" (Circular), 1 August
1974, No. 1415.
25. For an account of the dependability of the People's Bank's data, see:
Devlet Planlama Teskilati (SPO), Esnaf ve Sanatkarlarin Sosyal ve
Ekonomik Sorunlari Arastirmasi, 3 vols., (Ankara: D.P.T. Yay.
No. 975, 1971), vol. II., p. 17.
26. Ibid., p. 138, Table 19.
27. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
28. Ibid., p. 23, Tables 22 and 23.
29. Ibid., pp. 26-28, Table 24.
30. Ibid., vol. I., p. 2.
31. N. ". Izmirlioglu and M. Uzunyayla, Izahli Esnaf ve Kucuk Sanatkarlar
Kanunu , (Ankara: Turkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkariar Konfederasyonu
Yay., 1964), pp. 135-137
32. Ibid., p. 131.
m
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APPENDIX IV
THE FIELD SURVEY
1. Some General Problerms in Studying the Petty Production
Activities Domain
Unfortunately, there are few first hand studies on the nature of
Turkish petty production activities. At the same time, we do not know
much concerning the problems involved in surveying petty firms, petty
producers, petty repairers, journeymen, apprentices, (or the underpaid,
unregistered, non-union, and over-worked workers in "non-factories"),
and the institutional web connecting them to each other and the rest of
Turkish society. In Appendix III, I have pointed at the problems involved
in handling the already existing data referring to the petty production
activities domain. Now let us turn to the problems involved in generating
data: What to do when in the field? What to look for, what to see and
what not? Whom to believe? How to tell a myth from a "true personal account"?
How to gain access to records? How to design samples? Which questions to
ask? &C.. The following section is a brief account on my data gathering
experiences in Eskisehir and Gaziantep.
2. The Social and Anthropological Peculiarities of the
Research Environment in the Case of Turkey
Not every petty producer is literate. According to a 1971 SPO
Survey, of all the petty producers interviewed, 15 per cent in Gaziantep,
6 per cent in Konya, 31 per cent in Van, and 4 per cent in Karabuk were
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illiterate. A large portion of the literate petty producers, however,
i.e., 62 per cent in Gaziantep, 79.9 per cent in Konya, 45 per cent in
2Van and 80 per cent in Karabuk, have merely had a primary school education,
which is obligatory under Turkish Laws; and, 8-15 per cent were found not
to have completed primary school. Based on such findings, and my own
field observations, I have assumed that while a good 10 per cent of the
petty producers in Eskisehir and Gaziantep would not be able to do so,
about 60 per cent or even more would, at best, be reluctant to respond to
a written questionnaire. In this connection, it must be remembered that
even when official-institutional lines of authority are invoked, responses
to written questionnaires are very limited. For instance, in 1970, in order
to survey the number of petty producers in Turkey, the SPO sent forms to
every Petty Producers' Association, Municipality, and some selected
Provincial units of the Central Administration such as 'Valilik's and
'Ilce Kaymakamlik's, but it received answers to only half of those
questionnaires. More than 50 per cent of the Associations, 20 per cent of
the 'Valilik's and 'Kaymakamlik's, and 10 per cent of the Municipalities
5did not respond. I had intended to survey the 'kalfa's, 'cirak's, and 'usta's,
i.e, the workers, employed in petty production firms. But workers are more
difficult to get hold of, and they are less likely to respond to official-
looking surveys than their employers: the petty producers. Thus from the
outset, the possibility of carrying out an extensive and detailed written
questionnaire among the petty producers and their employees looked
unpromising.
Receiving answers is an important concern of the researcher. Yet,
an even more important problem is receiving correct answers. In an interview
4
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type survey this hinges upon the rapport and understanding between the
interviewer and the interviewed. It is important for the social scientist
to know he is viewed as well as to have a sense of how the considerations
of the interviewed and the conditions under which the interview is conducted
interact to modify the answers received. For instance, on inquiries
concerning the number of workers employed, wages, capital outlay, and
profits, the average petty producer gets defensive. To protect himself,
he will often tend to convey misleading information far below the actual
levels. In certain cases he may even decline to comment or cooperate. These
reactions are hardly surprising. For, at least in Turkey, his frank
responses to questions relating to the labor force may easily be used
against him by the Labor Office, while his own assessment of his capital
outlay and profits may justify higher taxes if used by the Tax Office. In
Eskisehir, where Government officials have tried almost all avenues8to collect
information, it is quite difficult to convince an average petty producer
that one is not a Government agent in disguise, but only interested in
learning about his business. In Gaziantep, on the other hand, the enforcement
of rules and regulations on petty production is far more lax and Government
officials are not as threatening as they are in Eskisehir. One reason may
be the relative isolation of Gaziantep. Yet, a more plausible reason is
the,widespread smuggling in the area which not only diverts official
attention from the domain of petty production activities, but also spurs
the habit of "bending the rules," perhaps, via corruption.
There are other sensitive areas that may be touched when relating
to petty producers. The most significant are religious and political. The
interviewer has to pay attention to subtle signs that indicate the political
____iCi__;~~~^ X1~__ rr______pi___CL~____/~_i* __ i~·_/__~)~
-373-
orientation and religious inclinations of the interviewed person. At
times it becomes advisable to omit one or two questions. Also, the
official and business-like attitudes of the interviewer, his speech,
class mannerisms, and even physical appearance can lead petty producers
to jump to conclusions and adjust their answers accordingly. In short,
when coAducting interviews with petty producers, the more official and
unfriendly the impression left is, the less valid the responses are. Thus,
in order to receive dependable answers, the interviewer should not try to
outsmart the petty producers by asking indirect questions, which give the
impression that he does not trust them, or by intimidating them through
an official and business-like manner. Instead, he has to gain their
confidence by being open, frank, relaxed, and above all, convincing that
though not one of them, he is nevertheless concerned about their problems.
Apart from his s(ensitivity towards the feelings of the interviewed,
the researcher has few other means of checking the relative dependability
of the answers that he receives. He can cross-check certain responses
through quick but relevant observations, or through comparisons with the
answers given by other petty producers. Also, he can design a cross-checking
system into his questionnaire. But all such measures can only allow the
researcher to weigh the consistency and dependability of the answers given.
Thus, to repeat, receiving dependable answers hinges upon the establishment
of a rapport between the interviewer and the interviewed at a personal
level, and nothing more than that.
-Where and under which circumstances an interview is held, seems
as important as the personal rapport between the researcher and the
interviewed. Quite often, upon entering an artisan shop or a workshop,
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a group of petty producers and workers surrounds the interviewer. This
is a situation which it is very difficult to control. When interviewing
under such conditions, the pressures from the silent and curious petty
producers have to be acknowledged and made use of. For instance, in the
presence of his neighbors an average petty producer feels compelled to
give more dependable answers assuming that the interviewer has secured the
sympathy of the small ad-hoc group. In short, the interviewer ought to
be aware of how he is received not only by the interviewed, but also by
the spontaneous groups of petty producers that eventually condition the
dependability of responses. Furthermore, whether the interview is conducted
inside a workshop or outside matters. When a petty producer does not wish
to cooperate fully, he implies it subtly by not inviting the interviewer
into the shop, by not asking him to sit down, or by not offering a cup
of tea or a cigarette. Interviewing a petty producer outside his own shop,
on the other hand, not only makes it easier for him to evade certain questions
but also makes it impossible for the interviewer to cross-check certain
anwers through observations.
Finally, how the interview is carried out bears some importance
upon the dependability of the answers that are received. Sometimes, the
order of the questions on the form may not be the order in which the petty
producer responds. Consequently, he may get irritated by what he considers
redundancy in questioning. Also, at times, certain questions may become
irrelevant and inappropriate. Thus, the interviewer may be forced to
reformulate certain questions and omit some others so as not to irritate
the interviewed. Petty producers pay ample attention to what is recorded
and which questions the researcher seems to consider important. Thus, if the
_I 
_ _ · ~
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interviewer unknowingly hides his notes and fails to frankly reveal
which questions he deems important and how precise he would like the
answers to be, petty producers may jump to conclusions of their own
and alter their attitude in the middle of the process.
In summary then, whether or not the petty producer is alienated
during the process of the interview makes a great difference. I have
outlined some considerations on this point so as to qualify the social,
anthropological environment within which I operated to collect information;
but more so, to show why the design of what may be termed a more "efficient"
data collection effort, where more but less dependable answers could be
accumulated through a research team and with less personal contact, becomes
inappropriate. This much may also clarify why I consider the information
gathered through the SPO and other official and semi-official channels
questionable if not totally unreliable.
In view of these considerations, I adopted an approach which would
facilitate the spending of more than an hour with each petty producer,
and about fifteen minutes with each worker interviewed. The length of
theinterviews, as well as other considerations, ruled out the use of
tape-recording techniques. Instead. I prepared the questionnaire forms
such that it would be possible to take notes as the petty producers
responded. The possibility of interviewing an average petty producer for
over an hour is an indication of the extent to which "unused capacity"
prevails in the petty production activities sector. However, it must be
noted that the winter months during which the surveys were conducted,
constitute the usual slack-season anyway. Not only before and after, but
also during the interviews I had to take additional time to socialize or
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explain the purpose of the research as a whole and why certain questions
were asked. If counted, such encounter sessions with individual petty
producers and their workers, can bring up the average time spent per
interview by about another half hour. As I have noted earlier, unless
invited into a shop, and received with trust I declined to ask questions.
There were times when after sensing uneasiness on the part of the interviewed,
I stopped the interview in the middle of the process and destroyed the
form upon which I was taking notes. Being convinced that help from other
interviewers would further complicate the situation I preferred to conduct
all interviews by myself. After two weeks of interviewing in each city,
I found it easier to proceed not only because I was getting used to the
process, but also because the news of a "single researcher-student asking
harmless questions" spread among the petty producers more quickly than
I had expected. In this connection, I have to admit that not being affiliated
with any organization helped. On several occasions my connections with the
NETU (Middle East Technical University) created minor difficulties due
to the turmoil that plagues Turkish Universities in general.
3. Designing the Questionnaires
The initial questionnaire forms, one for the petty producers and
ano,ther for their employees, were prepared in Ankara mainly in view of
9
the 1971 SPO Survey of Petty Producers and Petty Traders, the 1970
10
KUS-GEM Survey of Small Industries in Gaziantep, and the 1965 Ministry
11
of Construction and Resettlement Survey of Industries in Gaziantep.
Both in Gaziantep and Eskisehir, before embarking upon interviewing,
I allowed a day or two for casual encounters with petty producers and
_ _
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their workers. These initial contacts took place either a. :-ea-coffee
12houses (Fkahvehane's), or on the streets in the petty production quarters
('carsi' s), and were of much help in developing an understanding of the
prevailing sensitivities among the petty producers. Also, in each city,
I carried out several pre-tests of the questionnaire, (7 in Gaziantep and
3 in Eskisehir), according to which the initial forms were modified. It
was in Gaziantep, the first city surveyed, that the questions prepared
in Ankara were altered radically.
After the pre-tests in Gaziantep, several points became clear.
First, there were too many questions. This not only irritated those
interviewed, but also me. Consequently, the number of questions was reduced
by 30, from 103 to 73. For example, a set of questions designed to determine
the extent to which traditional Guild institutions survived among the
petty producers was dropped. Second, the order of questions proved to be
problematic. Thus, questions were regrouped so that those relating
specifically to the firm followed 26 others focusing upon the petty producer
himself. This, I hoped would ease the establishment of personal rapport,
and it did. Third, the manner in which the questions were formulated created
some problems of communication. Therefore, I dropped the practice of addressing
the petty producers cordially ( in second person plural), and reformulated
some questions which were rather confusing for the interviewed. Fourth,
the time spent in taking notes caused a strain on the rapport established
with the interviewed and obstructed the flow of questioning. Thus, I
reduced the time spent in taking notes by preparing check-lists for my
reference.
The questionnaires were designed to cover various aspects of the
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production process and the organization of work, as well as the
personal histories, opinions and beliefs of the petty producers and their
workers. The interviews were conducted in Turkish. To give a better
idea of the interviews I attempted to translate the gist of the
13questions posed. They were not only leading and open-ended, but also
formulated in different wordings when necessary. Furthermore, only the
relevant parts of the responses were noted alongside the observations.
4. Designing the samples
Neither the secondary nor the original sources of information on
petty production activities in Eskisehir and Gaziantep yield a clear
picture before actually going through with the interviews. In other words,
at the end of a critical scrutiny of the available information one
returns to the starting point: a vague understanding of the nature, scope,
and extent of petty production activities. Confronted with such an
information base on the one hand, and my perceptions of the social-
anthropological peculiarities of petty producers on the other, I decided to
proceed in a rather pragmatic way in the design of smples. The following
is a brief description of the method followed.
I acquired an official document from the University with which I
am #ffiliated to the effect that I was to conduct field surveys in
Eskisehir and Gaziantep. Addressed to the Governors' Offices in Eskisehir
and Gaziantep, it proved to be helpful in convincing the head of the
Confederation of Petty Producers' and Petty Traders' Associations in
Ankara to personally inform the heads of the Union of Petty Producers'
and Petty Traders' Associations in Eskisehir and Gaziantep in advance of
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my arrival.
Once in the field, before contacting the head of the Union, I
proceeded by seeing the Governor and the Mayor, and requested from them
official letters to the effect that I was a student and that I was going
to interview the heads of various institutions (specified in detail) and
the petty producers and their workers with the sole purpose of writing
a book. I was intending to collect as many official letters from as diverse
authorities as possible to convince the more skeptical of my real purpose
whenever it became necessary in the course of interviews. It was with this
collection of letters from the University, the Governor's Office, and the
Mayor's Office, that I called upon the Union. After explaining in detail
what I intended to do, I requested the head of the Union to officially
advertise by whatever means he deemed effective, my arrival and my intentions.
In Gaziantep "word of mouth" was supposed to do the job, in Eskisehir a
small article appeared in the Union's Weekly Newsletter.14
From the Unions I acquired the lists of the names, addresses and
telephone numbers of the chairmen of each Association. Then, I asked the
head of the Union to personally telephone the chairman of each Petty Producers'
Association, and to introduce me on the phone. This time summarizing my
intentions to each and every chairman, I informed them that I would contact
them' later and asked to arrange some kind of an informal meeting at the
Association's headquarters. (Usually, the headquarters turned out to be
the workshops of the chairmen). Arranging an informal meeting at the
headquarters of an Association every other day, I started my surveys.
As a rule, some members of the steering committee, the secretary
general, and the chairman of the Association as well as one or two interested
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petty producers attended these informal assemblies. On the average, the
meetings lasted from one to two hours. I asked those present to describe
the different occupations registered at the Association, name the general
problems of these businesses, outline the problems of running the Association,
and describe the possible solutions to better the situation. Taking notes,
I asked whether it would be possible for me to go through the records
kept at the Association. After weeding out the currently practising petty
traders by occupations (see: Appendix III, Tables A-19 and A-20), I asked
for their estimates of the total number of petty firms in each occupational
grouping regardless of the possibility that some could be registered at
the Chambers or not registered at all. Then,I requested that they give a
rough estimate of the percentage of petty firms that they would consider
,"small,""medium" and "large" in each trade. Upon noting down the consensus
I inquired about their criteria. In other words, I asked them to tell what
makes them consider a petty firm "small," "medium" or "large." Informing
them of the "factory" and "non-factory" distinction, and suggesting that
the size of capital outlay, number of workers (apprentices included), the
size of output, and the quality of technology (including the level of
utilization of inorganic energy) matters, I asked them to revise their
initial consensus estimate. Thus, I arrived at an approximate stratification
of the petty production firms by size for each occupation under consideration.
After the surveys, this rough stratification became instrumental in
forwarding estimates on the number of artisan shops and workshops in
particular lines of petty production.
From the registration records of each Association, I picked several
petty producers at random, and asked to which size category they belonged.
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Eventually, for each major occupation found in the registration records,
I identified three randomly selected petty producers whose businesses
were considered to be representative of the three categories that were
formulated earlier. It was to these petty producers that I asked to be
led. Upon arriving at the workshop, however, I did not interview the petty
producer whom I had selected at the Association headquarters. I did not
want the petty producer to get intimidated from the outset. Being selected
in advance, and not knowing why he had been chosen to be interviewed, I
thought he would quite rightly be suspicious. Therefore, upon meeting the
randomly selected petty producer, and observing his place of work, I
asked him to lead me to any petty producer that he knew who had a business
of a similar size if not one exactly like his. For the larger workshops
that were registered at the Chambers rather than at the Associations, however,
I used a different approach. Since they were well known, after deciding
which workshop to survey in advance, I directly contacted the petty producer
without the aid of intermediaries, explained my purpose, showed him the
collection of official papers and interviewed.
In summary, both the stratification and the samples emerged as I
proceeded in the above-described method of approaching the petty producers.
The result was a stratified random sample survey.
There are 33 Associations in Eskisehir and 55 in Gaziantep. Out of
these, 17 in Eskisehir and 23 in Gaziantep can be considered Petty Producers'
Associations. The number of Petty Producers' Associations, however, does
not correspond to the number of petty production occupations. Usually more
than one, and sometimes up to 15-20 different trades can be referred to
in the registration records kept at the Associations. This constitutes a
_
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problem. Although I wanted to cover all trades, it was impossible to do
so given the obvious constraints on time and money. Therefore, upon
identifying the Petty Producers' Associations and sorting out the Petty
Traders recorded by their trades, I decided to put selective emphasis
upon the incredibly large panoply of occupations.
First, I identified those trades that constitute part of a single
production process. For instance, the shoe makers, 'sayaci's, 'fora-frezeci's,
and cobblers form one such group of individually identified but closely
knit trades. Weavers, dyers, and pattern makers constitute another group.
Sometimes as in the case of the founders and stove makers in Eskisehir,
strong sub-contracting bonds exist among certain trades.
Second, after grouping those petty production trades that are
intimately linked together via strong sub-contracting or "putting-out"
relations, I identified the more "free-standing" trades. Of the free-standing
trades such as tailoring, iron works, copper works and the like, I chose
those which were the most widespread, employed the most labor, were in
rapid proliferation or decline, or were undergoing some sort of significant
transformation. After such a qualitative stratification of the petty production
trades, I proceeded with the surveys. I interviewed one or two petty
producers in the "less important" (for my purposes) trades. Often, I collected
information concerning such trades indirectly from other petty producers,
observations, and non-questionnaire bound brief encounters. For the more
important "free-standing" trades, I followed the research method outlined
above. Yet, for the trades which form closely knit clusters, I put additional
effort in terms of extra interviews and encounters, in order to clarify the
overall nature of the relations between petty firms in different occupation
.
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lines.
The field surveys were conducted during a four month period in
the winter of 1974-75. In Eskisehir, 62 petty firms out of a total
of 3,500 were surveyed. In Gaziantep, on the other hand, more interviews
were conducted: 76 out of a total of 6,500. Besides the survey of petty
firms, the responsible heads of institutions such as the People's Bank,
the Petty Producers' Credit Cooperatives, the Petty Producers' Associations,
and Unions, the Petty Producers' Associations Confederation, and the
directors of various programs and studies that relate to the petty production
activities domain such as the Small Industries Development Center in
Gaziantep (KUS-GEM), the Small Industries Department of the Ministry of
Industry and Technology, the State Planning Organization, the Gaziantep
Metropolitan Planning Agency, the Municipalities, the Chambers of Commerce
and Industries, the Petty Producers' Cooperatives, &c., were interviewed.
Often access to the records kept at the above-mentioned organizations
was secured. To these, however, various other formal and informal interviews
and manifold observations must be added. In short, field-surveys constitute
the major source of information. The reader should not expect to find a
"monography" produced on the basis of this pool of data, since it is
referred to only to shed some light upon the issues involved in the nature,
role' and future of petty production activities in Turkish industrial
development.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX IV
1. Devlet Planlama Teskilati(SPO), Esnaf ve Sanatkarlarin Sosyal ve Ekonomik
Sorunlari Arastirmasi, 3 vols.,(Ankara: D.P.T. Yay. No. 975,
1971), vol. I., p. 12.
2. Ibid., p. 11.
3. Ibid., p. 11.
4. Turkish petty producers are intimidated by impersonal and written official-
like documents. I presume this stems from the traditional relation
between the State and petty producers. Officials and official-like
documents have always meant harassement over tax and labor issues. Taxes
collected from petty producers were returned to them in the form of their
increased policing.
5. Devlet Planlama Teskilati (SPO), Turkiye'de Esnaf ve Kucuk Sanatkar
Sayilari, (Ankara: DPT. Yay. No. 991, 1970), pp. 3-5
6. Idem., Esnaf ve Sanatkarlarin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Sorunlari Arastirmasi,
3 vols., (Ankara: D.P.T. Yay. No. 975, 1971), vol. II., p.31.
15.3 per cent of the workers in petty production firms in Gaziantep
were found illiterate. Furthermore, if we consider the nature of secondary
industrial labor markets, it becomes clear that craft and detail workers
will be more reluctant to respond to an official-like written survey
than petty producers.
7. This problem does not emerge with the smaller and larger petty producers.
The former think they do not have much to lose, and the latter hope to
attract attention to their business problems. For example, in Eskisehir
many middle-sized stove makers declined to cooperate, but smaller ones
were eager to complain about their situation, and the bigger ones were
proud to talk about their businesses.
8. Petty producers strongly despise officials disguised as social researchers,
journalists, and plain customers. Petty producers in Eskisehir frequently
complain about such information gathering techniques used by the officials.
Indeed, petty producers offer bribes and tell lies when they are
suspicious. But one method of information gathering that they hate is
the practice of being asked questions about their neighbors.
9. Devlet Planlama Teskilati (SPO), Turkiye'de Esnaf ve Kucuk Sanatkar
Sayilari, (Ankara: D.P.T. Yay. No. 991, 1970).
10. 'S.V.S. Sharma, S. Altikardes, E. Erim, Gaziantep Kucuk Sanayii, (Gaziantep:
mimeo. KUS-GEM report, 1970).
11. Imar ve Iskan Bakanligi (Ministry of Construction and Settlement), Gaziantep
Sanayi Calismasi, (Ankara: mimeo., 1965).
12. Tea houses were not the best place to contact petty producers. Usually,
petty traders and the marginally employed or the unemployed frequent the
tea-coffee houses in the petty production quarters. Petty producers
take breaks in their own shops if not in their neighbor's , and order
tea or coffee from the 'kahvehane's.
_
-385-
13. The following are the questions used in interviewing petty producers:
1. What is the proportion of repair work to production work done
during an average month?
2. What is the legal status of your establishment?
3. What kind of work are you preoccupied with?(only management;
management and supervision of workers; management, supervision
of workers and manual work)
4. Since when have you stopped being involved in manual work?
5. How old are you?
6. How many people do you look after?
7. How did you learn this trade?
8. Do you know how to read and write?
9. What kind of formal education did you go through?
10. Do you follow literature that relates to your work?
11. Which daily newspapers do you read?
12. How often do you go to the Mosque?
13. How often do you go to tea-coffee houses?
14. What are the occasions when you come together with fellow petty
producers?
15. Which parties did you vote for in the last two nation-wide
elections?
16. At which Association are you registered?
17. Why did you register?
18. Are you affiliated with a Cooperative?
19. Are you registered at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry?
20. Are you registered at BAG-KUR?
21. When did you start this business?
22. What were you doing before?
23. What were your father's and grandfather's occupations?
24. Why did you get into this trade?
25. How do you assess the future of your trade?
26. What are the dangers in the future of your trade?
27. If I would like to open and operate an establishment identical
to yours, and if I have enough cash and I know the trade, how
much do I have to invest in fixed and operating capitals?
28. How many new firms were opened in the same trade as yours during
the last two years?
29. How many were closed?
30. What are the unsuccessful petty producers and their workers doing
now?
31. From where did you get the initial capital?
32. Did you expand your business?
33. If you are thinking about expanding your business, how?; and
if you are not, why?
34. What did you invest in while expanding your business?
35. What kinds of problems did you encounter in finding credits?
36. What is the total horsepower of your machinery?
37. Do you have machinery produced in Turkey?
38. Do you need new machinery?
39. How much do you pay for electricity, fuel oil, coal and other
sources of energy during an average month?
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40. How much do you pay for rent?
41. Do you buy raw materials on credit?
42. What are the terms of credit?
43. From which towns do you purchase your raw material inputs?
44. Do you use imported raw materials?
45. From whom do you purchase ?(directly from producers, wholesale
merchants, retailers)
46. How small are the merchant firms you are involved with?
47. How often do you purchase raw materials? Do you have stocks?
48. How much raw material do you spend for a typical month's
production? What are the unit prices of the raw materials?
49. What kinds of problems do you have with merchants?
50. Do you receive production orders?
51. From whom?
52. Do you retail your own products?
53. Do you sell on credit?
54. Who buys wholesale from you?
55. From which towns do you receive production orders? How wide
is your market?
56. What do you think about your competitors?
57. How do you advertise?
58. How do you collect information on your competitors?
59. What do you think about the existing market conditions?
60. How many workers do you employ?
61. What are the ages of your workers?
62. How would you describe the division of work in your firm?
Who does what?
63. What kinds of problems do you have with your workers?
64. Do you intend to hire new workers this year?
65. During this year, how many workers left this firm? How many
were laid off? Why?
66. What do the workers do when out of employment in one firm?
67. Since how long are your current workers employed in your firm?
68. Is your firm operating at its full-capacity?
69. If it would be operating at its full-capacity, what would be
the percentage increase in the total production?
70. Why is it not operating at its full-capacity?
71. What is a typical weeks output? What is the unit price of your
output?
72. How much do you pay for your 'kalfa's, 'usta's, 'cirak's and
'ayakalti's or 'elalti's?
73. How many of your workers are registered at the Labor Office?
The following are the questions used in interviewing craft and detail
workers employed in petty production firms:
1. How old are you?
2. How, and how much are you paid?
3. How many people do you look after?
4. How long have you been working in this firm?
5. In which other places (firms and towns) have you worked prior
to this job?
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6. What was/is your father's and grandfather's occupations?
7. What was your wage when you first entered this firm?
8. How many hours do you work in a typical work day?
9. What are you paid for overtime?
10. Do you work on sundays and holidays?
11. Do you have paid leaves?
12. Why did you get into this trade?
13. How did you find this job?
14. What are your plans for the future?
15. How would you describe the division of work in this firm?
16. Who supervises your work?
17o If permitted, can you run a firm similar to this?
18. Are you registered at the Labor Office?
19. Which parties did you vote for in the last two nation-wide
elections?
20. What do you think about your relations with the 'boss', and
the conditions of work in this firm?
14. Eskisehir Esnaf ve Sanatkarlar Dernekleri Birligi (Petty Producers'
Associations' Union), Eskisehir Esnaf ve Sanatkar, (Weekly
Press Bulletin, mimeo.), 10 March 1975, p. 4-5.
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APPENDIX V
SELECTED DATA ON THE 43 WORKSHOPS AND 95 ARTISAN SHOPS SURVEYED
IN GAZIANTEP AND ESKISEHIR IN 1974-1975
1. Workshops
In Eskisehir 16 workshop operators are interviewed. The following
is a list of their occupations: 2 furniture makers, a cartwright, a tanner,
2 stove makers, 2 founders, a nickel plater, a lathe shop operator specialized
in agricultural equipment making, another lathe shop operator specialized
in machine tool making, a tinsmith, a metal furniture maker, a tire recapper,
a binder, and a printer. In Gaziantep, on the other hand, the workshops
of the following 27 petty producers are surveyed: 2 bakers, a confectioner,
a pit sawyer, a tanner, a shoe maker, a spinner, a dyer, 2 'kilim' makers,
a towel maker, 2 tricot makers, a tailor, a silk weaver, a steel-safe maker,
2 coppersmiths, a brass and aluminum founder, a founder and lathe operator,
a box-spring maker, an ironsmith, 2 lathe operators, a plastic bag maker,
a printer,and a 'yun ve kil tarakci'.
TABLE WS-1
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKSHOP OPERATORS BY AGE GROUPS
No. Of Workshop No. Of Workshop
Age Groups Operators in Operators in
Eskisehir Gaziantep
29 and below - 5
30-39 3 5
40-49 7 12
50 and over 6 5
TOTAL 16 27
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TABLE WS-2
LITERACY AND SCHOOLING AMONG WORKSHOP OPERATORS
No. Of Workshop No. Of Workshop
Literacy and Schooling Operators in Operators in
Eskisehir Gaziantep
Illiterate - 3
Literate (self-taught) 4
Primary school education 11 11
Secondary school education 3 8
Higher-vocational education 2 1.
TOTAL 16 27
TABLE WS-3
VOCATIONAL TRAINING OF WORKSHOP OPERATORS
No. Of Workshop No. Of Workshop
Training Operators in Operators in
Eskisehir Gaziantep
Apprenticeship 14 23
No Apprenticeship (vocational
school, transfer from other
occupations such as trading) 2 4
TOTAL 16 27
TABLE WS-4
MOSQUE AND COFFEE-SHOP ATTENDANCE AMONG WORKSHOP OPERATORS
No, Of Workshop Operators No. Of Workshop Operators
Frequency in Eskisehir in Gaziantep
Mosque Coffee-shop Mosque Coffee-shop
Never 1 8 5 11
Once or twice a year 7 - 3 -
Once or twice a week 7 5 12 7
Once or twice a day 1 2 5 4
3-5 times a day - 5
No answer -1 1 -
TOTAL 16 16 27 27
w
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TABLE WS-5
NEWSPAPERS READ BY WORKSHOP OPERATORS
No. Of Workshop No. Of Workshop
Newspapers Operators in Operators in
Eskisehir Gaziantep
None 1 4
'Only local newspapers
Only 'Milliyet' 1 3
Only 'Cumhuriyet' 2 1
Only 'Hurriyet' 5 3
Only 'Gunaydin' - 1
Only 'Tercuman' 2 2
Only 'Son Havadis' 1-
More than one newspaper 5* 11*
No answer I
TOTAL 16 27
(*) (M,T),(H,T),(H, T),(H,T),(C,M.
(00) (H,T), (H,T),(M,local),(H,T),(H,G), (H ,T),(H,local),(C,M,local)
(MHlocal) _(C,M).
TABLE WS-6
VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF WORKSHOP OPERATORS IN THE LAST TWO ELECTIONS
No. Of Workshop Operators No. Of Workshop Operators
Parties in Eskisehir in Gaziantep
1969 1973 1969 1973
Did not vote 3 - 7 4
AP 3 4 8 3
CHP 5 9 9 12
DP 3 - I I
GP - - - 3
MSP - 1 - 1
MHP - - - 1
No answer 2 2 2 2
TOTAL 16 16 27 27
AP, ,Adalet Partisi (The Justice Party)
CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (The Republican Peoples' Party)
DP, Demokratik Parti (The Democratic Party)
GP, Guven Partisi (The Reliance Party)
MSP, Milli Selamet Partisi (The National Salvation Party)
MHP, Milli Hareket Partisi (The National Action Party)
ii i- i- i-
- - --
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TABLE WS-7
MEMBERSHIP OF WORKSHOP OPERATORS AT INSTITUTIONS
No. Of Workshop No. Of Workshop
Institutions Operators in Operators in
Eskisehir Gaziantep
Petty Producers'
Associations 13 23
Petty Producers'
Credit Cooperatives 12 24
Chamber of Commerce and
Industry in Gaziantep,
and Chamber of Commerce
in Eskisehir 6 16
Other Cooperatives 7 13
TABLE WS-8
WORKSHOP OPERATORS' PERSPECTIVE OF THE FUTURE OF THE TRADE
No. Of Workshop No. Of Workshop
Rating Operators in Operators in
Eskisehir Gaziantep
Good, Excellent 14 21
Middling - 3
Not promising, Bleak 2 3
TOTAL 16 27
TABLE WS-9
WORKSHOP OPERATORS' FATHERS' AND GRANDFATHERS' OCCUPATION
No. Of Workshop Operators No. Of Workshop Operators
Occupation in Eskisehir in Gaziantep
Father Grandfather Father Grandfather
Peasant 3 7 5 6
Petty trader, Trader 4 3 3 1
(Government official and
Employee, and Worker) 3 2 1
Petty Producer 5 2 19 15
No answer 1 2 4
TOTAL 16 16 27 27
J
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TABLE WS-10
WORKSHOP OPERATORS' REASON FOR CHOOSING THE TRADE
No. Of Workshop No. Of Workshop
Reasons Operators in Operators in
Eskisehir Gaziantep
Money 12 14
Father's Trade 3 13
No answer 1
TOTAL 16 27
TABLE WS-11
THE PERIOD WHEN THE WORKSHOP WAS OPENED
No. Of Workshops No. Of Workshopsin Eskisehir in Gaziantep
Pre 1940 1
1940-1949 1 4
1950-1959 6 9
1960-1969 6 10
1970 -1975 2 4
TOTAL 16 27
TABLE WS-12
SOURCES OF FUNDS AT THE INITIAL OPENING OF THE WORKSHOP
No. Of Workshop No. Of Workshop
Source of initial Operators in Operators in
Fund Eskisehir Gaziantep
Own savings 11 14
Borrowed from friends
and relatives 5 7
Sold property 1 3
Inherited, or gift
from father 6 8
Credit from a Bank 2 4
Partnership 4
Borrowed from merchants 1 3
J _· ss--~--~-------------------
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TABLE WS-13
SOURCES OF FUNDS IN EXPANDING THE WORKSHOP
No. Of Workshop No. Of Workshop
Source, of Fund Operators in Operators in
Eskisehir Gaziante p
Earnings 11 18
Bank Credits 9 13
Borrowings from Merchants - 2
Other 1 4
TABLE WS-14
DESIGNATIONS OF FUNDS IN EXPANDING THE WORKSHOP
No. Of Workshop No. Of Workshop
Designation of Fund Operators in Operators in
Eskisehir Gaziantep
Investments in Machinery 12 18
Expanding Capacity 8 8
Investments in Building 4 4
Increases in Employment - 5
Other I
TABLE WS-15
TOTAL CAPITAL OUTLAY IN WORKSHOPS ('000 TL.)
ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Outlay No. Of Average Total No. Of Average Total
Workshops Capital Workshops Capital
Less than 50 1 38 2 32
50-99 1 90 4 59
100-499 3 227 10 219
500-999 5 664 6 630
1000 and above 6 1696 5 2260
16 27
-394-
TABLE WS-16
FIXED CAPITAL OUTLAY IN WORKSHOPS ('000 TL.)
ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Fixed Capital No. Of Average Fixed No, Of Average Fixed
Outlay Workshops Capital Workshops Capital
Less than 50 1 30 8 21
50-99 6 65 3 63
100-499 1 150 9 199
500-999 2 565 5 520
1000 and above 6 1583 2 2500
16 27
TABLE WS-17
VARIABLE CAPITAL NECESSARY TO OPERATE A WORKSHOP ('000 TL.)
Variable ESKISEHiR GAZIANTEP
Capital No. Of Average Variable No. Of Average Variable
outlay workshops Capital Workshops Capital
Less than 50 2 14 9 24
50-99 - - 3 53
100-499 5 180 9 214
500-999 3 500 3 500
1000 and above 6 2250 3 1333
16 27
TABLE WS-18
MECHANICAL POWER UTILIZED IN WORKSHOPS (in Horsepowers)
ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
No, Of Average Hps No, Of Average Hps
Horsepowers Workshops Utilized Workshops Utilized
None 1 - 3 -
LesS than 5 3 3 5 3
5-9 1 9 6 6
10-14 3 10 4 10
15 and above 8 49 9 33
16 27
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TABLE WS-19
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS IN WORKSHOPS BY AGE GROUPS
ESKISEHIR' GAZIANTEPAge No. Of No. Of No. Of No. Of
Gros Journeymen Apprentices Journeymen Apprentices
9-14 - 7 - 64
15-19 7 21 46 38
20-24 19 2 45 1
25-29 38 - 39
30 and above 26 - 42 -
TOTAL 90 30 172 103
(*) One workshop operator, a stove maker, refused to supply information
on workers in his firm.
TABLE WS-20
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKSHOPS BY THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WORKERS
No Of Workrs No. Of Workshops No. Of Workshops
No Of Workers in Eskisehir in Gasiantep
1-3 4 1
4-6 6 7
7-10 1 10
11-15 1 4
16-20 3 4
21-30 - 1
TOTAL 150 27
(*) One workshop operator refused to supply information on workers in
his firm.
TABLE WS-21
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKSHOPS BY THE NUMBER OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES
No. OfJoeymen ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEPJouieymen
and Apprentices Journeymen Apprentices Journe••ymen Apprentices
Noae - 3 1 4
1-3 9 10 4 11
4-6 1 1 13 8
7-10 2 1 4 3
11-15 1 - 3 116-20 2 - 2 -
TOTAL 15' 15* 27 27
(*) One workshop operator did not supply information on workers in his firm.
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TABLE WS-22
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS BY THE SIZE OF MONTHLY WAGES
Wages ESKISEHIR* GAZIANTEP
in TL. Journeymen Apprentices Journeymen Apprentices
Below 200 3 11
200-399 -14 - 45
400-599 1 7 2 26
600-749 1 6 5 21
750-999 12 33 -
1000-1200 63 - 102 -
Above 1200 13 - 30 -
90 30 172 103
(*) One workshop operator did not supply information on workers in his firm.
TABLE WS-23
VALUE OF RAW MATERIALS USED ('000 TL. per Month)
ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Value Of Raw No. Of Average Value No. Of Average Value
Materials Workshops of Raw Materials Workshops of Raw Materials
Used used used
Less than 1 - - 1 0.6
1-9 2 5 4 5
10-49 10 26 10 23
50-99 - 2 61
100-499 3 183 7 187
500 and above - 3 657
15* 27
(') One workshop operator did not supply information
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TABLE WS-24
MONTHLY EXPENDITURES ON UTILITIES AND FUEL
Amount Of ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Expenditures No. Of Average No. Of Average
TL./Month Workshops Expenditure Workshops Expenditure
Less than 500 8 201 12 234
500-599 1 750 5 560
1000-1999 2 1375 7 1514
2000 and above 4 3283 3 2833
15* 27
(') One Petty producer did not supply information.
TABLE WS-25
RENT PAID
Rent ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
TL./Month No. Of Average No. Of Average
Workshops Rent Workshops Rent
Less than 500 - - 5 390
500-999 5 640 7 669
1000-1999 2 1200 7 1271
2000 and above 2 4250 1 3000
Pays no Rent, owns
the Shop 6 - 7 -
150 27
(*) One petty producer did not supply information.
TABLE WS-26
MONTHLY SALES ('000 TL.)
ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEPAmount of
Sales (o000 TL.) No. Of Average No. Of Average
Sales ('000 TL.) Workshops Sales Workshops Sales
Less than 50 7 34 12 27
50-99 4 78 3 72.5
100-499 3 217 8 233
500-999 - - 1 600
1000 and more 1 1500 3 1067
15* 27
(*) One petty producer did not supply information.
3
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2. Artisan Shops
In Eskisehir 47 artisans are interviewed. The following is a list
of their occupations: 2 carpenters, a furniture maker, an upholsterer,
2 shoe makers, a 'fora-frezeci', a 'sayaci', a saddler, a tanner,
3 tailors, a quilt maker, a plaiter, 2 stove makers, a founder, 2 iron-
smiths ('soguk demirci'), a ironsmith ('sicak-soguk demirci'), a locksmith,
a tinsmith ('kalayci'), 5 lathe shop operators, an auto-repairer, an auto-
radiator repairer, an auto-body repairer, an auto body repairer-welder, a
'karoserci', an exhaust pipe maker-repairer, an auto-upholsterer, an auto-
electrician, a tire recapper, 3 meerschaum pipe makers, 2 pipe stem and
other part makers, a printer, a radio assambler-repairer, a coil maker, a
clock repairer, and a bicycle and motorcycle repairer. In Gaziantep the
businesses of the following 48 artisans are surveyed: a 'baklava' maker,
a yogurt maker, a salt miller, a carpenter, a wooden chair maker, a pack-
saddle maker, a sieve maker, another carpenter ('agac tornacisi'), a tanner
('postcu'), a traditional shoe (yemeni) maker, a 'sayaci', a 'fora-frezeci',
a cobbler, a 'cozgucu', a dyer, an 'atki' maker, a 'caput kilim' maker, a
silk weaver, a tailor, a cap maker, a shirt maker, an ironsmith ('sicak
demirci'), another ironsmith ('sicak-soguk demirci'), a stove maker, a
founder, a steel-safe maker, an aluminum kitchen ware maker, a coppersmith,
2 lathe shop operators, 2 auto-repairers, a motorcycle and bicycle repairer,
2 auto-body repairers, a 'karoserci', an auto-glass mounter, an auto-
electrician, an auto painter, an auto-upholsterer, an exhaust pipe maker-
repairer, 2 photographers, a sign maker, a clock repairer, 2 gun repairers,
and a coil maker.
L W
TABLE AR-I
DISTRIBUTION OF ARTISANS BY AGE GROUPS
Age Groups No. of Artisans Ni
Age Groups in Eskisehir i
o. Of Artisans
n Gaziantep
29 and below 11 16
30-39 21 12
40-49 7 13
50 and over 8 7
TOTAL 47 48
TABLE AR-2
LITERACY AND SCHOOLING AMONG ARTISANS
Literacy and Schooling No. Of Artisans No. Of Artisans
Literacy and Schooling in Eskisehir in Gaziantep
Illiterate 1 8
Literate (self-taught) 4 4
Primary school education 23 29
Secondary school education 14 7
Higher-vocational education 5 21
TOTAL 47 48
TABLE AR-3
VOCATIONAL TRAINING OF ARTISANS
No. Of Artisans No. Of Artisans
Training in Eskisehir in Gaziantep
Apprenticeship 45 44
No Apprenticeship (vocational
school, transfer from other
occupations such as trading) 2 4
TOTAL 47 48
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TABLE AR-4
MOSQUE AND COFFEE-SHOP ATTENDANCE AMONG ARTISANS
No. Of Artisans in No. Of Artisans in
Frequency Eskisehir Gaziantep
Mosque Coffee-shop Mosque Coffee-shop
Never 6 32 9 18
Once or twice a year 18 8 1
Once or twice a week 18 11 20 15
Once or twice a day 2 4 2 10
3-5 times a day 3 9 4
TOTAL 47 47 48 48
Newspapers
TABLE AR-5
NEWSPAPERS READ BY ARTISANS
No. Of Artisans
in Eskisehir
No. Of Artisans
in GazianteD
None
Any newspaper, occasionally
Only local newspapers
Only 'Milliyet'
Only 'Cumhuriyet'
Only 'Hurriyet'
Only 'Gunaydin'
Only 'Tercuman'
More than one newspaper
TOTAL
14
6*
47
3
130*
48
(*) (H,T), (H,T), (T,G),(T,G),(T,G),(T,H,M)
(*") (Local,M), (Local,M), (Local,H),(Local,H),(Local,H),(Local,H),(H.M),
(H,M),(H,M),(M,T),(Local,M,C),(M,H,T) ,(M,C)
-- -- -- 
_ [ I i i . . . 1 I
-· · Y ·
- -- -- - -- - -
-- ----
ii L
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TABLE AR-6
VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF ARTISANS IN THE
ELECTIONS
LAST TWO
No. Of Artisans in No. Of Artisans in
Parties Eskisehir Gaziantep
1969 1973 1969 1973
Did not vote 13 7 17 12
AP 16 16 11 3
CHP 8 15 17 24
DP 3 1 2 2
GP - - I
MSP - 2
MHP 1 1 - I
Independent - 2
No answer 6 6 1 1
TOTAL 47 47 48 48
AP, Adalet Partisi (The Justice Party)
CHP, Cuhuriyet Halk Partisi (The Republican Party)
DP, Demokratik Parti (The Democratic Party)
GP, Guven Partisi (The Reliance Party)
MSP, Milli Selamet Partisi (The National Salvation Party)
MHP, Milli Hareket Partisi (The National Action Party)
TABLE AR-7
MEMBERSHIP OF ARTISANS AT INSTITUTIONS
No. Of Artisans No. Of Artisans
Institutions in Eskisehir in Gaziantep
Petty Producers'
Associations 46 45
Petty Producers'
Credit Cooperatives 17 20
Chamber of Commerce and
Industry in Gaziantep, and
Chamber of Commerce in
Eskisehir 3 1
Other Cooperatives 6 9
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TABLE AR-8
ARTISANS' PERSPECTIVE OF THE FUTURE OF THE TRADE
Rating No. of Artisans in No,Of Artisans in
Rating Eskisehir Gaziantep
Good, Excellent
Middling
Not promisinc, Bleak
TOTAL
TABLE AR-9
ARTISANS' FATHERS' AND GRANDFATHERS' OCCUPATION
No. Of Artisans in No.Of Artisans in
Occupation Eskisehir Gaziantep
Father Grandfather Father Grandfather
Peasant 16 27 10 23
Petty trader, Trader 6 4 9 8
(Government official
and employee, and Worker) 9 3 9 -
Petty producer 16 4 20 10
Does not know - 9 - 7
TOTAL 47 47 48 48
TABLE AR-10
ARTISANS' REASON FOR CHOOSING THE TRADE
Reasons No. Of Artisans in No. Of Artisans in
Eskisehir Gaziantep
Money 36 41
Father's Trade 11 7
TOTAL 47 48
__ ·
"
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TABLE AR-11
THE PERIOD WHEN THE ARTISAN SHOP WAS OPENED
Period No. Of Artisan Shops No. Of Artisan Shopsin Eskisehir in Gaziantep
Pre 1940 2 1
1940-1949 2 4
1950-1959 6 9
1960-1969 21 14
1970-1975 16 20
TOTAL 47 48
TABLE AR-12
SOURCES OF FUNDS AT THE INITIAL OPENING OF THE ARTISAN SHOP
Source of initial No. Of Artisans in No. Of Artisans in
Fund Eskisehir Gaziantep
Own savings 23 30
Borrowed from friends
and relatives 13 19
Sold property 2 8
Inherited, or gift
from father 20 14
Credit from a Bank 3 4
Partnership 2 5
Borrowed froa merchants 4 2
TABLE AR-13
SOURCES OF FUNDS IN EXPANDING THE ARTISAN SHOP
No. Of Artisans in No. Of Artisans in
Soue oEskisehir Gaziantep
Earnings 29 25
Bank Credits 10 11
Borrowings from Merchants 2 4
Other 4
W
DESIGNATIONS OF
Designation of Fund
TABLE AR-14
FUNDS IN EXPANDING THE ARTISAN SHOP
No. Of Artisans in No. Of Artisans in
Eskisehir GazianteD
Investments in Machinery 24 19
Expanding Capacity 15 13
Investments in Building 4 2
Increases in Employment 4 4
TABLE AR-15
TOTAL CAPITAL OUTLAY IN ARTISAN SHOPS ('000 TL.)
Total Capital ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Outlay No. Of Average Total No. Of Average TotalArtisan Shops Capital Artisan Shops Capital
Less than 10 4 5 8 4
10-24 4 15 11 18
25-49 5 30 10 34
50-99 13 69 8 53
100-499 18 177 9 187
500 and above 3 935 2 645
47 48
TABLE AR-16
FIXED CAPITAL OUTLAY IN ARTISAN SHOPS ('000 TL.)
Fixed Capital ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Outlay No. Of Average Fixed No. Of Average Fixed
Artisan Shops Capital Artisan Shops Capital
Less than 10 8 4 11 3
10-24 9 13 15 16
25-49 7 27 12 33
50-99 13 62 4 55
100-499 7 163 5 128
500 and above 3 917 1 500
47 48
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TABLE AR-17
VARIABLE CAPITAL NECESSARY TO OPERATE AN ARTISAN SHOP ('000 TL.)
Variable ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Capital No. Of Average No. Of Average
Outlay Artisan Shops variable Artisan Shops Variable
capital capital
Less than 10 15 1 25 2
10-24 5 13 10 17
25-49 6 38 3 33
50-99 15 59 4 66
100-499 6 150 5 150
500 and above - 1 500
47 48
TABLE AR-18
MECHANICAL POWER UTILIZED IN ARTISAN SHOPS (In Horsepowers)
ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
No. Of Average Hps No. Of Average Hps.Horsepower Artisan Utilized Artisan Utilized
Shops Shops
None 10 - 16 -
Less than 5 25 1.4 24 1.9
5-9 7 7 3 6
10-14 2 12 3 11
15 and over 3 32 2 20
47 48
TABLE AR-19
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS IN ARTISAN SHOPS BY AGE GROUPS
ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
No. Of No. Of No. Of No. Of
Journeymen Apprentices Journeymen Apprentices
9-14 - 26 - 55
15-19 11 32 31 17
20-24 9 2 18
25-30 8 - 3
30 and above 4 - 6 -
TOTAL 32 60 58 72
_ ~
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TABLE AR-20
DISTRIBUTION OF ARTISAN SHOPS BY THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WORKERS
No. Of Artisan Shops No. Of Artisan ShopsNoe Of workirs Es•isehir in Gasiantep
None 10 13
1-3 29 16
4-6 7 17
7-10 1 2
11-15 - -
TOTAL 47 48
TABLE AR-21
DISTRIBUTION OF ARTISAN SHOPS BY THE NUMBER OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES
NO. Of ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEPJourneymen
and Apprentices Journeymen Apprentices Journeymen Apprentices
None 28 18 18 16
1-3 18 28 26 27
4-6 - 4 5
7-10 1 - -
TOTAL 47 47 48 48
TABLE AR-22
DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS BY THE SIZE OF M~0THLY WAGES
Wages ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
in TL. Journeymen Apprentices Journeymen Apprentices
Below 200 - 22 32
200-399 1 25 - 25
400-599 3 7 12
600-749 5 5 9 -
750-999 13 1 15 3
1000-1200 8 - 19 -
Above 1200 2 - 15 -
TOTAL 32 60 58 72
___
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TABLE AR-23
VALUE OF RAW MATERIALS USED ( TL. per Month)
Value of Raw ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
No, Of Average Value No. of Average ValueMaterials Adtisan of Raw Materials Artisan of Raw Materials
U .se Shops Used Shops Used
Less than 500 9 97 8 193
500-999 3 500 5 660
1000-4999 17 2227 18 1783
5000-9999 3 6333 6 6307
10000-49999 14 22643 8 25150
50000 and above 1 60000 3 89333
47 48
TABLE AR-24
MONTHLY EXPENDITURES ON UTILITIES AND FUEL
Amount of ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Expenditures No. Of Average No. Of Average
TL./Month Artisan Expenditure Artisan Expenditure
Shops Shops
Less than 100 28 46 35 34
100-499 18 189 9 180
500-999 1 600 1 500
1000 and above - - 3 1258
47 48
TABLE AR-25
RENT PAID
ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Rent No. Of Average No. Of Average
TL./Month Artisan Rent Artisan Rent
Shops Shops
Less than 200 4 106 3 80
200-499 15 330 24 318
500-999 12 550 8 550
1000 and above 5 1240 7 1200
Pays no Rent, owns the
the Shop 11 - 6 ,
47 48
-408-
TABLE AR-26
MONTHLY SALES ('000 TL. )
ESKISEHIR GAZIANTEP
Amount of No. Of Average No. Of Average
Sales( '000 Ti.) Artisan Sales Artisan Sales
Shops Shops
Less than 5 14 3 13 3
5-9 9 7 15 6
10-49 20 23 15 25
50-99 3 53 3 68
100 and above 1 180 2 140
47 48
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